People of the Philippine Islands vs. Epifanio Diokno and Roman Diokno

The mere numerical superiority of the assailants over the victim does not establish the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength; it must be shown that the aggressors, individually and collectively, were greatly superior in strength to the offended party. Absent that circumstance and evident premeditation, a killing is simple homicide, not murder. A declaration made by a mortally wounded person is admissible as an ante mortem declaration where the circumstances permit the inference with certainty that he had abandoned all hope of life, the interval between the declaration and death being immaterial.

Yu Hiong, a Chinese vendor of sundry goods in Lucena, Tayabas, had been engaged for about a year to Salome Diokno, the daughter of Epifanio Diokno and the sister of Roman Diokno. The Dioknos belonged to a family of old customs for whom the elopement of a daughter with a man constituted a grave offense to their honor, disturbing the peace and tranquility of the home and spreading uneasiness and anxiety among its members. The prosecution arose under the Revised Penal Code, whose provisions on qualifying and mitigating circumstances and the Indeterminate Sentence Law governed the characterization of the killing and the penalty to be imposed.

Yu Hiong, a Chinese vendor of sundry goods in Lucena, Tayabas, had been engaged for about a year to Salome Diokno, daughter of Epifanio Diokno and sister of Roman Diokno. At about seven o'clock in the morning of January 4, 1935, Salome invited Yu Hiong to go with her. He accepted the invitation but told her that her father was angry with him; Salome answered, "No matter, I will be responsible." At about six o'clock in the afternoon of that day, Yu Hiong and Salome took an automobile and went to the house of Vicente Verina, Salome's cousin, in Pagbilao. Finding nobody in the house, they proceeded on their way to San Pablo, Laguna.

On January 5 or 6, 1935, Roman Diokno telegraphed his father Epifanio Diokno, who was in Manila, informing him that Salome had eloped with the Chinese Yu Hiong. On the morning of January 7, 1935, Epifanio and Roman went to San Pablo, Laguna, in search of the elopers. Having been informed that the latter were stopping at the house of Antonio Layco, they went there. Upon arriving near the house, they saw Yu Hiong coming down the stairs. When Yu Hiong saw them, he ran upstairs and they pursued him. Finding the door of the house locked, he shouted that it be opened for him. At that moment he was overtaken by the accused, who carried knives locally known as balisong, of different sizes. Yu Hiong fell on his knees and implored pardon. In that situation Roman Diokno stabbed him with the knife in the back and later in the left side, and Epifanio Diokno also stabbed him once. Yu Hiong fell on the landing of the stairs in the balcony, and there he was again stabbed repeatedly. Roman Diokno then said, "Enough, father." Yu Hiong lost consciousness.

Juan Alcantara, who lived on the same street, Hermanos Belen, in front of Antonio Layco's house, saw the accused pursue Yu Hiong and fired shots for the police to come. Upon hearing the shots, municipal policeman Francisco Curabo appeared and found Yu Hiong pale and lying on the landing of the stairs. He asked who had wounded the Chinese, and Epifanio Diokno answered that it was he. The policeman took the knife (Exhibit C) which Epifanio Diokno carried in his right hand and brought him to police headquarters. Roman Diokno had left before the policeman arrived and was not located until after three days.

The municipal president of San Pablo also went to the scene of the crime, found the Chinese almost unconscious, and questioned him, putting down his answers in Exhibit E. Yu Hiong was brought to the provincial hospital of San Pablo, where he was examined by Drs. David Evangelista and Manuel Quisumbing, who found that he had five incised wounds in different parts of the body, one of them at the back and about three and a half inches long, piercing the pleura and penetrating the lower lobe of the right lung about an inch; that wound was necessarily mortal and caused his death. On January 8, 1935, while the Chinese was in a serious condition in the hospital, he made a statement telling how he was attacked by the accused (Exhibit K).

Testifying as witnesses in their own behalf, the accused stated that they had not gone to San Pablo together on the day in question; that when Roman Diokno arrived, his father Epifanio Diokno was coming down the stairs of Antonio Layco's house with a knife in his hand; that Epifanio Diokno told his son Roman to go home and tell their relatives what had happened; that when Epifanio Diokno overtook Yu Hiong on the landing of the stairs, he asked Yu Hiong whether he was willing to marry his daughter; that the Chinese answered him in the negative and at the same time tried to take something from his pocket; and that, as Epifanio knew that Yu Hiong carried a revolver, he feared the Chinese might harm him, became obfuscated, drew his knife, and knew not what happened afterwards. The trial court found the prosecution's version proven beyond reasonable doubt and convicted both accused of murder.

