People of the Philippine Islands vs. Cabellon

Incomplete defense of a relative, where only unlawful aggression is present and the means employed were not reasonably necessary or the defender was impelled by resentment, does not exempt from criminal liability but lowers the penalty by one degree. An accused cannot be convicted of homicide where the evidence fails to prove participation in the fatal attack, conspiracy, or provocation.

Ignacio Cabellon and Simeon Gaviola were charged jointly for the death of Agapito Tabora. Cabellon and Gaviola were married to sisters, making Gaviola the brother-in-law of Cabellon; this relationship placed the case within the Penal Code provision on defense of relatives other than those covered by the preceding paragraph, which required reasonable necessity of the means employed and absence of revenge, resentment, or other evil motive. The case therefore turned on the old Penal Code’s rules on exempting and mitigating circumstances for defense of relatives.

Ignacio Cabellon and Simeon Gaviola were prosecuted for murder in connection with the death of Agapito Tabora. The prosecution presented as eyewitnesses Juliana Abadon and Pedro Tabora, the deceased’s wife and son. The defense alleged that the accused acted in self-defense, while the Attorney-General maintained that they were the instigators and the aggressors.

Juliana Abadon’s testimony was materially contradictory. She first said she did not notice whether Ignacio Cabellon inflicted a wound on her husband because she ran away when he fell face downward; later she asserted that she saw Cabellon strike the deceased with a cane, and at other points she said she only surmised the cane had been used because it was blood-stained. When asked directly whether she saw Cabellon strike the deceased with the cane, she answered in the affirmative and added that her son saw it. The woman she identified as her sister, however, denied being present when Agapito Tabora was killed; she testified that she was gathering tender coconut shoots, that the incident had not yet taken place when she was there, and that Pedro later came running to tell her the deceased was dead.

Pedro Tabora’s testimony was likewise not fully credited. The lower court did not give him full credence as to how Ignacio Cabellon’s wounds were caused, stating that he was mistaken on that point due to confusion and darkness. The lower court found that the deceased was carrying an hoz in a scabbard at his belt, but according to Pedro, the deceased had no chance to use it and Cabellon’s wounds were inflicted by Simeon Gaviola with a lance through mistaking Cabellon for the deceased after the latter had fallen.

No sufficient proof showed that Ignacio Cabellon attacked the deceased in any way, conspired with his co-accused for that purpose, did anything leading to that end connected with any act of his co-accused, or provoked the fight. All witnesses, both for the prosecution and the defense, agreed that Cabellon was not responsible for the wounds that caused Agapito Tabora’s death.

Simeon Gaviola admitted causing the injuries that produced the deceased’s death but alleged that he acted in defense of his wife’s brother-in-law, Ignacio Cabellon. It was deemed proved that the deceased was the instigator and unlawful aggressor in the fight, that the deceased was then armed with a sickle, and that the injuries sustained by Ignacio Cabellon had no other credible explanation under the circumstances than that they were caused by the deceased. Pedro Tabora’s statement that Gaviola himself mistakenly inflicted the wounds on Cabellon was not admitted.

The means employed by Gaviola to repel the attack were found not reasonably necessary. The nature and number of blows dealt to the deceased precluded reasonable necessity and gave rise to a strong suspicion that Gaviola, in defending his wife’s brother-in-law, acted also from resentment against the deceased, who according to defense witnesses had been persecuting Ignacio Cabellon and his family to the point that Cabellon’s wife became mentally unbalanced from the challenges and provocations.

• Self-Defense and Defense of Relative: The defense alleged that the accused acted in self-defense; Simeon Gaviola specifically claimed that he acted in defense of his wife’s brother-in-law, Ignacio Cabellon.

• Instigation and Aggression: The Attorney-General maintained that the accused were the instigators and the aggressors.

• Criminal Liability of Ignacio Cabellon: Whether the evidence sufficiently proved that Ignacio Cabellon attacked the deceased, conspired with Simeon Gaviola, or provoked the fight so as to hold him liable for homicide.
• Defense of Relative / Incomplete Defense: Whether Simeon Gaviola is exempt from criminal liability for causing the deceased’s death on the ground of defense of a relative, or whether only incomplete defense attended the killing.
• Aggravating Circumstance of Dwelling: Whether the aggravating circumstance of dwelling may be taken into account against Simeon Gaviola.

• Criminal Liability of Ignacio Cabellon: No. The evidence did not sufficiently prove that he attacked the deceased, conspired with his co-accused, or provoked the fight; all witnesses agreed he was not responsible for the fatal wounds.
• Defense of Relative / Incomplete Defense: No, not exempt. Only unlawful aggression was present; reasonable necessity of the means employed and absence of revenge or resentment were not established, so Gaviola incurred liability for homicide with incomplete defense, with the penalty one degree lower under Article 36 of the Penal Code.
• Aggravating Circumstance of Dwelling: No. It was not properly taken into account because the provocation came from the deceased.

