People of the Philippine Islands vs. Castro et al.

Criminal intent is essential to falsification of public documents and estafa through falsification; where the evidence establishes only human error, carelessness, or ineptitude rather than deliberate falsification, and the inculpatory facts are capable of an innocent explanation, the accused must be acquitted.

Pedro A. Pacana was secretary of the provincial board of Misamis, while Isidro Adorable and Vicente P. Castro were members of the same board; Segundo Gaston served as governor. The board began an inspection trip of the province on May 23, 1923. The prosecutions concerned the board’s official minutes, excerpts, and per diem vouchers, which were charged as falsification of public documents and estafa through falsification under the Penal Code.

The provincial board of Misamis was composed of Governor Segundo Gaston, members Isidro Adorable and Vicente P. Castro, and Secretary Pedro A. Pacana. On May 23, 1923, the board left on an inspection trip of the province. It held a session in Tulisan, Misamis, on June 4, 1923, and returned to Cagayan, Misamis, the provincial capital, on the morning of June 18, 1923. Upon its return, the board was occupied by the Governor-General’s visit on June 19, the Rizal birthday celebration, the Governor-General’s departure on June 20, and the arrival of the Quezon-Roxas-Osmeña-Gabaldon-Guevara party on June 20, which left on June 21. These facts were undisputed.

The prosecutions were based on Exhibits C, D, Q-3, Y, and X, all of which existed. The prosecution theorized that these documents were prepared by Pacana with the connivance of the board members for illegal purposes. Exhibits C and D were seen by Juan Callante, chief clerk of the district auditor, in Pacana’s office on the afternoon of June 18, 1923; copies were made by Juan Borja, a clerk in the district auditor’s office, on the morning of June 19, 1923. An excerpt from Exhibit C containing Resolution No. 224 was received in the provincial treasurer’s office before 5:50 p.m. on June 19, 1923. Another excerpt from Exhibit C containing Resolution No. 225, marked Exhibit Q-3 and the basis of the third prosecution, was received in the district engineer’s office on June 27, 1923; when the chief clerk noted the date June 9, 1923, and brought it to Pacana’s attention, the date was changed to June 16, 1923. The provincial board later attempted to rectify the mistake on September 20, 1923, by changing the dates of the excerpts to June 16, 1923, which produced another error (Exhibit B-2). The originals of Exhibits C and D disappeared, possibly through Pacana’s machinations. The prosecution also asserted that the board could not have held a session at Cagayan before June 18, 1923, because it was on inspection trip, and could not have held one on the afternoon of June 19, 1923, because a velada was held that afternoon at the intermediate school of Cagayan, attended by the provincial governor and member Castro. Before the district auditor, the three accused reaffirmed that sessions were held on June 9 and 16, 1923 (Exhibits J, K, L).

The defense contended that the errors were due to the carelessness of the provincial secretary and the heavy workload on his inexperienced shoulders, and that the meetings were actually held on June 19 and June 21, 1923, not June 9 and 16. In support, the defense presented the testimony of the members present, the secretary, and a clerk that meetings were actually held on the afternoons of June 19 and June 21. Subjects treated in those sessions could not have come to the board’s attention before the sessions. The secretary’s preoccupations with the inspection trip and the visits of the Governor-General and the Legislature caused the mistakes. Similar errors appeared in other board meetings. The excerpts sent to the district engineer and district auditor were prepared by a clerk in the provincial governor’s office and merely signed as a matter of form by the secretary. The minutes book was obtained by the district auditor, so the original minutes could have disappeared while in his possession. The accused signed statements before the district auditor without understanding the investigation. As soon as the date mistakes were discovered and before criminal prosecution began, the board corrected its minutes (Exhibits 8, 10).

Exhibit C, on which the first case was founded and which related to three other cases, was headed “Regular Meeting of the Provincial Board of Misamis Held at Cagayan on Thursday June 9, 1923,” although June 9 fell on a Saturday. It mentioned a letter of the Governor-General (Exhibit 4) dated Manila, June 11, 1923, probably not received at Cagayan until June 19, 1923; a “letter dated June 14, 1923, of the district engineer”; and a communication of the district engineer “dated June 16, 1923.” It also contained data as to letters of the district engineer of June 8, 1923, the Chief of the Executive Bureau, and the Public Utility Commissioner. Exhibit D, on which the second case was founded, showed a regular meeting on Saturday, June 16, 1923, and action on about fifty resolutions of municipal councils, including approval of a resolution of the municipal council of Salay of June 15, 1923; according to Sabas Abao, municipal secretary of Salay, the resolution was not mailed until June 16, 1923, and according to the postmaster of Balingasay, it could not have left for the provincial capital until June 20, 1923. Exhibit Q-3 purported to be an excerpt from the minutes of the regular meeting of June 9, 1923, and certified to a resolution concerning a “letter dated June 14, 1923, of the district engineer.” Exhibits Y and X were provincial vouchers, approved by the provincial governor and certified as correct and just by the two board members, respectively, calling for services rendered as board members during the period June 9, 16, 23, and 26, inclusive, at P12.50 per meeting.

