People of the Philippine Islands vs. Salamuddin No. 1, et al.

Each conspirator in a robbery is liable for the homicide committed by a co-conspirator in repelling an attack upon the robbers while they are carrying away the stolen property, because such killing is an act done to ensure the completion of the robbery and to defend possession of the loot. The Basisten doctrine does not apply where the killing was committed for the complete and effective carrying out of the preconcerted robbery.

The prosecution arose from a robbery committed at a store, from which property belonging to Tan Chin Chuan, valued at P1,500, was taken. The deceased was Kalon. The defendants were Salamuddin No. 1, Pangilan, Lajim, Imadi, and Igasan.

According to the decision, Kalon stopped and attacked the offenders after they had already come out of the store where the robbery was committed and were carrying away the stolen goods. Two or three of them, doubtless those who were nearest, returned Kalon’s attack and killed him.

The Court of First Instance of Jolo found the crime alleged and proven to be robbery with homicide and convicted all five appellants. The case was brought to the Supreme Court on appeal.

• Scope of Appeal: Appellants’ counsel confined the appeal to Salamuddin No. 1, Pangilan, and Imadi insofar as they were found guilty of homicide and sentenced, and did not discuss the sufficiency of the evidence for the conviction of all appellants or the penalty imposed on Lajim and Igasan.
• Liability for Homicide: Appellants maintained that because the defendants conspired only to rob and not to kill Kalon, and because Salamuddin No. 1, Pangilan, and Imadi did not attack the deceased, those three should answer only for robbery and not for homicide.
• Reliance on Basisten: Appellants cited People vs. Basisten (47 Phil., 493) to support the contention that a conspirator is not liable for a killing outside the common plan.

• Liability of Co-Conspirators for Homicide: Whether appellants who conspired only to rob, and who did not personally attack the deceased, are liable for the homicide committed by their co-conspirators during the robbery.
• Applicability of People vs. Basisten: Whether the doctrine in People vs. Basisten, which absolved conspirators of a killing outside the common plan, applies where the killing occurred while the robbers were carrying away the stolen goods and repelling the deceased’s attack.
• Penalty and Circumstances: Whether the lower court correctly convicted the appellants of robbery with homicide under article 502 in relation to article 503, paragraph 1, of the Penal Code and properly considered the aggravating circumstances and the extenuating circumstance of age.

• Liability of Co-Conspirators for Homicide: Yes. Each conspirator answers for all acts of the others committed for the accomplishment of the common purpose; the killing of Kalon was done to repel an attack that endangered the robbery and to defend possession of the stolen goods, ensuring the robbery’s completion.
• Applicability of People vs. Basisten: No. Basisten is not applicable because there the homicide did not enter the common plan and was not necessary or incidental to the robbery, while here the homicide was committed for the complete and effective carrying out of the preconcerted robbery.
• Penalty and Circumstances: No error. The crime was robbery with homicide under article 502 in relation to article 503, paragraph 1, of the Penal Code; dwelling, nocturnity, and band were aggravating, while the age of Pangilan and Igasan was extenuating; the lower court did not abuse its discretion under section 106 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Jolo.

• Liability of Co-Conspirators for Homicide: The homicide was not outside the conspiracy. The deceased Kalon attacked the offenders after they had left the store and were carrying away the stolen goods. Two or three of them, doubtless the nearest, returned the attack and killed him. That act was done to repel an aggression which, if effective, would have endangered the whole success of the robbery; it was done to defend possession of the stolen property. It therefore tended to ensure the practical termination of the robbery and secure to the robbers the possession and enjoyment of the goods. Under settled jurisprudence, each conspirator answers for all acts of the others committed for the accomplishment of the common purpose. U.S. vs. Estabillo, U.S. vs. Ipil, and People vs. Cabrera were cited.
• Applicability of People vs. Basisten: In Basisten, the homicide committed by Emilio Huesca on Nicolas Soldevilla did not enter the common plan. The victim surrendered; the malefactors took the goods; then Huesca, without known motive and without the others’ knowledge, stabbed the victim. The killing was not necessary for the robbery, nor incidental to it, nor done to facilitate it or defend possession of the property. It could not be considered part of the common scheme. Here, by contrast, the killing was committed for the complete and effective carrying out of the preconcerted robbery. Thus Basisten did not control.
• Penalty and Circumstances: The crime alleged and proven was defined in article 502 of the Penal Code in connection with paragraph 1 of article 503. Dwelling, nocturnity, and band were present as aggravating circumstances. For Pangilan and Igasan, the extenuating circumstance of age applied because both were over 15 and under 18 years old when the crime was committed. The Court found no error in the judgment nor any abuse of discretion in the lower court’s taking into account in favor of the defendants section 106 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Jolo.

