People of the Phil. vs. Edgar Ayupan

Treachery cannot be appreciated to qualify a killing to murder where the evidence does not establish how the aggression commenced, since the deliberate or conscious adoption of the means of execution must be shown and any doubt as to the existence of treachery must be resolved in favor of the accused.

Appellant Edgar Ayupan and the victim Francisco Mendoza were both residents of Batad, Iloilo, and the prosecution's lone eyewitness, Helen Batislaong, was a relative of the victim, her mother and the victim's father being cousins. The killing was charged under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with treachery alleged under paragraph 16 of Article 14, and the case reached the Supreme Court on appeal from a Regional Trial Court judgment of conviction. The statutory backdrop is the distinction between murder, which requires a qualifying circumstance such as treachery, and homicide, which does not.

On June 26, 1984, Helen Batislaong, accompanied by her younger sister Juvy and her cousin Joseph, arrived at the dance hall of Crossing Hamod, Batad, Iloilo Province, at around 9:00 p.m. to watch the dance. Edgar Ayupan, also a resident of Batad, was present at the same dance hall with companions Gerry Hablona, Roquito Penuela, and Efren Hablona. According to the prosecution, at around midnight Batislaong heard a commotion inside the dance hall; concerned that her cousin might be involved, she ran to the center of the dance floor, where she did not see her cousin but instead saw Francisco Mendoza — a relative of hers — lying bloodied on the floor, being stabbed repeatedly in the chest by Ayupan, who was kneeling over the victim near the knee portion of his body. She was only four meters away, and a light bulb brightly illuminated the scene. She shouted at Ayupan and called for help, but most of the people ran away; Ayupan and his companions fled, and the barangay captain later arrived, investigated, and brought her home, as she was weak from crying.

According to the defense, Ayupan testified that he knew the victim but did not stab him. Before entering the dance hall, he and his companions were frisked by the barangay tanod at the gate. Once inside, he invited a lady to dance; the victim slapped his hand, and when he turned his head, the victim immediately boxed him on the bridge of his nose, causing him to lose consciousness. Gerry Hablona and Roquito Penuela brought him out of the dance hall when he regained consciousness. He claimed he did not know Batislaong and did not leave his barangay, and that he learned of the charge only when he was arrested on June 21, 1995. Roquito Penuela corroborated the account, testifying that after Ayupan was boxed and fell down, the victim walked toward the center of the dance hall, where somebody met and stabbed him many times; at that time Ayupan was still lying down, and Penuela carried him out and took him home when he regained consciousness.

Dr. Noel C. Posadas, a retired rural health physician and resident of Batad, conducted the autopsy on the victim's cadaver and testified that the victim received three stab wounds on the chest, the third of which was fatal, and that the immediate cause of death was shock and hemorrhage.

Batislaong did not immediately report the incident because she was nervous and afraid; a week afterward, she related the circumstances of the killing to Atty. Teodosio, who told her that there were two other witnesses whom he felt were sufficient to prosecute appellant and that he would call her if the need arose. Those two other witnesses, Rodrigo L. Demayo and Noel T. Estebal, both died before they could testify.

The crime occurred in June 1984, but the indictments commenced only in 1995. An order for appellant's arrest was issued on July 24, 1984; for failure to serve the warrant, another order was issued on November 22, 1984, implementing an alias warrant; because he remained at large, another alias warrant was issued on August 20, 1987. The case was archived on November 29, 1989, in view of several failed attempts to apprehend him, and it was only in 1995 — ten years after the commission of the crime — that he was arrested by the police, although in connection with another crime attributed to him.

The trial court gave full faith and credence to the testimony of Helen Batislaong, finding that, having been at the locus criminis, she had the opportunity to see and observe the specific details of the crime. It disbelieved appellant's defense of denial, rejected the evidence of good moral character offered by the defense witnesses as based purely on conjecture and unsubstantiated by concrete details, and ruled that appellant's flight after the commission of the crime was an indication of his guilt.

