People of the Philippines and Dy vs. Court of Appeals

Probable cause to hold an accused for trial is an executive function of the public prosecutor; a trial judge may not dismiss a valid information for want of evidence absent manifest error, grave abuse of discretion, or prejudice, because the judge’s separate probable-cause determination is limited to the issuance of a warrant of arrest and evidentiary matters are for trial.

Rosalinda Dy was the mother of petitioner Alynn Plezette Dy, while private respondent Billy Cerbo is the father of Jonathan Cerbo, the primary suspect in the criminal case. The controversy concerns the respective roles of the public prosecutor and the trial court in determining probable cause during preliminary investigation and in issuing warrants of arrest under the Rules of Court.

Rosalinda Dy, mother of petitioner Alynn Plezette Dy, was fatally shot on August 30, 1993 at Purok 9, Poblacion, Nabunturan, Davao. According to the petition, she was shot at pointblank range by Jonathan Cerbo in the presence and at the office of his father, private respondent Billy Cerbo.

On September 2, 1993, eyewitness Elsa B. Gumban executed an affidavit positively identifying Jonathan Cerbo as the assailant. On September 20, 1993, Jonathan executed a counter-affidavit interposing the defense that the shooting was accidental. On October 6, 1993, the 3rd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Nabunturan-Mawab, Davao, after preliminary investigation, found sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that murder had been committed by Jonathan and forwarded the records to the provincial prosecutor at Tagum, Davao.

After an information for murder was filed against Jonathan, Alynn executed an affidavit-complaint charging Billy with conspiracy in the killing, supported by a supplemental affidavit of Gumban. In that supplemental affidavit, Gumban alleged that while she and Rosalinda were in Billy’s office at about 11:45 a.m. on August 30, 1993, Billy personally instructed her to fetch food from the kitchen and bring it to the office instead of the dining room; that while bringing the food, Billy again instructed her to place it on a corner table and commanded her to sit behind the entrance door while Billy positioned Rosalinda on a chair facing the entrance door for an easy target; that immediately after Rosalinda was shot, Billy called his son Jonathan, who was running, but did not bother to bring Rosalinda to a hospital or apply first aid; and that Billy instead brought Rosalinda to the funeral parlor and immediately ordered her embalmed without informing her children or immediate relatives. Billy submitted a counter-affidavit denying the allegations of Alynn and Gumban.

On or about April 8, 1994, Prosecutor Protacio Lumangtad filed a motion for leave of court to reinvestigate the case, which the respondent judge granted on April 28, 1994. In a resolution dated May 5, 1994, Prosecutor Lumangtad recommended the filing of an amended information including Billy as one of the accused in the murder case. The prosecution accordingly filed an amended information including Billy, and a warrant for his arrest was issued on May 27, 1994.

Billy then filed a motion to quash the warrant of arrest, arguing that it was issued without probable cause. On June 28, 1994, the respondent judge issued an order dismissing the case as against Billy only, recalling the warrant of arrest, and ordering the prosecution to withdraw the amended information and file a new one charging Jonathan only. Private Prosecutor Romeo Tagra filed a motion for reconsideration, which the respondent judge denied on August 18, 1994.

The Court of Appeals, in its June 28, 1996 Decision, dismissed the petition for certiorari and held that the trial judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in recalling the warrant and dismissing the case against Billy. After going over Gumban’s supplemental affidavit and considering the additional facts and circumstances alleged therein, the appellate court could not say that the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the case against Billy for lack of probable cause; it added that the prosecution, if it believed Billy was probably guilty by conspiracy, should have presented additional evidence sufficiently and credibly demonstrating probable cause. The CA denied reconsideration on August 27, 1996.

• Authority of RTC to Reverse Prosecutor’s Probable Cause: Petitioner Dy argued that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that the Regional Trial Court judge had the authority to reverse the public prosecutor’s finding of probable cause to prosecute the accused and thus dismiss the case filed by the latter on the basis of a motion to quash the warrant of arrest.
• Misapplication of Allado: Petitioner Dy maintained that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in fully and unqualifiedly applying Allado vs. PACC despite clear differences in their respective factual backdrops and contrary earlier jurisprudence on the matter.
• Absence of Probable Cause: The Solicitor General posited that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that no probable cause exists to merit the filing of charges against private respondent Billy Cerbo.
• Defective Motion to Quash: Petitioners averred that private respondent Cerbo did not give them a copy of the Motion to Quash the Warrant of Arrest, or a notice of the scheduled hearing, so Judge Valles should not have entertained such motion.

• Lack of Probable Cause: Private respondent Billy Cerbo filed a motion to quash the warrant of arrest, arguing that the warrant was issued without probable cause.
• Denial of Allegations: Billy Cerbo submitted a counter-affidavit denying the allegations of petitioner Alynn Plezette Dy and eyewitness Elsa B. Gumban.

