People of the Philippine Islands vs. Siojo

A person who provokes a fight and initiates the aggression cannot invoke self-defense, complete or incomplete, even if the victim later retaliates with a weapon; the killing is homicide. A dying declaration in a local dialect is admissible despite lack of translation where no specific objection was made on that ground and the dialect was known to the accused and counsel.

Joaquin Siojo was a secret agent of the Constabulary, while Gregorio Esguerra was the chief of police of San Miguel, Bulacan. Ill feeling existed between them. At the time of the incident, Esguerra was in uniform and discharging his official duties.

On August 17, 1933, Gregorio Esguerra, chief of police of San Miguel, Bulacan, was in Barrio San Jose, San Miguel, when a passenger truck from Manila bound for the town proper passed. He boarded and sat in the front seat beside the chauffeur. The truck had five rows of bench seats and ordinarily carried about thirty passengers, but only about eight persons were aboard. After about two kilometers, at Barrio Camias, in front of a gasoline station, Joaquin Siojo, who was there, stopped the truck to board. Instead of taking an empty seat, Siojo placed himself in the front seat between Esguerra and the chauffeur, although that seat was apparently and completely occupied.

Because of the existing ill feeling between them, Siojo complained that they were crowded. Esguerra replied that if so, Siojo should move to another seat or otherwise be patient. Siojo complained again that Esguerra wanted to oppress him. They continued arguing in an angry tone. Siojo told Esguerra that if he was angry, Siojo would get off, and ordered the chauffeur to stop; Esguerra replied that he was not making Siojo get off but that Siojo should get off if he wanted, since the truck was not theirs.

When the truck stopped and Siojo alighted, he invited Esguerra to get down so they could continue talking on the ground. Esguerra tried to alight, but upon seeing Siojo’s hostile attitude and noticing that Siojo had his right hand in his back pocket where he carried his revolver, Esguerra retreated to the upper part of the truck. While Esguerra was on the step, Siojo struck him with his fist on the back and buttocks, saying that although Esguerra was bigger, he was a coward. Irritated, Esguerra got down and faced Siojo. In retaliation, Esguerra immediately used his iron black-jack wrapped in leather and struck Siojo; Siojo, dodging the blows, suffered contusions on his left forearm and arm and on the parietal and occipital regions of his head.

Almost immediately and simultaneously with those blows, Siojo drew his automatic revolver and fired two shots at Esguerra, hitting him in the abdomen, involving the intestines, and in the lower part of the left ear. Esguerra fell forward face down; amid convulsions, he turned face up and sat. Siojo then took Esguerra’s black-jack and warned him, if he was brave, to charge. Esguerra carried no other weapon. He was taken to the Presidencia of San Miguel, then to the Emergency Hospital, and then to the Provincial Hospital of Malolos, where he died two days later. While at the San Miguel Hospital, Esguerra gave an ante mortem declaration, Exhibit B, containing the facts just related, which was corroborated by other prosecution witnesses.

Siojo admitted at trial that he shot Esguerra but claimed self-defense. He and his witnesses claimed Esguerra carried a revolver, but no revolver was found on Esguerra and no defense witness actually saw one; Esguerra stated in his dying declaration that he carried no arm except the black-jack. Siojo carried away the black-jack, and when asked why he did not take Esguerra’s revolver, he replied that if he had seen the revolver during the fight as he did the black-jack, he would have taken it. The trial court found that Siojo provoked the fight, challenged Esguerra, and began the aggression by striking him on the back and buttocks with his fist. It also found that Esguerra was the chief of police, in uniform, and discharging his official duties, and that Siojo was a secret agent of the Constabulary. After the incident, Lieut. Ferreol of the Constabulary received a telephone message in Malolos from the police of San Miguel stating that Siojo had not been arrested and requesting Constabulary aid; Ferreol went to San Miguel, and when he arrested Siojo at home, Siojo voluntarily handed him the revolver, Exhibit D. Ferreol then required Siojo to deliver his rifle and shotgun, after which he arrested Siojo and took him to the Constabulary headquarters in Malolos.