• Admissibility of Exhibit E: Appellants argued that Exhibit E should not be admitted on the ground that some words had been altered and because it had not been proven that the declarant had a sense of impending death.
• Admissibility of Exhibit K: Appellants argued that Exhibit K should not be admitted as an ante mortem declaration because it did not appear that the declarant was aware of impending death when he made it and because he did not die until three days after making it.
• Acquittal of Roman Diokno: Appellants assigned as error the failure of the trial court to acquit appellant Roman Diokno.
• Penalty Imposed on Epifanio Diokno: Appellants assigned as error the sentencing of appellant Epifanio Diokno to reclusion perpetua.

• Admissibility of Exhibit E: Whether the trial court erred in accepting Exhibit E as evidence.
• Admissibility of Exhibit K: Whether the trial court erred in admitting Exhibit K as evidence.
• Guilt of Roman Diokno: Whether the trial court erred in not acquitting appellant Roman Diokno.
• Qualifying Circumstances and Penalty: Whether the trial court erred in sentencing appellant Epifanio Diokno to reclusion perpetua.

• Admissibility of Exhibit E: No. The document was properly admitted as an ante mortem declaration, the declarant's sense of impending death being inferable with certainty from the circumstances, and, in any event, as part of the res gestae.
• Admissibility of Exhibit K: No. It was admissible as an ante mortem declaration; the declarant's conviction that he would not live, not the interval before his death, gives the declaration that character.
• Guilt of Roman Diokno: No. Eyewitness testimony, corroborated by the differing dimensions of the wounds and the ante mortem declarations, established his participation in the stabbing.
• Qualifying Circumstances and Penalty: Yes. Neither abuse of superior strength nor evident premeditation was established beyond reasonable doubt, reducing the crime to simple homicide and authorizing the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law.

• Admissibility of Exhibit E: The document was not shown to have been altered after it had been signed; municipal president Jacinto Peñaflor testified on cross-examination that he neither erased any word nor put another in its place after the document had been finished. An express avowal of hopelessness is unnecessary, for it is enough if, from the circumstances of the case, it can be inferred with certainty that the declarant had given up all hope of life (People vs. Chan Lin Wat, 50 Phil., 182). Yu Hiong was semiconscious as a result of his wounds and could not have hoped to live when he made his declaration immediately after being mortally wounded. Even if the document were not admissible as an ante mortem declaration, it was admissible as part of the res gestae because it was made under circumstances so proximate to the incident that it may be considered as a part thereof (People vs. Portento and Portento, 48 Phil., 971; People vs. Palamos, 49 Phil., 601).

• Admissibility of Exhibit K: The same considerations governing Exhibit E apply. When the deceased made the declaration, he complained of great difficulty in breathing and of being very ill. The fact that he did not die until three days later neither implied that he had no sense of impending death when he made the declaration, because he did not improve thereafter but became worse until he died, nor detracted from its character as an ante mortem declaration, because what gives the declaration such character is the declarant's conviction, upon making it, that he is not going to live (U.S. vs. Mallari, 29 Phil., 14).

• Guilt of Roman Diokno: The testimony of eyewitnesses Juan Alcantara and Antonio Layco, corroborated by the different dimensions of the wounds which, according to Dr. Manuel Quisumbing, were caused by two instruments of different sizes, and the ante mortem declarations (Exhibits E and K) of the deceased, left no room for doubt that Roman Diokno cooperated with his father and stabbed Yu Hiong with a knife in different parts of the body. The deceased further stated in his ante mortem declaration (Exhibit K) that it was Roman Diokno who inflicted the necessarily mortal wound in his back, which caused his death.

