People of the Philippine Islands vs. Gelacio Dequiña

Killing a person while asleep constitutes treachery (alevosia), and nocturnity is absorbed by treachery rather than treated as a separate aggravating circumstance; dwelling may be offset by the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation where the deceased had maintained illicit relations with the accused’s wife.

Gelacio Dequiña and Roman L. Lacson were connected through Dequiña’s wife, Modesta Tobesa, who was Lacson’s laundress and with whom Lacson maintained illicit relations. Dequiña had also lived in Lacson’s house with his wife for a time. The appeal required application of the Revised Penal Code’s rules on qualifying and aggravating circumstances—particularly treachery, nocturnity, dwelling, and passion or obfuscation—in fixing the penalty for asesinato.

Around 4:00 to 5:00 a.m. on September 18, 1933, Roman L. Lacson was asleep in his bed inside a room of his house in Talisay, Negros Occidental. An assailant attacked him with a bolo marked as Exhibit B, inflicting nine wounds on different parts of his body. Lacson died the following morning, September 19, 1933, at about 9:15 a.m., at the Provincial Hospital of Bacolod, Occidental Negros.

Lacson cried for help. His daughter Amparo Lacson, who was sleeping in an adjoining room with the maid Rosario Umaliao, woke and went to his room, followed by Rosario. When Amparo opened the connecting door, she saw a man standing near the bed and hacking her father inside the mosquito net. She screamed “Hombre!” The man turned on her and tried to attack her with the bolo. Amparo recognized him as Gelacio Dequiña. Rosario, who was behind Amparo, also identified Dequiña as the person attacking Lacson. Lacson managed to wrest the bolo from his attacker before the latter escaped. A window near Lacson’s bed was open, and electric light from a nearby post and the approaching dawn allowed Amparo and Rosario to identify Dequiña. Both already knew him because he had lived in the house for some time with his wife.

When Dequiña turned on Amparo, she retreated, closed the door of her room, and looked out the window shouting for help. Jose Capalar, a neighbor, heard the shouts, looked out his window, and by means of a flashlight saw a man escaping toward a street leading to the beach. The authorities and Lieutenant H. V. Cunanan, commander of the Constabulary detachment in Talisay, were notified. When Cunanan arrived that morning, Amparo was too nervous to be investigated, so he began asking about persons connected with the house. During the investigation, he was told that Lacson’s laundress, Modesta Tobesa, was married. Cunanan immediately went to her house to get Dequiña, accompanied by Cesar Lacson, to whom the deceased had previously confided that he had illicit relations with Modesta Tobesa.

When Dequiña was arrested at his house, Cunanan found his feet splashed with red spots resembling blood. That same morning, an opening large enough for a person to pass through was found in a part of the split-cane fence under the house, and about half a vara from the opening was a footprint of a right human foot. In the presence of several persons, Cunanan compared the footprint with Dequiña’s right foot and found that it coincided exactly. He then had Dequiña imprint his right foot beside the footprint, and the new print was exactly equal to the one discovered that morning. When Dequiña was taken to the room where the incident occurred, Amparo immediately said in a low voice to the lieutenant, “That is the man.” When he was brought to the house on the night of September 19, 1933, to be shown the corpse, Amparo, upon seeing him, shouted, “Ese es el hombre.” While beside Lacson’s corpse, Dequiña said nothing, kept his eyes closed, and was pale.

The defense was alibi. Dequiña, his wife Modesta Tobesa, and his father-in-law Juan Tobesa testified that he had been in his house, located a short distance from Lacson’s house, from the night of September 17, 1933 until about 6:30 a.m. the next day, when Cunanan arrested him. The trial court found this alibi insufficient to establish innocence or even reasonable doubt. Dequiña had been identified by Amparo and Rosario, both of whom knew him well because he had lived in Lacson’s house with his wife, who was the family’s laundress. Dequiña himself stated that Amparo and Rosario had no grudge against him, and the court found no reason to doubt their veracity.

As motive, the prosecution established that before the incident Lacson had been reprimanding Dequiña for not having work to support his wife and children, and that the chief of police, at Lacson’s suggestion, filed a complaint against Dequiña for delinquency in paying his cedula personal. It was also proved and not denied by the defense that Lacson had been maintaining illicit relations with Dequiña’s wife. The trial court found that these circumstances made it not strange for Dequiña to harbor intentions of revenge and to attack Lacson. It also found the alibi insufficient and credited the identifications by Amparo and Rosario.

• Ensañamiento and Alevosia: Appellant’s counsel contended that the lower court erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstances of ensañamiento and alevosia.
• Nocturnity and Morada: Appellant’s counsel contended that the lower court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and morada. As to morada, appellant argued that the fact that the deceased was killed in his own dwelling should not aggravate because it was inherent in the qualifying circumstance of treachery or premeditation and because the offended party provoked the crime by his illicit relations with the defendant’s wife.
• Mitigating Circumstance No. 10: Appellant’s counsel contended that the lower court erred in not appreciating the mitigating circumstance No. 10, repeated four times, of article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Penalty: Appellant’s counsel contended that the lower court erred in not imposing the minimum penalty of ten years and one day of prision mayor.

