People of the Philippine Islands vs. Lol-lo and Saraw

Piracy is a crime against all mankind, not against any particular state, and may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy, unlike all other crimes, has no territorial limits, and it does not matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes."

The case arose in the context of the early American colonial period in the Philippines, following the cession of the islands by Spain to the United States through the Treaty of Paris. The Spanish Penal Code, including its provisions on piracy in Articles 153 to 156, continued in force under the principles of public law governing the transfer of territory, as municipal laws providing for the punishment of crime remain effective until altered or repealed by the new sovereign. The United States Constitution authorized Congress to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and the U.S. Congress had enacted legislation punishing piracy as defined by the law of nations.

On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left Matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta, another Dutch possession. One boat carried a single individual, a Dutch subject, while the second boat carried eleven men, women, and children, likewise subjects of Holland. After several days of navigation, at about 7 o'clock in the evening, the second boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies, where it was surrounded by six vintas manned by twenty-four armed Moros.

The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, they took for themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated two of the women by methods too horrible to be described. All of the persons on the Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young women, were again placed on it and holes were made in it, with the idea that it would submerge. As a matter of fact, these people, after eleven days of hardship and privation, were succored. After violating the women, the Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro marauders were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro, the two women were able to escape.

Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands, where they were arrested and charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy. The proven facts were not disputed on appeal, and all of the elements of the crime of piracy were found to be present.

• Lack of Jurisdiction: The appellants, through counsel de officio, contended that the Court of First Instance was without jurisdiction over the offense charged, and that no court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over the crime.

• No Public Offense: The appellants argued that the facts did not constitute a public offense under the laws in force in the Philippine Islands, apparently questioning whether the Spanish Penal Code provisions on piracy remained effective after the American occupation.

• Jurisdiction Over Piracy: The appellee maintained that Philippine courts had jurisdiction over the crime of piracy, as pirates are hostes humani generis — enemies of all mankind — and piracy may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found.

• Continued Force of Penal Code: The appellee argued that the provisions of the Spanish Penal Code dealing with piracy remained in force in the Philippines, as municipal laws providing for the punishment of crime continue until altered or repealed by the new sovereign.

• Jurisdiction: Whether the Court of First Instance of Sulu had jurisdiction over the crime of piracy committed within the territorial waters of a foreign state.

• Continued Force of Penal Code Provisions: Whether Articles 153 to 156 of the Spanish Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy were still in force in the Philippines after the cession of the islands to the United States.

• Proper Penalty: Whether the penalty of death or life imprisonment should be imposed upon the appellants given the aggravating and mitigating circumstances present.

• Jurisdiction: Yes. Philippine courts had jurisdiction over the crime of piracy. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind, and it may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy, unlike all other crimes, has no territorial limits.

• Continued Force of Penal Code Provisions: Yes. Articles 153 and 154 of the Spanish Penal Code were held to be still in force in the Philippines. Wherever "Spain" is mentioned, it should be substituted by the words "United States," and wherever "Spaniards" are mentioned, the word should be substituted by the expression "citizens of the United States and citizens of the Philippine Islands."

• Proper Penalty: Death penalty for Lol-lo; life imprisonment affirmed for Saraw. The crime fell under the first paragraph of Article 153 in relation to Article 154, with at least two qualifying circumstances present: the crime was accompanied by an offense against chastity and the abandonment of persons without apparent means of saving themselves. At least three aggravating circumstances — deliberate augmentation of wrong, advantage of superior strength, and employment of means adding ignominy — could not be offset by the sole mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction.

• Jurisdiction: The Court reasoned that pirates are in law hostes humani generis — enemies of all mankind. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind, and may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy, unlike all other crimes, has no territorial limits. As it is against all, so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes," citing U.S. vs. Furlong.

• Continued Force of Penal Code Provisions: The Court applied the general rules of public law recognized and acted on by the United States relating to the effect of a transfer of territory. The political law of the former sovereignty is necessarily changed, but the municipal law, in so far as it is consistent with the Constitution, the laws of the United States, or the characteristics and institutions of the government, remains in force. Laws subsisting at the time of transfer, designed to secure good order and peace in the community, which are strictly of a municipal character, continue until by direct action of the new government they are altered or repealed. The Court cited the Instructions of President McKinley of May 19, 1898, to General Wesley Merritt, which stated that municipal laws providing for the punishment of crime are considered as continuing in force so far as they are compatible with the new order of things. The Court found that the articles of the Spanish Penal Code dealing with piracy were meant to include the Philippine Islands, and that the provisions were not inconsistent with the corresponding provisions in force in the United States. The U.S. Congress had provided that whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life, leaving the definition of piracy to rest on its universal conception under the law of nations.

• Proper Penalty: The crime fell under the first paragraph of Article 153 of the Penal Code in relation to Article 154. At least two of the circumstances named in Article 154 were present: the crime of piracy was accompanied by (1) an offense against chastity and (2) the abandonment of persons without apparent means of saving themselves. The trial court found present the one aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, compensated by the one mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction. However, the Court found at least three additional aggravating circumstances: that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary for its commission, that advantage was taken of superior strength, and that means were employed which added ignominy to the natural effects of the act. Considering the number and importance of the qualifying and aggravating circumstances, which could not be offset by the sole mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction, and the horrible nature of the crime committed, the Court found it its duty to impose capital punishment.

