People of the Philippine Islands vs. Enriquez, et al.

Conspirators who agree to commit grave personal injury are liable for the death that results from the assault even if the fatal wound was inflicted by a different means or weapon than originally intended; alevosia qualifies the killing as murder where the assault was characterized by surprise and lying in wait in the darkness of the night.

Mallorca Transportation, owned by Fernando Enriquez and managed by his son Candido Enriquez, operated passenger buses from Pampanga to Manila in competition with Pampanga Bus Co., which ran the Apalit-Masantol line. Ciriaco D. Gines was an inspector of Pampanga Bus Co. and was believed to have supplied the material for complaints before the Public Service Commission that resulted in fines against Fernando Enriquez. That rivalry and the fines formed the backdrop to the ill-will Candido Enriquez bore against Gines.

Prior to October 28, 1931, two rival bus corporations operated in central Luzon: Pampanga Bus Co., on the Apalit-Masantol line, and Mallorca Transportation, from Pampanga to Manila. Mallorca was owned by Fernando Enriquez and managed by his son Candido Enriquez, with a garage in Macabebe, Pampanga. Ciriaco D. Gines was an inspector of Pampanga Bus Co. and was believed to have supplied material for complaints before the Public Service Commission that led to fines against Fernando Enriquez. Candido Enriquez bore ill-will toward Gines, which increased on October 26, 1931, when Gines was seen jotting down the number of a Mallorca truck parked near the Manila Railroad station in Apalit.

On the morning of October 27, 1931, Candido boarded one of his buses at Macabebe for Manila, telling an employee in the garage that he would hire ruffians to beat up Gines so he would stop interfering with Mallorca’s business. In Manila he found Jose Palacio, a former chauffeur who had lost his job after an accident, and instructed him to procure ruffians (butañgeros) and bring them to Macabebe to beat Gines. Palacio agreed and contacted Marcelo Bonifacio, a notorious gangster, and four others—Marcelo Franco, Pedro Mocpoc, Vicente Domingo, and Ambrosio Basa—who agreed to undertake the job. Candido returned to Macabebe and told two employees to watch for the gangsters that night. Palacio and the five men boarded the last Mallorca truck leaving Manila at about 5 p.m. and were charged no fares by the conductor.

Arriving in Macabebe near 8 p.m., the truck stopped at an old house formerly used by Fernando Enriquez but occupied by Maximo Tuazon, a Mallorca mechanic. Palacio and the five men disembarked and entered the house. Candido soon arrived, ordered food supplied, and when it was insufficient gave Tuazon money to buy more. After the men ate, Palacio, on Enriquez’s direction, showed Gines’s house to Bonifacio. When they returned, the six were taken to the kitchen, where Enriquez discussed the plan to beat Gines. Bonifacio wanted to act that night, but Enriquez objected that an attack at that hour would attract too much attention and that Gines did not usually leave his house at night. They decided to wait until early morning when Gines would leave home, and agreed that the compensation would be paid on the morning the work was done.

About 3 a.m. on October 28, Candido awoke his employees Amado San Andres and Francisco Mallari, who were sleeping in a Mallorca truck in the garage, and instructed them to go that day with Maximo Tuazon to buy stone in Santa Maria, Bocaue, Bulacan. He then spoke with Bonifacio, who suggested that the men be given iron bars to beat Gines. Enriquez agreed, took the men to the garage, and gave them two small iron bars. Passenger trucks were moved into the street to make way for truck No. TH-4475, which was to be used by Tuazon and his companions to transport stone from Santa Maria; before that errand, however, the truck was to carry Palacio and the five ruffians to Gines’s house and then take them toward Bocaue after the beating. As daylight approached, Tuazon and his companions, along with Palacio and the five, boarded truck No. TH-4475. When they reached Gines’s house, Palacio and his men alighted, and Tuazon was told to drive a short distance away and wait. Before the truck left the garage that morning, Candido gave Tuazon P8.50 to buy stone in Bocaue and P20 more to give to Bonifacio and the ruffians after they finished beating Gines. After the truck stopped near Gines’s house, Bonifacio asked Tuazon for the money, and Tuazon gave him the P20 although instructed to deliver it only after the beating, fearing he would be assaulted if he refused.

Jose Palacio, who knew Gines and served as guide, posted himself in front of Gines’s house. As lights appeared and Gines came out, Palacio indicated that he was the man they were after. Gines was struck, gave an exclamation, and fell unconscious. The most serious wound was a cut four centimeters long and about seven and one-half centimeters deep on the inner side of the upper part of the calf of the right leg. He also suffered three severe contusions—one on an arm and two on the body—and two lighter bruises on the left side of the back. The contusions were evidently caused by the iron bars Enriquez had provided. The assailants fled; Palacio ran to Candido Enriquez’s office and reported that the victim was down, while the others ran to the waiting truck, which carried them rapidly toward Bocaue. At Bocaue, the five from Manila got off truck No. TH-4475 and boarded another bound for Manila. While still on the first truck, Marcelo Franco threw the iron bar he had used near a gasoline station in Bocaue, and Francisco Mallari threw the other iron bar in Santa Ana; both bars were later recovered upon information from Palacio and produced in evidence. Gines, left unconscious, regained consciousness and called for help; his father and others came to his aid. The seriousness of his wounds was not at first realized, and he was taken to the Pampanga provincial hospital only at 6 o’clock. At 3:30 p.m. that same day, he died from shock and loss of blood.

