People of the Phil. vs. Juan Francisco

A spouse who, while testifying in his own defense, imputes the crime to the other spouse waives the marital disqualification and cannot object to the other spouse's rebuttal testimony against him. The rule is not absolute; its rationale yields where the accused spouse himself opens the door by accusing the other.

Juan Francisco was the accused husband of Emilia Taladtad and the father of Romeo Francisco, the one-and-a-half-year-old child whose death gave rise to the parricide charge. At the time of the incident he was a detention prisoner in Mansalay, Mindoro, awaiting resolution of robbery charges. The case implicated the marital disqualification rule then found in section 26(d) of Rule 123, which generally barred a spouse from testifying for or against the other, and the Revised Penal Code provisions on parricide, mitigating circumstances, and penalties.

On March 4, 1945, Juan Francisco was a detention prisoner in the municipal jail of Mansalay, Mindoro, having been previously arrested on robbery charges. He asked the chief of police for permission to go home to see his wife about procuring bail for his provisional release. Permission was granted, and Sergeant Pacifico Pimentel was detailed to guard him. At the house, the sergeant allowed Francisco to see his wife in a room while the sergeant remained at the foot of the stairs.

After a few moments, Pimentel heard a woman scream. He ran upstairs and met Francisco's wife running out of the room, holding her right breast, which was bleeding. Moments later, Pimentel saw Francisco lying down with their little son Romeo, aged one year and a half, on his breast. Francisco had a wound in his belly; the child had a wound in the back and was dead.

The prosecution relied mainly on three pieces of evidence: Exhibit C, an affidavit signed and sworn to by Francisco before the justice of the peace of Mansalay on March 5, 1945, which was a virtual confession; Exhibit D, the justice of the peace record of his arraignment in which he entered a plea of guilty; and the rebuttal testimony of Emilia Taladtad, his wife. In Exhibit C, Francisco stated that after he was allowed upstairs to talk to his wife, he remembered his uncle's threat to have him killed because he was a shame and dishonor to the family; he lost his senses, thought it better to kill himself, saw scissors near his wife, unconsciously picked them up, stabbed his wife, then stabbed his son Romeo, and then stabbed himself. Sergeant Pimentel testified that Francisco confessed to him that, tired or disgusted with life because of his father-in-law's accusation, he wanted to wipe out his family by stabbing his wife, son, and himself, and that he was ashamed because his father-in-law had told him he should rather die than live in shame for having dishonored his wife's family.

The voluntariness and spontaneity of Exhibit C were testified to by the justice of the peace and Pimentel. The justice stated that Francisco signed and swore to the affidavit in his presence and in the presence of Pimentel, Sebastian Punzalan, and chief of police Alfredo Iwahi; that he had read the contents to Francisco; and that Francisco signed voluntarily without intimidation in the session hall of the justice of the peace court. Pimentel testified that no force was exerted, that he did not maltreat or box Francisco, that the contents were read, and that he did not threaten to shoot Francisco if he did not swear to Exhibit C. Francisco, however, testified that on the way to the justice of the peace, Pimentel told him he would swear to Exhibit C and that if he did not, Pimentel would shoot him. He also said Chief Iwahi treated him well; he had been under preventive detention in Iwahi's house, and it was Iwahi who allowed him to go home to procure bail. The Court found Francisco's version incredible, noting the absence of any motive for Pimentel to threaten him, that Francisco understood English, and that his testimony contained contradictions about whether he went alone to his wife's house and why he did not tell the justice of the peace that his wife had wounded the child.

On February 23, 1946, almost one year after the incident, Francisco testified in his own defense in the Court of First Instance. He repudiated Exhibit C and alleged torture and violence. The Court found the confession voluntary and concluded that its later repudiation was due to fear of its consequences. Defense counsel attacked Exhibit C as not spontaneous, questioned the admissibility of Exhibit D for lack of proper identification, and impugned the admissibility of the wife's testimony under section 26(d) of Rule 123. The wife testified only on rebuttal, after Francisco, testifying in his defense, imputed to her the killing of their little son. The Court found the crime of parricide established beyond reasonable doubt, found no sufficient proof of insanity or allied defense, and held that Francisco must have been suffering from an illness diminishing his will-power without depriving him of consciousness of his acts.

