People of the Philippine Islands vs. Jose Rubio

A search warrant for books, invoices, and records is valid where the supporting depositions establish probable cause and the description, though general, is as specific as the circumstances allow; the seizure does not violate the constitutional guarantees against unreasonable searches and self-incrimination where it is not made solely to obtain evidence but to prevent further fraud and under the public interest in regulating the property.

Jose Rubio was the manager of the Simplex Trading Corporation, whose premises at No. 129 Calle Juan Luna, Binondo, Manila, were the subject of an internal revenue investigation. Internal revenue agents acted under the police power granted by section 1434 of the Administrative Code, while the constitutional guarantees invoked were paragraphs 3 and 11 of section 3 of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act. The procedural requirements for search warrants were set out in sections 95 to 99 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, including probable cause, oath, examination of witnesses, and particular description of the place and things to be seized.

Jose Rubio was the manager of the Simplex Trading Corporation and occupied premises at No. 129 Calle Juan Luna, District of Binondo, City of Manila. Internal revenue agents Juan Evaristo, chief secret service agent, and Augusto Piccio, supervising agent, gave testimony under oath before Judge Revilla. They specified the premises occupied by Rubio, manager of the Simplex Trading Corporation, which they desired to search. The witnesses stated, among other things, that it had been reported by a person considered reliable that fraudulent books, invoices, and records were in the premises, and that the house had been watched personally several times in company of the complainant, with the assertion that prohibited fraudulent books, invoices, and records existed and were being conducted there, and that the occupant kept fraudulent books of the Simplex Trading Corporation and subsidiary companies Paramount Trading Corporation and New York Trading Corp.

Upon probable cause shown, Judge E. P. Revilla issued a search warrant on December 26, 1930. The warrant was in the usual form, directed to internal revenue agents of the City of Manila, and recited proof by affidavit by Juan Evaristo and Augusto Piccio that Jose Rubio keeps illegally and feloniously fraudulent books, invoices and records, and that they believed upon probable cause that the books, invoices and records at No. 129 Calle Juan Luna were being used in the commission of felony. It commanded the agents to enter the dwelling house in the day time or in the night time and diligently search for fraudulent books, invoices and records, and to seize and bring them before the court.

On the same day, internal revenue agents proceeded to the place indicated, searched the premises, and took books, invoices, and documents belonging to the Simplex Trading Corporation, of which Rubio was manager. Rubio then moved to declare the search warrant null and void and to have the seized books, invoices, and records returned. The trial court denied the motion after receiving memoranda but without taking evidence. In its order, the trial court noted that the documents and papers seized from Rubio were delivered by internal revenue agents to the City Fiscal, who instituted criminal case No. 41563, alleging that Rubio, using the documents and papers, sought to defraud the Government; the trial court reasoned that the documents were used as instruments or agencies to perpetrate frauds against the Government, that the public had an interest in them to prevent further frauds, and that the fiscal’s complaint constituted proof of probable cause that the documents were used for such ends.

On appeal, the record showed that an information was filed against Rubio charging him with a violation of the Customs Law, and that he compromised another case with the Bureau of Internal Revenue on payment of P100,000. The prosecution maintained that the search and seizure were made under internal-revenue laws and the authority of a search warrant, not for the purpose of obtaining evidence, but to seize instruments used in violation of those laws and to prevent the use of the books, documents, and papers in further offenses or fraud against the Government. No evidence in the record showed that the Government used the books, documents, and papers as evidence against Rubio or ever intended to do so.

• Validity of the Search Warrant: Rubio assigned as error that the lower court erred in not holding the search warrant illegal and void for failure to observe the constitutional and statutory provisions providing for its issue. He contended that the warrant was issued without the complainants or any witnesses having been examined and that the application and warrant did not particularly describe the things to be seized.
• Retention of Seized Property: Rubio assigned as error that the lower court erred in holding that even if the warrant were illegal and void, his books and papers might be retained because they were proper subjects for seizure under a search warrant.
• Seizure Solely for Evidence: Rubio assigned as error that the lower court erred in not holding that the seizure of his books and papers was made solely for the purpose of using them as evidence against him in a criminal prosecution and was therefore unlawful. He claimed the books, invoices, and records were property one may lawfully possess and were searched and seized solely to prove an offense against internal revenue and customs laws.
• Reliance on Precedents: Rubio relied on Regidor vs. Araullo, Uy Kheytin vs. Villa-Real, and United States vs. De los Reyes and Esguerra, and after the U.S. Supreme Court’s Lefkowitz opinion was received, urged that it was controlling.