• Piracy as a Crime Against All Mankind — Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility. Pirates are in law hostes humani generis — enemies of all mankind. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind, and may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy, unlike all other crimes, has no territorial limits. The Court applied this doctrine to uphold Philippine jurisdiction over a crime committed within the territorial waters of a foreign state, as the offenders were found in the Philippines.

• Continued Force of Municipal Laws Upon Transfer of Territory — The political law of the former sovereignty is necessarily changed upon transfer of territory, but the municipal law, in so far as it is consistent with the Constitution, the laws of the new sovereign, or the characteristics and institutions of the government, remains in force. Laws subsisting at the time of transfer, designed to secure good order and peace in the community, which are strictly of a municipal character, continue until by direct action of the new government they are altered or repealed. The Court applied this principle to hold that the Spanish Penal Code provisions on piracy remained in force in the Philippines after the cession to the United States.

• Construction of "Spain" and "Spaniards" in the Penal Code — By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States. A logical construction of articles of the Penal Code would be that wherever "Spain" is mentioned, it should be substituted by the words "United States," and wherever "Spaniards" are mentioned, the word should be substituted by the expression "citizens of the United States and citizens of the Philippine Islands." The Court applied this rule of construction to Article 153 of the Penal Code, making the crime of piracy committed against citizens of the United States and citizens of the Philippine Islands, or the subjects of another nation not at war with the United States, punishable with cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.

• "Pirates are in law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all." — This passage articulates the canonical formulation of the universal jurisdiction doctrine over piracy, which is the cornerstone of the Court's ruling on jurisdiction.

• "Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, 'for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes.'" — This statement establishes that even commission of piracy within a foreign state's territorial waters does not defeat Philippine jurisdiction, citing U.S. vs. Furlong.

• "We hold those provisions of the Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably articles 153 and 154, to be still in force in the Philippines." — This is the Court's direct holding on the continued force of the Spanish Penal Code provisions on piracy after the American occupation.

• "Considering, therefore, the number and importance of the qualifying and aggravating circumstances here present, which cannot be offset by the sole mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction, and the horrible nature of the crime committed, it becomes our duty to impose capital punishment." — This passage states the Court's reasoning for imposing the death penalty despite the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction.

• U.S. vs. Furlong (1820), 5 Wheat., 184 — Cited as authority for the proposition that the 3-mile territorial limit, though neutral to war, is not neutral to crimes, supporting the exercise of jurisdiction over piracy committed within a foreign state's territorial waters.

• Chicago, Rock Islands, etc., R. Co. vs. McGlinn (1885), 114 U.S., 542 — Cited as authority for the general rules of public law on the effect of transfer of territory, specifically that municipal laws of a strictly municipal character continue until altered or repealed by the new government.

• United States vs. Smith (1919), 39 Phil., 533 — Cited as a prior Philippine case applying similar reasoning in construing the word "authority" in the Penal Code to have a limited meaning consistent with the new sovereign, supporting the Court's construction of "Spain" and "Spaniards" in the piracy provisions.

• Article 153, Spanish Penal Code — Defined the crime of piracy committed against Spaniards or the subjects of another nation not at war with Spain, punishable with cadena temporal to cadena perpetua. The Court construed this provision to apply to crimes committed against citizens of the United States and citizens of the Philippine Islands, or subjects of another nation not at war with the United States.

• Article 154, Spanish Penal Code — Provided for the penalty of cadena perpetua or death when piracy was accompanied by qualifying circumstances, including seizure of a vessel by boarding or firing, murder or physical injuries, offenses against chastity, abandonment of persons without means of saving themselves, or when the offender was the captain or skipper of the pirates. The Court found at least two of these circumstances present: offense against chastity and abandonment of persons.

• Article 11, Spanish Penal Code (as amended) — Provided for the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction, which the Court considered but found insufficient to offset the multiple aggravating circumstances present.

• Article 156, Spanish Penal Code — Provided that for purposes of applying the Code, every person who, according to the Constitution of the Monarchy, has the status of a Spaniard shall be considered as such. The Court used this provision to support the applicability of the Code to Filipinos.

• U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Clause 10 — Declared that Congress shall have the power to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations. The Court cited this to show that the U.S. Congress left the definition of piracy to rest on its universal conception under the law of nations.

• U.S. Criminal Code, Section 290 — Provided that whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life. The Court cited this to demonstrate that the Philippine Penal Code provisions were not inconsistent with corresponding U.S. provisions.

• Act No. 2726 — The statute governing the imposition of the death penalty when the vote of the Court is not unanimous, which resulted in the affirmation of the life imprisonment sentence for Saraw and the imposition of the death penalty for Lol-lo.

Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concurred.

• Justice Romualdez — Registered his nonconformity with the imposition of the death penalty upon Lol-lo, although the Court noted that the vote upon the sentence was unanimous with regard to the propriety of the death penalty for Lol-lo. The dissent is not further elaborated in the text.