People of the Philippines and Manuel Geromo vs. Hon. Gregorio Consulta and Lea B. Olaguer

The dismissal of a criminal complaint upon the accused's own motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense is not a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense, both because that ground is not among the exceptions in Section 8, Rule 117, and because the accused's act of seeking the dismissal operates as a waiver of the defense of double jeopardy.

Manuel Geromo was the borrower and complainant, and Lea B. Olaguer the lender and accused, in a transaction governed by the Usury Law (Act No. 2655), which fixes the maximum rate of interest chargeable on loans and penalizes usurious charges. The sufficiency of a complaint for its violation — specifically, whether the interest alleged exceeded the rate allowed for loans without security — became the point on which the first prosecution was dismissed. The People of the Philippines was subsequently impleaded as principal party petitioner.

On June 23, 1973, Manuel Geromo filed with the Municipal Court of Guinobatan, Albay a complaint, docketed as Criminal Case No. 4578, charging Lea B. Olaguer with violation of the Usury Law (Act No. 2655, Section 1 in relation to Section 19). The complaint alleged that in or about November 1972, at Guinobatan, Albay, Olaguer willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously lent money and goods to Geromo in the total sum of P560.00 and, after payment of P30.06 leaving a balance of P530.00, charged a usurious rate of interest of .03% per month for eight (81) months from November 1972 to June 1973, or a total of P607.20, to his damage and prejudice. It further alleged that by reason of the criminal act, Geromo suffered and would suffer damages of no less than P10,000.00, including attorney's fees and incidental expenses.

Upon arraignment, Olaguer pleaded not guilty and immediately moved orally to quash the complaint on the ground that it charged no offense. On July 17, 1973, pursuant to the order of the Municipal Court of Guinobatan, Albay, she filed a written motion to quash alleging that the allegations contained in the case, or the facts charged, did not constitute an offense under paragraph (e), Section 2, Rule 117 of the New Rules of Court. On January 31, 1974, the Municipal Court ordered the dismissal of the complaint against Olaguer. Geromo filed a motion for reconsideration of the order and/or a motion to reinstate or accept an amended complaint against her, but the motion was denied.

Geromo then filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of First Instance of Albay, docketed as Case No. 5003, assailing the Municipal Court's order dismissing the complaint. On June 7, 1974, the Court of First Instance of Albay dismissed the petition, although it made known to Geromo that another complaint could be filed against Olaguer in accordance with the provisions of Section 3, Rule 117. Ten days later, on June 17, 1974, Geromo filed with the same court another complaint for violation of the Usury Law against Olaguer, docketed as Criminal Case No. 4738.

The respondent Court dismissed the second complaint upon a motion to quash filed by Olaguer on the ground that its filing would place her in double jeopardy. Geromo's motion for reconsideration of that order was denied, prompting the present petition. The records showed that the first complaint was dismissed because the interest charged — described in the decision as .08% per month, or .36% — did not exceed the 14% allowed by the Usury Law for loans without security, so that the complaint on its face charged no offense.

• Finality of the Dismissal Order: Private respondent contended that petitioner had not questioned the decision of the Court of First Instance of Albay dismissing the petition for certiorari he had filed in Civil Case No. 5003, which assailed the order of the Municipal Court of Guinobatan, Albay dismissing the original complaint as well as the order denying the motion to reinstate or to accept the amended complaint; she concluded that the order of the Municipal Court dismissing the original complaint had become final.
• Laches: Private respondent claimed that the present suit suffered from laches because the order sought to be set aside dated back to November 24, 1974.
• Double Jeopardy (as sustained by the respondent Court): The respondent Court took the posture that the dismissal of the complaint in Criminal Case No. 4738 against private respondent was a bar to the subsequent filing of another complaint against her for the same offense on the ground that she would thereby be placed in double jeopardy.

• Double Jeopardy: Whether the quashal or dismissal of Criminal Case No. 4578 of the Municipal Court of Guinobatan, Albay, upon a motion to quash filed by private respondent, and the subsequent filing of another complaint (Criminal Case No. 4738) with the respondent Court against her for the same offense, placed private respondent in double jeopardy.
• Finality and Res Judicata: Whether the order of the Municipal Court of Guinobatan, Albay dismissing the original complaint became final and barred the prosecution of the second complaint upon the principle of res judicata.
• Laches: Whether the present suit was barred by laches.

• Double Jeopardy: No. The dismissal was grounded on the insufficiency of the allegations — that the facts charged did not constitute an offense — which is not among the exceptions in Section 8, Rule 117, and the first complaint was not sufficient in form and substance to support a conviction.
• Finality and Res Judicata: No. The order dismissing the first complaint was not a decision on the merits and therefore could not bar the second prosecution as res judicata; Rule 30, Section 3, on dismissals operating as adjudications on the merits, does not apply to criminal cases.
• Laches: No. Petitioner perfected his appeal from the order in question within the reglementary period, and the case was elevated to the Supreme Court on a question of law upon motion by the Provincial Fiscal; no laches attached.

