People of the Philippine Islands vs. Remedios de la Cruz

A woman who is suddenly grabbed from behind on a dark night by an unidentified man who seizes her breasts and private parts and attempts to throw her down is justified in using a pocket-knife to repel what she believes to be an attack on her honor, and is exempt from criminal liability, where she has no other means of defending herself. The justifying defense of honor, reinforced by the rule on mistake of fact, exempts her from criminal liability even if the assailant did not actually intend rape, provided her belief was not due to negligence or bad faith.

Remedios de la Cruz was an illiterate barrio girl, unable to write her name, scarcely eighteen years old, who sold fruit. Francisco Rivera, the deceased, had been making love to her and to another girl, Felicisima Sincaban.

On the evening of February 18, 1934, Francisco Ramos and his wife, Brigida Vistada; his sister, Baltazara Ramos; and a woman named Consuelo or Natividad Santoyo called at the house of Remedios de la Cruz and asked her to accompany them to a wake in honor of one Sion, who had died in the house of Maria Inguit. About nine o’clock, de la Cruz and her friends started home.

According to Enrique Bautista, about five minutes later the deceased Francisco Rivera, who had been playing cards at the wake, followed with Bautista. They overtook de la Cruz’s party. When they reached a narrow part of the path, Rivera went ahead of Bautista. At that time the members of de la Cruz’s party were walking in single file; Baltazara Ramos was in the lead and de la Cruz was the hindmost, about two brazas from the person immediately ahead of her. Francisco Ramos, the only one of de la Cruz’s companions called to testify, heard someone cry out “Aruy, Dios mio.” He went back and found Rivera stabbed under the right breast. The wounded man was taken to the hospital, where he died the next afternoon.

Francisco Ramos testified that it took him about two minutes to return to the place where Rivera was. He found Bautista with the wounded man, and de la Cruz had started back toward the house of mourning. He overtook her; she had a knife in her hand. When they reached the house of Maria Inguit, de la Cruz stuck the knife into a table and said that she stabbed Rivera because he embraced her.

The prosecution’s case rested on Bautista. According to him, de la Cruz waited on the right side of the path near some guava trees and stabbed Rivera with a knife in her right hand when he arrived in front of her; the injured man cried “Aruy, Dios mio,” while de la Cruz turned around and returned to the house of Maria Inguit, saying “Icao ay malaon na” (hacia tiempo ya). He further testified that de la Cruz stabbed the deceased before either of them had said anything; that the distance between him and the deceased was about one foot; and that he did not see any of de la Cruz’s companions after they reached the path and had to walk one behind the other.

De la Cruz testified that after they had passed a fork in the trail and reached a narrow part, a man suddenly threw his arms around her from behind, caught hold of her breasts and kissed her, and seized her private parts. She tried to free herself, but he held her and tried to throw her down. When she felt weak and could do nothing more against the man’s strength, she got a knife from her pocket, opened it, and stabbed him in defense of her honor. She said the man who attacked her did not say anything; she asked him who he was but he did not answer; when she was assaulted she cried for help, saying “Madre mia; Dios mio”; when she was seized she was about two brazas behind her nearest companion; and when she was face to face with her assailant during the struggle she could scarcely recognize his face in the darkness and could not be sure that it was Francisco Rivera. She further testified that she was engaged in selling fruit, and that the knife in question was in a pocket of the overcoat she was wearing that day; she had gone off with her friends without an opportunity to change her clothes.

The Court found Bautista’s testimony unbelievable because Francisco Ramos, a prosecution witness, testified that it was a dark night, and Bautista himself said that he could scarcely see anyone in the darkness and did not see any of de la Cruz’s companions. Evidence showed that the deceased had been making love to de la Cruz and also to another girl named Felicisima Sincaban, but the trial judge’s finding that Rivera and de la Cruz were engaged, that she was madly in love with him, and that she was extremely jealous of Felicisima Sincaban was not sustained by the evidence. De la Cruz stabbed the deceased only once, although she retained possession of the knife and could have inflicted other wounds if she had desired; she desisted as soon as he released her. A Constabulary officer went to see the injured man about eleven o’clock that night in the hospital, but it did not appear that Rivera told him anything about the circumstances of the stabbing. De la Cruz was an illiterate barrio girl, unable to write her name, and scarcely eighteen years old; the Court did not believe her story was a fabrication. Almost immediately after the incident, she said she stabbed Rivera because he embraced her, and it was not improbable that she was reluctant to relate the details in the presence of all the people in Maria Inguit’s house. The Court was convinced that the deceased did in fact grab hold of de la Cruz on the night in question.

• Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in giving absolute credit to the prosecution’s evidence, which was insufficient to support a conviction.
• Motive of Jealousy: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in declaring that jealousy was the motive that impelled her to attack Francisco Rivera.
• Credibility of the Accused: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in declaring her testimony incredible.
• Acquittal / Defense of Honor: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in not acquitting her, maintaining that she stabbed Rivera in defense of her honor after he suddenly embraced her from behind, seized her breasts and private parts, and attempted to throw her down.

• Credibility of Prosecution Evidence: Whether the trial court erred in giving absolute credit to the prosecution evidence despite its insufficiency to support conviction.
• Motive of Jealousy: Whether the trial court erred in finding that jealousy impelled the accused to attack the deceased.
• Credibility of the Accused: Whether the trial court erred in declaring the accused’s testimony incredible.
• Defense of Honor / Acquittal: Whether the accused is entitled to acquittal on the ground that she acted in defense of her honor when she stabbed the deceased.

• Credibility of Prosecution Evidence: Yes. The trial court erred in giving absolute credit to the prosecution evidence. Enrique Bautista’s testimony could not support conviction because the night was dark, he himself said he could scarcely see anyone, and he did not see the defendant’s companions.
• Motive of Jealousy: Yes. The finding that jealousy impelled the accused was not sustained by the evidence. The record showed only that the deceased had been making love to the accused and to Felicisima Sincaban.
• Credibility of the Accused: Yes. The trial court erred in declaring the accused’s testimony incredible. Her account was not a fabrication, and she immediately said she stabbed Rivera because he embraced her.
• Defense of Honor / Acquittal: Yes. The accused was justified in using the pocket-knife to repel what she believed to be an attack upon her honor, and she was exempt from criminal liability. The conviction was reversed and she was acquitted.

• Credibility of Prosecution Evidence: The prosecution’s case rested on Enrique Bautista, but his testimony could not support conviction. Francisco Ramos, a prosecution witness, testified that it was a dark night, and Bautista himself admitted that he could scarcely see anyone in the darkness and did not see any of de la Cruz’s companions. Because the alleged stabbing occurred in darkness and Bautista’s opportunity to observe was doubtful, the trial court erred in giving absolute credit to the prosecution evidence. The Court also noted that the Constabulary officer who saw the injured man at the hospital about eleven o’clock that night did not testify that Rivera told him anything about the circumstances of the stabbing. Thus, the prosecution evidence was insufficient.

• Motive of Jealousy: The trial judge found that Rivera and de la Cruz were engaged, that she was madly in love with him, and that she was extremely jealous of Felicisima Sincaban. The evidence showed only that the deceased had been making love to de la Cruz and also to Felicisima Sincaban; the finding of engagement, mad love, and extreme jealousy was not sustained by the record. The trial court therefore erred in declaring jealousy as the motive that impelled the accused to attack Rivera.

• Credibility of the Accused: The trial court erred in declaring de la Cruz’s testimony incredible. She was an illiterate barrio girl, unable to write her name, and scarcely eighteen years old. The Court did not believe her story was a fabrication. Almost immediately after the incident, she said she stabbed Rivera because he embraced her, and it was not improbable that she was reluctant to relate the details in the presence of all the people in Maria Inguit’s house. Her account was also consistent with her having stabbed the deceased only once and desisted as soon as he released her, despite retaining possession of the knife.