• Qualifying Circumstances and Penalty: The circumstance of abuse of superior strength, which the trial court found proven, was not established beyond reasonable doubt. In United States vs. Devela (3 Phil., 625), the Court held that the mere fact that the number of the assailants is superior to that of those attacked by them is not sufficient to constitute the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superiority. The photographs of the body of the deceased (Exhibits D and D-1) showed that he had a strong constitution, but there was no evidence of the physical constitution of the accused; hence it could not be determined whether the accused were physically stronger than the deceased and whether they abused such superiority. Neither was evident premeditation proven beyond reasonable doubt: even assuming that both accused went to San Pablo each carrying the knife used in attacking Yu Hiong, it being customary for the people of the province to carry it, it could not be inferred with certainty from the mere fact that they carried knives that their intention in going to San Pablo was to look for the deceased in order to kill him. For premeditation to be considered either as an aggravating or as a qualifying circumstance, it must be evident — the intention to kill must be manifest and must have been planned in the mind of the offender and carefully meditated; it is not enough that it arose at the moment of the aggression. With neither abuse of superior strength nor evident premeditation, the crime committed was simple homicide. The mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense under article 13 of the Revised Penal Code was taken into account in favor of both accused, because although the elopement took place on January 4, 1935, and the aggression on the 7th of the same month and year, the offense did not cease while Salome's whereabouts remained unknown and her marriage to the deceased unlegalized; there was thus no interruption from the time the offense was committed to the vindication thereof. The accused belonged to a family of old customs to whom the elopement of a daughter with a man constituted a grave offense to their honor and caused disturbance of the peace and tranquility of the home, spreading uneasiness and anxiety among its members. The mitigating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation was likewise taken into account: the fact that the accused saw the deceased run upstairs when he became aware of their presence, as if he refused to deal with them after having gravely offended them, was a stimulus strong enough to produce in their minds a fit of passion that blinded them and led them to commit the crime. The circumstance of having surrendered himself immediately to the agents of persons in authority was taken into account in favor of Epifanio Diokno. With three mitigating circumstances in favor of Epifanio Diokno and two in favor of Roman Diokno, and no aggravating circumstance, the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law — prision mayor in its full extent — could be imposed, and the medium period thereof, or eight years and one day of prision mayor, was deemed applicable under article 64, rule 5. Both accused were granted the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law under Act No. 4103, as amended by Act No. 4225, which prescribes a minimum taken from the penalty next lower to prision mayor, or prision correccional of from six months and one day to six years; taking into account the circumstances of the case, the indeterminate penalty was fixed at from two years and one day of prision correccional to eight years and one day of prision mayor, with credit for one-half of the time of preventive imprisonment under article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Abuse of Superior Strength — The qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength requires proof that the aggressors, individually and collectively, were greatly superior in strength to the offended party; the mere numerical superiority of the assailants over the victim does not suffice. The Court applied the rule in rejecting the trial court's finding, because although the victim was shown by photographs to have had a strong constitution, there was no evidence of the physical constitution of the accused, so it could not be determined whether they were physically stronger than the deceased or abused such superiority.

• Ante Mortem Declaration (Dying Declaration) — A statement made by a person mortally wounded is admissible as an ante mortem declaration where the circumstances permit the inference with certainty that the declarant had abandoned all hope of life; an express avowal of hopelessness is unnecessary. What gives the declaration its character is the declarant's conviction, upon making it, that he is not going to live, not the interval between the declaration and death. The Court applied the doctrine to both Exhibit E, taken at the scene while the victim was semiconscious, and Exhibit K, taken at the hospital a day later, notwithstanding that the victim died three days after making the latter declaration.

• Res Gestae — A statement made under circumstances so proximate to the incident that it may be considered a part thereof is admissible as part of the res gestae. The Court held that Exhibit E, even if not admissible as an ante mortem declaration, was admissible on this ground because it was made immediately after the victim was mortally wounded.

• Evident Premeditation — For premeditation to be considered either as an aggravating or as a qualifying circumstance, it must be evident: the intention to kill must be manifest and must have been planned in the mind of the offender and carefully meditated; it is not enough that it arose at the moment of the aggression. The Court held the circumstance unproven, since the mere carrying of knives customary in the province did not permit the inference with certainty that the accused went to San Pablo to kill the deceased.

• Immediate Vindication of a Grave Offense — The mitigating circumstance under article 13, paragraph 5, of the Revised Penal Code may be credited where the aggression is a vindication of a grave offense and no interruption intervenes between the offense and the vindication. The Court held that the elopement of a daughter with a man constituted a grave offense to the honor of a family of old customs, and that the offense did not cease while Salome's whereabouts remained unknown and her marriage to the deceased unlegalized, so that there was no interruption from January 4 to January 7, 1935.

• Passion or Obfuscation — The mitigating circumstance under article 13, paragraph 6, of the Revised Penal Code may be credited where the accused acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation. The Court found that the sight of the deceased running upstairs as if refusing to deal with the accused, after having gravely offended them, was a stimulus strong enough to produce a fit of passion that blinded them.

• Voluntary Surrender — The mitigating circumstance under article 13, paragraph 7, of the Revised Penal Code was credited in favor of Epifanio Diokno, who admitted his authorship of the wound to the responding policeman and was brought to police headquarters without resistance.

• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Under Act No. 4103, as amended by Act No. 4225, the minimum of the indeterminate penalty is taken from the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law. With the crime reduced to homicide and mitigating circumstances credited, the Court fixed the indeterminate penalty at from two years and one day of prision correccional to eight years and one day of prision mayor.

• "It is enough if, from the circumstances of the case, it can be inferred with certainty that such must have been his state of mind." — This states the standard for determining the declarant's sense of impending death in an ante mortem declaration, dispensing with an express avowal of hopelessness and grounding the admissibility of Exhibit E.

• "the mere fact that the number of the assailants is superior to that of those attacked by them is not sufficient to constitute the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superiority." — Quoted from United States vs. Devela and adopted as the ratio for rejecting the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, the passage being the formulation commonly cited in later jurisprudence.