• Sufficiency of the Lone Witness's Testimony: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in relying on the testimony of the lone prosecution witness, Helen Batislaong, because her testimony was not corroborated by other witnesses.
• Delay in Reporting: Appellant argued that because Batislaong did not immediately report the incident to the police, her testimony deserved scant consideration.
• Preservation of Evidence and Delay: Appellant claimed that the prosecution had no record to show that the facts of the case had been preserved, in light of the lapse of time between the 1984 crime and the 1995 indictments.
• Absence of Treachery: In his Reply, appellant argued that if he was responsible for the death of the victim, he would be guilty only of homicide, because the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not proven.

• Preservation of Records: The Solicitor General pointed out that the relevant documents had been preserved before the case was archived.

• Credibility of the Lone Witness: Whether the trial court erred in convicting appellant of murder despite the allegedly insufficient and unreliable testimony of the lone prosecution witness, Helen Batislaong.
• Treachery: Whether the qualifying circumstance of treachery was sufficiently established to qualify the killing to murder.

• Credibility of the Lone Witness: No. The testimony of a lone witness, if found by the trial court to be positive, categorical, and credible, is sufficient to support a conviction; corroborative evidence is necessary only when there are reasons to suspect that the witness bent the truth or that the observation was inaccurate.
• Treachery: No. Treachery must be proved by clear and convincing evidence as conclusively as the killing itself, and any doubt as to its existence must be resolved in favor of the accused; absent any particulars as to the manner in which the aggression commenced, treachery cannot be appreciated, and appellant can be convicted only of homicide.

• Credibility of the Lone Witness: The settled rule is that the testimony of a lone witness, if found by the trial court to be positive, categorical, and credible, is sufficient to support a conviction, especially where the testimony bears the earmarks of truth and sincerity and is delivered spontaneously, naturally, and in a straightforward manner. Corroborative evidence is necessary only when there are reasons to suspect that the witness bent the truth or that the observation was inaccurate; evidence is assessed in terms of quality, not quantity, and is weighed, not counted. Although the prosecution could have presented two other witnesses, Rodrigo L. Demayo and Noel T. Estebal, both died before they could testify. The trial court found Batislaong's narration straightforward and categorical, and the Court found no reason to disturb the factual findings of the RTC, the credibility of witnesses being a matter best left to the determination of the trial court because of its unique advantage of observing them firsthand and noting their demeanor, conduct, and attitude. Batislaong positively identified appellant as the perpetrator: she had a clear view of the stabbing incident, standing only four meters from the victim, and the dance hall was sufficiently illuminated; the medicolegal's testimony and Medical Report corroborated her recollection of the specific details — the stabbing of the victim on the chest several times, the use of a knife, and the position of the assailant. The fact that she was a relative of the victim did not taint her testimony, since blood relationship between a witness and the victim does not by itself impair credibility and may even strengthen it, it being unnatural for an aggrieved relative to falsely accuse someone other than the real culprit. Appellant's denial was inherently weak and must fail against Batislaong's positive declaration, and it was not physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis; his admission that the victim had slapped his hand prior to the stabbing was undisputed. Absent evidence of improper motive, the presumption is that no such motive existed and that the witness's testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. On the delay in reporting, different people react differently to a given stimulus, and there is no standard form of behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling, or frightful experience; delay, when adequately explained, does not impair credibility. Batislaong explained that she was initially nervous and afraid and had to be brought home, weak from crying after witnessing the stabbing, and there is no rule that a suspect must be immediately named by a witness. On the lapse of time, the relevant documents had been preserved before the case was archived, and appellant was to blame for the delay: an order for his arrest was issued on July 24, 1984, an alias warrant on November 22, 1984, and another alias warrant on August 20, 1987, before the case was archived on November 29, 1989, and he was arrested only in 1995. Flight means the act of evading the course of justice by voluntarily withdrawing oneself to avoid arrest or detention or the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings, and the unexplained flight of the accused may, as a general rule, be taken as evidence tending to establish guilt; since appellant could not be found in Batad as soon as the Information was filed and the warrant issued, resulting in the archiving of the case, he plainly left the place to avoid arrest and prosecution, and his flight to Masbate was an indication of his guilt.
• Treachery: Treachery must be proved by clear and convincing evidence as conclusively as the killing itself, and any doubt as to its existence must be resolved in favor of the accused. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof tending directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Two conditions must be present: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or for retaliation, and (2) the deliberate or conscious adoption of the means of execution. The RTC had explained that the crime was attended by treachery because appellant stabbed the victim who was lying on the ground, a situation that propelled the method of attack to a successful accomplishment of the criminal act without exposing the accused to any possible retaliation. While the essence of treachery is the swiftness and unexpectedness of an attack upon an unsuspecting and unarmed victim who has not given the slightest provocation, the suddenness of the attack does not by itself suffice to support a finding of alevosia, even if the purpose is to kill, so long as the decision is sudden and the victim's helpless position is accidental. In order to appreciate treachery as a modifying circumstance in a continuous aggression, it must be shown to have been present at the inception of the attack. The second requisite was not sufficiently established: the prosecution was not able to show that appellant had deliberately adopted the attack, considering that it was executed during a commotion and as a result of it, and the lower court failed to consider that the lone eyewitness could not have had any knowledge of it, having arrived at the scene sometime after the stabbing started, and thus could not testify on whether there was provocation on the part of the victim. Appellant and the victim had an altercation prior to the stabbing incident, and the attack could have been done on impulse as a reaction to the latter's actual or imagined provocation, which negated the presence of treachery even if the attack may have been sudden and unexpected. The mere fact that several stab wounds were inflicted on the victim — who was either sitting or lying down — did not show treachery unless there was evidence that such form of attack had purposely been adopted by the accused, and the fact that a bladed weapon was used did not per se make the attack treacherous. Absent any particulars as to the manner in which the aggression commenced, treachery cannot be appreciated, and one cannot substitute mere suppositions for a hiatus in the prosecution's evidence. Since the lone prosecution witness failed to see how the attack had been initiated on the victim, the qualifying circumstance of treachery cannot be applied, and appellant can be convicted only of homicide, for which the imposable penalty under the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and considering the absence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the proper penalty is prision mayor in its medium period, as minimum, to reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.

