People of the Philippine Islands vs. Tan Bomping, et al.

A deed acknowledged before a notary public is a public document, and the fact that false dates were inserted before notarization does not alter the crime if the document was presented to the notary by the parties who committed the falsification or at their instance. The accused who falsified the deeds and was directly instrumental in causing them to be made public documents was therefore guilty of falsification of public documents, not merely private documents.

Tan Bomping owned eight parcels of land in Jimenez, Misamis, while his co-accused—Leon Galindo, Policarpo Tambor, Lucio Macalisang, and Andres Burias—were named as grantees in deeds of conveyance over those parcels. The deeds were acknowledged before a notary public, placing their classification as public or private documents at the center of the falsification charge.

Tan Bomping, Leon Galindo, Policarpo Tambor, Lucio Macalisang, and Andres Burias were charged in an information alleging that on or about November 21 and 22, 1923, in Jimenez, Misamis, they confederated to prepare and cause to be prepared eight fictitious and simulated documents acknowledged before a notary public. The documents purported to convey eight parcels of land belonging to Tan Bomping to his co-accused and made it appear that they were executed on previous dates in 1919, 1920, 1921, 1922, and August 1923, when in fact they were executed and signed by all five defendants on November 21, 1923, and acknowledged before a notary public on November 22, 1923.

The evidence showed that Tan Bomping, in order to escape the attachment of his property in a civil action then pending, on November 21, 1923 executed eight deeds of conveyance over various parcels of land he owned to his codefendants, and that he intentionally antedated the documents. Certified copies of the deeds were in evidence as Exhibits A to H. Exhibits A and B were executed in favor of Leon Galindo and dated January 15, 1920, witnessed by Policarpio Tambor and Andres Burias. Exhibits C and D were made out in favor of Policarpo Tambor and dated October 10, 1921 and October 15, 1920, respectively, witnessed by Leon Galindo and Andres Burias. Exhibits E and F were executed in favor of Andres Burias, dated August 15, 1923, and witnessed by Leon Galindo and Policarpo Tambor. Exhibits G and H were executed in favor of Lucio Macalisang and dated January 20, 1919, with Leon Galindo and Policarpo Tambor as subscribing witnesses.

On the following day, Tan Bomping took the documents to a notary public and acknowledged them in the usual manner. The notary, observing that the documents bore earlier dates, apparently became suspicious and, at his instance, Tan Bomping stated under oath that they were executed and signed on the dates therein stated.

The originals of the deeds were in the hands of the defendants. The fiscal demanded their production in court, but the defendants refused to comply with the demand. The evidence left room for a reasonable doubt as to whether the codefendants knew the true character of the transactions described.

• Amendment of Information: Appellants argued that under section 23 of General Orders No. 58 the trial court may order the filing of a new information but has no power to order an amendment.
• Admissibility of Certified Copies: Appellants argued that the trial court erred in admitting certified copies of the falsified documents instead of the originals, citing United States vs. Gregorio and Balistoy, 17 Phil., 522, for the proposition that the original document must be before the court in criminal prosecutions for falsification.

• Amendment of Information: Whether the trial court had authority to order the amendment of the information to charge falsification of public documents only, rather than requiring the filing of a new information under section 23 of General Orders No. 58.
• Admissibility of Certified Copies: Whether certified copies of the alleged falsified documents were admissible in evidence in lieu of the originals where the originals were in the defendants’ possession and they refused to produce them upon demand.
• Classification of the Falsified Documents: Whether the antedated deeds, acknowledged before a notary public, constituted falsification of public documents or only private documents.
• Guilt of Codefendants: Whether the codefendants’ knowledge and participation in the falsification were established beyond reasonable doubt.
• Guilt of Tan Bomping: Whether Tan Bomping was guilty of falsification of public documents.