• Double Jeopardy: The posture taken by the respondent Court — that the dismissal of the complaint in Criminal Case No. 4738 barred the subsequent filing of another complaint for the same offense on double jeopardy grounds — is wrong. The order sustaining the motion to quash was based on Section 2 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, on the ground that the facts charged in the complaint do not constitute an offense. Under Section 8 of Rule 117, an order sustaining a motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense unless the motion was based on the grounds specified in Section 2, subsections (f) and (h) of the same rule — that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished, or that the defendant has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted, or acquitted, of the offense charged. The ground relied upon by the Municipal Court of Guinobatan, Albay in dismissing the first complaint was not one of those exceptions. Neither was the criminal action or liability of the private respondent extinguished, nor had she been previously convicted or placed in jeopardy of conviction or acquittal, because the first complaint under which she was prosecuted did not allege facts constituting any offense. For the protection against double jeopardy to issue in favor of an accused, the following requisites must be present in the original prosecution: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a competent court; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against her was dismissed or terminated without her express consent. The complaint for violation of the Usury Law filed with the Municipal Court was not sufficient in form and substance to support a conviction; a mere reading of the first complaint readily showed its substantial defect, and on its face no violation of the Usury Law was committed because the interest charged did not exceed the 14% allowed by the Usury Law for loans without security. The complaint therefore charged no offense. Under People vs. Austria, if an information is dismissed and the accused is discharged on a demurrer or on petition of the fiscal or the accused, or on the court's own motion, because the information or complaint is either void or fatally defective, or when it does not charge the proper offense, such dismissal and the consequent discharge of the accused is not a bar to his prosecution for the same offense.
• Finality and Res Judicata: Private respondent contended that petitioner had not questioned the decision of the Court of First Instance of Albay dismissing the petition for certiorari in Civil Case No. 5003, and concluded that the order of the Municipal Court dismissing the original complaint was final. The order of the Municipal Court in Criminal Case No. 4578 dismissing the first complaint for usury was not a decision on the merits. Not being a decision on the merits, that order of dismissal could not bar the prosecution of the second complaint against private respondent for the same offense upon the principle of res judicata. In People vs. Bellosillo, the Court held that where an order dismissing a criminal case is not a decision on the merit, it cannot bar as res judicata a subsequent case based on the same offense. The provision of Rule 30, Section 3, to the effect that a dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits unless otherwise provided by the court, does not apply to criminal cases.
• Laches: Private respondent's claim that the present suit suffered from laches because the order sought to be set aside dated back to November 24, 1974, is untenable. In a general sense, laches is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. The record showed that petitioner had perfected his appeal from the order in question within the reglementary period; the lower court remanded the record of the case to the Court of First Instance of Albay, and the case was elevated to the Supreme Court on a question of law upon motion by the Provincial Fiscal. No laches attached to the present suit.

• Requisites of Double Jeopardy — For the protection against double jeopardy to issue in favor of an accused, the following requisites must be present in the original prosecution: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a competent court; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against her was dismissed or terminated without her express consent. In this case, the first complaint did not allege facts constituting any offense and was not sufficient in form and substance to support a conviction; the requisites were therefore absent, and the second prosecution was not barred.
• Effect of a Dismissal Based on the Insufficiency of the Complaint — Under Section 8, Rule 117, an order sustaining a motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense unless the motion was based on the grounds specified in Section 2, subsections (f) and (h) of the same rule — that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished, or that the defendant has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted, or acquitted, of the offense charged. The dismissal in this case rested on the ground that the facts charged did not constitute an offense, which is not among the exceptions; hence it did not bar the second complaint.
• Waiver of Double Jeopardy by Seeking Dismissal — When a criminal case is dismissed upon the express application of the defendant, the dismissal is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense, because the defendant's action in having the case dismissed constitutes a waiver of the constitutional prerogative against double jeopardy, as it prevents the court from proceeding to trial on the merits and rendering judgment of conviction. The quashing of the first complaint for insufficiency, as prayed for by private respondent, could not be used by her to plead that she had already been placed in jeopardy.
• Res Judicata in Criminal Cases — Where an order dismissing a criminal case is not a decision on the merit, it cannot bar as res judicata a subsequent case based on the same offense. The provision of Rule 30, Section 3, that a dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits unless otherwise provided by the court, does not apply to criminal cases.
• Laches — Laches is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. No laches attached where the petitioner perfected his appeal within the reglementary period and the case was elevated to the Supreme Court on a question of law upon motion by the Provincial Fiscal.

