People of the Phil. vs. Alegado

Proof of the age of a statutory rape victim may be established by her own testimony in open court and by the declarations of a family member regarding family reputation or tradition concerning pedigree, which are admissible under the exceptions to the hearsay rule. The gravamen of statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve years of age; force and intimidation are not elements of the offense and need not be proved.

Alfredo Alegado y Delima, a 53-year-old watchman at the San Carlos City public market, was charged in two separate criminal complaints with raping Cristina Deang y Villarosa on the evenings of 14 April and 20 April 1988. The complaints alleged that the victim was a girl below twelve years of age and that the carnal knowledge was committed against her will and without her consent. At pre-trial, the parties stipulated that the accused was inside the market premises on both occasions, and they identified two common issues: whether the victim was under twelve years old, and whether the accused had carnal knowledge by means of force and intimidation.

• The April 14, 1988 Incident: At around 6:00 p.m., the victim, Cristina Deang, was playing at the Freedom Square inside the public market. The accused, a watchman weighing approximately 170 pounds, held her by the hand and took her upstairs to the second floor of the market building, which housed government offices and was then deserted. He ordered her to hold and masturbate his penis, then commanded her to lie down. When she refused, he pushed her down and placed himself on top of her while she was still wearing her pedal pushers and panty. He forced her to remove her shorts and panty, lay on top of her, and attempted to insert his penis into her vagina. Full penetration did not occur before he ejaculated, but the victim bled a little. Afterwards, the accused gave her ₱2.00 and left. She did not report the incident, as she feared he would kill her.

• The April 20, 1988 Incident: At around 7:00 p.m., the victim was sitting at the Freedom Square when the accused approached and told her to go with him upstairs. She refused, but he shoved her toward the stairs, held her left arm, and brought her to the upper floor near the civic center. He ordered her to remove her shorts and panty; when she resisted, he threatened to kill her. Out of fear, she allowed him to undress her. He forced her to lie down, placed himself on top of her without his pants, and inserted his penis into her vagina. After some difficulty, penetration occurred, causing excruciating pain. The victim begged him to stop, but he ignored her. She felt liquid oozing from his organ, and after he withdrew, she discovered her vagina was bleeding. The accused gave her another ₱2.00 and warned her not to tell anyone.

• Immediate Discovery and Medical Examination: As the accused descended the stairs, Patrolwoman Evangeline Alfaro, who knew him well, saw him. A minute later, she saw the victim coming down the same stairs, pale, with blood flowing to her thighs and legs, and reeling. Pat. Alfaro approached her, and the victim stated she had been taken upstairs and raped. Pat. Alfaro immediately brought her to the city hospital, where Dr. Oscar Jagdon examined her at around 8:40 p.m. The examination revealed sperm cells in the vaginal secretion along the cervical wall, and a fresh laceration one centimeter long at the 9:00 o’clock position, indicating partial penetration. After the medical examination, the victim was taken to the police station, where she identified the accused, who was already in custody, as the rapist.

• Defense Version: The accused testified that on April 14, 1988, he was on duty roving the market and did not meet the victim. On April 20, 1988, he claimed to have been having snacks and later drinks with Cpl. Allarce and Lito Alverez at Valdevia Street from about 5:00 p.m. until he was arrested at 7:30 p.m., and he never saw the victim that entire time. He alleged that Pat. Alfaro harbored ill feelings toward him because he once refused to question armed men she had spotted. A corroborating witness, Sgt. Rolando Allarce, confirmed that they had snacks at Namie’s Lunch until 6:00 p.m. and later drank at Valdevia Street, but he left the accused there at about 7:00 p.m.

• Failure to Prove Age: Accused-appellant contended that the prosecution failed to prove with certainty that the offended party was below twelve years old at the time of the incidents. He argued that the testimony of the victim’s maternal grandfather, Cornelio Villarosa, regarding the date of birth was hearsay and could not establish her minority.

• Lack of Force and Intimidation / Reasonable Doubt: Accused-appellant maintained that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt because the alleged rapes were not attended by force or intimidation. He pointed to the absence of external signs of physical injuries and the victim’s failure to shout for help as negating rape, and characterized her acceptance of ₱2.00 as tacit consent.

• Sufficiency of Age Evidence: The Solicitor General argued that the victim’s age was competently established through her own categorical testimony in court that she was born on September 5, 1976, and through the declarations of her maternal grandfather regarding family tradition. Both forms of evidence fall under exceptions to the hearsay rule relating to pedigree.

• Elements of Statutory Rape Proven: The People maintained that the gravamen of statutory rape under Article 335, paragraph 3 is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve, rendering proof of force or intimidation unnecessary. The prosecution’s evidence—the victim’s straightforward testimony, the timely medical findings of sperm cells and a laceration, and the eyewitness account of Pat. Alfaro—established the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The defense of alibi was weak and uncorroborated as to the critical time of the incident.

• Proof of Age: Whether the prosecution proved with certainty that the offended party was below twelve years of age at the time of the alleged rapes, in light of the admissibility of the testimonies of her maternal grandfather and of the victim herself under the rules on pedigree.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the accused-appellant’s guilt for two counts of statutory rape was proven beyond reasonable doubt despite his defenses of denial and alibi and the claim that no force or intimidation was employed.

