People of the Philippine Islands vs. Amadeo Corral

A person sentenced by final judgment to suffer not less than eighteen months of imprisonment is permanently disqualified from voting under Section 432 of the Revised Administrative Code, and such disqualification continues until removed by plenary pardon, regardless of the expiration of the sentence or the lapse of time. The disqualification is a civil disability imposed for the protection of the public and the preservation of election purity, not a punishment that is extinguished upon the service of the sentence.

The appellant was a registered voter in the Province of Davao who had previously been convicted of a crime by final judgment of the Supreme Court. The statutory framework governing the case was the Revised Administrative Code, which contained both the disqualification provision (Section 432) and the penal provision for illegal voting (Section 2642). The case required the Court to interpret the nature and duration of the voting disqualification imposed on persons convicted of crimes, specifically whether such disqualification was permanent or merely coextensive with the term of imprisonment.

The appellant, Amadeo Corral, was charged with having voted illegally at the general elections held on June 5, 1934, in election precinct No. 18 of the municipality of Davao, Province of Davao. It was undisputed that the appellant had been sentenced by final judgment of the Supreme Court, promulgated on March 3, 1910, to suffer eight years and one day of presidio mayor. No evidence was presented to show that prior to June 5, 1934, the appellant had been granted a plenary pardon.

The trial court convicted the appellant on the ground that he had voted while laboring under a legal disqualification, basing the judgment of conviction on Section 2642, in connection with Section 432, of the Revised Administrative Code. Section 432 disqualified from voting any person who, since August 13, 1898, had been sentenced by final judgment to suffer not less than eighteen months of imprisonment, such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon. Section 2642 provided the penalty for anyone who votes or attempts to vote knowing that he is not entitled to do so.

On appeal, the appellant's counsel contended that because the appellant had voted in 1928, his offense had already prescribed and he could no longer be prosecuted for illegal voting at the general election held on June 5, 1934. The appellant further contended that the disqualification imposed on him must be considered as having been removed at the expiration of his sentence.

• Prescription of Offense: The appellant contended that inasmuch as he had voted in 1928, his offense had already prescribed, and he could no longer be prosecuted for illegal voting at the general election held on June 5, 1934.
• Removal of Disqualification at Expiration of Sentence: The appellant argued that the disqualification imposed on him must be considered as having been removed at the expiration of his sentence, claiming that the disqualification was a punishment that terminated upon completion of the sentence.

• Continuing Disqualification: The prosecution maintained that the disqualification for crime imposed under Section 432 of the Revised Administrative Code, having once attached to the appellant and not having been subsequently removed by a plenary pardon, continued and rendered it illegal for the appellant to vote at the general elections of 1934.
• Nature of Disqualification: The prosecution argued that the disqualification was imposed "for protection and not for punishment, the withholding of a privilege and not the denial of a personal right," and that judicial interpretation and long established administrative practice were against the view that the disqualification expired with the sentence.

• Continuing Effect of Disqualification: Whether the appellant's disqualification from voting, having attached by virtue of his prior conviction, continued to render his vote at the 1934 general elections illegal despite the lapse of time and his prior voting in 1928.
• Duration of Disqualification: Whether the disqualification imposed under Section 432 of the Revised Administrative Code must be considered as having been removed at the expiration of the appellant's sentence.

• Continuing Effect of Disqualification: Yes. The disqualification for crime imposed under Section 432 of the Revised Administrative Code, having once attached to the appellant and not having been subsequently removed by a plenary pardon, continued and rendered it illegal for the appellant to vote at the general elections of 1934. The contention that the offense had prescribed was without merit.
• Duration of Disqualification: No. The disqualification was not removed at the expiration of the sentence. The claim was based on an erroneous theory of the nature of the disqualification, which regarded it as a punishment when, in fact, it was imposed "for protection and not for punishment, the withholding of a privilege and not the denial of a personal right."

• Continuing Effect of Disqualification: The Court reasoned that the modern conception of suffrage is that voting is a function of government, and the right to vote is not a natural right but a right created by law. Suffrage is a privilege granted by the State to such persons or classes as are most likely to exercise it for the public good. The State has the right to deprive persons of the right of suffrage by reason of their having been convicted of crime. The manifest purpose of such restrictions is to preserve the purity of elections, and the presumption is that one rendered infamous by conviction of felony or other base offense indicative of moral turpitude is unfit to exercise the privilege of suffrage or to hold office. Upon the facts established, the appellant was not entitled to vote on June 5, 1934, because Section 432 of the Revised Administrative Code disqualified any person who had been sentenced by final judgment to suffer not less than eighteen months of imprisonment, such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon. The appellant had been sentenced to eight years and one day of presidio mayor and had not been granted a plenary pardon. The disqualification, having once attached and not having been removed, continued to render the appellant's vote illegal.
• Duration of Disqualification: The Court rejected the appellant's theory that the disqualification was a punishment that expired with the service of the sentence. The correct view, as supported by judicial interpretation and long established administrative practice, is that the disqualification is imposed "for protection and not for punishment, the withholding of a privilege and not the denial of a personal right." The exclusion must be adjudged a mere disqualification, imposed for protection and not for punishment. Because the disqualification is not a penalty, it does not terminate upon the expiration of the sentence but continues until removed by plenary pardon.