As Palacio and his five companions were gathered by the authorities, they made confessions implicating themselves in varying degrees. Palacio and Marcelo Franco admitted that the purpose of the assault was to put Gines to sleep, and Palacio was the one commissioned by Enriquez to employ the others. Franco, Basa, Mocpoc, and Domingo admitted each had been paid P4 for his part. Gines, in a declaration before his death, stated that he was assaulted by three individuals, satisfactorily proved to be Marcelo Bonifacio, Marcelo Franco, and Pedro Mocpoc. Of these three, Franco and Mocpoc used the small iron bars Enriquez had supplied. There was no satisfactory proof as to who used the knife. Lieutenant Lauro Dizon of the Constabulary testified that Palacio told him he saw Candido Enriquez give Bonifacio a knife at the same time he supplied Franco and Mocpoc with iron bars; this statement was competent against Palacio but not against the others, and the trial judge made no mention of the incident in his opinion. Vicente Domingo, Ambrosio Basa, and any other participant were apparently posted as lookouts. The defense sought to prove that the fatal cut was inflicted not by any of the Manila hirelings but by Amado San Andres, an employee of Candido Enriquez, citing a witness who saw San Andres fleeing with a knife and a suspicious bloodstain on his foot; Gines, however, explicitly stated before his death that San Andres was not one of his assailants. The trial court made no mention of the knife incident in its opinion.

• Scope of Conspiracy: Appellants argued that the conspiracy contemplated only beating Gines and did not include the infliction of injury by a cutting instrument; the knife wound was outside the scope of the agreement.
• Liability Limited to Bruises: Appellants insisted that only the individual who inflicted the fatal cut could be held responsible for the death, if that person were known; because the author was unidentified, none of them could be held liable beyond the bruises inflicted with the iron bars.
• Curability of Injuries: Appellants claimed that the injuries from the iron bars would in the natural course of events have been curable in a few days.
• Amado San Andres as the Knife Wielder: The defense undertook to prove that the fatal cut was inflicted not by any of the hirelings brought from Manila but by Amado San Andres, an employee of Candido Enriquez, citing a witness who saw San Andres fleeing from the scene with a knife and a suspicious bloodstain on his foot later that morning.

• Liability for Death Beyond Intended Beating: Whether appellants, having conspired only to beat Gines, may be held liable for his death when the fatal knife wound was inflicted by an unidentified assailant and was not within the intended plan.
• Effect of Amado San Andres’s Participation: Whether the possibility that Amado San Andres inflicted the fatal cut exculpates appellants from liability for the death.
• Alevosia as Qualifying Circumstance: Whether alevosia qualified the killing as murder.
• Aggravating Circumstances: Whether price, nocturnity, abuse of superior strength, and premeditation were properly considered.
• Mitigating Circumstance and Penalty: Whether lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong was properly appreciated and whether reclusion perpetua should be substituted for cadena perpetua.

• Liability for Death Beyond Intended Beating: No. Conspirators who agree to commit grave personal injury are liable for the death resulting from the assault even if the fatal wound was inflicted by a different means than intended.
• Effect of Amado San Andres’s Participation: No. Even if San Andres inflicted the fatal cut, he acted in cooperation with appellants and with their consent, so they remain liable.
• Alevosia as Qualifying Circumstance: Yes. The assault was characterized by surprise and lying in wait in the darkness of the night, qualifying the killing as murder.
• Aggravating Circumstances: Yes. Price was aggravating as to all except Jose Palacio; nocturnity and abuse of superior strength were absorbed in alevosia; premeditation was present as to all.
• Mitigating Circumstance and Penalty: Yes. Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong was properly allowed; reclusion perpetua was substituted for cadena perpetua.

