People of the Philippine Islands vs. Modesto Silang Cruz

An ante-mortem statement is admissible even though the declarant did not expressly state that he had given up all hope of living, where the circumstances — his very serious condition and his death a few hours later — establish with certainty that he was of the conviction that he was dying. Corollarily, one who admits killing another must establish self-defense clearly and sufficiently; and passion and obfuscation, to mitigate guilt, must spring from a legitimate and sufficient cause and from lawful feelings.

Modesto Silang Cruz and Calixto Perea were rivals for the affections of Asuncion Hernandez, with Perea favoring the courtship of his friend Cornelio Enriquez. The prosecution proceeded under the Penal Code then in force, which penalized homicide in article 404, governed extenuating circumstances in article 9, prescribed the graduation of penalties in article 81, and provided for accessory penalties in article 59.

Modesto Silang Cruz and Calixto Perea were both suitors of Asuncion Hernandez, and Perea favored the courtship of his friend Cornelio Enriquez. It was this rivalry in courtship that the defense would later invoke as the source of the passion and obfuscation said to have attended the killing.

The defendant inflicted wounds upon Calixto Perea, among them a wound in the abdomen, which caused the latter's death. The infliction of the fatal wounds by the defendant was not disputed at any stage of the proceedings; what the defense contested was the character of the act, the accused claiming that he had acted in self-defense.

While still alive and gravely wounded, Perea gave a statement, marked as Exhibit A, before the justice of the peace. During the taking of that statement he asked the justice of the peace to let him rest because he felt very ill on account of his wounds. He died a few hours later. Exhibit A contained no express averment by Perea that he had given up all hope of living or that he felt he was dying.

The trial court admitted Exhibit A as an ante-mortem statement, found that the defendant had not acted in self-defense, and convicted him of homicide. It further found in his favor two extenuating circumstances: that he had acted from an impulse so powerful as to produce passion and obfuscation, and that he had lacked the intent to commit so great a wrong as that committed. On the basis of these findings the trial court imposed the lighter penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor. The Supreme Court, reviewing the record, found that Perea had been in a very serious condition when he gave Exhibit A and that he died a few hours thereafter, and concluded that he had been of the conviction that he was dying notwithstanding the absence of any express declaration to that effect.

• Admissibility of Exhibit A: The defense opposed the judgment on the ground that the trial court erred in admitting document Exhibit A as an ante-mortem statement, the declarant not having stated therein that he had given up all hope of living.
• Self-Defense: The defense maintained that the trial court should have found that the defendant acted in self-defense and, consequently, should have acquitted him.

• Passion and Obfuscation: The Attorney-General, for the appellee, argued that the trial court erred in holding that the appellant acted from an impulse so powerful as to produce passion and obfuscation, merely because the deceased favored his friend Cornelio Enriquez's courting of Asuncion Hernandez, whom the appellant also courted.
• Lack of Intent to Commit So Great a Wrong: The Attorney-General argued that the third extenuating circumstance of article 9 of the Penal Code could not be considered in favor of the defendant, since the wound in the deceased's abdomen and the weapon used by the appellant manifest the intent to kill.

• Ante-Mortem Statement: Whether Exhibit A was admissible as an ante-mortem statement notwithstanding that the declarant did not state that he had given up all hope of living.
• Self-Defense: Whether the defendant established clearly and sufficiently that he committed the killing in self-defense.
• Passion and Obfuscation: Whether the deceased's preference for a rival suitor in the courtship of Asuncion Hernandez constituted a legitimate and sufficient cause of passion and obfuscation mitigating the defendant's guilt.
• Lack of Intent to Commit So Great a Wrong: Whether the extenuating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so great a wrong as that committed attended the killing.
• Penalty: What penalty should be imposed upon the defendant, no aggravating circumstance being present.