• "In order that premeditation may be considered either as an aggravating circumstance or as a qualifying circumstance, it must be evident, that is, the intention to kill must be manifest and it must have been planned in the mind of the offender and carefully meditated. It is not enough that it arose at the moment of the aggression." — This defines evident premeditation and explains why the circumstance was not credited despite the accused having carried knives to San Pablo.

• "what gives the declaration such character is the declarant's conviction, upon making it, that he is not going to live." — This identifies the essential element of an ante mortem declaration and supports the admissibility of Exhibit K notwithstanding that the declarant died three days after making it.

• People vs. Chan Lin Wat, 50 Phil., 182 — Cited as authority for the rule that the declarant's sense of impending death need not be expressly stated but may be inferred with certainty from the circumstances of the case.
• People vs. Portento and Portento, 48 Phil., 971 — Cited for the admissibility of a statement as part of the res gestae where it was made under circumstances so proximate to the incident as to be considered a part thereof.
• People vs. Palamos, 49 Phil., 601 — Cited alongside Portento for the same res gestae doctrine, in support of the alternative ground for admitting Exhibit E.
• U.S. vs. Mallari, 29 Phil., 14 — Cited for the rule that the declarant's conviction of impending death, and not the interval between the declaration and death, characterizes an ante mortem declaration.
• U.S. vs. Devela, 3 Phil., 625 — Cited for the rule that mere numerical superiority of the assailants over the victim does not constitute the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superiority; the ruling was followed in rejecting the qualifying circumstance.

• Article 13, Revised Penal Code — Enumerates the mitigating circumstances. Paragraph 5 (immediate vindication of a grave offense) and paragraph 6 (passion or obfuscation) were credited in favor of both accused, while paragraph 7 (voluntary surrender) was credited in favor of Epifanio Diokno alone.
• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Defines and punishes homicide, the penalty being reclusion temporal in its full extent. The crime was reduced to homicide under this article after both qualifying circumstances were rejected.
• Article 64, rule 5, Revised Penal Code — Provides that when two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance concur, the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law shall be imposed. Applied to impose prision mayor in its medium period, or eight years and one day of prision mayor.
• Article 29, Revised Penal Code — Governs credit for preventive imprisonment. Each accused was credited with one-half of the time during which he had undergone preventive imprisonment.
• Act No. 4103, as amended by Act No. 4225 (Indeterminate Sentence Law) — Prescribes the indeterminate penalty, the minimum of which is taken from the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law. Applied to fix the penalty at from two years and one day of prision correccional to eight years and one day of prision mayor.
• Article 14, Revised Penal Code — Enumerates the aggravating circumstances. The paragraph numbers for evident premeditation (paragraph 13) and abuse of superior strength (paragraph 15) are cited in the separate opinion of Justice Laurel; the majority opinion refers to both as circumstances qualifying the crime of murder without citing the article.

Avanceña, C.J., Abad Santos, and Imperial, JJ., concurred in the majority opinion. Justice Laurel filed a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, and Justice Diaz filed a dissenting opinion.

• Justice Laurel — Concurred in the conclusion that the crime was simple homicide, both qualifying circumstances having been ruled out, and agreed to the mitigating circumstances of passion or obfuscation and, for Epifanio Diokno, voluntary surrender. Dissented on the crediting of immediate vindication of a grave offense: the proximate cause of the tragedy was the elopement of Salome, which took place at her own instance, and under existing legislation a woman eighteen years of age or over may contract marriage without parental consent, so that neither she nor her lover committed any offense. The interpretation was not in keeping with the mores of the times, and the act of the deceased in eloping with Salome at her invitation was not a grave offense calling for or justifying immediate vindication. Disregarding that mitigating circumstance, Epifanio Diokno, with two mitigating circumstances, should be sentenced to an indeterminate term of four years, two months and one day of prision correccional to ten years and one day of prision mayor, and Roman Diokno, with one mitigating circumstance, to six years and one day of prision mayor to twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal.

• Justice Diaz — Dissented on the characterization of the crime, maintaining that the appellants committed murder, not homicide, qualified by abuse of superior strength. Two armed persons attacked an unarmed victim who, having no means of escape, fell on his knees and implored forgiveness, thereby acknowledging his helplessness and the superiority of his assailants; the circumstance of abuse of superior strength therefore clearly and undeniably existed. Cited decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain holding that abuse of superior strength exists where the aggressors are greatly superior in strength or employ means weakening the victim's defense, and that singleness of action and purpose in taking advantage of the victim's lack of means of defense establishes the circumstance. Proposed a penalty, under article 64, rule 5, of from ten years and one day of prision mayor to seventeen years and four months of reclusion temporal, or, at least, an indeterminate penalty of from five years of prision correccional to ten years and one day of prision mayor under Act No. 4103.