• Criminal Liability of Ignacio Cabellon: The prosecution’s eyewitness testimony was unreliable. Juliana Abadon’s testimony was contradictory, based on conjecture, and contradicted by her sister, who denied being present when the deceased was killed. Pedro Tabora was not fully credited by the lower court as to how Cabellon’s wounds were caused; the lower court thought he was mistaken due to confusion and darkness. No sufficient proof showed that Cabellon attacked the deceased, conspired with Gaviola, performed any act connected with Gaviola’s acts, or provoked the fight. All witnesses for both sides agreed Cabellon was not responsible for the wounds that caused death. Thus he could not be found guilty of homicide or held criminally liable in any manner.
• Defense of Relative / Incomplete Defense: Gaviola admitted causing the injuries that produced death. He claimed defense of his wife’s brother-in-law, Ignacio Cabellon. The deceased was found to be the instigator and unlawful aggressor, armed with a sickle, and Cabellon’s injuries were credibly caused by the deceased; Pedro Tabora’s contrary statement that Gaviola mistakenly wounded Cabellon was rejected. Unlawful aggression alone, however, did not exempt Gaviola. Paragraph No. 6 of article 8 of the Penal Code applied because the relationship—men married to two sisters—was not covered by the preceding paragraph. That provision required, in addition to unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the attack and that the defender not be impelled by revenge, resentment, or any other evil motive. The means Gaviola employed were not reasonably necessary, and the nature and number of blows, plus the deceased’s prior persecution of Cabellon and his family, gave rise to a strong suspicion that Gaviola acted also from resentment. Only unlawful aggression was present. Under article 36 of the Penal Code, the penalty was one degree lower than that prescribed by law.
• Aggravating Circumstance of Dwelling: The aggravating circumstance of dwelling was not properly taken into account because the provocation came from the deceased.

• Incomplete Defense of a Relative — Under the Penal Code, defense of a relative outside the relationship covered by the preceding paragraph requires (a) unlawful aggression, (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the attack, and (c) absence of revenge, resentment, or other evil motive on the defender’s part. When only unlawful aggression is present, the defense is incomplete and the penalty is reduced by one degree under article 36. The Court applied this to Simeon Gaviola, who was married to a sister of Ignacio Cabellon’s wife, because he used means not reasonably necessary and appeared to act also from resentment.
• Conspiracy and Criminal Participation Must Be Proved — Criminal liability for homicide cannot attach to an accused where the evidence fails to show that he attacked the deceased, conspired with the actual assailant, performed any act connected with the assailant’s acts, or provoked the fight. The Court applied this to Ignacio Cabellon, acquitting him because all witnesses agreed he was not responsible for the fatal wounds and no conspiracy or provocation was proved.
• Credibility of Eyewitness Testimony — Contradictory, conjectural, and uncorroborated testimony deserves no credit, especially where it is contradicted by the witness’s own relative. The Court discounted Juliana Abadon’s testimony because she repeatedly contradicted herself and her sister denied being present at the killing.
• Aggravating Circumstance of Dwelling — Dwelling cannot be properly taken into account as an aggravating circumstance where the provocation came from the deceased. The Court applied this to Gaviola.

• "But unlawful aggression is not sufficient to exempt Simeon Gaviola from a liability. Paragraph No. 6 of article 8 of the Penal Code, which would be applicable, in view of the fact that the relationship of these two men, married to two sisters, is not the one provided for in the preceding paragraph, requires, besides the unlawful aggression, a reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the attack, and that the defender be not impelled by revenge, resentment or any other evil motive." — States the requisites for the applicable defense-of-relative provision and explains why unlawful aggression alone did not exempt Gaviola.
• "Therefore, of the three elements, required by the law for exemption from guilt, only one maybe held to be present in the crime in question, and that is, the unlawful aggresion on the part of the deceased. And by virtue of the provision of article 36 of the Penal Code, the penalty to be imposed upon the appellant Gaviola must be the penalty one degree lower than that prescribed by law." — Articulates the incomplete-defense conclusion and the resulting one-degree reduction of the penalty.
• "If this appellant is not responsible for the wounds which caused the death of Agapito Tabora, and all the witnesses both for the prosecution and for the defense agree that he is not; if there was no conspiracy between him and his coaccused; if, likewise, he did not provoke the fight, nor take any part in the attack upon the deceased, certainly he cannot be found guilty of homicide, or in any manner be held criminally liable." — States the ratio for Ignacio Cabellon’s acquittal based on absence of participation, conspiracy, and provocation.

• Paragraph No. 6 of article 8, Penal Code — Requires, for defense of a relative not covered by the preceding paragraph, unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed, and absence of revenge, resentment, or other evil motive. Applied to Simeon Gaviola because his relationship to Ignacio Cabellon—men married to two sisters—fell outside the preceding paragraph; only unlawful aggression was present, so the defense was incomplete.
• Article 36, Penal Code — Provides for a penalty one degree lower than that prescribed by law when the exempting circumstances are incomplete. Applied to Gaviola after the Court found only unlawful aggression among the elements of defense of a relative.

Avanceña, C.J.; Johnson, J.; Street, J.; Villa-Real, J.

• Malcolm, Villamor and Ostrand, JJ. — Dissented and voted for the confirmation of the judgment appealed from. The provided text does not state any further reasoning for the dissent.