• Involuntariness of Exhibit C: Petitioner repudiated his extrajudicial confession almost a year later and claimed that its statements were extracted through violence and intimidation; he testified that Sergeant Pimentel threatened to shoot him if he did not swear to Exhibit C.
• Admissibility of Exhibit D: Petitioner questioned the admissibility of Exhibit D, the justice of the peace record of his arraignment and plea of guilty, on the ground that it had not been properly identified.
• Marital Disqualification: Petitioner invoked section 26(d) of Rule 123 and objected to the testimony of his wife, Emilia Taladtad, arguing that a wife cannot testify for or against her husband.

• Prosecution's Evidence: The prosecution relied mainly on Exhibit C, the virtual confession; Exhibit D, the record of arraignment and plea of guilty; and the rebuttal testimony of Emilia Taladtad, the appellant's wife.
• Capital Penalty: The prosecution recommended the imposition of the capital penalty upon the accused.

• Voluntariness and Admissibility of Exhibit C: Whether the extrajudicial confession was voluntarily executed and admissible despite appellant's repudiation and claim of violence and intimidation.
• Admissibility of Exhibit D: Whether the justice of the peace record of arraignment and plea of guilty was properly admissible.
• Marital Disqualification and Waiver: Whether the wife's rebuttal testimony was admissible against appellant under section 26(d) of Rule 123, or whether appellant waived the objection by testifying that his wife killed their child.
• Sufficiency of Evidence and Motive: Whether parricide was established beyond reasonable doubt and whether proof of motive was necessary.
• Mitigating Circumstance: Whether appellant was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of illness diminishing will-power under article 13, paragraph 9, of the Revised Penal Code.

• Voluntariness and Admissibility of Exhibit C: Yes. The confession was voluntarily signed and sworn before the justice of the peace; no sufficient proof of violence or intimidation overcame the justice's testimony, and its later repudiation did not render it inadmissible.
• Admissibility of Exhibit D: Yes. Exhibit D was part of the justice of the peace record and was expressly presented by the prosecution as evidence in the Court of First Instance.
• Marital Disqualification and Waiver: Yes, the wife's rebuttal testimony was admissible. By testifying in his defense that his wife caused the child's death, appellant waived objection to her rebuttal testimony under the marital disqualification rule.
• Sufficiency of Evidence and Motive: Yes. Parricide was established beyond reasonable doubt; motive need not be proved when the commission of the crime is established as required by law.
• Mitigating Circumstance: Yes. Appellant was credited with the mitigating circumstance of illness diminishing will-power under article 13, paragraph 9, of the Revised Penal Code; with no aggravating circumstance, the lesser indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua was proper.