• Suffrage as a Privilege, Not a Natural Right — Voting is a function of government, and the right to vote is not a natural right but a right created by law. Suffrage is a privilege granted by the State to such persons or classes as are most likely to exercise it for the public good. The Court applied this doctrine to justify the State's power to impose disqualifications on convicted persons, holding that the restriction is a legitimate exercise of the State's authority to preserve the purity of elections.
• Disqualification as Protection, Not Punishment — The disqualification of convicted persons from suffrage is imposed "for protection and not for punishment, the withholding of a privilege and not the denial of a personal right." The presumption is that one rendered infamous by conviction of felony or other base offense indicative of moral turpitude is unfit to exercise the privilege of suffrage or to hold office. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the disqualification under Section 432 of the Revised Administrative Code continues until removed by plenary pardon and does not expire with the service of the sentence.

• "The modern conception of the suffrage is that voting is a function of government. The right to vote is not a natural right but is a right created by law. Suffrage is a privilege granted by the State to such persons or classes as are most likely to exercise it for the public good." — This passage articulates the foundational principle underlying the Court's analysis of the nature of suffrage and the State's authority to regulate and restrict the franchise.
• "The manifest purpose of such restrictions upon this right is to preserve the purity of elections. The presumption is that one rendered infamous by conviction of felony, or other base offense indicative of moral turpitude, is unfit to exercise the privilege of suffrage or to hold office. The exclusion must for this reason be adjudged a mere disqualification, imposed for protection and not for punishment, the withholding of a privilege and not the denial of a personal right." — This passage states the ratio decidendi of the case, defining the nature of the disqualification as a protective measure rather than a punitive one, and justifying the State's power to impose permanent voting disqualifications on convicted persons.
• "The disqualification for crime imposed under section 432 of the Revised Administrative Code having once attached on the appellant and not having been subsequently removed by a plenary pardon, continued and rendered it illegal for the appellant to vote at the general elections of 1934." — This passage states the Court's application of the disqualification provision to the facts of the case, establishing that the disqualification persists until removed by plenary pardon.

• U.S. vs. Corral, 15 Phil., 383 — This is the prior conviction of the appellant, referenced in the footnote, which established the factual predicate for the application of Section 432 of the Revised Administrative Code. The Court relied on this prior judgment to determine that the appellant had been sentenced to more than eighteen months of imprisonment.

• Section 432, Revised Administrative Code — This provision disqualified from voting any person who, since August 13, 1898, had been sentenced by final judgment to suffer not less than eighteen months of imprisonment, such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon. The Court applied this provision to hold that the appellant, having been sentenced to eight years and one day of presidio mayor and not having received a plenary pardon, was disqualified from voting at the 1934 general elections.
• Section 2642, Revised Administrative Code — This provision penalized anyone who at any election votes or attempts to vote knowing that he is not entitled to do so, with imprisonment of not less than one month nor more than one year, a fine of not less than one hundred pesos nor more than one thousand pesos, and deprivation of the right of suffrage and disqualification from public office for a period of not more than four years. The Court applied this provision in connection with Section 432 to sustain the appellant's conviction for illegal voting.

Villa-Real, Vickers, Imperial, Butte, and Goddard, JJ., concurred. Justice George A. Malcolm participated in the decision and voted to affirm the judgment.

• Chief Justice Avanceña — Dissented, arguing that the appellant was not disqualified from voting in 1934. The Chief Justice reasoned that the appellant's sentence of eight years and one day of prision mayor carried with it, as an accessory penalty, disqualification from the right of suffrage during the term of the sentence. Having begun serving his sentence on April 11, 1910, and having been granted a conditional pardon on July 31, 1913, the accessory penalty of disqualification was understood to have been extinguished on April 12, 1918. The Chief Justice further argued that Section 432 of the Administrative Code was ambiguous as to whether the disqualification was for the term of the sentence or for the entire lifetime of the convict, and that the majority's interpretation was contrary to the spirit of the law. He contended that the majority's interpretation would create anomalies and inconsistencies with other provisions of the Administrative Code relating to election offenses, which imposed disqualification from suffrage for limited periods not exceeding fourteen years. He concluded that the disqualification referred to in Section 432 should be interpreted as merely during the term of the sentence.
• Justice Recto — Concurred in the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Avanceña.