• Lone-Witness Rule — The testimony of a lone witness, if found by the trial court to be positive, categorical, and credible, is sufficient to support a conviction, especially where it bears the earmarks of truth and sincerity and is delivered spontaneously, naturally, and in a straightforward manner. Corroborative evidence is necessary only when there are reasons to suspect that the witness bent the truth or that the observation was inaccurate; evidence is assessed in terms of quality, not quantity, and is weighed, not counted. The Court applied this rule to sustain the conviction on the testimony of Helen Batislaong, the sole eyewitness, whose testimony the trial court found straightforward and categorical.
• Credibility of Witnesses as a Matter for the Trial Court — The credibility of witnesses is a matter best left to the determination of the trial court because of its unique advantage of observing them firsthand and noting their demeanor, conduct, and attitude. The Court found no reason to disturb the RTC's factual findings on this ground.
• Positive Identification Prevails Over Alibi and Denial — The positive identification of the accused, when categorical and consistent and without any ill motive on the part of the eyewitness, prevails over alibi and denial, which are negative and self-serving and undeserving of weight in law. The Court applied this rule where Batislaong positively identified appellant and his denial was inherently weak.
• Delay in Reporting Does Not Impair Credibility When Explained — Different people react differently to a given stimulus or type of situation, and there is no standard form of behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling, or frightful experience; delay in a witness's reporting of a crime to the police, when adequately explained, does not impair that witness's credibility. The Court accepted Batislaong's explanation that she was nervous and afraid and had to be brought home, weak from crying.
• Flight as Evidence of Guilt — In criminal law, flight means the act of evading the course of justice by voluntarily withdrawing oneself to avoid arrest or detention or the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings; the unexplained flight of the accused may, as a general rule, be taken as evidence tending to establish guilt. The Court found that appellant left Batad to avoid arrest and prosecution, resulting in the archiving of the case, and that his flight to Masbate was an indication of his guilt.
• Treachery (Alevosia) — Definition and Requisites — There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof tending directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Two conditions must be present: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or for retaliation, and (2) the deliberate or conscious adoption of the means of execution. Treachery must be proved by clear and convincing evidence as conclusively as the killing itself, and any doubt as to its existence must be resolved in favor of the accused. The Court held that the second requisite was not established, since the prosecution failed to show the deliberate adoption of the attack, which was executed during a commotion and as a result of it.
• Treachery in Continuous Aggression — In order to appreciate treachery as a modifying circumstance in a continuous aggression, it must be shown to have been present at the inception of the attack. The suddenness of the attack does not by itself suffice to support a finding of alevosia, even if the purpose is to kill, so long as the decision is sudden and the victim's helpless position is accidental. Absent any particulars as to the manner in which the aggression commenced, treachery cannot be appreciated. The Court applied this doctrine because the lone eyewitness arrived only after the stabbing had begun and could not testify as to how the aggression was initiated.

