People of the Philippine Islands vs. Andres Ancasan

A dying declaration need not include an express statement by the declarant that he has lost all hope of recovery; it is sufficient that the circumstances lead inevitably to the conclusion that he did not expect to survive the injury from which he actually died. The conviction for homicide was affirmed, with treachery offset by intoxication and probable lack of intent to kill.

On May 3, 1927, a celebration of the last day of novenario took place in the house of Faustino Lancian in Banganga, Province of Davao. Among those present were Andres (Mandaya), Venancio Lamncian, Domingo Bancailan, the accused Andres Ancasan, and the deceased Eugeniano Felizardo.

After supper, Domingo Bancailan and Eugeniano Felizardo undertook to sing a duet. Because Felizardo sang in a higher pitch than Bancailan, Bancailan became very angry and tried to throw Felizardo down on the floor. His efforts did not meet with success, and he himself fell down with Felizardo on top of him.

While the two men were lying in that position, Ancasan, a friend of Bancailan, struck Felizardo on the back of the head with a heavy cudgel, causing a wound. The wound became infected with tetanus and led to Felizardo’s death a few days later.

The widow of the deceased testified that in one of his conscious moments, Felizardo told her that Andres Ancasan had inflicted the wound from which he was suffering. He also enjoined her to take care of their children, and immediately thereafter he again lost consciousness and died within an hour. The trial court found the prosecution witnesses credible and considered the deceased’s statement to his wife as part of the evidence.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in believing the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution and in declaring him guilty of the crime charged in the information.
• Admissibility of Dying Declaration: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in taking into consideration the testimony of the wife of the deceased as to statements made shortly before his death, because the deceased did not directly state that he at that time believed death was impending.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the trial court erred in believing the testimony of the prosecution witnesses and declaring appellant guilty of the crime charged in the information.
• Admissibility of Dying Declaration: Whether the trial court erred in admitting the deceased’s statements to his wife as a dying declaration despite the absence of an express statement that he believed death was impending.
• Penalty and Circumstances: Whether the penalty imposed was proper in light of the presence of treachery and the extenuating circumstances of intoxication and probable lack of intent to kill.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence: No. The first assignment of error is entirely without merit; the testimony of the prosecution witnesses was not unreasonable and there was no reason to doubt their veracity.
• Admissibility of Dying Declaration: No. It is not necessary for the validity or admissibility of a dying declaration that the declarant expressly state he has lost all hope of recovery; it is sufficient that the circumstances lead inevitably to the conclusion that he did not expect to survive the injury from which he actually died.
• Penalty and Circumstances: Affirmed. Treachery existed because the deceased was struck from behind, but intoxication and the probability that the defendant did not intend to kill the deceased were extenuating circumstances that more than offset the aggravating circumstance and brought the penalty to the minimum degree of reclusion temporal, as imposed.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence: The Court found nothing unreasonable in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses and saw no reason to doubt their veracity. The trial court’s reliance on that testimony was therefore sustained.
• Admissibility of Dying Declaration: The defense contended that the deceased’s statements to his wife could not be regarded as a dying declaration because he did not directly state that he believed death was impending. The Court rejected this, citing U.S. vs. Schneider and People vs. Chan Lin Wat for the rule that an express statement of lost hope is unnecessary; it is enough that the circumstances lead inevitably to the conclusion that the declarant did not expect to survive the injury from which he actually died. The widow’s uncontradicted testimony showed that in one of his conscious moments the deceased told her Ancasan had inflicted the wound, enjoined her to take care of their children, and then lost consciousness and died within an hour. The surrounding circumstances and the reference to the children clearly showed he had lost hope of recovery, making the statement admissible as a dying declaration.
• Penalty and Circumstances: The deceased was struck from behind, so treachery existed. The record also showed the defendant was intoxicated and probably did not intend to kill the deceased. These two extenuating circumstances more than offset the aggravating circumstance of treachery and brought the penalty down to the minimum degree of reclusion temporal, which was the penalty imposed by the lower court. The appealed judgment was therefore affirmed with costs against appellant.

• Dying Declaration — A dying declaration is admissible even if the declarant did not expressly state that he had lost all hope of recovery; it is sufficient that the circumstances lead inevitably to the conclusion that, at the time the declaration was made, the declarant did not expect to survive the injury from which he actually died. Applied here, the deceased’s statement to his wife identifying Ancasan, his instruction to care for their children, and his death within an hour showed that he had lost hope of recovery.
• Treachery — Treachery is an aggravating circumstance present when the victim is struck from behind. The Court found treachery because the deceased was struck from behind.
• Extenuating Circumstances of Intoxication and Lack of Intent to Kill — The Court treated intoxication and the probability that the defendant did not intend to kill the deceased as extenuating circumstances. These more than offset the aggravating circumstance of treachery and brought the penalty down to the minimum degree of reclusion temporal.

• "A sufficient answer to this contention is that it is not necessary to the validity or admissibility of a dying declaration that the declarant expressly state that he has lost all hope of recovery; it is sufficient that the circumstances are such as to lead inevitably to the conclusion that at the time declaration was made, the declaration did not expect to survive the injury from which he actually died (U.S. vs. Schneider, 21 D.C., 381; People vs. Chan Lin Wat, 50 Phil., 182)." — This states the controlling rule on the admissibility of dying declarations, rejecting the need for an express statement of impending death.
• "In our opinion, the surrounding circumstances and the reference to the children clearly show that the deceased had lost hope of recovery at the time the declaration was made and his statement was therefore admissible in evidence as a dying declaration." — This applies the rule to the facts, holding that the deceased’s statement to his wife was admissible.
• "The deceased was struck from behind and the aggravating circumstance of treachery is therefore existed, but it is also evident from the record that the defendant was intoxicated and that he probably did not intend to kill the deceased. This two extenuating circumstances more than offset aforesaid aggravating circumstance and brings the penalty down to the minimum degree of reclusion temporal, the penalty imposed by the court below." — This explains the Court’s treatment of the aggravating and extenuating circumstances in affirming the penalty.

• U.S. vs. Schneider, 21 D.C., 381 — Cited by the Court for the rule that a dying declaration need not contain an express statement that the declarant has lost all hope of recovery; circumstances may suffice.
• People vs. Chan Lin Wat, 50 Phil., 182 — Cited for the same rule on the admissibility of dying declarations.

Johnson, Malcolm, Villamor, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.