• Ensañamiento: Whether the lower court erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of ensañamiento.
• Alevosia: Whether the lower court erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of alevosia.
• Nocturnity: Whether the lower court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity.
• Morada: Whether the lower court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of morada.
• Mitigating Circumstance No. 10: Whether the lower court erred in not appreciating the mitigating circumstance No. 10, repeated four times, of article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Penalty: Whether the lower court erred in not imposing the minimum penalty of ten years and one day of prision mayor.

• Ensañamiento: No. The trial judge made no express finding of ensañamiento, and the crime was not shown to have been committed with cruelty by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the victim’s suffering or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.
• Alevosia: Yes. Treachery was clearly proved because the defendant, taking advantage of nighttime, entered the deceased’s house and attacked him with a bolo while he was asleep; killing a sleeping person constitutes alevosia under article 14, subsection 16, of the Revised Penal Code.
• Nocturnity: No. Nocturnity was included in the qualifying circumstance of treachery and should not be regarded as a separate aggravating circumstance.
• Morada: Yes, but offset. Dwelling was an aggravating circumstance under article 14, subsection 3, because the deceased had not given provocation closely related to the crime in his dwelling; however, it was offset by the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation arising from the deceased’s illicit relations with the accused’s wife.
• Mitigating Circumstance No. 10: Yes, in part. The accused was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation because the deceased had maintained illicit relations with his wife, but not as repeated four times; the other facts urged did not constitute extenuating circumstances.
• Penalty: No. Because the aggravating circumstance of dwelling was offset by passion and obfuscation, the penalty was properly imposed in its medium degree, reclusion perpetua, not the minimum of ten years and one day of prision mayor.

• Ensañamiento: The trial judge did not make any express finding as to ensañamiento or any other circumstance; he merely stated that in view of the circumstances of the case the defendant was sentenced to reclusion perpetua, the medium degree of the penalty provided by law. Although it did not appear that the crime was committed with ensañamiento or cruelty by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse, the evidence clearly proved alevosia. Thus, ensañamiento was not established.
• Alevosia: Treachery exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make (article 14, subsection 16, Revised Penal Code). The defendant took advantage of nighttime, entered the deceased’s house, and attacked him with a bolo while he was asleep. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that there exists the qualifying circumstance of alevosia or treachery when one takes the life of a person who is asleep. Treachery was therefore clearly proved.
• Nocturnity: Nocturnity in this case was included in the qualifying circumstance of treachery and should not be regarded as an aggravating circumstance. It could not be separately appreciated to increase the penalty.
• Morada: Under article 14, subsection 3, of the Revised Penal Code, dwelling is an aggravating circumstance if the act is committed in the dwelling of the offended party, if the latter has not given provocation. The Spanish robbery decision cited by appellant was not applicable by analogy. In United States vs. Cas, the commission of the offense in an inhabited house was not taken as an aggravating circumstance because it was an essential element of the crime defined and penalized under article 508 of the Penal Code. In United States vs. Turla, where the appellants were convicted of robbery through intimidation upon the inmates of the house and punished under article 503, No. 5, instead of article 508, the aggravating circumstance of morada was present and should be taken into account. The exception for provocation applies only when there is a close relation between the provocation and the commission of the crime in the dwelling of the person from whom the provocation came. In United States vs. Licarte, morada did not exist because the invasion of the offended party’s home was the direct and immediate consequence of the provocation given by her. In the case at bar, the provocation was not given immediately prior to the commission of the crime and had no particular relation to the house of the deceased. If the defendant had entered the house of the deceased and surprised the deceased and the wife of the defendant in the act of adultery, the aggravating circumstance of morada would not exist. The lower court found, and the evidence justified the finding, that the deceased had been maintaining illicit relations with the defendant’s wife. This fact was sufficient to produce passion and obfuscation in the mind of the defendant, and it may be inferred that the accused was impelled thereby to commit the crime. He was accordingly entitled to the benefit of this mitigating circumstance. The other facts urged by the attorney for the appellant in mitigation did not constitute extenuating circumstances: neither the fact that the deceased reproved the accused because he had no means of supporting his wife and children, nor the fact that the deceased urged the chief of police to file a complaint against the accused for failure to pay his cedula tax, nor the relation existing between the parties because the accused was a tenant or had been a retainer of the deceased. Since the aggravating circumstance of dwelling was offset by passion and obfuscation, the penalty was properly imposed in its medium degree, or reclusion perpetua.
• Mitigating Circumstance No. 10: The lower court found, and the evidence justified the finding, that the deceased had maintained illicit relations with the defendant’s wife. This fact was sufficient to produce passion and obfuscation in the mind of the defendant, and it may be inferred that the accused was impelled thereby to commit the crime. He was entitled to the benefit of this mitigating circumstance. The other facts urged by appellant did not constitute extenuating circumstances: neither the deceased’s reproof because the accused had no means of supporting his wife and children, nor the deceased’s urging the chief of police to file a complaint against the accused for failure to pay his cedula tax, nor the relation existing between the parties because the accused was a tenant or had been a retainer of the deceased.
• Penalty: Since the aggravating circumstance of dwelling was offset by that of passion and obfuscation, the penalty was properly imposed in its medium degree, or reclusion perpetua. The lower court did not err in not imposing the minimum penalty of ten years and one day of prision mayor.