• "In order that the protection against double jeopardy may issue in favor of an accused Person, the following requisites must be present in the original Prosecution: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a competent court; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was dismiss or terminated without his express consent." — This is the Court's canonical enumeration of the requisites of double jeopardy, the analytical framework against which the absence of the first requisite (a valid complaint) was measured.
• "The act of private respondent in asking for the dismissal of the complaint against him operates as a waiver, of her defense of double jeopardy in the second prosecution for the same offense. When a criminal case is dismissed upon the express application of the defendant, the dismissal is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense because his action in having the case dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional prerogative against double jeopardy as he thereby prevents the court from proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering judgment of conviction against him." — This states the waiver doctrine, an independent ground, alongside the Section 8, Rule 117 exception, for rejecting the double jeopardy plea.
• "Where an order dismissing a criminal case is not a decision on the merit, it cannot bar as res judicata a subsequent case based on the same offense. Besides, the provision of Rule 30, Section 3 of the Rules of Court to the effect that a 'dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise provided by the court', does not apply to criminal cases." — Quoted from People vs. Bellosillo, this passage disposes of the finality and res judicata arguments and clarifies that the civil rule on dismissals has no application to criminal cases.
• "In a general sense, laches is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it." — This is the Court's definition of laches, applied to reject the claim that the petition was time-barred.

• People vs. Austria, 94 Phil. 897 — Controlling precedent for the rule that if an information is dismissed and the accused is discharged on a demurrer or on petition of the fiscal or the accused, or on the court's own motion, because the information or complaint is either void or fatally defective, or when it does not charge the proper offense, such dismissal and the consequent discharge of the accused is not a bar to prosecution for the same offense. Cited as the direct authority for rejecting the double jeopardy plea.
• People vs. Obsania, L-24447, June 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 1249 — Cited as authority for the requisites of double jeopardy and for the waiver doctrine; relied upon in the discussion of both the elements of the defense and the effect of the accused's own application for dismissal.
• People vs. Bellosillo, 9 SCRA 835 — Cited for the rule that where an order dismissing a criminal case is not a decision on the merit, it cannot bar as res judicata a subsequent case based on the same offense, and that Rule 30, Section 3 does not apply to criminal cases. Quoted directly in the decision.
• Sugay vs. Pamaran, 41 SCRA 260 — Cited, together with People vs. Obsania and People vs. Catolico, for the proposition that the quashing of the first complaint for insufficiency, as prayed for by the accused, cannot be used to plead jeopardy.
• People vs. Catolico, 38 SCRA 389 — Cited in the same line of authority supporting the waiver of the double jeopardy defense where the accused sought the dismissal.
• Flordelis vs. Castillo, 58 SCRA 303 — Cited, together with People vs. Obsania, People vs. Sy, and People vs. Togle, for the rule that when a criminal case is dismissed upon the express application of the defendant, the dismissal is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense because the defendant's action constitutes a waiver of the constitutional prerogative against double jeopardy.
• People vs. Sy, 30 SCRA 150 — Cited in the same line of authority on waiver of double jeopardy by express application for dismissal.
• People vs. Togle, 105 Phil. 126 — Cited in the same line of authority on waiver of double jeopardy by express application for dismissal.
• Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 32 SCRA 29 — Cited as authority for the definition of laches applied in rejecting private respondent's claim that the suit was time-barred.

• Section 1, Act No. 2655 (Usury Law), in relation to Section 19 — The Usury Law fixes the maximum rate of interest chargeable on loans and penalizes usurious charges; the complaint against private respondent was filed under this provision. The Court examined the allegations of the first complaint against this provision and concluded that no violation was committed because the interest charged did not exceed the 14% allowed for loans without security, so that the complaint charged no offense.
• Section 2, Rule 117, Rules of Court — Enumerates the grounds for a motion to quash. The first complaint was quashed on the ground that the facts charged did not constitute an offense. The Court noted that the ground relied upon by the Municipal Court was not among the exceptions in Section 8 of the same rule.
• Section 8, Rule 117, Rules of Court — Provides that an order sustaining a motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense unless the motion was based on the grounds specified in Section 2, subsections (f) and (h) of the same rule — that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished, or that the defendant has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted, or acquitted, of the offense charged. Because the dismissal was grounded on the insufficiency of the allegations, the exception did not apply and the second complaint was not barred.
• Section 3, Rule 117, Rules of Court — Referred to by the Court of First Instance of Albay when it made known to petitioner that another complaint could be filed against private respondent notwithstanding the dismissal of the certiorari petition; petitioner thereafter filed Criminal Case No. 4738.
• Section 3, Rule 30, Rules of Court — Provides that a dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits unless otherwise provided by the court. The Court held that this provision does not apply to criminal cases, so that the dismissal of the first complaint did not operate as res judicata.

Makasiar, Esguerra, and Muñoz Palma, JJ., concur. Teehankee (Chairman), concurs in the result.