• Voluntariness and Admissibility of Exhibit C: The confession was sworn to and subscribed before the justice of the peace, who testified that he asked Francisco whether he understood its contents, that Francisco answered affirmatively, and that he signed voluntarily. Pimentel likewise testified that no force, maltreatment, or threat was used. Apart from Francisco's own testimony, there was no evidence that the statements were extracted by violence or intimidation. The Court noted the practice of third-degree methods but found insufficient proof to destroy the justice of the peace's categorical testimony. Francisco's version was incredible because no motive was shown for Pimentel to threaten him, he understood English, and his testimony was contradictory. His repudiation almost a year later was attributed to fear of the confession's consequences. The confession was also corroborated by the wife's rebuttal testimony.
• Admissibility of Exhibit D: Exhibit D was part of the record of the case in the justice of the peace court and was expressly presented by the prosecution as evidence in the Court of First Instance. The objection that it had not been properly identified did not prevail.
• Marital Disqualification and Waiver: Section 26(d) of Rule 123 generally disqualifies a spouse from testifying for or against the other, except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed by one against the other. The rule rests on identity of interests, danger of perjury, protection of marital confidences, avoidance of domestic disunion, and prevention of punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other. But the rule has exceptions, and it may be waived. Here, the wife did not testify in the prosecution's direct evidence; she testified only after Francisco, in his own defense, imputed the killing of their son to her. This gave the prosecution the right to rebut the new matter and gave the wife the right to testify in self-defense against possible criminal prosecution and moral and social stigma. By imputing the crime to his wife, Francisco must be taken to have intended the natural and necessary consequence that she would deny the imputation. He thus waived all objection to her rebuttal testimony, even if the objection would have been available at the outset. The right to present rebuttal evidence is secured to the State by Rule 115, section 3, paragraph (c), which also allows the court to permit new additional evidence bearing on the main issue. The Court held that it was not necessary that the wife be in jeopardy of punishment in the same case; the waiver depends on the consequences that common sense, justice, and fairness should have led the husband to expect. The scope of the wife's testimony should at least be the same as that of her husband's testimony.
• Sufficiency of Evidence and Motive: The commission of parricide was established beyond reasonable doubt. Motive need not be proved when the commission of the crime is established as required by law. In any event, there was proof of motive from the accused's own confession, strange though it was. The Court searched the record for insanity or an allied defense but found none.
• Mitigating Circumstance: Whether the accused was a simpleton, an eccentric, or an inexplicable phenomenon, and indulging all reasonable intendments in his favor, the Court concluded that when he committed the crime he must have been suffering from an illness of the body, mind, nerves, or moral faculty as contemplated in article 13, paragraph 9, of the Revised Penal Code—an illness that diminished the exercise of his will-power without depriving him of consciousness of his acts. Under article 246, parricide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Under article 63, paragraph 3, when the act is attended by a mitigating circumstance and no aggravating circumstance, and the penalty is composed of two indivisible penalties, the lesser penalty is applied. Thus, reclusion perpetua was correct, with accessory penalties under article 41, plus indemnity of P2,000 and costs.

• Marital Disqualification Rule and Its Waiver — Under section 26(d) of Rule 123, a spouse cannot testify for or against the other, except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed by one against the other. The rule rests on identity of interests, danger of perjury, protection of marital confidences, avoidance of domestic disunion, and prevention of punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other. The rule may be waived. Where the accused spouse testifies in his own defense and imputes the crime to the other spouse, he waives objection to the other spouse's rebuttal testimony; it is not necessary that the other spouse be in jeopardy of punishment in the same case. The scope of the rebuttal testimony should at least be the same as that of the accused spouse's testimony.
• Motive Not Essential When Crime Proven — Motive need not be proved when the commission of the crime is established as required by law. In this case, parricide was established beyond reasonable doubt, and motive was in any event supplied by the accused's own confession.
• Mitigating Circumstance of Illness Diminishing Will-Power — Article 13, paragraph 9, of the Revised Penal Code treats as mitigating such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of his will-power without depriving him of consciousness of his acts. The Court applied this where the accused's conduct was strange or inexplicable, indulging reasonable intendments in his favor.
• Indivisible Penalties and Mitigating Circumstance — Under article 63, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code, when the penalty is composed of two indivisible penalties and the commission of the act is attended by a mitigating circumstance with no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty is applied. Parricide under article 246 is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death; with the mitigating illness, reclusion perpetua was proper.
• Right to Rebuttal Evidence — Rule 115, section 3, paragraph (c), secures to the State, no less than to the accused, the right to present rebuttal evidence and authorizes the court, in furtherance of justice, to permit new additional evidence bearing upon the main issue. This supported the admission of the wife's rebuttal testimony after the accused introduced new matter imputing the crime to her.