• Liability for Death Beyond Intended Beating: The contention that the conspirators could not be liable for the knife wound because they intended only a beating was rejected. The accused had conspired to do grave personal injury to Gines; the injuries actually inflicted resulted in death. They cannot escape the legal effect of their acts on the ground that one wound was inflicted differently from what was intended. A blow from one of the small iron bars could well have resulted in death, and the use of a knife did not relieve them of the consequences of their joint acts. The Court cited Boyd vs. U.S., where persons who agree to commit and enter upon a crime probably endangering human life are all responsible for a death that ensues, and U.S. vs. Patten, where conspirators who join a criminal attack with dangerous weapons are liable for manslaughter when the victim is killed by a knife wound inflicted by one of them during the beating, although they did not initially contemplate the use of a knife.
• Effect of Amado San Andres’s Participation: The defense’s attempt to prove that Amado San Andres inflicted the fatal cut did not exculpate appellants. Gines, in a declaration before death, stated that San Andres was not one of his assailants, and the defense failed to prove San Andres used the knife. Even assuming San Andres inflicted the fatal cut, he was an employee of Enriquez; he was present when Enriquez announced he would obtain gangsters to dispose of Gines; he was present when the Manila contingent arrived at the Macabebe garage about 8 p.m. on October 27; and he was on the truck that carried the accused (except Enriquez) on the fatal mission the next morning. No proof showed that any accused objected to his participation or tried to prevent it. Cooperation may be inferred not only from proof of actual previous conspiracy but from the facts done when the unlawful act is committed. Thus, if San Andres inflicted the fatal cut, he was cooperating with appellants with their consent, and they were responsible for the consequences.
• Alevosia as Qualifying Circumstance: The crime was murder, with alevosia as the qualifying circumstance. The assault was characterized by surprise and was effected by lying in wait for the deceased in the darkness of the night. The plan was designed to insure execution of the offense without risk to appellants from any defense the deceased might make. Nocturnity and abuse of superior strength were absorbed in alevosia.
• Aggravating Circumstances: The offense was committed for a price in money as to all accused except Jose Palacio. Known premeditation was present as to all appellants because the offense had been under contemplation overnight and they had ample time to reflect repeatedly on how best to accomplish it.
• Mitigating Circumstance and Penalty: The trial court gave all accused the benefit of the mitigating circumstance that the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong. Its estimation was proper and not inconsistent with the finding of murder, as held in U.S. vs. Candelaria, U.S. vs. Luciano, and People vs. Cagoco. The judgment was affirmed, with reclusion perpetua substituted for cadena perpetua in accordance with the Revised Penal Code.

• Conspiracy — Liability for Death Resulting from Assault — When persons conspire to commit grave personal injury, all are liable for the death that results from the assault, even if the fatal wound was inflicted by a different means or weapon than originally intended. The Court applied this to reject the argument that the conspirators intended only a beating; the knife wound did not sever their liability.
• Implied Conspiracy from Cooperation — Cooperation may be inferred not only from proof of a previous conspiracy but from the facts done when the unlawful act is committed. Applied to Amado San Andres: even if he inflicted the fatal cut, his presence, participation, and lack of objection from the accused made them responsible for his acts as a co-operating participant with their consent.
• Alevosia — Treachery qualifies a killing as murder when the assault is characterized by surprise and lying in wait in the darkness of the night, designed to insure execution without risk to the assailants. Nocturnity and abuse of superior strength are absorbed in alevosia.
• Price or Reward as Aggravating Circumstance — The offense was committed for a price in money, an aggravating circumstance present as to all accused except Jose Palacio.
• Premeditation — Known premeditation exists when the offense had been under contemplation overnight and the offenders had ample time to reflect repeatedly on the manner of its accomplishment. Present as to all appellants.
• Mitigating Circumstance of Lack of Intent to Commit So Grave a Wrong — This mitigating circumstance may be allowed even when the crime is murder and is not inconsistent with that finding. The trial court properly gave it to all accused.

• "We are of the opinion that this contention is not tenable. The accused had undoubtedly conspired to do grave personal injury to the deceased, and now that the injuries actually inflicted have resulted in death, they cannot escape from the legal effect of their acts on the ground that one of the wounds was inflicted in a different way from that which had been intended." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on conspiracy: liability for the resulting death is not defeated by the fact that the fatal wound was inflicted in a manner different from what the conspirators intended.
• "Cooperation can be inferred not only from proof of actual previous conspiracy, but from the future of the facts done when the unlawful act is committed." — This states the rule on implied conspiracy, allowing liability for San Andres’s act even absent proof of a prior agreement.
• "The crime committed in this case was murder, in which alevosia should be taken as the qualifying circumstance. This circumstance is conspicuous in the fact that the assault was characterized by surprise and was effected by lying in wait for the deceased in the darkness of the night." — This defines the controlling qualifying circumstance and explains why the killing was murder rather than homicide.
• "The judgment appealed from will be affirmed, it being understood that reclusion perpetua is substituted for cadena perpetua, in accordance with the Revised Penal Code. So ordered, with costs against the appellants." — This is the dispositive portion, confirming the conviction and the substituted penalty.

• Boyd vs. U.S., 142; U.S., 450; 35 Law. ed., 1077 — Cited for the principle that persons who agree to commit and enter upon a crime probably endangering human life, such as robbery, are all responsible for a death that ensues as a consequence.
• U.S. vs. Patten, 42 Appeals, D.C., 239 — Cited for the rule that conspirators who join a criminal attack with dangerous weapons are liable for manslaughter when the victim is killed by a knife wound inflicted by one of them during the beating, although they did not initially contemplate the use of a knife.
• U.S. vs. Candelaria, 2 Phil., 104 — Cited in support of allowing the mitigating circumstance that the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong.
• U.S. vs. Luciano, 2 Phil., 96 — Cited for the same rule on the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong.
• People vs. Cagoco, G.R. No. 38511, page 524, ante — Cited for the same rule on the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong.

• Revised Penal Code — The Court substituted reclusion perpetua for cadena perpetua “in accordance with the Revised Penal Code.” The text does not cite a specific article. The provision was applied to the penalty imposed by the trial court.

Avanceña, C.J., Hull, Vickers, and Butte, JJ., concur.