• Conspiracy — Liability of Co-Conspirators — Each conspirator is liable for all acts of the others committed in furtherance of the common purpose. Applied here, robbers who conspired to rob were liable for the homicide committed by co-conspirators in repelling Kalon’s attack while carrying away stolen goods, because the killing ensured the robbery’s completion and defended possession of the loot.
• Robbery with Homicide — Killing in Furtherance of Robbery — A killing is part of the robbery and attributable to all conspirators when committed for the complete and effective carrying out of the preconcerted robbery, even if the original agreement was only to rob. The Court found the killing of Kalon was done to repel an attack that endangered the robbery and to secure the stolen property.
• People vs. Basisten Doctrine — Homicide Outside Common Plan — Where the homicide did not enter the common plan, was not necessary or incidental to the robbery, and was not done to facilitate the robbery or defend possession of the stolen property, the co-conspirators are not liable for the homicide. The Court distinguished Basisten because the killing there was unrelated to the common purpose, unlike the killing here.
• Aggravating and Extenuating Circumstances — Dwelling, nocturnity, and band aggravated the crime; age over 15 and under 18 at the time of the crime was extenuating for Pangilan and Igasan. The Court affirmed the lower court’s consideration of section 106 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Jolo in favor of the defendants.

• “It should be borne in mind that in said case of People vs. Basisten, it clearly appeared that the homicide committed by Emilio Huesca on the person of Nicolas Soldevilla, one of the occupants of the assaulted house, did not enter into the common plan of the aggressors.” — This passage states the factual premise for distinguishing Basisten, where the killing was outside the conspirators’ common design.
• “In the case before us the deceased Kalon stopped and attacked the offenders when the latter had already come out of the store where the robbery was committed and were carrying away the stolen goods. Two or three of them, doubtless those who were nearest, returned Kalon's attack and killed him.” — This is the Court’s factual basis for holding that the killing was connected to the robbery and therefore attributable to the conspirators.
• “That act was done in order to repel an aggression which, had it been effective, would have endangered the whole success of the robbery committed; it was done, in the final analysis, in order to defend the possession of the stolen property.” — This is the ratio decidendi: the killing was an act in furtherance of the robbery, not a separate or unrelated homicide.
• “And it has been held time and again by this court that each conspirator answers for all acts of the others committed for this accomplishment of the common purpose.” — This is the canonical formulation of the conspiracy rule applied to hold all conspirators liable for the homicide.

• People vs. Basisten, 47 Phil., 493 — Cited by appellants for the proposition that conspirators are not liable for a homicide outside the common plan; distinguished by the Court because the killing there was not part of or incidental to the robbery, unlike the killing in this case.
• U.S. vs. Estabillo, 11 Phil., 150 — Cited by the Court in support of the rule that each conspirator answers for all acts of the others committed for the accomplishment of the common purpose.
• U.S. vs. Ipil, 27 Phil., 530 — Cited by the Court for the same rule on the liability of co-conspirators.
• People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil., 64 — Cited by the Court for the same rule on the liability of co-conspirators.

• Article 502, Penal Code — The Court identified the crime alleged and proven as that defined in article 502, which governs robbery with homicide. Applied to affirm the conviction for robbery with homicide.
• Article 503, paragraph 1, Penal Code — Read in connection with article 502, the provision supplied the penalty for the crime. The Court affirmed the penalties imposed on the appellants.
• Section 106, Administrative Code of Mindanao and Jolo — The lower court took this provision into account in favor of the defendants; the Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion in doing so.

Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Villa-Real, JJ., concurred. Romualdez, J., penned the opinion.