• Ante-Mortem Statement: Yes. Exhibit A was properly admitted; an express declaration that the declarant had lost all hope of living is not indispensable, his conviction of impending death being deducible with certainty from his very serious condition and his death a few hours after giving the statement.
• Self-Defense: No. The killing being undisputed, the burden lay on the accused to establish self-defense clearly and sufficiently, and his failure to do so left the homicide without an explanation compatible with his innocence.
• Passion and Obfuscation: No. A rival's preference in courtship is not a legitimate and sufficient cause of passion and obfuscation, which must in any event originate from lawful feelings.
• Lack of Intent to Commit So Great a Wrong: No. The weapon employed and the abdominal wound manifest the intent to kill, and no great or obvious disproportion exists between the means and circumstances of the attack and its consequences.
• Penalty: Reclusion temporal in its medium degree, there being no aggravating circumstance to consider; the accused was sentenced to fourteen years, eight months and one day, with indemnity of 1,000 to the heirs, the accessory penalties of article 59, and costs.

• Ante-Mortem Statement: The objection rested on the silence of Exhibit A as to any declaration by Calixto Perea that he had given up all hope of living. The Court held that such an express declaration is not essential. The record showed that Perea was in a very serious condition, so much so that while testifying he asked the justice of the peace to let him rest because he felt very ill on account of his wounds, and that he died a few hours later. From these circumstances the Court deduced with certainty that, although he did not express in so many words that he felt he was dying and had lost all hope of surviving, he was nonetheless of that conviction. This was sufficient for admissibility as an ante-mortem statement, consistently with People vs. Chan Lin Wat (50 Phil., 182).

• Self-Defense: The killing of Calixto Perea by the defendant was not disputed. It was therefore incumbent upon the latter to establish clearly and sufficiently that he committed the act in self-defense, as held in U.S. vs. Coronel (30 Phil., 112) and People vs. Baguio (43 Phil., 683). The defense was not proved in the proceedings. Accordingly, the homicide of which the defendant was undoubtedly guilty remained without an explanation compatible with his innocence, and he had to answer for the death before the law.

• Passion and Obfuscation: The circumstance was rejected on two grounds. First, the fact that the deceased favored a rival of the defendant in his courtship of Asuncion Hernandez did not constitute a legitimate and sufficient cause of the passion and obfuscation that mitigates guilt; under U.S. vs. Herrera (13 Phil., 583) and U.S. vs. Fitzgerald (2 Phil., 419), the accused must have been actuated by causes both strong and powerful as naturally produce passion and obfuscation, and causes that merely give rise to the excitement inherent in combatants are not sufficient. Second, the obfuscation must originate from lawful feelings (U.S. vs. Flores, 28 Phil., 29). The act of the deceased was not enough to obfuscate the defendant, who had no right to prevent others from courting the Hernandez woman or the deceased from favoring that courtship.

• Lack of Intent to Commit So Great a Wrong: The circumstance could not be deemed present considering the weapon employed by the defendant and the part of the deceased's body upon which it was used. There being no great or obvious disproportion between the means and circumstances of the attack and its consequences, the extenuating circumstance found by the trial court was unsupported, in line with U.S. vs. Rodriguez (23 Phil., 22).

• Penalty: With both extenuating circumstances eliminated and no aggravating circumstance to be taken into consideration, the penalty for homicide under article 404 of the Penal Code had to be imposed in its medium degree, pursuant to article 81, rule 1, of the Penal Code, as recommended by the Attorney-General. The judgment appealed from was accordingly modified.

• Ante-Mortem Statement Without Express Declaration of Lost Hope — The admissibility of an ante-mortem statement does not depend on the declarant's express statement that he has given up all hope of living. It is enough that the circumstances of the case permit the deduction, with certainty, that the declarant was of the conviction that he was dying. In this case, the declarant's very serious condition, his request during the taking of the statement that he be allowed to rest because he felt very ill from his wounds, and his death a few hours later, sufficed to establish that conviction and to render Exhibit A admissible.

• Burden of Proof in Self-Defense — Where the killing is not disputed, it is incumbent upon the accused to establish clearly and sufficiently that he committed the act in self-defense. Absent such proof, the homicide remains without an explanation compatible with the innocence of the accused, and he must answer for the death before the law. The defense in this case was held not proved.

