People of the Philippines and Heirs of Esteban Lim Jr. vs. Presiding Judge of the RTC of Muntinlupa City and Ricardo Tobias

An order granting bail in a capital offense must contain a summary of the prosecution's evidence and the trial judge's assessment of whether the evidence of guilt is strong; absent that summary and assessment, the order is invalid for grave abuse of discretion. A prior conviction for illegal possession of firearms under PD 1866 does not bar a subsequent murder prosecution arising from the same killing, because the offenses are distinct and the requisites of double jeopardy are absent.

The People of the Philippines and the Heirs of Esteban Lim Jr. challenged orders of the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 276, granting bail to Ricardo Tobias in a murder case. Tobias had previously been convicted under PD 1866 for qualified illegal possession of firearm used in murder, and a separate murder charge for the same killing was pending. RA 8294 later amended PD 1866 by decriminalizing illegal possession when an unlicensed firearm is used in another crime and by treating such use as an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide. The murder trial had been transferred to the RTC of Muntinlupa City.

On October 5, 1990, Esteban Lim Jr., also known as Jojo, was shot and killed in Santiago, Isabela. Ricardo Tobias, also known as Ding Tobias, was charged on January 10, 1991 before the RTC of Santiago, Isabela, Branch 21, with "qualified illegal possession of firearm used in murder." The Information alleged that Tobias, not being authorized by law to keep, possess, or carry firearms, had in his possession and control a Browning pistol, Caliber 9MM, Serial No. RPT 3221943, without the necessary permit or license, and that on the occasion of such possession he shot Lim with evident premeditation and treachery, inflicting gunshot wounds that caused his death.

On January 11, 1994, the RTC found Tobias guilty as charged and sentenced him to life imprisonment. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed on January 30, 1997, with modifications consisting mainly of a change in the penalty from life imprisonment to reclusión perpetua, and directed the provincial prosecutor of Isabela to institute a criminal action for murder against Tobias. Unknown to the Supreme Court, as early as October 15, 1993, Tobias had already been charged with murder before the RTC of Santiago, Isabela; he was arraigned only on November 23, 1998.

RA 8294 was approved on June 6, 1997, amending PD 1866, for violation of which Tobias had been convicted earlier. Relying on RA 8294, Tobias filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus before the RTC of Muntinlupa City. On January 18, 1999, the Supreme Court resolved to transfer the venue of the murder trial from the RTC of Santiago, Isabela to the RTC of Muntinlupa City. On September 21, 2000, the trial court declared the habeas corpus petition moot and academic because Tobias was being validly detained for murder, a non-bailable offense, and no longer for illegal possession of firearms. Nonetheless, on the basis of the retroactive effect of RA 8294 provisions beneficial to the accused, the RTC reduced the penalty for illegal possession of firearms from reclusión perpetua to prisión correccional; having already served the reduced penalty, Tobias should have been freed from detention were it not for the murder charge. On January 26, 2001, the murder trial commenced.

On August 9, 2001, Tobias filed a Petition for Bail on the ground that evident premeditation had not been proven and that no ballistic report was submitted by the prosecution. Despite opposition, the trial court granted bail at ₱50,000 on September 26, 2001. The order stated that after evaluating the evidence and the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, it was shown that the victim was gunned down admittedly by the accused during a quarrel, or immediately soon after, with the quarrel still continuing. It also noted that Tobias had been sentenced for possession of a low-powered firearm to life imprisonment, but that with the amendment of the law on illegal possession of firearms, the court had granted him a reduction of the penalty in a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus to only six years imprisonment because a 9MM caliber firearm is considered a low caliber firearm under RA 8294; he had been in jail for eight years, eleven months, and fifteen days and had completed the service of his sentence. The court allowed him to post bail for the pending offense in light of the evidence adduced by the prosecution. On September 27, 2001, the RTC ordered his release from detention after he posted the required bail bond through Wellington Insurance Company, Inc. On November 7, 2001, the RTC denied the prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration.

