People of the Philippine Islands vs. Lojo, Jr.

When a single act constitutes two distinct crimes — here, homicide and assault upon an agent of authority — the penalty for the more serious crime is imposed in its maximum degree, pursuant to Article 89 of the Penal Code, and the defendant's deliberate disregard of a traffic officer's signal to stop, followed by flight and concealment, establishes malice and criminal intent.

Manuel Lojo, Jr. operated an automobile in the City of Manila during the period when the Spanish Penal Code (as modified) and the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila governed criminal liability and traffic regulation, respectively. The provisions on assault upon agents of authority (Articles 249 and 250) and the rule on complex crimes (Article 89) of the old Penal Code were central to the disposition, as was section 1139 of the Revised Ordinances concerning traffic violations. The deceased, Nicanor Constantino, was a member of the Manila Police Department assigned to traffic enforcement duty on Juan Luna Street near Pretil Bridge.

At about 3:30 a.m. on January 18, 1928, dancers Maria Lingat and Natalia Tanchico, having finished their engagement at the Lerma Cabaret, contracted with Manuel Lojo, Jr. to drive them in his automobile to Manila for a meal. Lojo seated Maria Lingat between himself and Natalia Tanchico, started the engine, and drove with his right hand while placing his left arm around both passengers. As the car approached Pretil Bridge on Juan Luna Street heading toward the City of Manila, it was running at great speed with one of its front lights off.

Policeman Nicanor Constantino, standing in the middle of the road, raised his club as a signal for Lojo to stop. Instead of obeying, Lojo headed straight for the policeman without diminishing his speed, striking him so that Constantino sprawled upon the radiator of the car, fell onto the left running board, and was hurled to the ground, dying instantly from a fractured skull and multiple internal and external injuries. When Maria Lingat saw that the car had run over the policeman, she shouted at Lojo to stop; he instead accelerated and told her, "Shut up, and don't tell anybody." Upon reaching the corner of Solis Street in Manila, another policeman, Pelagio C. de las Alas, who was on duty there, likewise signalled Lojo to stop, but Lojo again disregarded the order and sped away.

Testifying in his own behalf, Lojo admitted running over the deceased but claimed by way of defense that upon approaching Pretil Bridge and seeing a policeman in the middle of the street, he tried to steer to the right but the policeman moved in the same direction, causing the collision. He further stated that he did not stop afterward for fear of being roughly treated by people in the vicinity. The trial court rejected this account, finding beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant had deliberately disregarded the officer's signal and continued at full speed.

• Factual Finding on Police Signal: The appellant contended that the lower court erred in finding as fact that the deceased policeman was in the middle of the street with one hand raised, signalling the defendant to stop.
• Liability for Homicide: The appellant argued that the lower court erred in finding him guilty of consummated homicide and in sentencing him to fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, with indemnity to the deceased's heirs in the sum of ₱1,000.
• Penalty for Ordinance Violation: The appellant asserted that the lower court erred in sentencing him to six months' imprisonment and a fine for violating section 1139 of Revised Ordinances No. 1600 of the City of Manila.
• Exculpatory Defense: The appellant alleged that he attempted to avoid the collision by turning aside and that he failed to stop afterward only out of fear of being roughly treated by bystanders.

• Factual Finding on Police Signal: Whether the lower court correctly found that the deceased policeman was in the middle of the street, signalling the defendant to stop.
• Criminal Liability for Homicide: Whether the defendant is criminally liable for the homicide of the policeman he ran over, and whether his defense of attempted avoidance negates criminal intent.
• Complex Crime Classification: Whether the defendant's single act of running over the policeman constitutes the complex crime of assault upon an agent of authority with homicide.
• Ordinance Violation: Whether the defendant is guilty of violation of section 1139 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila.

• Factual Finding on Police Signal: Yes. The evidence established beyond reasonable doubt that the policeman stood in the middle of the road and raised his club as a signal to stop, which the defendant disregarded.

• Criminal Liability for Homicide: Yes. The defendant acted with full knowledge of his act and its consequences, and with malice, making him criminally liable as a principal by direct participation in the crime of homicide; his defense of attempted avoidance was untenable.

• Complex Crime Classification: Yes. The single act constituted both homicide and assault upon an agent of authority, and under Article 89 of the Penal Code the penalty for the more serious crime — homicide — is imposed in its maximum degree, resulting in a sentence of eighteen years reclusion temporal.

• Ordinance Violation: Yes. The conviction for violation of section 1139 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila was affirmed in its entirety.

• Factual Finding on Police Signal: The facts were proven beyond reasonable doubt at the hearing. The policeman was stationed in the middle of the road and raised his club as a signal to stop. The defendant, driving at great speed with one front light off, was plainly visible to and had clear notice of the officer's command. The trial court's factual finding on this point was sustained on appeal, the defendant's own testimony having admitted seeing the policeman in the middle of the street.