• Requisites of Passion and Obfuscation — For passion and obfuscation to mitigate criminal liability, (a) the accused must have been actuated by causes both strong and powerful as naturally produce passion and obfuscation, mere causes giving rise to the excitement inherent in combatants being insufficient; and (b) the obfuscation must originate from lawful feelings. A suitor has no right to prevent others from courting the same woman, nor to resent the deceased's favoring of a rival's courtship; such circumstances therefore do not constitute a legitimate and sufficient cause.

• Lack of Intent to Commit So Great a Wrong — This extenuating circumstance is not present where the weapon employed and the part of the body struck manifest the intent to kill, and where there is no great or obvious disproportion between the means and circumstances of the attack and its consequences.

• Graduation of Penalty Absent Modifying Circumstances — Where no aggravating circumstance attends the commission of the offense, the penalty prescribed by law must be imposed in its medium degree, pursuant to article 81, rule 1, of the Penal Code.

• "It is true that in Exhibit A, Calixto Perea, the wounded man, did not state that he had given up all hope of living; but the evidence shows that he was in a very serious condition, so much so, that while testifying, he asked the justice of the peace to let him rest, because he felt very ill on account of his wounds." — This passage frames the evidentiary question and identifies the circumstances from which the declarant's consciousness of impending death was inferred, supplying the factual predicate for the ruling on admissibility.
• "although he did not express in so many words that he felt he was dying and that he had lost all hope of surviving the mishap, still he was of that conviction. And this is sufficient for its admissibility as an ante-mortem statement, as held by this court in the case of People vs. Chan Lin Wat (50 Phil., 182)" — This is the ratio decidendi on ante-mortem statements: an express declaration of lost hope is unnecessary where the conviction of impending death may be deduced with certainty from the circumstances.
• "Inasmuch as it is not disputed that Calixto Perea was killed by the defendant, it is incumbent on the latter to establish clearly and sufficiently that he committed the act in self-defense" — This states the canonical formulation of the burden of proof resting on an accused who admits the killing but pleads self-defense.
• "the accused must have been actuated by such causes, both strong and powerful, as naturally produced passion and obfuscation, and those cause which merely give rise to the excitement inherent in combatants are not sufficient. Furthermore, the obfuscation must originate from lawful feelings" — This passage sets out the twin requisites of the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, which the Court applied to reject the trial court's finding.

• People vs. Chan Lin Wat, 50 Phil. 182 — Cited as the controlling authority for the admissibility of an ante-mortem statement notwithstanding the absence of an express declaration by the declarant that he had lost all hope of living.
• U.S. vs. Coronel, 30 Phil. 112 and People vs. Baguio, 43 Phil. 683 — Cited for the rule that the accused bears the burden of establishing self-defense clearly and sufficiently once the killing is shown or admitted.
• U.S. vs. Herrera, 13 Phil. 583 and U.S. vs. Fitzgerald, 2 Phil. 419 — Cited for the requirement that passion and obfuscation be produced by causes both strong and powerful, and that causes merely giving rise to the excitement inherent in combatants do not suffice.
• U.S. vs. Flores, 28 Phil. 29 — Cited for the requirement that the obfuscation originate from lawful feelings.
• U.S. vs. Rodriguez, 23 Phil. 22 — Cited for the rule that the extenuating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so great a wrong requires a great or obvious disproportion between the means and circumstances of the attack and its consequences.

• Article 404, Penal Code — Defines and penalizes homicide; the provision under which the defendant was held guilty after the extenuating circumstances were eliminated and self-defense was rejected.
• Article 9, Penal Code — Enumerates the extenuating circumstances; invoked by the trial court for passion and obfuscation and for lack of intent to commit so great a wrong, both of which the Court held inapplicable.
• Article 81, rule 1, Penal Code — Governs the graduation of penalties; applied to impose the penalty in its medium degree, there being no aggravating circumstance to consider.
• Article 59, Penal Code — Provides for accessory penalties; imposed upon the defendant in addition to the principal penalty.

Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Villamor, Johns, and Villa-Real, JJ.