• Defense of Honor / Acquittal: The Court was convinced that the deceased did in fact grab hold of de la Cruz on the night in question. Whether he intended to rape her or not, the circumstances—dark night, sudden grab from behind without warning or identification, refusal to say who he was, touching of her private parts during the struggle, and her inability to free herself by strength alone—justified her in using the pocket-knife to repel what she believed to be an attack upon her honor, since she had no other means of defending herself. The Court cited United States vs. Ah Chong for the rule that a person is not criminally responsible when, by reason of a mistake of facts, he does an act for which he would be exempt if the facts were as he supposed them to be, provided the ignorance or mistake was not due to negligence or bad faith. It also cited United States vs. Santa Ana and Ramos for the rule that a woman in defense of her honor is justified in inflicting wounds on her assailant with a bolo she happens to be carrying, even though her cry for assistance might have been heard by people nearby. Although de la Cruz claimed to have cried for help and the record did not show her cries were heard by her companions, the Court still held her exempt from criminal liability, considering the suddenness of the grab and the fright it naturally caused. The conviction was therefore reversed and she was acquitted.

• Defense of Honor — A woman in defense of her honor is justified in inflicting wounds on her assailant with a weapon she happens to be carrying, even though her cry for assistance might have been heard by people nearby. In this case, the accused was grabbed from behind on a dark night, her breasts and private parts were seized, and she was unable to free herself by strength alone; she stabbed the deceased once with a pocket-knife and desisted as soon as he released her. The Court held her exempt from criminal liability.

• Mistake of Fact — A person is not criminally responsible when, by reason of a mistake of facts, he does an act for which he would be exempt if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but would constitute murder if he had known the true state of facts at the time, provided that the ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith. The Court applied this rule because the accused believed she was repelling an attack on her honor; even if the deceased did not actually intend rape, the circumstances made her belief reasonable and she was not negligent or in bad faith.

• “We are convinced from a study of the record that the deceased did in fact grab hold of the defendant on the night in question, and whether he intended to rape her or not, taking into consideration that it was a dark night and that the deceased grabbed her from behind without warning and without making himself known and refused to say who he was, and in the struggle that followed touched her private parts, and the fact that she was unable to free herself by means of her strength alone, we are of the opinion that she was justified in making use of the pocket-knife in repelling what she believed to be an attack upon her honor, since she had no other means of defending herself.” — This passage states the ratio decidendi: the accused’s belief that she was repelling an attack on her honor was reasonable under the circumstances, justifying her use of the pocket-knife.

• “In the case of the United States vs. Ah Chong (15 Phil., 488), this court held that a person is not criminally responsible when, by reason of a mistake of facts, he does an act for which he would be exempt if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but would constitute murder if he had known the true state of facts at the time, provided that the ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.” — This excerpt defines the mistake-of-fact rule relied upon by the Court to exempt the accused from criminal liability.

• “In the case of the United States vs. Santa Ana and Ramos (22 Phil., 249), this court held that a woman in defense of her honor is justified in inflicting wounds or her assailant with a bolo which she happens to be carrying, even though her cry for assistance might have been heard by people near by.” — This excerpt supplies the controlling precedent on defense of honor, which the Court applied to the accused’s use of a pocket-knife.

• “The appellant stabbed the deceased only once, although she retained possession of the knife, and undoubtedly could have inflicted other wounds on him if she had desired. In other words she desisted as soon as he released her.” — This passage supports the Court’s finding that the accused acted in defense of her honor and not from a criminal intent to kill.

• United States vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 488 — Cited for the rule on mistake of fact. The Court used it to support exemption from criminal liability where the accused acted on a mistaken belief that she was repelling an attack, provided there was no negligence or bad faith.
• United States vs. Santa Ana and Ramos, 22 Phil. 249 — Cited for the rule on defense of honor. The Court relied on it to hold that a woman may inflict wounds on her assailant with a weapon she happens to be carrying even if her cry for assistance might have been heard by people nearby.

Avanceña, C.J., Malcolm, Abad Santos, Imperial, Butte, and Diaz, JJ., concur.

• Hull, J. — Dissented on the ground that his colleagues, possibly through chivalry and compassion, gave much greater credence to the defendant’s tale than it justified; he was convinced that the trial judge, who heard her testify, more correctly appreciated the facts. Goddard, J., concurred.