People of the Philippines and Sps. Amado and Teresa Rubite vs. Hon. Filomeno A. Vergara, et al.

Double jeopardy bars refiled criminal charges where the original cases were dismissed upon the prosecutor's motion after reinvestigation, because the accused's motion for reinvestigation is not express consent to dismissal and the lack of notice and hearing on the prosecutor's motion to dismiss is a mere irregularity that does not invalidate the dismissal or deprive the court of jurisdiction.

The Rubite spouses were the complaining witnesses in two frustrated murder cases against Leonardo Salde, Sr. and his co-accused, while the provincial fiscal initially directed the prosecution. After the fiscal's reinvestigation, the Secretary of Justice took a contrary position and ordered the charges refiled, setting up the accused's claim that the refiled Informations violated the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy under Section 21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The case therefore required the Supreme Court to reconcile the fiscal's control and discretion over criminal prosecutions with the accused's right not to be twice put in jeopardy.

On 7 April 1988, 3rd Asst. Provincial Fiscal Luis E. Estiller of Puerto Princesa City filed Criminal Cases Nos. 7396 and 7397 for frustrated murder against Leonardo Salde, Sr., Leonardo Salde, Jr., Floresita Salde, Gloria Salde-Panaguiton, and Jojeta Panaguiton. The Informations alleged that the accused conspired in attacking and taking turns in assaulting the spouses Teresa and Amado Rubite: in one case, by throwing stones at Amado and hacking him with a bladed weapon, hitting him on the left fronto-parietal area, which would have caused his death (Crim. Case No. 8572 / G.R. No. 101557); in the other, by striking Teresa with wood and stones and hacking her with a bolo, which would have caused her death (Crim. Case No. 8573 / G.R. No. 101558). On 3 June 1988, Leonardo Salde, Sr., Leonardo Salde, Jr., Floresita Salde, and Gloria Salde-Panaguiton were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. On 2 August 1988, Jojeta Panaguiton was also arraigned and pleaded not guilty.

On 19 September 1988, when the cases were initially called for trial, the Prosecuting Fiscal and counsel for the accused jointly moved to suspend the hearing pending the outcome of the accused's motion for reinvestigation. Provincial Fiscal Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. later resolved the reinvestigation in favor of the accused. On 12 December 1988, counsel for the offended parties gave notice to the Provincial Fiscal of their intention to appeal the resolution to the Department of Justice. On 2 February 1989, while the appeal to the Department of Justice was pending, Provincial Fiscal Gacott moved to dismiss the cases on the ground that the reinvestigation disclosed that the Rubite spouses were the real aggressors and that the accused had only acted in self-defense. On 9 February 1989, the Regional Trial Court of Palawan, Br. 52, acting on the Provincial Fiscal's motion, ordered the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. 7396 and 7397.

Thereafter, on 1 March 1990, the Secretary of Justice ordered the Provincial Prosecutor to refile the Informations. On 6 April 1990, Acting Provincial Prosecutor Clarito A. Demaala filed two new Informations for frustrated murder against the same accused, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 8572 and 8573. On 13 May 1991, after pleading not guilty to the new Informations, the accused moved to quash on the ground of double jeopardy. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor opposed the motion. On 10 July 1991, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 8572 and 8573. The motion for reconsideration filed by Acting Provincial Prosecutor Demaala was denied on 16 August 1991. The Rubite spouses then filed the present petition for certiorari.

The original Informations were valid, filed before a competent court, and the accused had been arraigned and had pleaded not guilty. The only remaining question was whether the cases against them were dismissed with their express consent.

• Express Consent: Petitioners contended that the filing of the new Informations did not place the accused in double jeopardy because the dismissal of the original cases was made with the accused's express consent, which could be equated with their motion for reinvestigation, dismissal being their ultimate intention in moving for reinvestigation.
• Void Dismissal for Lack of Notice: Petitioners submitted that the dismissal of the original cases was null and void because the Provincial Prosecutor's motion to dismiss did not contain a notice of hearing, rendering it a "mere scrap of paper" that the lower court should not even have entertained.
• Denial of Due Process: Petitioners maintained that where the prosecution has been deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to due process is violated.
• Solicitor General's Concurrence: The Solicitor General concurred, citing Gumabon vs. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, and argued that the order granting the motion to dismiss without notice and hearing violated basic constitutional rights and ousted the trial court of jurisdiction, so the first jeopardy never terminated; the new Informations should have been refiled in the original cases, and their filing merely continued the first jeopardy.

• Express Consent Not Given: Private respondents, invoking the now repealed Section 9, Rule 117, Rules of Court, argued that the rules speak of "EXPRESS CONSENT," which cannot be equated with intention; while they may have intended dismissal in moving for reinvestigation, they never gave express consent and never sought dismissal of the charges.
• Belated Challenge/Waiver: They argued that if the dismissal orders were null and void, petitioners should not have waited for the filing of the new Informations and their subsequent quashal; having slept on their rights, petitioners cannot belatedly claim denial of due process.

