People of the Phil. vs. Fe C. Arcilla

Reclusion perpetua is a single and indivisible penalty, notwithstanding the duration fixed by Section 17 of R.A. 7659, and voluntary surrender cannot alter it; likewise, the momentary absence of a public prosecutor cannot be raised by the accused to invalidate a state witness's testimony absent proof of personal prejudice.

Fe Arcilla y Cornejo and Antonio Arcilla were married in Goa, Camarines Sur, on April 19, 1975, and had five children. Fe was a teacher while Antonio was an employee of the National Power Corporation in Daraga, Albay. In 1983, Fe left her family to work in Singapore, leaving the children in the conjugal home in Camarines Sur while Antonio stayed mostly in Albay. The case is governed by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code on parricide, and by the classification of reclusion perpetua under Republic Act No. 7659.

Fe Arcilla y Cornejo and Antonio Arcilla were married in Goa, Camarines Sur, on April 19, 1975, and had five children. Fe was a teacher while Antonio worked for the National Power Corporation in Daraga, Albay. In 1983, Fe left her family to work in Singapore, leaving the children in the conjugal home in Camarines Sur while Antonio stayed mostly in Albay. Unknown to Fe, Antonio developed an illicit affair with Lilia Lipio, using the house of Lilia's parents in Barangay Namantao, Daraga, Albay, as their love nest, and siring two children with her. Fe eventually learned of the infidelity and returned to the country in 1988, but her return did not stop the relationship.

The illicit relationship came to a tragic end on May 1, 1992. At about 9:00 A.M. of that date, the accused went to Lilia's residence in Namantao, Daraga, Albay, looking for Antonio. It was the barangay's feast day and Lilia's family had many guests. The accused found Antonio having a drinking spree with his friends in a kiosk a few meters from Lilia's house. The meeting immediately turned violent: the accused approached Antonio and slapped him, then went inside Lilia's house and instructed Antonio to tell Lilia to join them. The three proceeded to the bedroom where the three-year-old son of Lilia and Antonio was sleeping, and a heated altercation between the accused and Antonio followed. Lilia left the bedroom and sat on a sofa in the receiving room, about two meters away, from where she could see the bickering couple through the half-closed bedroom door.

According to the prosecution, at the height of their argument the accused took a fan knife from her shoulder bag and stabbed Antonio on the chest, causing him to embrace her tightly. Lilia barged back into the room, held Antonio's belt at the back, and pulled him away from the accused. The accused was able to pull the knife out of Antonio's chest and delivered a second thrust, hitting him on the left thigh. She then fled with the fan knife, her clothes stained with blood. Antonio was rushed to the hospital where he died due to "hypovolemic shock due to massive hemorrhage secondary to stab wound."

The accused gave a different version. She testified that she received an urgent letter from her eldest daughter asking for money to pay tuition fees, and thus went early in the morning of May 1, 1992, to see her husband at his office in Daraga, Albay. The security guard told her that Antonio was in Namantao, so she proceeded to Lilia's residence and found Antonio drinking with friends. Antonio advised her to go home and not to make a scene; irked, she slapped him and went inside Lilia's house. Antonio followed her to the bedroom where Lilia's three-year-old son was sleeping, and Lilia joined them. The accused asked whether the child was theirs; Lilia denied it, but Antonio boldly admitted that the boy was theirs. The admission provoked a heated verbal exchange while Lilia brought the child outside. The altercation became violent when Antonio pushed the accused, causing her to hit the concrete wall and feel dizzy. Seeing a fan knife in a cabinet, she held it with her right hand and warned Antonio not to go near her or she would stab him. Antonio did not heed the warning, and they grappled for the knife until Antonio twisted her left arm behind her back. She freed her left arm and held the knife with both hands, but Antonio moved behind her, wrapped his arms around her, held her hands, and tried to force the knife toward her. She twisted her body and the knife struck Antonio's left thigh. Undaunted, Antonio tried to direct the knife toward her a second time; she bit his arm but his grip tightened, and again she twisted her body, and in the process the knife struck Antonio. When his embrace loosened, she ran away. She chanced upon a barangay tanod who helped her surrender to the barangay captain of Namantao, and she was then taken to the police headquarters in Daraga, Albay.

The trial court gave more credence to the testimony of prosecution witness Lilia Lipio and convicted the accused. In its assessment of the witnesses, the trial court found that Lilia was "quite honest and sincere," emphatic, straightforward, and composed, with no evasiveness detected, while the accused did not appear disturbed by the incident, seemed at times amused, and would smile although there was nothing funny about the matter.