The RTC's September 26, 2001 Order was one page and contained no summary of the prosecution's evidence and no conclusion on whether the evidence of guilt was strong. In the earlier Supreme Court Decision in GR No. 114185, treachery was found present because the attack was sudden against an unarmed victim; although a scuffle preceded the attack, it had already ended, the victim was chasing Giron with his attention turned toward the latter and his back against the accused, and the accused's shots were a complete surprise. The prosecution also presented eyewitnesses Pacita Recto and Clarita Lim, who both affirmed that Tobias had killed Lim.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioners averred that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it granted bail to private respondent, and they sought annulment of the September 26, 2001 Order, the September 27, 2001 Order of Release, and the November 7, 2001 Order.

• Double Jeopardy: Private respondent countered that he cannot be tried anew for a crime for which he has already been convicted.
• Absence of Ballistic Report: Private respondent contended that no ballistic report was submitted by the prosecution.
• Evident Premeditation: Private respondent argued that evident premeditation had not been proven.

• Propriety of Bail: Whether bail was validly granted to private respondent in the murder case.
• Double Jeopardy / Subsequent Prosecution: Whether private respondent may still be prosecuted for murder for which he claims he has already been convicted.

• Propriety of Bail: No. Bail was not validly granted; the RTC's order lacked the required summary of the prosecution evidence and the trial judge's assessment of the strength of the evidence, and the evidence of guilt was strong.
• Double Jeopardy / Subsequent Prosecution: Yes. Private respondent may still be prosecuted for murder; the prior conviction was for illegal possession of firearms under PD 1866, a different offense, and the requisites of double jeopardy are absent.

• Propriety of Bail: The general rule is that a person in custody before final conviction is entitled to bail as a matter of right. The exception applies when the person is charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail, and the evidence of guilt is strong. At the time of the alleged felony in 1990, murder was punishable by reclusión perpetua; with RA 7659, murder became punishable by reclusión perpetua to death. Thus, bail was discretionary, not a matter of right, depending on the strength of the prosecution evidence. The grant or denial of bail depends on whether the evidence of guilt is strong, which the lower court must determine in a hearing called for that purpose; judicial discretion may be exercised only after the evidence of guilt is submitted during the bail hearing. Here, no separate bail hearing was conducted. The Petition for Bail was filed on August 9, 2001; after the prosecution filed its Opposition and private respondent submitted a Reply, and after the prosecution had presented all its witnesses in the regular course of trial but before it had rested its case, the Petition for Bail was deemed submitted for resolution. On the same day, the assailed September 26, 2001 Order was issued. The one-page Order demonstrated grave abuse of discretion because it had no summary of the evidence, only a curt one-sentence description of the prosecution's evidence, and no conclusion on whether the evidence of guilt was strong. The summary is required because it is an extension of the hearing and part of procedural due process, and because it is the basis for the judge's exercise of discretion; without it, there is no basis for granting bail. The trial judge also failed to take into account the Supreme Court's Decision in GR No. 114185, which found treachery and directed the filing of an information for murder. That ruling was unrebutted and reinforced by the clear and convincing proof from eyewitnesses Pacita Recto and Clarita Lim, who both affirmed that private respondent had killed Esteban Lim Jr. The evidence of guilt was therefore strong, and bail should not have been allowed. The absence of a ballistic report was superfluous, and there was no need to adduce evidence of evident premeditation because it was not alleged in the Information and would neither qualify nor aggravate the offense under the Rules of Procedure.
• Double Jeopardy / Subsequent Prosecution: The crime for which private respondent was convicted by the RTC was committed on October 5, 1990. The applicable law at the time was PD 1866, which prescribed the death penalty if homicide or murder was committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm. The death penalty was suspended by the 1987 Constitution, so the penalty next lower in degree, reclusión perpetua, was imposed in GR No. 114185 when the Supreme Court affirmed private respondent's conviction for violation of Section 1 of PD 1866. Under previous rulings, one who kills another with the use of an unlicensed firearm commits two separate offenses: murder under the Revised Penal Code and aggravated illegal possession of firearm under the second paragraph of Section 1 of PD 1866. Thus, the filing of an Information for murder after conviction for violation of Section 1 of PD 1866, a special law, was in order, and there was no violation of the constitutional rule proscribing double jeopardy. When RA 8294 took effect on July 6, 1997, nearly six months after the affirmation of private respondent's conviction under PD 1866, the use of an unlicensed firearm was considered merely an aggravating circumstance if murder, homicide, or any other crime was committed with it. Hence, the use of an unlicensed firearm in killing a person may no longer be the source of a separate conviction for illegal possession of a deadly weapon; only one felony may be charged, murder in this instance. Private respondent was convicted of qualified illegal possession of firearms used in murder under PD 1866, not of murder under the Revised Penal Code. Under RA 8294, the use of an unlicensed firearm is a mere aggravating circumstance in a charge for murder, and illegal possession of firearms has been explicitly decriminalized. Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege. Although private respondent had been convicted of illegal possession of firearm, his sentence was effectively cancelled when the trial court reduced the penalty therefor, and he was effectively given the benefit of the new law that decriminalized his offense. However, he may still be prosecuted for murder, a crime that has not been decriminalized and is completely different from that for which he was convicted earlier. The requisites of double jeopardy are not present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first. In the interest of substantial justice and a speedy disposition of the case, the Court cancelled his bail bond and directed the proper authorities to effect his arrest so that he may continue to stand trial for the crime charged.