• Treachery (alevosia) by killing a sleeping person — Under article 14, subsection 16, of the Revised Penal Code, treachery exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Killing a person while asleep constitutes treachery. The doctrine was applied because Dequiña took advantage of nighttime, entered Lacson’s house, and attacked him with a bolo while he was asleep.
• Absorption of nocturnity in treachery — When nocturnity is included in the qualifying circumstance of treachery, it should not be regarded as a separate aggravating circumstance. The Court applied this by holding that nocturnity could not be separately appreciated in the present case.
• Dwelling as an aggravating circumstance and the provocation exception — Article 14, subsection 3, of the Revised Penal Code makes dwelling an aggravating circumstance when the crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended party, if the latter has not given provocation. The provocation exception applies only when there is a close relation between the provocation and the commission of the crime in the dwelling. The Court held that the deceased’s illicit relations with the accused’s wife were not immediately prior to the crime and had no particular relation to the deceased’s house, so dwelling remained an aggravating circumstance, but it was offset by passion and obfuscation.
• Passion and obfuscation — Article 13, No. 10, of the Revised Penal Code mitigates liability when the accused acted under passion and obfuscation produced by sufficient provocation. The Court held that the deceased’s illicit relations with the accused’s wife were sufficient to produce passion and obfuscation and that the accused was entitled to this mitigating circumstance; the other facts urged—reproof for lack of support, the cedula complaint, and the tenancy or retainer relation—did not constitute extenuating circumstances.
• Offsetting of aggravating and mitigating circumstances — When an aggravating circumstance is offset by a mitigating circumstance, the penalty is imposed in its medium degree. The Court applied this by holding that dwelling was offset by passion and obfuscation, so reclusion perpetua, the medium degree, was properly imposed.
• Ensañamiento — Cruelty requires deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse. The Court held that ensañamiento was not shown in this case.

• "There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make (article 14, subsection 16, of the Revised Penal Code)." — This states the canonical definition of treachery applied by the Court in holding that the attack on the sleeping victim qualified the killing as asesinato.
• "It has been repeatedly held by this court that there exists the qualifying circumstance of alevosia or treachery when one takes the life of a person who is asleep." — This is the ratio for treating the killing of a sleeping person as treacherous, a point central to the affirmance of the conviction.
• "Nocturnity in this case is included in the qualifying circumstance of treachery, and should not be regarded as an aggravating circumstance." — This establishes the absorption rule: nocturnity cannot be separately appreciated when it is already inherent in treachery.
• "Since the aggravating circumstance of dwelling is offset by that of passion and obsfuscation, the penalty was properly imposed in its medium degree, or reclusion perpetua." — This is the Court’s final penalty ruling, explaining why reclusion perpetua, rather than a lower penalty, was correct.

• United States vs. Cas, 14 Phil. 21, 22 — Cited for the rule that the commission of an offense in an inhabited house should not be taken as an aggravating circumstance where it is an essential element of the crime defined and penalized under article 508 of the Penal Code. The Court distinguished it because dwelling is not an essential element of asesinato.
• United States vs. Turla, 38 Phil. 346 — Cited to illustrate that where the appellants were convicted of robbery through intimidation upon the inmates of the house and punished under article 503, No. 5, instead of article 508, the aggravating circumstance of morada was present and should be taken into account.
• United States vs. Licarte, 23 Phil. 10 — Cited for the provocation exception to dwelling: where the invasion of the offended party’s home was the direct and immediate consequence of the provocation given by her, the aggravating circumstance of morada did not exist. The Court distinguished it because in the present case the provocation was not immediately prior to the crime and had no particular relation to the deceased’s house.

• Article 14, subsection 16, Revised Penal Code — Defines treachery or alevosia. The Court applied it to hold that the defendant’s attack on the deceased while asleep, taking advantage of nighttime, constituted treachery.
• Article 14, subsection 3, Revised Penal Code — Provides that dwelling is an aggravating circumstance when the crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended party, if the latter has not given provocation. The Court applied it to recognize dwelling as aggravating, but held it was offset by passion and obfuscation.
• Article 13, No. 10, Revised Penal Code — Provides the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation. The Court applied it because the deceased had maintained illicit relations with the accused’s wife, which was sufficient to produce passion and obfuscation.

Avanceña, C.J., Street, Hull, and Diaz, JJ., concur.