• Criminal Liability for Homicide: The defendant's defense — that he tried to steer right but the policeman moved in the same direction — was rejected as untenable. Traffic regulations obliged him to slacken speed and obey the officer's order upon seeing the signal. His continued speed with the policeman directly ahead, and his failure to obey, showed indifference to whether he ran over the agent of authority. His consciousness of guilt was further demonstrated by his failure to report the incident to the next policeman he encountered (Pelagio C. de las Alas), his disobedience of that officer's order to stop, and his instruction to Maria Lingat to keep silent. A driver who, going at great speed, sees a policeman in his path signalling him to stop, pays no attention, and goes straight for the officer, killing him instantly, cannot claim lack of intent, because within the limits of human foresight such an act could produce no other result. The defendant's steering movement at the last moment was not voluntary but a mere automatic reflection of the policeman's own evasive movement, and thus did not negate criminal intent.

• Complex Crime Classification: The act committed by the defendant constituted not only homicide but also the crime of assault upon an agent of authority, defined and penalized under Article 249, paragraph 2, in connection with Article 250, paragraph 1, of the Penal Code, the deceased policeman being actually engaged in the performance of his official duties when the incident occurred. Because a single act produced two crimes, Article 89 of the Penal Code required that the penalty for the more serious crime — homicide — be imposed in its maximum degree. The trial court had imposed only the medium degree of reclusion temporal (fourteen years, eight months and one day); the Supreme Court accordingly modified the judgment to impose eighteen years reclusion temporal, the maximum degree.

• Ordinance Violation: The appealed judgment in the ordinance violation case was affirmed in its entirety, the defendant's conduct — driving at excessive speed with a front light off and disobeying traffic signals — having clearly violated section 1139 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila.

• Complex Crime (Article 89, old Penal Code) — When a single act constitutes two or more crimes, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed in its maximum degree. Applied here: the defendant's act of running over the policeman constituted both homicide and assault upon an agent of authority; homicide being the more serious crime, its penalty (reclusion temporal) was imposed in the maximum degree — eighteen years.

• Assault upon an Agent of Authority (Articles 249 and 250, old Penal Code) — An assault committed upon an agent of authority while actually engaged in the performance of official duties is separately penalized. Applied here: the deceased policeman was signalling the defendant to stop in the discharge of his traffic-enforcement functions when he was struck and killed.

• Presumption of Intent from the Nature of the Act — A person who performs an act that, within the limits of human foresight, could produce no other result than what occurred is presumed to have intended that result and cannot claim lack of criminal intent. Applied here: the defendant's act of driving at great speed directly toward a plainly visible officer and failing to stop or slow down could only result in running over the officer; his last-moment steering was deemed an involuntary reflex, not a negation of intent.

• "A chauffeur who, going at great speed, sees in the middle of the road directly in his path a policeman signalling him with the hand to stop, pays no attention to the order nor lessens the speed of his car, but goes straight for said policeman, runs over him, and kills him instantly, cannot pretend that he did not intend to cause the evil that he did; because, even within the limits of human foresight such an act could not produce any other result than what took place." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi on criminal intent: the deliberate disregard of a traffic officer's signal at high speed establishes malice and foreknowledge of the consequences, precluding a defense of lack of intent.

• "The act committed by the defendant constitutes, furthermore, the crime of assault upon an agent of authority, defined and penalized in article 249, paragraph 2, in connection with article 250, paragraph 1, of the Penal Code, the deceased policeman being actually engaged in the performance of his official duties when the accident occurred." — This passage establishes the legal basis for classifying the act as a complex crime, identifying the second offense (assault upon an agent of authority) that, together with homicide, triggers the application of Article 89's maximum-penalty rule.

• Article 249, paragraph 2, Penal Code (old) — Defined and penalized the crime of assault upon an agent of authority; applied because the deceased policeman was engaged in the performance of his official duties when struck by the defendant's automobile.

• Article 250, paragraph 1, Penal Code (old) — Read in connection with Article 249, paragraph 2, to establish the penalty for assault upon an agent of authority in the circumstances of the case.

• Article 89, Penal Code (old) — Governed complex crimes arising from a single act; provided that when one act constitutes two or more crimes, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed in its maximum degree. Applied to impose the maximum period of reclusion temporal (eighteen years) for the complex crime of assault upon an agent of authority with homicide.

• Section 1139, Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila (Revised Ordinances No. 1600) — Penalized traffic violations; the defendant was convicted thereunder for driving at excessive speed with a front light off and for disobeying traffic signals, sentenced to six months' imprisonment and a fine of ₱200.

Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, and Romualdez, JJ., concurred.