• Amendment of Information: Yes. The trial court has authority to direct amendments to an information or complaint in a criminal case; there is no substantive difference between an amended information and a new information.
• Admissibility of Certified Copies: Yes. Certified copies were admissible because the originals were in the defendants’ hands, demand was made, and they refused production; secondary evidence is admissible when primary evidence is not obtainable, in criminal as well as civil cases.
• Classification of the Falsified Documents: Public documents. A deed acknowledged before a notary public is a public document; antedating before notarization does not alter the case if presented by the parties who falsified or at their instance.
• Guilt of Codefendants: No. The case against them was not clear, and reasonable doubt existed as to their knowledge of the true character of the transactions.
• Guilt of Tan Bomping: Yes. He was guilty of falsification of public documents because he falsified the deeds and was directly instrumental in causing them to be made public documents.

• Amendment of Information: The appellants contended that section 23 of General Orders No. 58 permits the court to order the filing of a new information but not an amendment. The Court rejected this, relying on United States vs. Muyot, 2 Phil., 177, which held that the trial court has authority to direct amendments to an information or complaint in a criminal case. The Court reasoned that there is no difference in substance between an amended information and a new one, and whether the pleading is styled “New Information” or “Amended Information” is immaterial. Thus, the amendment to charge falsification of public documents only was proper.

• Admissibility of Certified Copies: The appellants argued that the trial court erred in admitting certified copies instead of the originals, citing United States vs. Gregorio and Balistoy, 17 Phil., 522. The Court found no error. The originals were in the defendants’ hands; the fiscal demanded their production in court; the defendants refused. Under sections 321 and 322 of the Code of Civil Procedure, certified copies were admissible. The Court stated that secondary evidence is admissible whenever primary evidence is not obtainable, and this rule applies in criminal as well as civil cases, citing Allen vs. State, 21 Ga., 217, and Commonwealth vs. Jeffries, 7 Allen, 548. United States vs. Gregorio and Balistoy was not in point because no reasonable effort had been made to procure the original; its statement that the original document is indispensable in all criminal prosecutions for falsification was too broad and, in any event, obiter dicta.

• Classification of the Falsified Documents: The trial court held the crime was falsification of private documents. The Court held this was error. A deed acknowledged before a notary public is a public document. The fact that the false dates were written into the documents before they were presented to the notary does not alter the case if they were presented by the parties who committed the falsification or at their instance. Tan Bomping was not only guilty of falsifying the documents but was directly instrumental in causing them to be made public documents. Thus, the crime was falsification of public documents.

• Guilt of Codefendants: The case against the codefendants was not clear. There was room for a reasonable doubt as to their knowledge of the true character of the transactions described. The majority therefore acquitted them.

• Guilt of Tan Bomping: Tan Bomping was manifestly guilty of falsification of public documents. He executed the deeds to escape attachment of his property in a pending civil action, intentionally antedated them, and caused them to be acknowledged before a notary public, making them public documents. He was sentenced accordingly.

• Falsification of Public Documents by Notarization of Antedated Deeds — A deed acknowledged before a notary public is a public document. The fact that false dates were written into the document before it was presented to the notary does not alter the classification if the document was presented by the parties who committed the falsification or at their instance. In this case, Tan Bomping’s antedated deeds were acknowledged before a notary, and he was directly instrumental in causing them to become public documents; hence he was guilty of falsification of public documents, not merely private documents.
• Amendment of Criminal Information — A trial court has authority to direct amendments to an information or complaint in a criminal case. There is no substantive difference between an amended information and a new information; the style or title is immaterial. The Court applied this to uphold the amended information charging falsification of public documents only.
• Admissibility of Secondary Evidence in Criminal Cases — Secondary evidence is admissible whenever primary evidence is not obtainable, and this rule applies to criminal as well as civil cases. Where the originals of allegedly falsified documents are in the defendants’ hands, demand for their production is made, and the defendants refuse to comply, certified copies are admissible under sections 321 and 322 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
• Reasonable Doubt as to Co-Accused’s Knowledge — Where the evidence leaves room for a reasonable doubt as to a co-accused’s knowledge of the true character of the transactions, acquittal is proper. The Court applied this to Tan Bomping’s codefendants, whose knowledge of the falsification was not clearly established.
• Obiter Dicta and Overbroad Statements — A statement in a prior decision that the original document is indispensable in all criminal prosecutions for falsification is too broad and, in any event, obiter dicta. The Court distinguished United States vs. Gregorio and Balistoy on this basis.