• "It is not necessary to prove motive in case the commission of the crime is established as required by law." — States the rule that motive is not an essential element when the crime itself is proved as required by law.
• "By his said act, the husband himself exercising the very right which he would deny his wife upon the ground of their marital relations — must be taken to have waived all objection to the latter’s testimony upon rebuttal, even considering that such objection would have been available at the outset." — States the ratio decidendi on waiver of the marital disqualification objection.
• "The right to present rebuttal evidence is secured to the State, no less than to the accused, by Rule 115, section 3, paragraph (c), the provision further authorizing the court, in furtherance of justice, to permit one or the other party to offer "new additional evidence bearing upon the main issue in question."" — Identifies the procedural basis for allowing the wife's rebuttal testimony.
• "such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of the will-power of the offender without however depriving him of consciousness of his acts." — Defines the mitigating circumstance under article 13, paragraph 9, of the Revised Penal Code that the Court applied to the accused.

• U.S. vs. Ricafor, 1 Phil. 173; U.S. vs. McMann, 4 Phil. 561; U.S. vs. Reyes, 18 Phil. 495; U.S. vs. Balmori and Apostol, 18 Phil. 578 — Cited by the majority for the rule that motive need not be proved when the commission of the crime is established as required by law.
• Cargill vs. State, 220 Pac. 61, 25 Okl. Cr. 314, 35 A.L.R. 133 — Cited for the reasons underlying the marital disqualification rule: identity of interests, danger of perjury, protection of private life, and prevention of domestic disunion and spousal punishment.
• People vs. Natividad, 70 Phil. 315 — Cited in the dissenting opinion of Justice Feria as squarely applicable, holding that a wife cannot testify against her husband in a criminal case in which the latter is charged with having killed the child of the former.
• U.S. vs. Concepcion, 31 Phil. 182 — Cited in the dissenting opinion for the proposition that section 26(d) of Rule 123 applies only where the testimony of a spouse is offered for or against the other in a proceeding to which the latter is a party.

• Section 26(d), Rule 123 — General marital disqualification; applied to the wife's testimony, but the majority found that appellant waived the objection by imputing the crime to her.
• Rule 115, section 3, paragraph (c) — Secures the right to rebuttal evidence and authorizes the court to permit new additional evidence bearing on the main issue; basis for allowing the wife's rebuttal testimony.
• Article 246, Revised Penal Code — Punishes parricide by reclusion perpetua to death.
• Article 13, paragraph 9, Revised Penal Code — Provides the mitigating circumstance of illness diminishing the exercise of will-power without depriving the offender of consciousness of his acts; applied to appellant.
• Article 63, paragraph 3, Revised Penal Code — When the penalty is composed of two indivisible penalties and only a mitigating circumstance attends the act, the lesser penalty is applied; reclusion perpetua was imposed.
• Article 41, Revised Penal Code — Provides the accessory penalties carried by reclusion perpetua.
• Section 12, Article IX, Constitution — Cited in Justice Feria's dissent, requiring a decision convicting an accused to express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

Moran, C.J., Paras, Perfecto, Bengzon, and Tuason, JJ., concurred. Briones, J., concurred in the result. Padilla, J., issued a separate concurring opinion concurring in the result but stating that the evidence was sufficient to support conviction without the wife's rebuttal testimony and agreeing with the dissent that she was incompetent to testify against appellant. Pablo, M., J., issued a concurring and dissenting opinion concurring in the conviction but agreeing with the dissent that the wife's testimony should be excluded as inadmissible.

• Justice Feria — Dissented from the majority's new theory that appellant's testimony imputing the killing to his wife capacitated her to testify on rebuttal and constituted a waiver. Argued that section 26(d) of Rule 123 only relates to cases where the testimony of a spouse is offered for or against the other in a proceeding to which the latter is a party; the husband's testimony against his wife, who was not a party, was admissible but could not be used against her, so it did not justify her testimony against him. The wife's testimony was not true rebuttal but new additional evidence bearing on the main issue; the prosecution could offer rebutting evidence only unless the court permitted new additional evidence. To allow it as rebuttal would amend Rule 123 and create a new exception. No waiver occurred because appellant objected strongly, and the only waiver cases recognized in Wharton were those in sections 1149 and 1205. The wife's testimony should be excluded, leaving the confession to be assessed alone. The majority's statement that other evidence proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt was out of place; the decision should clearly express the facts and law under the Constitution.