• Executive vs. Judicial Determination of Probable Cause: Whether the Regional Trial Court judge had authority to reverse the public prosecutor’s finding of probable cause to prosecute Billy Cerbo and dismiss the murder information on the basis of a motion to quash the warrant of arrest.
• Applicability of Allado and Salonga: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in applying Allado vs. PACC and Salonga vs. Cruz-Paño to uphold the dismissal despite differences in factual backdrop and contrary earlier jurisprudence.
• Probable Cause to Charge Billy Cerbo: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that no probable cause exists to merit the filing of charges against Billy Cerbo.
• Procedural Defect in Motion to Quash: Whether the trial court could act on the motion to quash the warrant of arrest when the adverse party was not served a copy and notice of hearing.

• Executive vs. Judicial Determination of Probable Cause: No. The trial court erred in dismissing the information. Probable cause during preliminary investigation is an executive function of the public prosecutor; the judge’s judicial determination is limited to probable cause for the arrest warrant and does not authorize overriding the prosecutor’s finding to hold an accused for trial.
• Applicability of Allado and Salonga: No. Those cases are exceptions and do not apply. The eyewitness was not a participant or conspirator, private respondent was accorded due process, and no precipitate haste or bias was shown.
• Probable Cause to Charge Billy Cerbo: Yes, the Court of Appeals erred. The information was valid on its face and no manifest error, grave abuse of discretion, or prejudice was shown; evidentiary matters should be presented at trial.
• Procedural Defect in Motion to Quash: No. The motion was pro forma because no copy and notice were served; under Rule 15, the trial court had no authority to act on it.

• Executive vs. Judicial Determination of Probable Cause: The determination of probable cause during preliminary investigation belongs to the public prosecutor and is executive in character. The prosecutor has quasi-judicial discretion to decide whether a criminal case should be filed, and the trial court may not be compelled to pass upon the correctness of that exercise. The judicial determination of probable cause is separate: it concerns the issuance of a warrant of arrest, for which the judge must personally evaluate the evidence and cannot rely solely on the prosecutor’s report. However, this judicial duty does not authorize the judge to override the prosecutor’s determination of probable cause to hold an accused for trial on the ground that the evidence supporting the arrest warrant was insufficient. If the information is valid on its face and there is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of discretion, or prejudice on the part of the public prosecutor, the trial court should respect the prosecutor’s determination. Evidentiary matters, including the presence or absence of the elements of the crime, should be presented and heard during trial. The RTC therefore erred in dismissing the information against Billy, and the CA erred in upholding that dismissal. The Court also stressed that it was not prejudging the criminal case or Billy’s guilt or innocence; if there was palpable error or grave abuse of discretion in the prosecutor’s finding, the accused could appeal to the Secretary of Justice and move for deferment or suspension of the proceeding.
• Applicability of Allado and Salonga: Allado vs. Diokno and Salonga vs. Cruz-Paño are exceptions to the general rule and may be invoked only if similar circumstances clearly exist. In Allado, the judge relied merely on the prosecutor’s certification, the corpus delicti was not established, the principal witness’s extrajudicial statement was full of material inconsistencies, the PACC operatives never implicated the petitioners, and there was undue haste in filing the information. In Salonga, the evidence was insufficient to charge the petitioner with violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act, the main witness was a confessed participant who later denied involvement, there was failure to show probable guilt of conspiracy, initial disregard of constitutional rights, and massive damaging publicity. In the present case, Gumban was not a participant or conspirator in the killing; Billy was accorded due process; no precipitate haste or bias during the investigation could be imputed to the public prosecutor; and the evidence before the prosecutor was not utterly insufficient. Thus, the CA’s reliance on Allado and Salonga was misplaced.
• Probable Cause to Charge Billy Cerbo: The Court of Appeals erred in finding that no probable cause existed to merit the filing of charges against Billy. The prosecutor had recommended the amended information after reinvestigation, and the information was valid on its face. No manifest error, grave abuse of discretion, or prejudice was shown on the part of the public prosecutor. The trial court’s dismissal for want of evidence improperly substituted the court’s judgment for the prosecutor’s executive determination and preempted the trial where evidentiary matters should be heard.
• Procedural Defect in Motion to Quash: The motion to quash the warrant of arrest was pro forma because the requisite copy and notice were not duly served upon the adverse party. Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 require every written motion to be set for hearing and served with notice in such manner as to ensure receipt by the other party at least three days before the hearing, and Section 6 provides that no motion shall be acted upon without proof of service. Since these requirements are mandatory, the trial court had no authority to act on the motion.

