People of the Philippine Islands vs. Juan Moreno

A driver convicted under section 67(d) of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law for reckless driving resulting in death is punished under that provision, and the Revised Penal Code’s civil indemnity and subsidiary imprisonment provisions apply supplementarily under article 10 because the Motor Vehicle Law contains no contrary provision.

Juan Moreno drove automobile No. 1-9925-Manila, in which Eulogio Pabalan, Aurelio Lee, and Fabian Pabalan were passengers. The governing statutes were the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, Act No. 3992, effective January 1, 1933, which regulated reckless operation and fixed penalties for accidents causing death or serious bodily injury, and the Revised Penal Code, effective January 1, 1932, which contained general provisions on criminal and civil liability. The appeal required application of the Motor Vehicle Law’s penalty provision alongside the Penal Code’s provisions on indemnity and subsidiary imprisonment.

On August 17, 1933, Juan Moreno and Aurelio Lee traveled from San Pedro Makati to Manila in Moreno’s automobile. They stopped at a Chinese store on Tejeron Street to drink gin, proceeded to the San Lazaro Jockey Club, and then to the house of the Pabalan brothers, where Fabian Pabalan joined them. The three then went to the Bureau of Labor to fetch Eulogio Pabalan. While waiting for Eulogio, Moreno remained in the automobile and slept. When the group was ready to leave, Lee drove the automobile until Sañgandaan, Caloocan, where Moreno relieved him.

Eulogio sat on the left side, Lee between Eulogio and Moreno, and Fabian in the rumble seat. As soon as Moreno took the wheel, he drove very fast and the automobile’s course was crooked. His companions protested and asked him to stop and let them out, but he did not heed them. Continuing in a reckless manner, Moreno approached a curve leading to a concrete bridge in Meycauayan, violently struck the bridge railing, and crushed the left side of the automobile. Eulogio sustained injuries and died the same day; Fabian and Lee were also injured.

The defense contended that as they approached the bridge they saw a truck coming from the opposite direction, that the deceased became frightened and pulled Moreno’s left sleeve, causing the automobile to swerve left, and that Moreno swerved right to avoid falling into the river, striking the bridge in the process. This account was not sustained by the evidence. In a sworn statement before the justice of the peace of Meycauayan, Moreno said only that he saw another car entering the bridge, placed his car on the left side, and struck the bridge when he turned, without mentioning that the deceased pulled his sleeve. At trial, he described a truck coming from the opposite direction after a sharp curve and said he veered right to avoid falling into the river or a precipice, causing the left part of his car to hit a bridge post. The claim that Eulogio pulled his sleeve was not made until it was suggested by leading questions at trial.

Aurelio Lee, Moreno’s compadre, testified that when they saw the truck, Eulogio touched the accused with his left hand; that Moreno swerved left, then right upon seeing the automobile was about to fall into the river. The statement that the deceased touched Moreno with his left hand was improbable because Eulogio was seated on the left side and Lee sat between Eulogio and Moreno. Lee also testified that he was frightened because his compadre kept entering the bridge at considerable speed. The trial court found that the accident resulted from Moreno’s reckless negligence in approaching the bridge at high speed on a curve, and the Supreme Court agreed with that finding.

• Negligence Finding: Appellant argued that the lower court erred in holding that the collision of the automobile with the foot of the bridge was due to his negligent driving.
• Emergency Maneuver: Appellant maintained that the lower court erred in not finding that the collision was due to his efforts to prevent the automobile from falling into the river, thereby endangering his life and the lives of the other passengers.
• Guilt: Appellant argued that the lower court erred in finding him guilty of the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence.
• Blame on the Deceased: Appellant’s principal contention was that when they approached the bridge they saw a truck coming toward them, the deceased became frightened and pulled his left sleeve, causing the automobile to swerve to the left, and that he suddenly swerved to the right to avoid the river, striking the bridge in the maneuver. The decision noted that this effort to place the blame on the deceased was not sustained by the evidence.

• Reckless Negligence: Whether the collision and the resulting death of Eulogio Pabalan were caused by the accused’s reckless negligence in driving the automobile.
• Guilt for Homicide Through Reckless Negligence: Whether the accused was correctly found guilty of homicide through reckless negligence.
• Governing Penalty: Whether the penalty should be imposed under section 67(d) of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law rather than article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Civil Indemnity and Subsidiary Imprisonment: Whether the accused may be ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased and suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency although the Revised Motor Vehicle Law contains no such provision.

• Reckless Negligence: Yes. The accident resulted from the accused’s reckless negligence in approaching the bridge at high speed on a curve; the defense attributing the collision to the deceased’s act was not sustained by the evidence.
• Guilt for Homicide Through Reckless Negligence: Yes. The acts alleged and proved constituted a violation of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, and the conviction for homicide through reckless negligence was affirmed.
• Governing Penalty: Section 67(d) of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law governs. It supersedes the corresponding Revised Penal Code provision on penalty for accidents resulting in death or serious bodily injury from negligence or reckless or unreasonably fast driving.
• Civil Indemnity and Subsidiary Imprisonment: Yes. Articles 100 and 39 of the Revised Penal Code apply supplementarily under article 10 because the Revised Motor Vehicle Law contains no contrary provision.