• Self-Defense: Joaquin Siojo maintained that he acted in lawful defense of his person when he shot Gregorio Esguerra, because Esguerra was larger and stronger and attacked him with a black-jack, and that the trial court erred in not exempting him from criminal liability; alternatively, he argued that he was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense if not all requisites of complete self-defense were present.
• Provocation and Aggression: Siojo contended that the trial court erred in finding that the fight was preconcerted and that he was the challenger and provocateur, and in finding that Esguerra was not carrying any weapon other than the black-jack, Exhibit 2.
• Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances: Siojo argued that the trial court erred in appreciating against him the aggravating circumstance of committing the crime in contempt of and with insult to public authority and in offsetting it with voluntary surrender; he also claimed the mitigating circumstances of no intention to commit so grave a wrong, sufficient provocation on the part of the deceased immediately preceding the act, immediate vindication of a great offense, and passion and obfuscation.
• Dying Declaration: Siojo argued that the trial court erred in admitting and giving weight to the dying declaration, Exhibit B, because the prosecution failed to prove it was made under consciousness of impending death and failed to submit an English or Spanish translation of the Tagalog document.
• Credibility and Sufficiency: Siojo argued that the trial court erred in believing the prosecution witnesses and not giving credit to his testimony and that of his witnesses, and in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt and imposing the sentence.

• Self-Defense: Whether Joaquin Siojo acted in lawful self-defense, or was at least entitled to the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense, when he shot Gregorio Esguerra.
• Provocation and Aggression: Whether the trial court erred in finding that Siojo provoked and challenged Esguerra and that Esguerra was not carrying a weapon other than the black-jack.
• Aggravating Circumstance: Whether the killing was committed in contempt of and with insult to public authority, justifying that aggravating circumstance.
• Voluntary Surrender: Whether the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated in Siojo’s favor.
• Other Mitigating Circumstances: Whether the mitigating circumstances of no intention to commit so grave a wrong, sufficient provocation, immediate vindication of a great offense, and passion and obfuscation should be appreciated.
• Dying Declaration: Whether Exhibit B was admissible as a dying declaration despite the alleged failure to prove consciousness of impending death and the absence of an English or Spanish translation.
• Credibility and Sufficiency: Whether the evidence supported Siojo’s conviction for homicide beyond reasonable doubt.

• Self-Defense: No. Siojo was the unlawful aggressor; he provoked the fight, challenged Esguerra, and struck the first blow. Self-defense, complete or incomplete, cannot prosper.
• Provocation and Aggression: No error. The prosecution evidence, including the dying declaration and testimonies of Julio Oreta and Alberto Domingo, sustained the finding that Siojo provoked and challenged Esguerra; the claim that Esguerra carried a revolver was not proved.
• Aggravating Circumstance: No. The deceased was an agent of the authorities, not a public authority, and the provision on contempt of or insult to public authority does not apply when the person in authority is the offended party.
• Voluntary Surrender: No. The evidence did not justify voluntary surrender; Siojo was arrested by Lieut. Ferreol after the police requested Constabulary aid, even though Siojo handed over his firearms.
• Other Mitigating Circumstances: No separate mitigating circumstance was appreciated; the remaining assignments were included in those already considered and required no further discussion.
• Dying Declaration: Yes, admissible. Consciousness of impending death was shown, and the lack of translation was not a reversible error because no specific objection was made on that ground and the dialect was known to the accused and his attorneys.
• Credibility and Sufficiency: No error. The conviction was affirmed; the trial court’s findings and the prosecution evidence were sustained.