• Executive determination of probable cause — The determination of probable cause during preliminary investigation is an executive function belonging to the public prosecutor, who has quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether a criminal case should be filed. Courts must respect this determination when the information is valid on its face and no manifest error, grave abuse of discretion, or prejudice is imputed to the prosecutor.
• Judicial determination of probable cause for arrest warrants — Distinct from the prosecutor’s determination, the judge’s probable-cause inquiry for issuing a warrant of arrest is judicial. The judge must personally evaluate the evidence and cannot rely solely on the prosecutor’s report, but this duty does not allow the judge to override the prosecutor’s finding of probable cause to hold the accused for trial or to dismiss the information for want of evidence.
• Information valid on its face — If the information is valid on its face and there is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of discretion, or prejudice on the part of the public prosecutor, the trial court should not dismiss it for want of evidence; evidentiary matters should be presented and heard during trial.
• Allado and Salonga exceptions — Allado vs. Diokno and Salonga vs. Cruz-Paño are exceptions to the general rule and may be invoked only when similar circumstances clearly exist, such as tainted witnesses who were confessed perpetrators, precipitate haste or bias, disregard of constitutional rights, massive publicity, or evidence utterly insufficient to support probable cause.
• Notice of hearing for written motions — Every written motion must be set for hearing and served with notice on the adverse party in a manner ensuring receipt at least three days before the hearing; no motion may be acted upon without proof of service. A motion that fails this requirement is pro forma, and the court has no authority to act on it.
• Remedy for erroneous prosecutor finding — If there is palpable error or grave abuse of discretion in the public prosecutor’s finding of probable cause, the accused may appeal to the Secretary of Justice and move for deferment or suspension of the proceeding until the appeal is resolved.

• "The determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation is a function that belongs to the public prosecutor. It is an executive function, the correctness of the exercise of which is matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon." — This states the core executive-function rule that the trial court cannot review the prosecutor’s probable-cause determination.
• "Verily, a judge cannot be compelled to issue a warrant of arrest if he or she deems that there is no probable cause for doing so. Corollary to this principle, the judge should not override the public prosecutor's determination of probable cause to hold an accused for trial on the ground that the evidence presented to substantiate the issuance of an arrest warrant was insufficient, as in the present case." — This distinguishes judicial probable cause for arrest from executive probable cause for trial and is the ratio for reversing the dismissal.
• "Therefore, if the information is valid on its face, and there is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of discretion and prejudice on the part of the public prosecutor , the trial court should respect such determination." — This is the controlling standard for when courts must respect the prosecutor’s determination and refrain from dismissing the information for want of evidence.
• "The motion to quash the warrant of arrest in the present case being pro forma, inasmuch as the requisite copy and notice were not duly served upon the adverse party, the trial court had no authority to act on it." — This resolves the procedural issue and invalidates the RTC’s action on the motion to quash.

• Roberts vs. Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA 307, March 15, 1996 — Cited for the separate concurring opinion of Chief Justice Narvasa on the executive nature of the prosecutor’s probable-cause determination.
• Crespo vs. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462, June 30, 1987 — Cited for the rule that criminal actions are prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal, whose discretion to file or not file depends on the sufficiency of the evidence.
• Ledesma vs. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 657, September 5, 1997 — Cited for the purpose and nature of preliminary investigation; dismissal therein is not an acquittal and does not bar double jeopardy.
• Ho vs. People, 280 SCRA 365, October 9, 1997 — Cited for the judicial determination of probable cause for arrest warrants and the definition of probable cause.
• Allado vs. Diokno, 232 SCRA 192, May 5, 1994 — Distinguished; the Court found it inapplicable because its evidence was utterly insufficient, the judge relied merely on the prosecutor’s certification, and there was undue haste.
• Salonga vs. Cruz-Paño, 134 SCRA 438, February 18, 1985 — Distinguished; the Court found it inapplicable because its main witness was a confessed perpetrator, the evidence was insufficient, and there was disregard of rights and massive publicity.
• Pilapil vs. Sandiganbayan, 221 SCRA 349, April 7, 1993 — Cited for the rule that the presence or absence of the elements of a crime is evidentiary and best passed upon after a full-blown trial.
• Buchanan vs. Vda. de Esteban — Cited in a footnote for the definition of probable cause as facts and circumstances that would excite belief in a reasonable mind that the person charged was guilty.
• Tan vs. Court of Appeals and Bloomberry Export Manufacturing, Inc., G.R. No. 130314, September 22, 1998 — Cited for the mandatory character of the rules on notice of hearing.
• People vs. Court of Appeals et al., G.R. No. 125164, September 25, 1998 — Cited for the rationale of the notice requirement.
• Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 39, August 4, 1994 — Cited in relation to appeal to the Secretary of Justice.

• Section 1, Rule 112, Rules of Court — Defines preliminary investigation and its purpose; cited to show that the prosecutor determines whether sufficient ground exists to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty, not whether guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt.
• Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rule 15, Rules of Court — Written motions must be set for hearing and served with notice on the adverse party in a manner ensuring receipt at least three days before the hearing; no motion may be acted upon without proof of service. Applied to the motion to quash the warrant of arrest, which was pro forma.
• Republic Act 5180, as amended, and Section 4, Department of Justice Circular No. 223 dated June 30, 1993 — No appeal may be taken from a resolution finding probable cause except upon showing of manifest error or grave abuse of discretion; an appeal or motion for reinvestigation does not hold the filing of the information in court. Applied to the remedy for an erroneous prosecutor finding.
• Constitution (general reference, as cited in the text) — The Court invoked the Constitution’s command that the judge personally determine probable cause in the issuance of warrants of arrest.

Romero, Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.