• Reckless Negligence: The accident was found to result from reckless negligence in approaching the bridge at high speed on a curve. The evidence showed that as soon as Moreno took the wheel he drove very fast and the automobile’s course was crooked; his companions protested and asked to be let out, but he did not heed them; and he continued driving recklessly until he violently struck the bridge railing. The defense’s claim that Eulogio Pabalan pulled Moreno’s left sleeve was not credible: Moreno did not mention it in his sworn statement before the justice of the peace, raised it only through leading questions at trial, and Aurelio Lee’s testimony that the deceased touched Moreno with his left hand was improbable because Eulogio was seated on the left side and Lee sat between Eulogio and Moreno.
• Guilt for Homicide Through Reckless Negligence: Section 52 of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law prohibits operating a motor vehicle on any highway recklessly or without reasonable caution, considering the width, traffic, grades, crossings, curvatures, visibility, and other conditions of the highway, or so as to endanger property or the safety or rights of any person. Section 67(d) provides that if, as a result of negligence or reckless or unreasonably fast driving, an accident occurs resulting in death or serious bodily injury, the driver or operator at fault shall, upon conviction, be punished by imprisonment for not less than fifteen days nor more than six years. The acts alleged and proved thus constituted a violation of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law.
• Governing Penalty: The lower court’s penalty of one year and one day was not in accordance with article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that when death is caused by imprudence or negligence and with a violation of the Automobile Law, the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and maximum period, or from two years, four months, and one day to six years. Section 67(d) of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, however, supersedes the corresponding provision of the Revised Penal Code with respect to the penalty in cases of accidents resulting in death or serious bodily injury as a consequence of negligence or reckless or unreasonably fast driving. An indeterminate sentence of not less than two years and not more than four years was therefore imposed.
• Civil Indemnity and Subsidiary Imprisonment: Although the Revised Motor Vehicle Law contains no provision for indemnity or subsidiary imprisonment and repeals all other acts or parts of acts contrary to its provisions, article 10 of the Revised Penal Code provides that offenses punishable under special laws are not subject to the Code, but the Code is supplementary to such laws unless the latter specially provide the contrary. Article 100 provides that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable, and article 39 provides for subsidiary personal liability if the convict has no property to meet the reparation of damages. These provisions were held applicable to a person found guilty of violating the Revised Motor Vehicle Law because there is nothing contrary in that law. The general provisions on indemnity and subsidiary imprisonment were also not affected by the approval of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law. Reliance was placed on United States vs. Velazquez, United States vs. Lafuente, and United States vs. Ondaro to support the award of indemnity and subsidiary imprisonment.

• Supplementary application of the Revised Penal Code to special laws — Under article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, offenses punishable under special laws are not subject to the Code, but the Code is supplementary to such laws unless the latter specially provide the contrary. This rule was applied to the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, with the result that the Penal Code’s provisions on civil indemnity and subsidiary imprisonment remained applicable because the Motor Vehicle Law contained no contrary provision.
• Civil liability arising from criminal liability — Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code provides that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. This civil liability, including indemnification of the heirs of the deceased, was held to attach to a conviction for reckless driving causing death under the Revised Motor Vehicle Law.
• Subsidiary imprisonment for non-payment of civil indemnity — Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code imposes subsidiary personal liability on a convict who has no property with which to meet the reparation of damages, at the rate of one day for each two pesos and fifty centavos, subject to the rules in that article. Subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency was upheld, not exceeding one-third of the principal penalty.
• Reckless driving causing death under the Revised Motor Vehicle Law — Section 52 prohibits reckless operation of a motor vehicle, and section 67(d) punishes a driver whose negligence or reckless or unreasonably fast driving causes an accident resulting in death or serious bodily injury. It was held that section 67(d) supersedes the corresponding Revised Penal Code penalty for such accidents.

• "We entirely agree with the finding of the lower court that the accident resulted from defendant's reckless negligence in approaching the bridge at high speed on a curve." — This passage states the Court’s affirmance of the factual finding on reckless negligence, rejecting the defense attempt to shift blame to the deceased passenger.
• "It is clear therefore that the acts of the defendant as alleged and proved constitute a violation of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, and that he should have been sentenced in accordance with section 67 (d) thereof, because it supersedes the corresponding provision of the Revised Penal Code with respect to the penalty in cases of accidents resulting in death or serious bodily injury to any person as a consequence of negligence or reckless or unreasonably fast driving." — This is the ratio on the governing penalty, holding that section 67(d) of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law controls over the corresponding Revised Penal Code penalty provision.
• "We are of the opinion therefore that although the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, Act No. 3992, is a special law, the provisions of article 100 and article 39 of the Revised Penal Code are applicable to a person found guilty of a violation of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, because of the provision of article 10 of the Revised Penal Code that the Code shall be supplementary to special laws under which offenses are punishable, unless the latter shall specially provide the contrary, and there is nothing to the contrary in the Revised Motor Vehicle Law." — This passage is the central ruling on civil indemnity and subsidiary imprisonment, applying the Revised Penal Code supplementarily to a conviction under the Revised Motor Vehicle Law.
• "The penalty of one year and one day imposed by the lower court is not in accordance with article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that when the death of a person shall be caused by imprudence or negligence and with a violation of the Automobile Law, the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and maximum period, or from two years, four months, and one day to six years." — This excerpt explains why the lower court’s penalty was incorrect and frames the penalty issue resolved by the Court.