• Purpose of Seizure: The prosecution maintained that the search and seizure were made under the internal-revenue laws and the authority of a search warrant, not for the purpose of obtaining evidence, but with a view to seizing the instruments used in the violation of those laws committed by Rubio.
• Prevention of Further Fraud: On appeal, the prosecution persistently maintained that the seizure was made with the object of preventing the use of the books of account, documents, and papers in the commission of further offenses or fraud against the Government.

• Validity of the Search Warrant: Whether the search warrant was illegal and void for failure to observe the constitutional and statutory provisions governing its issuance, including the examination of complainants or witnesses and the particular description of the things to be seized.
• Retention of Seized Property: Whether the lower court erred in holding that even if the warrant were illegal and void, appellant’s books and papers might be retained because they were proper subjects for seizure under a search warrant.
• Seizure Solely for Evidence: Whether the seizure of appellant’s books and papers was made solely for the purpose of using them as evidence against him in a criminal prosecution and was therefore unlawful.
• Applicability of Lefkowitz: Whether the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in United States vs. Lefkowitz controlled and required invalidation of the search and seizure.

• Validity of the Search Warrant: No. The requirements of law were substantially, and even literally, complied with; the depositions show the complainants and witnesses were examined, and the description “fraudulent books, invoices and records” was sufficient as circumstances allowed.
• Retention of Seized Property: No reversible error. The agents strictly obeyed the warrant by seizing only the property described, and the public interest in preventing further fraud and regulating the books supported retention.
• Seizure Solely for Evidence: No. The record does not support the claim that the seizure was solely for evidence; the prosecution maintained it was to prevent further fraud, and no evidence showed the Government used or intended to use the books as evidence.
• Applicability of Lefkowitz: No. Lefkowitz involved searches and seizures without a search warrant and exploratory general searches; here a search warrant was issued and no such purpose was shown.

