People of the Philippine Islands vs. Praxedes Ayaya

An injury caused by accident, without any fault or intention to cause it, incurs no criminal liability when the act that produced it was a licit act done to free a person from a grave and imminent danger.

The accused, Praxedes Ayaya, was married to the deceased, Benito dela Cruz. The couple lived together in peace with no disagreements, either on or before the date of the incident. The case arose from an incident in the municipality of Pagbilao, Province of Tayabas, where the accused was charged with parricide under article 402 of the Penal Code for the death of her husband.

At about 1 o'clock in the morning of January 16, 1928, Jose Fajardo, the chief of police of Pagbilao, Tayabas, was informed by a policeman that one Benito de la Cruz was drunk, wounded, and vomiting in his house. The chief of police went to the place and found Benito lying in bed with a wound on his left eyelid, unconscious and unresponsive to questions. When his wife, the defendant Praxedes Ayaya, was questioned as to the cause of the wound, she replied that she herself had jabbed her husband with an umbrella. Health officer Victoriano Litonjua was called and, upon examining Benito, found a bleeding wound on the left upper eyelid, dilated pupils, and signs of drunkenness from the odor of his breath and his vomiting. The wounded man was later taken to the provincial hospital of Tayabas, where he died four days after the incident.

Health officer Litonjua and Dr. G. Santos Cuyugan, the director of the provincial hospital, expressed different opinions as to the cause of death. Litonjua believed the cerebral hemorrhage was due to alcoholic excesses, while Doctor Cuyugan, who performed the autopsy, declared that the wound was caused by a blunt instrument and that death was caused by the cerebral hemorrhage produced by the wound in the forehead, expressly stating that Litonjua's opinion was erroneous.

The prosecution's evidence consisted of Exhibit A, the sworn statement filed by the accused with the justice of the peace of Pagbilao; Exhibit B, the umbrella used by the defendant; Exhibit C, the report of the autopsy signed by Doctor Cuyugan; and Exhibit D, the death certificate. In her sworn statement, the accused stated that at about 8 o'clock at night on January 15, 1928, she, her husband, and her son Emilio drank tuba in the store of one Felicidad Losloso, after which they went to a cinema. While returning home, her drunk husband gave her a blow which she dodged, and he then went home ahead of her and her son. When they arrived, they found the door closed, and when they pushed it, her husband inside prevented it from opening. The door gave way somewhat, and her son Emilio succeeded in putting his head between the opening of the door and the wall. To prevent the door from crushing him, she pushed it, and when Benito poked his head out of the opening, she jabbed him with the umbrella she carried, though she did not know where she jabbed him. When she and her son finally entered the house, they found Benito already in bed with a wound in the forehead.

In her testimony, the accused substantially repeated her sworn statement, adding that when the door was opened and her son put his head between the opening and the wall, she jabbed her husband with her umbrella with a downward motion to prevent the door from crushing her son's head, though she could not tell if she touched him. She stated she did not know how the wound in her husband's forehead was caused. This point of her testimony was not contradicted by any evidence to the contrary and was corroborated by her son Emilio, who also testified at trial. Both the defendant and her son testified that the husband and wife did not quarrel in the street while returning home that night and that they lived together in peace with no disagreements during their marriage.

• Wound Not Caused by Appellant: The appellant argued that the trial court erred in holding that the deceased's wound on the left upper eyelid was caused by her.
• Wound Not the Immediate Cause of Death: Supposing, without admitting, that the wound was really caused by the appellant, she argued that the lower court erred in concluding that said wound was the immediate cause of the deceased's death and consequently in convicting her.
• Reasonable Doubt: The appellant argued that the lower court erred in not acquitting her, at least, for reasonable doubt.

• Prosecution's Case: The Attorney-General, as appellee, relied on the prosecution's evidence consisting of the accused's sworn statement, the umbrella used, the autopsy report, and the death certificate to support the conviction for parricide.

• Causation of the Wound: Whether the trial court erred in holding that the deceased's wound on the left upper eyelid was caused by the appellant.
• Immediate Cause of Death: Whether the wound inflicted by the appellant was the immediate cause of the deceased's death.
• Criminal Liability: Whether the appellant should be acquitted on the ground that the injury was caused by accident without fault or intention.

• Causation of the Wound: Yes, the wound was caused by the appellant, as she herself admitted in her sworn statement and testimony that she jabbed her husband with her umbrella.
• Immediate Cause of Death: Yes, the wound was the immediate cause of death, as Doctor Cuyugan's autopsy report declared that death was caused by the cerebral hemorrhage produced by the wound in the forehead.
• Criminal Liability: No. The appellant incurred no criminal liability under article 8, No. 8 of the Penal Code because the injury was caused by mere accident, without any fault or intention to cause it, as she acted to free her son from imminent danger.

• Causation of the Wound: The Court accepted the declaration of the defendant that she jabbed her husband with her umbrella in order to prevent the door from closing and crushing her son's head, which was inserted between the door and the wall of the house. The Court found nothing improbable in this statement, and given the absence of any reasonable motive to prompt the defendant to injure her husband, it concluded that in thrusting her umbrella in the opening of the door, she did so to free her son from the imminent danger of having his head crushed or being strangled.

• Immediate Cause of Death: The Court relied on Doctor Cuyugan's autopsy report, which declared that the wound was caused by a blunt instrument and that death was caused by the cerebral hemorrhage produced by the wound in the forehead, rejecting health officer Litonjua's opinion that the hemorrhage was due to alcohol.

• Criminal Liability: The Court held that if the defendant caused her husband's injury, it was by a mere accident, without any fault or intention to cause it. Under article 8, No. 8 of the Penal Code, no criminal liability is incurred when the act is a licit act done to free a person from grave danger, and the resulting injury was accidental. The Court cited the Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of November 30, 1888, in support of this principle.

• Accident as an Exempting Circumstance — Under article 8, No. 8 of the Penal Code, a person incurs no criminal liability when the injury caused is by mere accident, without fault or intention. The Court applied this doctrine where the accused's act of thrusting her umbrella to free her son from imminent danger of having his head crushed was a licit act, and the resulting injury to her husband was accidental.

• "We find nothing improbable in this statement and if we add to this the absence of any reasonable motive to prompt said defendant to injure her husband, we are compelled to conclude that in thrusting her umbrella in the opening of the door in question, she did so to free her son from the imminent danger of having his head crushed or being strangled; and if she thus caused her husband's injury, it was by a mere accident, without any fault or intention to cause it." — This passage states the Court's core reasoning for acquitting the accused, establishing that the injury was accidental and without fault.
• "This being so, we believe that she incurred no criminal liability in accordance with article 8, No. 8, of the Penal Code, because, it being a licit act to free her son from the grave danger threatening him, and the fact of having touched the left eye of her husband, who was behind the door, with the end of her umbrella, does not make her criminally liable." — This passage articulates the controlling doctrine of accident as an exempting circumstance under the Penal Code.

• Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of November 30, 1888 — Cited as controlling authority for the principle that a licit act done to free a person from grave danger, resulting in accidental injury, does not give rise to criminal liability.

• Article 402, Penal Code — The provision under which the accused was charged with parricide for killing her husband.
• Article 8, No. 8, Penal Code — The exempting provision applied by the Court, providing that no criminal liability is incurred when an injury is caused by mere accident, without fault or intention, in the performance of a licit act.

Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Ostrand, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concurred.