The prosecution claimed the motive was Pacana’s desire to fabricate resolutions, probably with the connivance of the governor and board members, to placate the American engineer Mr. Allen, and to allow the board members to collect a total of P50 not legally due them. The defense claimed the prosecution arose from enmity between the district engineer and the district auditor and was brought as vengeance by the district auditor, with political intrigue also insinuated. The physical facts appearing from the documents were mostly favorable to the accused: Exhibits C and D could not have been fabricated on June 9 and June 16 if the matters to which they related were not then before the board, unless by supernatural means. The prosecution’s oral testimony was mostly circumstantial. The prosecution and defense also offered conflicting explanations of the motive.

• Absence of Criminal Intent: The accused maintained that the erroneous dates in the minutes and excerpts were due to the carelessness of the provincial secretary and the heavy workload on his inexperienced shoulders, not to deliberate falsification.
• Actual Meetings: They argued that meetings of the provincial board were actually held on the afternoons of June 19 and June 21, 1923, as testified to by the members present, the secretary, and a clerk, and that subjects treated in those sessions could not have come before the board earlier.
• Clerical and Procedural Errors: They contended that similar errors appeared in other board meetings; that the excerpts sent to the district engineer and district auditor were prepared by a clerk in the provincial governor’s office and merely signed as a matter of form by the secretary; that the minutes book was obtained by the district auditor and the original minutes could have disappeared while in his possession; and that the accused signed statements before the district auditor without understanding the investigation.
• Correction Before Prosecution: They asserted that as soon as the mistakes in dates were discovered and before criminal prosecution began, the provincial board corrected its minutes (Exhibits 8, 10).
• Motive and Vengeance: The defense claimed the prosecution arose from enmity between the district engineer and the district auditor and was brought as an act of vengeance by the district auditor, with political intrigue also insinuated.

• Deliberate Falsification with Connivance: The prosecution theorized that the documents were prepared by the provincial secretary with the connivance of the board members for illegal purposes.
• Fictitious Meetings: It asserted that the board could not have held a session at Cagayan before June 18, 1923, because it was on an inspection trip, and could not have held one on the afternoon of June 19, 1923, because of a velada attended by the provincial governor and member Castro.
• Documentary Evidence: It relied on the fact that Exhibits C and D were seen in Pacana’s office on June 18, 1923; copies were made on June 19, 1923; an excerpt containing Resolution No. 224 was received by the provincial treasurer before 5:50 p.m. on June 19, 1923; and Exhibit Q-3 was received by the district engineer on June 27, 1923, with the date later changed from June 9 to June 16, 1923.
• Disappearance of Originals and Reaffirmation: The originals of Exhibits C and D disappeared, possibly through Pacana’s machinations, and the three accused reaffirmed before the district auditor that sessions were held on June 9 and 16, 1923 (Exhibits J, K, L).
• Motive: The prosecution claimed the motive was Pacana’s desire to fabricate resolutions, probably with the connivance of the governor and board members, to placate the American engineer Mr. Allen, and to permit the board members to collect a total of P50 not legally due them.

• Criminal Intent in Falsification: Whether the accused deliberately falsified public documents, or merely committed human error and carelessness without criminal intent.
• Estafa Through Falsification: Whether the accused are guilty of estafa through falsification for collecting per diems for alleged fictitious meetings.
• Reasonable Doubt: Whether the evidence supports conviction beyond reasonable doubt when the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one consistent with innocence.

• Criminal Intent in Falsification: No. Criminal intent is essential; the evidence showed only human error, carelessness, and ineptitude, not deliberate falsification.
• Estafa Through Falsification: No. The alleged unlawful taking of P25 each was not established beyond reasonable doubt, as it depended on the same absent criminal intent and deliberate falsification.
• Reasonable Doubt: Yes. The inculpatory facts were capable of an innocent explanation, so the evidence did not fulfill the test of moral certainty.

