People of the Philippine Islands vs. Luague

A woman who kills an aggressor to repel an imminent attempt to rape acts in legitimate self-defense under Article 11(1) of the Revised Penal Code and is exempt from criminal liability, where the killing is the only means left to protect her honor from such an outrage. A co-accused cannot be convicted where the prosecution fails to prove conspiracy or any participation in the act.

Natividad Luague and Wenceslao Alcansare, spouses, were charged with homicide in the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros for the death of Paulino Disuasido. The case required application of Article 11(1) of the Revised Penal Code, which exempts from criminal liability a person acting in defense of person or rights, and of the principle that a woman's honor is among the rights protected by that exempting circumstance.

On February 18, 1935, Natividad Luague was in her house in Lupuhan, barrio of Agpañgi, municipality of Calatrava, Occidental Negros, with only her three children of tender age for company. Her husband and co-accused Wenceslao Alcansare had gone to grind corn in Juan Garing's house several kilometers away. Paulino Disuasido came and began to make love to her. When Natividad could not dissuade him from his purpose, she started for the kitchen, but Paulino followed her despite her refusal. He drew and opened a knife, threatened her with death, embraced her, and touched her breasts. As he prepared to lie with her, he left the knife on the floor. Natividad picked up the weapon and stabbed him in the abdomen. Paulino ran away, jumped through the window, and fell on some stones. Natividad immediately set forth for the poblacion to surrender herself to the authorities and report the incident.

The prosecution contended that Wenceslao, thinking Paulino had made unchaste advances to his wife, was jealous and decided to get rid of him. According to the prosecution, Paulino passed in front of the spouses' house with his friend Olimpio Libosada; Natividad invited Paulino to drop in; the spouses met them at the threshold; Natividad asked Paulino if he had a knife and borrowed it to cut her nails; while cutting her nails, she asked where he came from; when he turned his head, she slashed his abdomen; Wenceslao picked up a stone and struck Paulino in the forehead; Paulino fled.

The government presented Pablo Alvarez, Angel Emia, and Olimpio Libosada. Alvarez, barrio lieutenant of Cabuñgahan, testified that the day before the crime Natividad told him she wanted his help because her husband was jealous of Paulino and maltreating her, and was resolved to assault Paulino at sight. The next day he dropped by the spouses' house to ask for tobacco seeds, left, and later learned Paulino had been stabbed. Angel Emia testified that he saw the crime, but he had previously stated that he did not know who had stabbed Paulino; he could not satisfactorily explain the contradiction. Olimpio Libosada claimed that he accompanied Paulino and saw the events, but Paulino's two statements before his death did not mention him; he did nothing to help Paulino, did not report the crime, and disappeared, saying that he was afraid to be implicated.

The trial court gave unusual importance to the testimony of two policemen who made an ocular inspection and found no bloodstain in the kitchen of the spouses' house, which the trial court believed destroyed the defense theory that Paulino was stabbed in the kitchen when he tried to lie with Natividad through intimidation and violence. The policemen also found no bloodstain on the threshold where the prosecution claimed the aggression took place. The trial court properly disregarded Exhibits C and D, the two statements styled ante mortem by the Solicitor-General, because there was no evidence that they were made under a sense of impending death and with no hope of recovery.

• Defense of Honor / Self-Defense: The defense maintained that Paulino was stabbed in the kitchen by Natividad when he tried to lie with her through intimidation and violence.
• Prayer for Acquittal: The appellants appealed the judgment and prayed that it be reversed and that they be acquitted.

• Conspiracy and Jealousy: The prosecution theorized that Wenceslao, jealous of Paulino's advances, conspired with Natividad to kill Paulino; Natividad invited Paulino, borrowed his knife under the pretext of cutting her nails, slashed him in the abdomen, and Wenceslao struck him with a stone.
• Witness Testimony: The government presented Pablo Alvarez, Angel Emia, and Olimpio Libosada to establish the killing.
• Ante Mortem Statements: The Solicitor-General styled Exhibits C and D as ante mortem statements.

• Legitimate Self-Defense / Defense of Honor: Whether Natividad Luague acted in legitimate self-defense, or under the exempting circumstance in Article 11(1) of the Revised Penal Code, when she stabbed Paulino Disuasido after he attempted to rape her.
• Participation and Conspiracy of Wenceslao Alcansare: Whether Wenceslao Alcansare conspired with or participated in the killing of Paulino Disuasido.
• Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence: Whether the prosecution's evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions, considering the credibility of its witnesses and the trial court's reliance on the absence of bloodstains and the ante mortem statements.

• Legitimate Self-Defense / Defense of Honor: Yes. Natividad acted in legitimate self-defense under Article 11(1) of the Revised Penal Code; the attempt to rape was an aggression sufficient to place her in legitimate defense, and the killing was the only means left to protect her honor.
• Participation and Conspiracy of Wenceslao Alcansare: No. The prosecution failed to establish conspiracy or any participation; Wenceslao had no participation in the act.
• Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence: No. The prosecution's theory was unsubstantial; its witnesses were unreliable or uncorroborated, and the trial court erred in crediting them and in relying on the absence of bloodstains.