• Self-Defense: The trial judge found that Siojo provoked the fight, challenged Esguerra, and began the aggression by striking Esguerra on the back and buttocks with his fist. The evidence showed that Esguerra desisted from accepting the challenge when he saw Siojo armed with a revolver; when Esguerra tried to resume his seat and had turned his back, Siojo struck him. Esguerra then stepped down and struck Siojo with a black-jack, the only weapon he carried, and almost simultaneously Siojo shot him twice. There was no self-defense: instead of being the object of unlawful aggression without provocation, Siojo was the aggressor although Esguerra had given him no provocation. The claim that shooting was necessary because Esguerra was larger and stronger and struck with a black-jack could not prosper; Siojo had treacherously assaulted Esguerra, was armed with a revolver, and had attempted to draw it when Esguerra first got out of the bus. This was not self-defense, complete or incomplete.
• Provocation and Aggression: The lower court apparently made no finding that the fight was preconcerted. The prosecution evidence, consisting of Esguerra’s dying declaration and the testimony of Julio Oreta and Alberto Domingo, sustained the finding that Siojo provoked the fight and challenged Esguerra, although what followed was not a mutual fight but an assault in which Siojo was the aggressor. Ill feeling between them was fully established, and Siojo’s act of seating himself between Esguerra and the driver where there was scarcely room, despite vacant seats, showed he was bent on making trouble. The defense claim that Esguerra carried a revolver was not proved; it rested on conjectures, no revolver was found, no defense witness actually saw one, and Esguerra stated in his dying declaration that he carried no arm except a black-jack. Siojo carried away the black-jack and admitted he would have taken the revolver if he had seen it during the fight.
• Aggravating Circumstance: The deceased was discharging his duties as chief of police at the time of the assault, but the information did not allege facts that would justify a finding of the complex crime of assault upon an agent of the authorities with homicide. The finding that the crime was committed in contempt of and with insult to public authority was not justified. The deceased was not a public authority but an agent of the authorities, and the provision on that aggravating circumstance is not applicable when the person in authority is the offended party. U.S. vs. Rodriguez, 19 Phil., 150, held that the circumstance can exist only when the public authority is engaged in the exercise of his functions and is not the person against whom the crime is committed; the Spanish Supreme Court decision of January 24, 1881, and 1 Viada, 310, were cited in support.
• Voluntary Surrender: The lower court gave Siojo the benefit of voluntary surrender because he allegedly procured means to present himself immediately to the authority and delivered to Lieut. Ferreol the revolver used and other firearms. The evidence did not justify this finding. Lieut. Ferreol testified that he received a telephone message in Malolos from the police of San Miguel stating that Siojo had not been arrested and requesting Constabulary aid; he went to San Miguel to investigate and arrest Siojo; when he arrested Siojo at home, Siojo voluntarily handed him the revolver, Exhibit D; Ferreol then required Siojo to deliver his rifle and shotgun; after that, he arrested Siojo and took him to the Constabulary headquarters in Malolos. On these facts, voluntary surrender was not established.
• Other Mitigating Circumstances: The remaining assignments of error were included in those already considered and required no further discussion. No separate finding was made that the additional mitigating circumstances should be appreciated.
• Dying Declaration: Javier Pabalan, justice of the peace of San Miguel, was called to the Emergency Hospital to take the statement of Gregorio Esguerra, who had been shot in the abdomen and through the face and was about to die. Esguerra told Pabalan that he was in a critical condition and was going to die. Pabalan asked the doctor about Esguerra’s condition, and the doctor said Esguerra was going to die; Pabalan asked Esguerra if he heard what the doctor said, and Esguerra replied that he had. The dying declaration itself showed that Esguerra realized he was about to die. Under these circumstances, Exhibit B was admissible as a dying declaration. As to the lack of translation, Rule 29 of the Rules of Courts of First Instance provides that documents written in an unofficial language shall not be admitted as evidence unless accompanied by an English or Spanish translation. The trial judge should have required the fiscal to submit a translation, but defense counsel did not object on that specific ground; the document was written in the language of the province where the crime was committed, and that language was known to the accused and his attorneys. There was no error, certainly no reversible error, in its admission. Nothing in the record justified the insinuation that Pabalan, a near relative of the deceased, perverted the dying man’s words because Siojo had filed administrative charges against him.
• Credibility and Sufficiency: No reversible error was found in the trial court’s assessment of credibility and sufficiency. The prosecution evidence, including the dying declaration and the testimonies of Julio Oreta and Alberto Domingo, sustained the findings against Siojo. The sentence was affirmed.