• Bail in Capital Offenses and the Summary Requirement — In capital offenses or offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua, bail is discretionary and may be granted only when the evidence of guilt is not strong. The order granting or denying bail must contain a summary of the evidence presented by the prosecution and the trial judge's assessment or conclusion on whether the evidence of guilt is strong. The summary is part of procedural due process and the basis for judicial discretion; its absence renders the order invalid for grave abuse of discretion. Applied: the RTC's one-page order had no summary and no conclusion, so the bail grant was annulled.
• Double Jeopardy Requisites — Double jeopardy requires (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy is for the same offense as that in the first. Applied: the prior conviction for illegal possession of firearms under PD 1866 and the subsequent murder charge were not the same offense, so double jeopardy did not bar the murder prosecution.
• Separate Offenses for Killing with an Unlicensed Firearm under PD 1866 — Under previous rulings, one who kills another with the use of an unlicensed firearm commits two separate offenses: murder under the Revised Penal Code and aggravated illegal possession of firearm under the second paragraph of Section 1 of PD 1866. Applied: the murder Information filed after conviction under PD 1866 was proper.
• Effect of RA 8294 on Illegal Possession of Firearms — RA 8294 decriminalized illegal possession of firearms when an unlicensed firearm is used in murder, homicide, or another crime; the use of the unlicensed firearm becomes merely an aggravating circumstance in the murder or homicide charge, not a separate offense. Applied: private respondent's illegal-possession sentence was reduced and effectively cancelled, but he remained subject to prosecution for murder, which was not decriminalized.
• Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege — There is no crime where there is no law punishing it. Applied: RA 8294 decriminalized the illegal possession charge, but murder remained a punishable offense.

• "An order granting bail in a capital offense must contain a summary showing the strength or the weakness of the prosecution evidence, as well as the trial judge’s assessment thereof. Absent such summary and assessment, the order would not stand appellate scrutiny and must be struck down." — This opening statement states the ratio decidendi on the mandatory contents of a bail order in a capital offense.
• "The assailed September 26, 2001 Order was sorely defective in both form and substance. It had no summary of the evidence, but merely a curt one-sentence description of the evidence for the prosecution. Neither did the Order have a conclusion on whether the evidence of guilt was strong. Without such conclusion, there was no basis for granting bail. Thus, the Order cannot be sustained, allowed to stand, or given any semblance of validity." — This passage applies the summary requirement to the RTC's bail order and explains why the grant was invalid.
• "However, private respondent may still be prosecuted for murder -- a crime that has not been decriminalized and is completely different from that for which he was convicted earlier. Evidently, the requisites of double jeopardy, which are (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have terminated; (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first, are not present here." — This passage states the double jeopardy holding and lists the requisites as applied to the murder prosecution.
• "Under previous rulings of this Court, 'one who kills another with the use of an unlicensed firearm commits two separate offenses of (1) x x x murder under the [Revised Penal Code], and (2) aggravated illegal possession of firearm under the [second] paragraph of Section 1 of [PD] 1866 x x x.'" — This passage explains why the murder charge could be filed after the prior conviction for illegal possession of firearms.