• Legitimate Self-Defense / Defense of Honor: Article 11(1) of the Revised Penal Code exempts from criminal liability one who acts in defense of person or rights. The Court adopted Viada's view that the right to honor is included among the rights protected, and that an attempt to rape a woman constitutes an aggression sufficient to put her in legitimate defense. A woman's honor is as precious as, if not more than, her existence; the offense impresses an indelible blot. The Spanish Supreme Court decision of February 21, 1911 was cited as similar. On the facts, Natividad was alone with her three small children; her husband was away; Paulino made love to her, followed her to the kitchen, drew and opened a knife, threatened her with death, embraced her and touched her breasts, and was preparing to lie with her, leaving the knife on the floor. She picked up the knife and stabbed him in the abdomen. The Court concluded that all requisites of the exempting circumstance were present and that she acted in legitimate self-defense.
• Participation and Conspiracy of Wenceslao Alcansare: The prosecution's conspiracy theory was a trifle unsubstantial. If the spouses had conspired, they would have prepared weapons; instead the weapon was Paulino's own knife and a stone casually picked up. If Wenceslao were jealous, the natural reaction would be to avenge the affront himself, not have his wife execute the plan at hazard to her life and liberty. Witness Pablo Alvarez's conduct was strange: he had been told the husband would get even, saw them together, and did nothing; if Natividad complained, she would have sought the Agpañgi barrio lieutenant, not Alvarez of Cabuñgahan; she instead reported directly to municipal authorities. Angel Emia contradicted his prior statement disclaiming knowledge; the trial judge erred in crediting him. Olimpio Libosada's testimony was uncorroborated and inherently weak; he did nothing to help Paulino, did not report the crime, and disappeared with a frivolous excuse; Paulino's ante mortem statements did not mention him. Thus no conspiracy or participation was established.
• Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence: The trial court gave unusual importance to the policemen's testimony that no bloodstain was found in the kitchen. This was error because the policemen also found no bloodstain on the threshold where the prosecution claimed the aggression occurred; the testimony contradicted the prosecution as much as the defense. The ante mortem statements Exhibits C and D were properly disregarded because there was no evidence that they were made under a sense of impending death and with no hope of recovery. The prosecution's evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions.

• Legitimate self-defense / defense of honor under Article 11(1), Revised Penal Code — A woman who, to repel an imminent attempt to rape, wounds or kills the offender acts in legitimate self-defense and is exempt from criminal liability. The right to honor is a right protected by the exempting circumstance; an attempt to rape is an aggression sufficient to place the woman in a state of legitimate defense; the killing is exempt when it is the only means left to protect her honor from such an outrage. Applied to Natividad.
• Conspiracy must be proved by competent and credible evidence — The prosecution's conspiracy theory failed because it rested on improbable conduct, unprepared weapons, and unreliable witnesses; no overt act or common design was established. Applied to Wenceslao.
• Ante mortem statements require proof of impending death — A dying declaration is admissible only when made under a sense of impending death and without hope of recovery; absent such proof, Exhibits C and D were properly disregarded.
• Presumptions of fact — When the truth is beyond reach, courts may rely on the probable; acts out of the ordinary conduct of men are devoid of probability. The Court used this to discredit Alvarez's testimony.

• "aside from the right to life on which rest the legitimate defense of our person, we have the right to party acquired by us, and the right to honor which is not the least prized of man's patrimony." — The Court adopts Viada's view that legitimate self-defense includes defense of honor, not merely life or person.
• "It is evident that a woman who, imperiled, wounds, nay kills the offender, should be afforded exemption from criminal liability provided by this article and subsection since such killing cannot be considered a crime from the moment it became the only means left for her to protect her honor from so great an outrage." — This states the ratio for treating the killing as exempt from criminal liability.
• "In resume, we are of the opinion that we should, as we do hereby hold that the accused Natividad Luague in wounding Paulino Disuasido to death, acted in legitimate self-defense, and that the other accused Wenceslao Alcansare had no participation in said act; wherefore, reversing the appealed judgment, we hereby acquit both accused, and order their immediate release, if in confinement, with costs de oficio." — This is the final holding and dispositive portion of the decision.

• Supreme Court of Spain decision, February 21, 1911 — Cited by the Court as a similar case; it held that a woman acted in legitimate self-defense in defense of her honor when she repelled an imminent affront, and the Court used it to support Natividad's exemption.

• Article 11, subsection 1, Revised Penal Code — The exempting circumstance for legitimate self-defense; applied to exempt Natividad from criminal liability for stabbing Paulino.
• Article 8, subsection 4, Spanish Penal Code — Cited in the quoted Spanish Supreme Court decision as the analogous provision on legitimate self-defense in defense of honor.

Avanceña, C.J.; Abad Santos, J.; Hull, J.; Vickers, J.