• Criminal Intent in Falsification: The Court applied the principle that evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to be a crime: actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. There can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting. Ignorance or mistake as to particular facts, honest and real, generally exempts the doer from criminal responsibility, except neglect in the discharge of duty or indifference to consequences equivalent to criminal intent. The Court found the physical facts mostly in favor of the accused: Exhibits C and D could not have been fabricated on June 9 and June 16 if the matters to which they related were not then before the provincial board, unless by supernatural means. The prosecution’s oral testimony was mostly circumstantial and difficult to reconcile with these physical facts unless some witnesses exaggerated. The motive was weak: actual meetings would have served the same purposes, and it made little sense for board members to certify fictitious meetings to recover P25 each when they could have recovered the same amount for actual meetings. The whole case appeared to be a bungling job by the provincial secretary; his hopeless ineptitude and stupidity did not amount to criminal intent, although the facts skirted perilously near reckless imprudence. The Court also relied on a Spanish Supreme Court decision of December 23, 1885, where a clerk who entered proceedings as of an earlier date was convicted of imprudencia temeraria but reversed because the change did not affect the integrity or effects of the document and criminal intent was absent. Accordingly, deliberate falsification was not established.
• Estafa Through Falsification: Because the estafa charges were committed by means of the alleged falsification of public documents, the absence of deliberate falsification and criminal intent likewise negated the estafa charges. The alleged unlawful taking of P25 each by Adorable and Castro for two fictitious meetings depended on the same documents and meetings that the Court found not proven to be deliberately falsified. The Government suffered no loss. The evidence did not establish the charges beyond reasonable doubt.
• Reasonable Doubt: The Court held that all reasonable doubt intended to demonstrate error and not crime should be indulged in favor of the accused. If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one consistent with innocence and the other with guilt, the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is insufficient to support conviction, citing U.S. vs. Maaño. Since the physical facts favored the accused and the prosecution’s evidence was susceptible of an innocent explanation, the convictions could not stand.

• Mens Rea in Criminal Law — Evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to be a crime; actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. There can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting. The Court applied this principle to conclude that the accused’s errors, even if careless, did not amount to deliberate criminal intent.
• Falsification of Public Documents Requires Criminal Intent — Even though falsification of public documents may punish violation of public faith and does not require gain or intent to injure a third person, the change must affect the integrity of the document or change its effects; absent criminal intent, no crime is committed. The Court found the changes in dates did not establish deliberate falsification.
• Honest Mistake or Ignorance of Fact — Ignorance or mistake as to particular facts, honest and real, generally exempts the doer from criminal responsibility. The exception is neglect in the discharge of a duty or indifference to consequences, which is equivalent to criminal intent. The Court treated the secretary’s date errors as human error rather than deliberate falsification.
• Reasonable Doubt and Moral Certainty — If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one consistent with innocence and the other with guilt, the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is insufficient to support conviction. The Court applied this rule because the physical facts favored the accused and the prosecution’s evidence was susceptible of an innocent explanation.
• Reckless Imprudence Distinguished from Deliberate Falsification — The Court observed that the facts skirted perilously near the Penal Code crime of reckless imprudence, but hopeless ineptitude and stupidity are far from criminal intent and criminal responsibility for deliberate falsification.

• “Ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to be crime. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. There can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting.” — This states the ratio decidendi on mens rea, the core reason the convictions for falsification and estafa through falsification were reversed.
• “Ignorance or mistake as to particular facts, honest and real, will as a general rule, exempt the doer from criminal responsibility. The exception, of course, is neglect in the discharge of a duty or indifference to consequences, which is equivalent to a criminal intent.” — This defines the doctrine of honest mistake of fact and its exception, which the Court applied to the accused’s erroneous dates.
• “If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused of the crime charged and the other consistent with their guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction.” — This is the Court’s formulation of the reasonable doubt standard, cited from U.S. vs. Maaño and applied to acquit the accused.
• “But it is a far cry from hopeless ineptitude and hopeless stupidity to criminal intent and criminal responsibility.” — This passage captures the Court’s factual conclusion that the provincial secretary’s bungling did not establish the deliberate criminal intent required for conviction.

• Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, December 23, 1885 — Cited as in point; a clerk who entered proceedings as of an earlier date was convicted of imprudencia temeraria but reversed because the change did not affect the integrity or effects of the document and criminal intent was absent. This supported the acquittal.
• U.S. vs. Maaño, 2 Phil. 718 (1903) — Cited for the rule that if inculpatory facts are capable of two or more explanations, one consistent with innocence, the evidence does not fulfill moral certainty and is insufficient for conviction.
• U.S. vs. Mateo, 25 Phil. 324, 334 (1913) — Cited in the Court’s survey of further authorities on criminal intent and mistake.
• U.S. vs. Reyes, 1 Phil. 341 (1902) — Cited in the same survey of authorities on criminal intent and mistake.

• Article 1, Penal Code — The Spanish Supreme Court decision quoted by the Court referred to the intention to commit the crime required by article 1 of the Penal Code; the Court adopted the principle that criminal intent is essential to criminal responsibility.
• Penal Code — Reckless Imprudence — The Court observed that the facts skirted perilously near the Penal Code crime of reckless imprudence, but this did not establish the deliberate falsification charged.

Johnson, Street, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.