• People vs. Hon. Cabral, 362 Phil. 697, 709, February 18, 1999 — Cited for the rule that the grant or denial of bail depends on whether the evidence of guilt is strong, which the lower court must determine in a hearing, and that judicial discretion in granting bail may be exercised only after the evidence of guilt is submitted during the bail hearing.
• Santos vs. Judge Ofilada, 315 Phil. 11, June 16, 1995 — Cited for the requirement that the order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence presented by the prosecution.
• People vs. Tobias, 334 Phil. 881, January 30, 1997 — The prior Supreme Court Decision in GR No. 114185 affirming private respondent's conviction, finding treachery, and directing the filing of a murder information; the Court held the trial judge failed to take this ruling into account.
• People vs. Quijada, 328 Phil. 505, July 24, 1996 — Cited for the rule that one who kills another with the use of an unlicensed firearm commits two separate offenses: murder under the Revised Penal Code and aggravated illegal possession of firearm under PD 1866.
• People vs. Walpan Ladjaalam, 340 SCRA 617, September 19, 2000 — Cited for the rule that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms; illegal possession becomes merely an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide.
• People vs. Marquez, 417 Phil. 516, September 13, 2001 — Cited for the rule that the use of an unlicensed firearm may no longer be the source of a separate conviction for the crime of illegal possession of a deadly weapon.
• People vs. Deunida, 231 SCRA 520, March 28, 1994 — Cited for the rule that the constitutional right against double jeopardy protects against a second prosecution for the same offense; when the subsequent information charges another and different offense, even if arising from the same act, there is no double jeopardy.
• People vs. Nitafan, 302 SCRA 424, February 1, 1999; People vs. Tampal, 244 SCRA 203, May 22, 1995 — Cited for the requisites of double jeopardy.

• Section 13, Article III, 1987 Constitution — Provides the right to bail, except for persons charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong. Applied: murder was a capital offense for which bail was discretionary and should not have been granted given the strong evidence.
• Sections 4, 6, and 7, Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Govern bail in capital offenses and the exception when evidence of guilt is strong. Applied: the RTC failed to comply with the requirements for granting bail in a capital offense.
• Section 1, Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Defines bail as a security given for the release of a person under custody of the law, as a guarantee of appearance before any court as required under specified conditions. Applied: the Court cancelled private respondent's bail bond.
• Section 19(1), Article III, 1987 Constitution — Suspends the imposition of the death penalty. Applied: because PD 1866 prescribed death for killing with an unlicensed firearm but the death penalty was suspended, the penalty next lower in degree, reclusión perpetua, was imposed.
• Section 8, Rule 110, Rules of Court — Requires that aggravating circumstances be alleged in the Information. Applied: evident premeditation was not alleged, so there was no need to adduce evidence to prove it.
• Section 1, Presidential Decree No. 1866 — Penalizes illegal possession of firearms and prescribed the death penalty if homicide or murder was committed with an unlicensed firearm. Applied: private respondent was previously convicted under this provision.
• Republic Act No. 8294 — Amended PD 1866 by decriminalizing illegal possession of firearms when an unlicensed firearm is used in another crime and by treating such use as merely an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide. Applied: private respondent's illegal-possession penalty was reduced and effectively cancelled, but the murder prosecution continued.
• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes murder. Applied: private respondent was charged with murder, a crime distinct from illegal possession of firearms and not decriminalized by RA 8294.
• Article 25, Revised Penal Code — Provides for the penalty next lower in degree. Applied: reclusión perpetua was imposed in GR No. 114185 because the death penalty was suspended.

Davide, Jr., Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.