• "A deed acknowledged before a notary public is a public document and the fact that the false dates were written into the documents here in question before said documents were presented to the notary, does not alter the case if they were so presented by the parties who committed the falsification or at their instance." — This is the ratio decidendi on why the crime was falsification of public documents rather than private documents.
• "There is in fact no difference in substance between an amended information and a new one, and whether the information upon which the case goes to trial is styled "New Information" or "Amended Information" is wholly immaterial." — This states the Court’s ruling upholding the trial court’s authority to allow the amended information.
• "No proposition of law is better established than the rule that secondary evidence is admissible whenever primary evidence is not obtainable, and this rule applies to criminal as well as to civil cases" — This defines the controlling rule on admissibility of certified copies in lieu of the originals.
• "The case against his codefendants is not quite as clear and there is room for a reasonable doubt as to their knowledge of the true character of the transactions described." — This is the basis for the acquittal of the co-accused.

• United States vs. Muyot, 2 Phil., 177 — Controlling authority cited by the Court for the rule that the trial court has authority to direct amendments to an information or complaint in a criminal case.
• United States vs. Gregorio and Balistoy, 17 Phil., 522 — Distinguished. The Court held it was not in point because no reasonable effort was made to procure the original; its statement that the original document is indispensable in all criminal prosecutions for falsification was too broad and obiter dicta.
• Allen vs. State, 21 Ga., 217 — Cited by the Court for the rule that secondary evidence is admissible whenever primary evidence is not obtainable, and that this applies to criminal as well as civil cases.
• Commonwealth vs. Jeffries, 7 Allen, 548 — Cited together with Allen vs. State for the same rule on secondary evidence.

• Section 23, General Orders No. 58 — Cited by the appellants for the argument that the court may order a new information but not an amendment. The Court rejected this reading, holding that the trial court has authority to direct amendments to an information or complaint in a criminal case.
• Sections 321 and 322, Code of Civil Procedure — Cited by the Court as the basis for admitting certified copies of the falsified documents as secondary evidence where the originals were in the defendants’ hands, demand was made, and the defendants refused to produce them.

Malcolm, Villamor, Johns, and Villa-Real, JJ.

• Street, J. — Dissented from the conviction of Tan Bomping for falsification of a public document. He argued that the decision extended article 300 and related provisions of the Penal Code contrary to their spirit and letter; that the making of a false statement of facts by the grantor in acknowledging a deed before a notary public should not constitute falsification of a public document; and that statutes on perjury and false testimony already penalize such acts. He noted that the notarial certificate was true in its recitals because it stated only that the appellant acknowledged under oath that the deed was executed on the date it bore, not that the deed was in fact executed on that date. He reasoned that subsection 4 of article 300, which covers a false narrative of facts, can only be committed by the officer, employee, or notary whose duty it is to formulate the narrative, acting as principal; a private individual who procures a false acknowledgment might be liable as author by induction only if the fact recorded were false, but here the acknowledgment merely recorded that the appellant made a false oath. He also noted the incongruity that the amended information charged falsification of several deeds alleged to be simulated and fictitious, while the conviction was based on falsification of the notarial certificate of acknowledgment, which was not charged. He submitted that if the coaccused were correctly acquitted, Tan Bomping should also have been acquitted. He cited Spanish decisions in Viada, 4th ed., vol. 2, Questions XXXI and XXXIII, pages 406, 407, and Question V, page 428, as tending to show the offense was not falsification of a public document.
• Romualdez, J. — Dissented, believing that the accused should be convicted only of falsification of a private document. Avanceña, C.J., concurred.