• Express Consent: Whether private respondents gave their express consent to the dismissal of the original Informations.
• Invalid Termination of First Jeopardy: Whether the first jeopardy was invalidly terminated.

• Express Consent: No. Express consent must be directly given viva voce or in writing and must be positive, direct, and unequivocal; a motion for reinvestigation is not express consent to dismissal. Thus the dismissal was without express consent.
• Invalid Termination of First Jeopardy: No. The first jeopardy was not invalidly terminated. The absence of notice and hearing on the prosecutor's motion to dismiss did not render the dismissal void or deprive the court of jurisdiction; it was at most an irregularity, and the dismissal order became final. All requisites of double jeopardy concurred, so double jeopardy barred the refiled cases.

• Express Consent: The right against double jeopardy prohibits any subsequent prosecution of any person for a crime of which he has previously been acquitted or convicted, and it aims to set the effects of the first prosecution forever at rest. Under Que vs. Cosico, double jeopardy attaches when there is (a) a valid complaint or information, (b) a court of competent jurisdiction, (c) the accused has pleaded to the charge, and (d) the accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case dismissed or terminated without the express consent of the accused. Here, valid Informations for frustrated murder were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Palawan, a court of competent jurisdiction, and the accused were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. The only remaining question was whether the cases were dismissed with their express consent. Express consent is that which is directly given either viva voce or in writing; it is a positive, direct, unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication to supply its meaning. Private respondents merely moved for reinvestigation of the cases before the prosecutor. To equate this with express consent to the dismissal of the case in the lower court is to strain the meaning of "express consent" too far. There was no express consent of the accused when the prosecutor moved for the dismissal of the original Informations.

• Invalid Termination of First Jeopardy: The Solicitor General argued that there could be no valid defense of double jeopardy because the first jeopardy was not validly terminated, the motion to dismiss having lacked notice of hearing. The Court disagreed. While the general rule under Rule 15 is that motions should contain a notice of hearing, these cases presented an unusual situation where the motion to dismiss filed by the public prosecutor negated the necessity of a hearing. It was the public prosecutor himself who, after instituting Criminal Cases Nos. 7396 and 7397, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that reinvestigation showed that the evidence tilted in favor of the accused, that the Rubite spouses were the aggressors, and that the accused merely defended themselves, making prosecution unfair, arbitrary, and unjustified. The accused would not have opposed the motion, and the private complainants are precluded from questioning the fiscal's discretion in moving for dismissal. A hearing is necessary only in cases of contentious motions; the motion had ceased to be contentious, and a hearing would have been useless and futile. The order granting the motion to dismiss despite the absence of notice and hearing cannot be challenged in this petition for certiorari assailing the dismissal of the two cases on double jeopardy. Petitioners should have appealed the dismissal on the ground that the motion failed to include a notice of hearing, and should not have waited for the dismissal of the subsequent cases on double jeopardy and thereafter questioned the first dismissal, which had already become final. Once an Information is filed with the court, the court acquires jurisdiction over the case and the consequent discretion to dismiss it; while the prosecutor retains full control over the prosecution, he loses jurisdiction over the entire proceedings. The failure to give notice of a subsequent step after the court has obtained jurisdiction does not deprive the court of jurisdiction; it is merely an irregularity, correctable in the proper proceeding, and not an act without or in excess of jurisdiction. Thus, the first jeopardy was not invalidly terminated. The conditions for a valid defense of double jeopardy — (a) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (b) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (c) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first — were all present, so the defense of double jeopardy had to prevail.

• Double Jeopardy — Requisites — Under Que vs. Cosico, double jeopardy attaches when the following concur: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a court of competent jurisdiction; (c) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (d) the accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case dismissed or terminated without the express consent of the accused. The concurrence of all these circumstances bars a second prosecution for the same offense, an attempt to commit it, a frustration of it, or any offense necessarily included in or necessarily including the first offense charged. In this case, all requisites were present, so the refiled Informations were barred.
• Express Consent — Express consent is that which is directly given either viva voce or in writing. It is a positive, direct, unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication to supply its meaning. A mere motion for reinvestigation is not express consent to the dismissal of the criminal case. The Court applied this definition to hold that private respondents did not expressly consent to the dismissal of the original Informations.
• Fiscal's Control and Discretion — All criminal actions are under the direction and control of the fiscal. The public prosecutor has quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether a criminal case should be filed, whether a prima facie case exists, whether to include particular persons in the charge, what evidence to present, which witnesses to call, and whether to move for dismissal for insufficiency of evidence. Because the prosecuting officer instituted the cases and thereafter moved for their dismissal after reinvestigation, a hearing on his motion to dismiss was not necessary; a hearing is required only for contentious motions.
• Jurisdiction Over a Criminal Case After Information Filed — Once an Information is filed with the court, the court acquires jurisdiction over the case and the consequent discretion to dismiss it. While the prosecutor retains full control over the prosecution, he loses jurisdiction over the entire proceedings. The failure to give notice of a subsequent step after the court has obtained jurisdiction does not deprive the court of jurisdiction; it is merely an irregularity, not an act without or in excess of jurisdiction, and does not render the order void.
• Finality and Remedy — An order granting a motion to dismiss, even if erroneous, becomes final if not appealed. The remedy of an aggrieved party is to have the order set aside, to have the irregularity cured by the dismissing court, or to appeal from the dismissal order, and not certiorari. Petitioners could not collaterally attack the first dismissal in a certiorari petition assailing the later dismissal on double jeopardy.
• Nemo debet bis puniri pro uno delicto — No person can be twice put in peril for the same offense. The constitutional guarantee prohibits subsequent prosecution for a crime of which the accused has previously been acquitted or convicted, and its objective is to set the effects of the first prosecution forever at rest, assuring the accused that he shall not thereafter be subjected to the peril and anxiety of a second charge for the same offense.