• Validity of the Search Warrant: The Organic Act, section 3, paragraph 11, guarantees the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures, and section 3, paragraph 3, provides that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. Sections 95 to 99 of the Code of Criminal Procedure require a search warrant to issue only for probable cause, upon application supported by oath particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized, and after the judge examines on oath the complaint and witnesses and takes their depositions in writing. The two internal revenue agents gave sworn testimony before Judge Revilla specifying the premises at No. 129 Calle Juan Luna, occupied by Jose Rubio, manager of the Simplex Trading Corporation, and stating that fraudulent books, invoices, and records existed and were being used in the commission of a felony. The warrant issued on December 26, 1930. The contention that no complainants or witnesses were examined was untenable because the depositions spoke for themselves. The contention that the things to be seized were not particularly described also failed: while property must be particularly described and no other property may be taken, the description need be specific only so far as the circumstances ordinarily allow; where the nature of the goods makes a general description necessary, a technical description is not required. The agents were not shown to have exceeded their powers, and the list of seized books, invoices, and records was the best evidence that they seized only the things described in the warrant.
• Retention of Seized Property: The cases relied on by Rubio rested on different facts. In Regidor vs. Araullo, the officers did not limit themselves to the property described in the affidavit or search warrant. In Uy Kheytin vs. Villa-Real, the question was whether, under a search warrant for opium, officers could seize books, personal letters, and other property having a remote or no connection with opium. In United States vs. De los Reyes and Esguerra, the holding was that no public officer has the right to enter the premises of another for search or seizure against the occupant’s will and without a proper search warrant. In the case at bar, a search warrant was issued, and the internal revenue agents strictly obeyed its command by seizing no other property than that described. The public also had an interest in the proper regulation of Rubio’s books under Act No. 3292, section 4; the books belonged to a corporation of which Rubio was simply the manager; and the warrant issued only on a showing of probable cause that fraudulent books, invoices, and records were being used in the commission of a felony. Retention was therefore proper.
• Seizure Solely for Evidence: The decisive question was whether the books, invoices, and records were seized solely for use as evidence of a crime of which Rubio was accused or suspected, or whether they were seized to prevent further perpetration of fraud. The assistant city fiscal stated that the search and seizure were made under the internal-revenue laws and the authority of a search warrant, not for the purpose of obtaining evidence, but to seize the instruments used in the violation of those laws. On appeal, the prosecution maintained that the seizure was made to prevent the use of the books, documents, and papers in further offenses or fraud against the Government. No scintilla of evidence showed that the Government used the books as evidence against Rubio or ever intended to do so. The record showed only that an information was filed against Rubio for a violation of the Customs Law and that he compromised another case with the Bureau of Internal Revenue for P100,000. On that showing, the books could not be deemed to have been wanted solely for use as evidence. The public interest in the proper regulation of the books, the corporate ownership of the books, and the probable-cause showing that they were being used in a felony further supported the seizure.
• Applicability of Lefkowitz: The U.S. Supreme Court’s Lefkowitz opinion did not control. In Lefkowitz, all the searches and seizures were made without a search warrant, and the only question was whether the searches of desks, cabinets, and baskets and the seizures of things taken were reasonable as an incident of arrests. The searches there were exploratory and general and made solely to find evidence of guilt. In the case at bar, the searches and seizures were made with a search warrant. The Court acknowledged that the Fourth Amendment forbids every unreasonable search and is construed liberally to safeguard privacy, and that this admonition should be respected in the jurisdiction because constitutional rights are as sacred as in the United States. But the factual differences made Lefkowitz inapplicable. The authorities relied on in Lefkowitz, such as Gouled vs. United States and Go-Bart Importing Co. vs. United States, also did not support Rubio: Gouled recognized that search warrants may be used where the public has an interest in the property or where police power renders possession unlawful, and Go-Bart involved a general exploratory search under an invalid warrant. Thus no constitutional right of Rubio was violated, the letter of the law was followed, and the trial court’s order was correct.

• Search Warrant Particularity — A search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized, but the description need be specific only so far as the circumstances ordinarily allow; where the nature of the goods makes a more general description necessary, a technical description is not required. The Court applied this to uphold the description “fraudulent books, invoices and records” because the agents seized only the property described.
• Probable Cause and Oath — A search warrant shall not issue except for probable cause and upon application supported by oath; the judge must examine on oath the complaint and witnesses and take their depositions in writing. The Court found compliance because the two internal revenue agents gave sworn testimony before Judge Revilla specifying the premises and the fraudulent books, invoices, and records.
• Seizure for Evidence versus Prevention of Fraud — The constitutional guarantees against unreasonable searches and self-incrimination are not violated where the seizure of books and papers is not solely to secure evidence for a criminal prosecution but is made to prevent further fraud or under a public interest in regulating the property. The Court found no evidence that the Government used or intended to use the seized books solely as evidence; the prosecution maintained the purpose was to prevent further offenses or fraud.
• Invalid General or Exploratory Searches — Searches and seizures made without a warrant, or exploratory and general searches, or seizures exceeding the warrant’s description, are invalid. The Court distinguished Regidor vs. Araullo, Uy Kheytin vs. Villa-Real, United States vs. De los Reyes and Esguerra, and United States vs. Lefkowitz on the ground that the agents here acted under a valid warrant and seized only the described property.
• Public Interest in Corporate Books — The public has an interest in the proper regulation of corporate books under Act No. 3292, section 4, and the fact that the books belonged to a corporation managed by the accused supports the lawfulness of their seizure. The Court used this to reject the claim that the books were seized solely for evidence against Rubio.