• Absence of the Public Prosecutor: The accused-appellant contended that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Lilia Lipio despite the absence of a public prosecutor during its taking.
• Credibility of the Prosecution Witness: The accused-appellant contended that the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of Lilia Lipio relative to the circumstances that led to the death of Antonio Arcilla.
• Credibility of the Accused: The accused-appellant contended that the trial court erred in not giving credence to her own testimony relative to the circumstances that led to the death of her husband, maintaining that the stabbing was merely accidental and through the victim's own doing, and that she was forced to use the knife to resist the victim's assault.

• Absence of the Public Prosecutor: Whether the testimony of Lilia Lipio should be invalidated because it was taken during the momentary absence of the public prosecutor.
• Credibility of the Prosecution Witness: Whether the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of Lilia Lipio on the circumstances surrounding the death of Antonio Arcilla.
• Credibility of the Accused: Whether the trial court erred in rejecting the accused's testimony that the stabbing was accidental and that she acted in self-defense.
• Penalty: Whether reclusion perpetua is a divisible or indivisible penalty, and whether the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender may affect it.

• Absence of the Public Prosecutor: No. The fleeting absence of the fiscal is not a sufficient ground to invalidate the testimony of a state witness, the accused having neither objected to the continuation of the testimony nor shown personal prejudice.
• Credibility of the Prosecution Witness: No. The trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves great respect, it having had the opportunity to observe the witnesses' expression and demeanor firsthand, and no cogent reason existed to depart from that rule.
• Credibility of the Accused: No. The claim of accident was incredible in itself, the location of the victim's wounds, the position of the accused and the victim, and their relative strength negating the accused's story; the claim of self-defense likewise failed because the accused provoked the victim and there was no reasonable necessity for the use of the knife.
• Penalty: Reclusion perpetua is a single and indivisible penalty. Section 17 of R.A. 7659 did not alter its original classification, and voluntary surrender cannot change the penalty.

• Absence of the Public Prosecutor: The records did not show that the entire testimony of Lilia Lipio was given in the absence of the prosecuting fiscal. The trial judge explained that Prosecutor de Joya attended only the pre-trial, which the defense waived, and that he was absent for only a few minutes, not for the whole time Lipio took the witness stand. The fleeting absence was not a sufficient ground to invalidate the testimony because the accused did not object to its continuation despite the momentary absence of the prosecutor, and she showed no prejudice, having fully cross-examined Lipio through counsel to test her credibility. A crime is an offense against the State and is prosecuted in the name of the People of the Philippines; under Section 5 of Rule 110, all criminal actions are prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal, and only private crimes may be prosecuted at the instance of the offended party. The presence of a public prosecutor is necessary to protect vital state interests, foremost the interest in vindicating the rule of law. That right belongs to the public prosecutor and not to the accused, and the absence of a prosecutor cannot be raised by an accused to invalidate the testimony of a state witness if he cannot prove personal prejudice.

• Credibility of the Prosecution Witness: The records showed that Lilia Lipio was clear and categorical when she testified on how Antonio was stabbed by the accused, recounting that the accused asked Antonio whether the sleeping child was theirs, that Antonio admitted it, that the accused asked "what do you like me to do, do I have to kill you," that Antonio answered "just do it," that the accused opened her shoulder bag and took out a fan knife, and that she immediately stabbed Antonio on the left breast and, after pulling the knife out, stabbed him a second time on the left thigh. On cross-examination, Lipio remained firm and certain on what transpired that day. The trial judge was impressed by her demeanor, finding her honest, sincere, emphatic, and straightforward, with no evasiveness, and composed and cool, while the accused did not appear disturbed and at times seemed amused and smiled. The trial court's assessment of credibility deserves great respect because it had the important opportunity to observe firsthand the expression and demeanor of the witnesses, and no cogent reason existed to depart from this well-settled rule.

• Credibility of the Accused: The accused's testimony did not convince the Court that the stabbing was merely accidental and through the victim's own doing. The location of the victim's wounds, the position of the accused and the victim, and their relative strength negated the credence of her story; her claim that she twisted her body at an angle that allowed the knife to pass just below her armpit and pierce the victim's chest and left thigh was incredulous. Evidence to be believed must not only come from the mouth of a credible witness but must also be credible in itself. The contention that she was forced to use the knife to resist the victim's assault was likewise rejected: while the estranged couple had a heated argument before the stabbing, the evidence showed that it was the accused who provoked the victim, who initially dissuaded her from making a scene, yet she could not control her emotion and slapped him in front of his friends. Even assuming that the victim harmed her prior to the stabbing, there was no reasonable necessity for her to use the knife, as there were many people outside the house who could readily render assistance.