• Self-defense, complete and incomplete — Self-defense is unavailable to an accused who is the unlawful aggressor. One who provokes a fight, challenges the victim, and strikes the first blow cannot claim that he acted in defense of his person, even if the victim later retaliates with a weapon. In this case, Siojo provoked the encounter, challenged Esguerra, and struck him first; therefore, neither complete nor incomplete self-defense could be appreciated.
• Aggravating circumstance of contempt of or insult to public authority — This aggravating circumstance can exist only when the public authority is engaged in the exercise of his functions and is not the person against whom the crime is committed. It does not apply when the offended party is the public authority or agent himself. Here, Esguerra, the chief of police, was the offended party, and the information did not allege the complex crime of assault upon an agent of the authorities with homicide; the aggravating circumstance was therefore improperly appreciated.
• Dying declaration — A dying declaration is admissible when made under a consciousness of impending death. The declarant’s awareness may be shown by his statements and by the attending physician’s prognosis. In this case, Esguerra was told he was going to die and acknowledged it, and the declaration itself showed he realized his impending death; Exhibit B was thus admissible.
• Translation of documents in unofficial language — Under Rule 29 of the Rules of Courts of First Instance, documents in an unofficial language shall not be admitted unless accompanied by an English or Spanish translation. However, failure to attach a translation is not reversible error where the accused did not object on that specific ground and the language was known to him and his counsel. The Court applied this to Exhibit B, which was written in Tagalog.
• Voluntary surrender — Voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance requires that the accused voluntarily surrender to the authorities. It is not established where the authorities sought and arrested the accused, even if he handed over his firearms upon arrest. The Court found that Siojo was arrested by Lieut. Ferreol after the police requested Constabulary assistance, so voluntary surrender was not justified.

• "It is evident that in such a case there was no self-defense. Instead of the accused being the object of an unlawful aggression without provocation on his part, he was the aggressor, although the deceased had given him no provocation." — This passage states the ratio decidendi for rejecting Siojo’s claim of self-defense, complete or incomplete.
• "In the first place, the deceased was not a public authority, but an agent of the authorities." — This passage supports the rejection of the aggravating circumstance of contempt of or insult to public authority, because the offended party was an agent of the authorities rather than a public authority.
• "Under these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the document in question was admissible as the dying declaration of Gregorio Esguerra." — This passage states the Court’s holding on the admissibility of Exhibit B as a dying declaration.
• "Undoubtedly the trial judge should have required the fiscal to submit with Exhibit B an English or Spanish translation of it, but in view of the failure of defendant's attorneys to object to the admission of Exhibit B on that specific ground, and because of the particular facts of this case, namely, that the document in question is written in the language of the province where the crime was committed, and this language was known by the accused and his attorneys, there was no error, certainly no reversible error, in the admission of the document in question." — This passage defines the Court’s treatment of the missing translation and explains why its admission was not reversible error.

• Ahag vs. Cabiling, 18 Phil., 415 — Cited in connection with the translation of exhibits written in a language other than Spanish; the Court noted that it had previously considered documents in a Philippine dialect admitted without translation and directed that translations be submitted on appeal.
• U.S. vs. Rodriguez, 19 Phil., 150 — Cited for the rule that the aggravating circumstance of contempt of or insult to public authority can exist only when the public authority is engaged in the exercise of his functions and is not the person against whom the crime is committed. The Court used it to reject the aggravating circumstance against Siojo.

• Rule 29, Rules of Courts of First Instance — Provides that documents written in an unofficial language shall not be admitted as evidence unless accompanied by a translation into English or Spanish. The Court held that although the trial judge should have required a translation of Exhibit B, the failure to do so was not reversible error because no specific objection was made on that ground and the Tagalog language was known to the accused and his attorneys.

Avanceña, C.J., Abad Santos, Hull, and Diaz, JJ., concur.