• “While it is true that the property to be seized under a warrant must be particularly described therein and no other property can be taken thereunder, yet the description is required to be specific only in so far as the circumstances will ordinarily allow.” — This states the particularity standard applied to uphold the warrant’s description of “fraudulent books, invoices and records.”
• “In the case at bar, however, it has been shown that the internal revenue agents strictly obeyed the command of their warrant by seizing no other property than that described therein.” — This distinguishes the precedents where officers exceeded the warrant and supports the Court’s finding that the seizure was lawful.
• “The question, in its final analysis, is, were appellant’s books, invoices, and records seized solely for use as evidence of a crime of which the appellant was accused or suspected? — or were the books, invoices, and records seized in order to prevent the further perpetration of fraud?” — This frames the decisive issue on self-incrimination and the purpose of the seizure.
• “A thorough reexamination of the case, in the light of the arguments presented and the authorities cited, leads us to the same conclusion as before, namely, that no constitutional right of the appellant was violated; that the letter of the law was followed, and that the order of the trial judge was correct in all particulars.” — This is the majority’s final holding affirming the trial court.

• Regidor vs. Araullo, 5 Off. Gaz. 955 (1904) — Distinguished; the seizure there was irregular because officers did not limit themselves to the property described in the affidavit or search warrant.
• Uy Kheytin vs. Villa-Real, 42 Phil. 886 (1920) — Distinguished; officers executing an opium search warrant seized books, personal letters, and other property with remote or no connection to opium.
• United States vs. De los Reyes and Esguerra, 20 Phil. 467 (1911) — Distinguished; it held that no public officer may enter premises for search or seizure against the occupant’s will without a proper search warrant, whereas a search warrant was issued here.
• United States vs. Daniel M. Lefkowitz and Pauline Paris (U.S. Supreme Court, Apr. 11, 1932) — Distinguished; the searches and seizures there were made without a search warrant and were exploratory and general, made solely to find evidence.
• Gouled vs. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1920) — Cited; search warrants may not be used solely to secure evidence, but may be resorted to where the public has an interest in the property or where police power renders possession unlawful.
• Go-Bart Importing Co. vs. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1930) — Cited; a general exploratory search and seizure of papers under an invalid warrant cannot be sustained, and reasonableness depends on the facts of each case.
• Boyd vs. United States, 116 U.S. 623 — Cited in the Gouled quotation; search warrants may not be used as a means of gaining access to papers solely to secure evidence, subject to the public-interest exception.

• Section 3, paragraph 11, Act of Congress of August 29, 1916 (Philippine Autonomy Act) — Guarantees the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures; the Court found no violation because the warrant complied with statutory requirements and the agents seized only the described property.
• Section 3, paragraph 3, Act of Congress of August 29, 1916 — Provides that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself; the Court found no violation because the seizure was not shown to be solely for use as evidence against Rubio.
• Sections 95–99, Code of Criminal Procedure — Define a search warrant, its grounds, the probable-cause and oath requirements, the particular description of the place and things to be seized, the examination of the complainant and witnesses, and the form of the warrant; the Court found substantial and literal compliance.
• Section 1434, Administrative Code — Grants police power to internal revenue agents; the agents acted pursuant to this authority when they applied for and executed the search warrant.
• Section 4, Act No. 3292 — The public has an interest in the proper regulation of the appellant’s books; the Court cited this in rejecting the claim that the books were seized solely for evidence.

Avanceña, C.J., Villamor, Ostrand, Hull, Vickers, Imperial, and Butte, JJ., concurred in the majority opinion. Villa-Real, J., concurred in the dissenting opinion of Abad Santos, J.

• Justice Abad Santos — Dissented on the ground that the search warrant was null and void for having been issued without authority of law and in contravention of express constitutional and statutory provisions. He reasoned that probable cause must be based on sworn facts, not suspicions, beliefs, or surmises; the witnesses could not positively state who occupied the premises and relied only on information and an assertion of probable cause. He also found the description “fraudulent books, invoices and records” insufficient because it did not particularly describe the things to be seized and authorized a general exploratory search. Finally, he maintained that the constitutional rights of the appellant were violated because the books and papers were seized to be used as evidence against him; the order under review itself justified the search by the fact that the seized documents were used as evidence in criminal case No. 41563. He would have reversed the order, declared the search warrant invalid, and ordered the return of the books and papers. Villa-Real, J., concurred.