• United States vs. Velazquez, 33 Phil. 368 — Cited for the principle that a special law which expressly repealed certain Penal Code articles did not affect the general principles embodied in articles 119, 120, and 121 of the Penal Code regarding indemnification, supporting the continued application of the Penal Code’s general provisions on civil liability.
• United States vs. Lafuente, 37 Phil. 671 — Cited as reaffirming the right to indemnification in cases involving special laws.
• United States vs. Ondaro, 39 Phil. 70 — Cited as a case where the accused, found guilty of embezzlement, was ordered to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P34.90 or to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, supporting the imposition of both indemnity and subsidiary imprisonment.

• Section 52, Revised Motor Vehicle Law (Act No. 3992) — Prohibits operating a motor vehicle on any highway recklessly or without reasonable caution considering width, traffic grades, crossings, curvatures, visibility, and other conditions, or so as to endanger property or the safety or rights of any person or cause excessive damage. Applied to Moreno’s fast and crooked driving.
• Section 67(d), Revised Motor Vehicle Law (Act No. 3992) — Provides that if, as a result of negligence or reckless or unreasonably fast driving, an accident occurs resulting in death or serious bodily injury, the driver or operator at fault shall, upon conviction, be punished by imprisonment for not less than fifteen days nor more than six years. Held to govern the penalty and to supersede the corresponding Revised Penal Code penalty.
• Article 10, Revised Penal Code — Provides that offenses punishable under special laws are not subject to the Code, but the Code is supplementary to such laws unless the latter specially provide the contrary. Used to apply the Penal Code’s civil liability and subsidiary imprisonment provisions to the Revised Motor Vehicle Law.
• Article 100, Revised Penal Code — Provides that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Applied to uphold the P1,000 indemnity to the heirs of Eulogio Pabalan.
• Article 39, Revised Penal Code — Provides that if the convict has no property with which to meet the reparation of damages, he shall be subject to subsidiary personal liability at the rate of one day for each two pesos and fifty centavos, subject to the rules in the article. Applied to impose subsidiary imprisonment not exceeding one-third of the principal penalty.
• Article 365, Revised Penal Code — Provides that when death is caused by imprudence or negligence and with a violation of the Automobile Law, the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and maximum period, or from two years, four months, and one day to six years. The lower court’s penalty was noted as not in accordance with this article, but section 67(d) of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law superseded the corresponding penalty provision.

Avanceña, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Villa-Real, Hull, Butte, Goddard, and Diaz, JJ., concurred. Justice Imperial issued a separate concurring and dissenting opinion, and Justice Abad Santos dissented; their separate opinions are summarized below.

• Justice Imperial — Concurred in the conclusion that the defendant was guilty of violating section 67(d) of Act No. 3992 and in the imprisonment penalty, but dissented from the additional imposition of P1,000 indemnification with subsidiary imprisonment. He reasoned that the information was filed under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code; the facts fell under both article 365 and section 67(d); and section 67(d) was applied because its penalty was more favorable to the defendant. The indemnity and subsidiary imprisonment were not authorized by the Revised Motor Vehicle Law. Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code refers only to special laws, and the Revised Motor Vehicle Law is a general law, not a special law, because it applies to all persons of a class who violate its terms. If the Legislature intended the accessory penalties of the Penal Code to apply, it should have expressly provided so; instead, section 74 of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law repealed all contrary acts or parts of acts.
• Justice Abad Santos — Agreed with Justice Imperial that there was no legal warrant for sentencing the appellant to indemnify the heirs of Eulogio Pabalan in the sum of P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The imposition of such accessory penalty was not authorized by Act No. 3992, under which the appellant was sentenced, and could not be justified under article 10 of the Revised Penal Code. The supplementary clause was too general and vague to justify an additional penalty under article 39 in relation to article 100. Penal statutes should be construed strictly in favor of the accused, and doubts resolved in favor of liberty. The Spanish text of article 10 uses “supletorio,” meaning that which supplies the lack of another thing; Act No. 3992 was complete in itself and had no defect to be supplied. The majority’s effect was to add something to the law, which was unjustified, especially because it deprived a citizen of liberty.