• "Express consent has been defined as that which is directly given either viva voce or in writing. It is a positive, direct, unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication to supply its meaning." — This passage supplies the controlling definition of express consent for purposes of the double jeopardy exception; it is the basis for rejecting the argument that a motion for reinvestigation amounted to consent to dismissal.
• "To equate this with express consent of the accused to the dismissal of the case in the lower court is to strain the meaning of "express consent" too far. Simply, there was no express consent of the accused when the prosecutor moved for the dismissal of the original Informations." — This is the Court's application of the definition to the facts, and it is the ratio for finding that the dismissal was without express consent.
• "It has been repeatedly held that once an Information is filed with the court, it acquires jurisdiction over the case, and the consequent discretion to dismiss it. While the prosecutor retains full control over the prosecution, he loses jurisdiction over the entire proceedings." — This passage states the jurisdictional rule governing the trial court's authority after an Information is filed and explains why the prosecutor's motion to dismiss did not oust the court of jurisdiction.
• "The order of the court granting the motion to dismiss despite absence of a notice of hearing, or proof of service thereof, is merely an irregularity in the proceedings. It cannot deprive a competent court of jurisdiction over the case." — This is the Court's core holding that the lack of notice and hearing did not render the dismissal void, thereby allowing the first jeopardy to be considered validly terminated.

• Julia vs. Sotto, 2 Phil. 246, 252-253 (1903) — Quoted for the rationale of the double jeopardy guarantee: without the safeguard, the accused's fortune, safety, and peace of mind would be at the mercy of the complaining witness, who could repeat the accusation as often as dismissed.
• Que vs. Cosico, G.R. No. 81861, 8 September 1989, 177 SCRA 410 — Enumerates the requisites for double jeopardy; the Court applied these requisites and found all of them present in this case.
• People vs. Bocar, No. L-27935, 16 August 1985, 138 SCRA 166 — Cited by the Solicitor General for the requisites of a valid double jeopardy defense; the Court ultimately concluded that the conditions for double jeopardy were present.
• People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851 (1933) — Cited in the decision's footnote as not giving the fourth requisite prescribed by Que vs. Cosico; instead, it requires that the defendant should have pleaded to the complaint or information.
• Suarez vs. Platon, 69 Phil. 556, 564-565 (1940) — Quoted for the public prosecutor's role as a representative not of an ordinary party but of a sovereignty whose interest is that justice shall be done; the Court used this to support the fiscal's control and discretion over the prosecution.
• Gumabon vs. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, No. L-30026, 30 January 1971, 37 SCRA 420 — Cited by the Solicitor General for the argument that a violation of basic constitutional rights ousted the trial court of jurisdiction; the Court did not adopt this position.
• Pederanga vs. Drilon, G.R. No. 96080, 19 April 1991, 196 SCRA 86, citing Crespo vs. Mogul, G.R. No. 53373, 30 June 1987, 151 SCRA 462 — Cited for the rule that once an Information is filed, the court acquires jurisdiction over the case and the prosecutor loses jurisdiction over the entire proceedings.
• Caes vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. Nos. 74989-90, 6 November 1989, 179 SCRA 54 — Cited for the rule that a hearing is necessary only in cases of contentious motions, supporting the holding that the prosecutor's motion to dismiss did not require a hearing.

• Section 21, Article III, 1987 Constitution — Provides that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The Court applied this guarantee to bar the refiled Informations after the original cases were dismissed without the accused's express consent.
• Section 5, Rule 110, New Rules of Criminal Procedure — Provides that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be under the direction and control of the fiscal. The Court applied this provision to uphold the prosecutor's authority to move for dismissal and to hold that a hearing on his own motion to dismiss was unnecessary.
• Rule 15, Rules of Court — The general rule that motions should contain a notice of hearing. The Court recognized the rule but held that the prosecutor's motion to dismiss negated the necessity of a hearing because it had ceased to be contentious.
• Section 9, Rule 117, Rules of Court (now repealed) — Private respondents invoked this provision on express consent. The Court held that express consent cannot be equated with the accused's intention in moving for reinvestigation.

Justice Cruz, Justice Griño-Aquino, and Justice Quiason concurred.