• Penalty: In an en banc resolution dated January 9, 1995, the Court clarified its earlier ruling in People vs. Lucas and held that although Section 17 of R.A. 7659 fixed the duration of reclusion perpetua from twenty years and one day to forty years, there was no clear legislative intent to alter its original classification as an indivisible penalty. In accord with this clarification, the proper penalty to be imposed on the appellant is reclusion perpetua without any divisible period. It was therefore needless to address the appellant's plea that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender be considered in her favor, since voluntary surrender will not alter the penalty of reclusion perpetua, the same being a single and indivisible penalty.

• Trial court's assessment of witness credibility — The trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves great respect because it has the important opportunity to observe firsthand the expression and demeanor of the witnesses at trial. The Court found no cogent reason to depart from this rule, especially where the trial judge had been critical and keen in observing the witnesses and found the prosecution witness honest, sincere, emphatic, and straightforward.

• Absence of a public prosecutor as a ground to invalidate testimony — A crime is an offense against the State and is prosecuted in the name of the People of the Philippines; under Section 5 of Rule 110, all criminal actions are prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal, and only private crimes may be prosecuted at the instance of the offended party. The presence of a public prosecutor protects vital state interests, and the right to such presence belongs to the public prosecutor and not to the accused. Accordingly, the absence of a prosecutor cannot be raised by an accused to invalidate the testimony of a state witness if he cannot prove personal prejudice. In this case, the fleeting absence of the fiscal, coupled with the accused's failure to object and her full opportunity to cross-examine the witness, did not warrant invalidating the testimony.

• Evidence must be credible in itself — Evidence to be believed must not only come from the mouth of a credible witness but must also be credible in itself. The accused's claim that she twisted her body at an angle that allowed the knife to pass just below her armpit and pierce the victim's chest and left thigh was rejected as incredulous, given the location of the wounds, the position of the accused and the victim, and their relative strength.

• Reclusion perpetua as an indivisible penalty — Although Section 17 of R.A. 7659 fixed the duration of reclusion perpetua from twenty years and one day to forty years, there was no clear legislative intent to alter its original classification as an indivisible penalty. The proper penalty is therefore reclusion perpetua without any divisible period, and a mitigating circumstance such as voluntary surrender cannot alter it because the penalty is single and indivisible.

• "The absence of a prosecutor cannot therefore be raised by an accused to invalidate the testimony of a state witness if he cannot prove personal prejudice as in the case at bar." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the first assigned error, defining the accused's burden to show personal prejudice before a state witness's testimony may be invalidated on the ground of the prosecutor's absence.
• "Evidence to be believed must not only come from the mouth of a credible witness but must also be credible in itself." — This passage articulates the canonical formulation of the rule on the intrinsic credibility of evidence, applied to reject the accused's claim that the stabbing was accidental.
• "although Section 17 of R.A. 7659 has fixed the duration of reclusion perpetua from twenty years (20) and one (1) day to forty (40) years, there was no clear legislative intent to alter its original classification as an indivisible penalty." — This passage states the controlling rule on the nature of reclusion perpetua as clarified in the en banc resolution, and is the basis for modifying the penalty imposed by the trial court.
• "the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves great respect since it has the important opportunity to observe first-hand the expression and demeanor of the witnesses at the trial." — This passage restates the settled standard of appellate deference to the trial court's credibility findings, which the Court applied in affirming the crediting of the prosecution witness.

• People vs. Lucas, G.R. Nos. 108172-173, May 25, 1994 — The earlier ruling on the penalty of reclusion perpetua that was clarified by the Court's en banc resolution dated January 9, 1995, which held that R.A. 7659 did not alter its classification as an indivisible penalty.
• People vs. Vinas, Sr., G.R. Nos. 112070-71, June 29, 1995, 245 SCRA 448 — Cited as authority for the rule that the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves great respect.
• People vs. Quino, G.R. No. 105580, May 17, 1994 — Cited as authority for the rule that evidence, to be believed, must not only come from the mouth of a credible witness but must also be credible in itself.

• Article 246, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes the crime of parricide, under which the accused was charged and convicted for stabbing her lawfully wedded husband to death.
• Section 5, Rule 110 — Provides that all criminal actions commenced by complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal; cited to explain that only private crimes may be prosecuted at the instance of the offended party, and that the right to the prosecutor's presence belongs to the public prosecutor and not to the accused.
• Section 2, Rule 110 — Cited for the rule that a crime is an offense against the State and is prosecuted in the name of the People of the Philippines.
• Section 17, Republic Act No. 7659 — Fixed the duration of reclusion perpetua from twenty years and one day to forty years; construed as not having altered the original classification of reclusion perpetua as an indivisible penalty.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied by the trial court in its amended decision in imposing a minimum and maximum term; the Supreme Court's modification to reclusion perpetua without a divisible period effectively set aside that application.

Regalado, Romero, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.