• "When the evidence does not establish how the aggression commenced, treachery cannot be appreciated to qualify a killing to murder." — This passage states the ratio decidendi of the decision, framing the single ground on which the conviction for murder was reduced to homicide.
• "In order to appreciate treachery as a modifying circumstance in a continuous aggression, as in the present case, it must be shown to have been present at the inception of the attack." — This passage articulates the controlling rule on the temporal requirement for treachery in a continuous aggression, which the prosecution failed to satisfy.
• "It is well-settled that the testimony of a lone witness — if found by the trial court to be positive, categorical and credible — is sufficient to support a conviction." — This passage states the canonical formulation of the lone-witness rule relied upon to sustain the conviction notwithstanding the absence of corroboration.
• "Absent any particulars as to the manner in which the aggression commenced, treachery cannot be appreciated. One cannot substitute mere suppositions for a hiatus in the prosecution's evidence, as the trial court apparently did." — This passage explains why the qualifying circumstance could not be supplied by inference, the prosecution having left a gap in its evidence as to how the attack began.

• People vs. Nalangan, 270 SCRA 234 (1997) — Cited for the rule that absent any particulars as to the manner in which the aggression commenced, treachery cannot be appreciated; controlling on the decisive issue in this case.
• People vs. Porras, 255 SCRA 514 (1996) — Cited for the rule that treachery must be shown to have been present at the inception of the attack in a continuous aggression, and for the principle that mere suppositions cannot substitute for a hiatus in the prosecution's evidence.
• People vs. Arrojado, G.R. No. 130492 (2001) — Cited for the two conditions required to appreciate treachery: the employment of means of execution giving the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation, and the deliberate or conscious adoption of the means of execution.
• People vs. Sabanal, 172 SCRA 430 (1989) — Cited for the rule that provocation on the part of the victim negates the presence of treachery, even if the attack may have been sudden and unexpected.
• People vs. Hilot, 342 SCRA 128 (2000) — Cited for the rule that delay in a witness's reporting of a crime, when adequately explained, does not impair credibility; that there is no rule requiring a suspect to be immediately named by a witness; that a bladed weapon does not per se make an attack treacherous; and that appellant could be convicted only of homicide.
• People vs. Milliam, 324 SCRA 155 (2000) — Cited for the rule that the credibility of witnesses is a matter best left to the determination of the trial court because of its unique advantage of observing them firsthand.
• People vs. Lovedorial, G.R. No. 139340 (2001) — Cited for the rule that positive identification, when categorical and consistent and without ill motive, prevails over alibi and denial, and for the rule on the effect of a witness's relationship to the victim.
• People vs. De Mesa, G.R. No. 137036 (2001) — Cited for the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law in fixing the penalty.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes murder; invoked by the trial court in convicting appellant, but held inapplicable because the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not established.
• Article 14, paragraph 16, Revised Penal Code — Defines treachery (alevosia) as an aggravating circumstance; the Court held that its two requisites were not satisfied, so it could not qualify the killing to murder.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied in fixing the penalty for homicide, considering the absence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, resulting in a minimum of prision mayor in its medium period and a maximum of reclusion temporal in its medium period.

Melo, Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concurred.