• Proof of Age: The age of the victim was sufficiently and competently proven. The testimony of the maternal grandfather, Cornelio Villarosa, that the victim was born on September 5, 1976 and that the mother instructed him to send her to school because she was already seven years old, constituted family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree, admissible under Section 40 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. The requisites for admissibility—controversy as to pedigree, pre-existing family tradition, and testimony by a family member—were all present. Moreover, the victim’s own declaration in open court regarding her birth date was admissible, as it is settled that a person may testify as to her age based on what she learned from her parents and relatives, such testimony being an assertion of family tradition. The defense presented no contrary evidence to dispute the victim’s minority, which was twelve years old at the time of the crimes.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Guilt for two counts of statutory rape was established beyond reasonable doubt. Under Article 335, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code, the gravamen of statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve years of age; force and intimidation are not elements and the law presumes the victim, by reason of tender age, cannot give consent. The victim’s testimony was given in a straightforward manner and was corroborated by the medical finding of sperm cells and a laceration. The slightest penetration—even partial, as found by the examining physician—consummates the crime of rape. Force and intimidation were, in any case, present: the victim was pushed, threatened with death, and overcome by the accused’s physical superiority. The absence of external injuries and her failure to shout do not negate rape; the force employed need only be sufficient to consummate the lewd purpose. The trial court’s finding that the accused’s defense of denial and alibi was unworthy of credence was entitled to great respect and was not shown to be erroneous. The accused’s claim that the victim’s acceptance of ₱2.00 amounted to consent was rejected as “highly offensive and depraved.”

• Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree — Under Sections 39 and 40, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence, declarations concerning pedigree (including birth, age, and family relationships) are admissible as exceptions to the hearsay rule when the witness is a member of the family and the tradition existed previous to the controversy. Pedigree testimony is admitted because it is the best evidence the nature of the case admits and rejecting it would cause greater evil than admitting it. In this case, the grandfather’s testimony about the victim’s date of birth and the family tradition of sending a child to school at age seven was admitted to establish she was below twelve.

• Admissibility of a person’s own testimony as to age — A person may testify as to her own age, even though she lacks personal knowledge of her birth, because all knowledge of one’s age is acquired from what parents and relatives relate. Such testimony constitutes an assertion of family tradition and is admissible. Applied here to admit the victim’s statement that she was born on September 5, 1976.

• Elements of statutory rape — Statutory rape under Article 335, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code requires only (1) carnal knowledge of a woman, and (2) that the woman is under twelve years of age. Force and intimidation need not be proved because the law presumes that a girl of such tender age cannot have a will of her own. The accused’s conviction was upheld on this basis.

• Slightest penetration doctrine — In rape, the slightest penetration of the female organ is sufficient to consummate the crime; full penetration or rupture of the hymen is not necessary. The presence of sperm cells and a 1 cm laceration from partial penetration satisfied this requirement.

• “[D]eclarations in regard to pedigree, although hearsay, are admitted on the principle that they are natural expressions of persons who must know the truth … Pedigree testimony is admitted because it is the best that the nature of the case admits and because greater evil might arise from the rejection of such proof than from its admission.” — Reaffirming the rationale for admitting pedigree evidence under the rules of evidence.

• “It is long-settled … that the testimony of a person as to his age is admissible although hearsay and though a person can have no personal knowledge of the date of his birth as all the knowledge a person has of his age is acquired from what he is told by his parents … [H]e may testify as to his age as he had learned it from his parents and relatives and his testimony in such case is an assertion of family tradition.” — Articulating the rule that permits a victim to state her own age in court.

• “[T]he gravamen of the offense of statutory rape … is the carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve years old. … It is not necessary to prove that the victim was intimidated or that force was used against her because in statutory rape the law presumes that the victim on account of her tender age, does not and cannot have a will of her own.” — Distinguishing statutory rape from rape by force.

• “The force used in rape cases need not be absolutely overpowering or irresistible. What is essential is simply that the force employed was sufficient to allow the offender to consummate his lewd purpose.” — Clarifying the quantum of force required when force is alleged.

• Lazatin v. Campos, 92 SCRA 250 (1979) — Relied upon for the principle that pedigree declarations are admissible as exceptions to hearsay because they are the best evidence available and natural expressions of truth.

• U.S. v. Bergantino, 3 Phil. 118 (1903) and U.S. v. Angeles and Sabacahan, 36 Phil. 246 (1917) — Cited as early authority that a person’s testimony regarding his own age, though hearsay, is admissible as an assertion of family tradition.

• U.S. v. Evangelista, 32 Phil. 321 (1915) — Reiterated the rule that knowledge of one’s age derived from one’s parents is admissible.

• People v. Edgardo Puedan y Lalongisip, G.R. No. 92586, 26 April 1991; People v. Villegas, Jr., 127 SCRA 195 (1984); People v. Mangalino, 182 SCRA 329 (1990) — Cited to affirm that the gravamen of statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a girl below twelve.

• People v. Jun Aquino, G.R. No. 83214, 28 May 1991; People v. Cruz, 180 SCRA 765 (1989) — Applied for the doctrine that the slightest penetration consummates rape.

• Article 335, paragraphs 1 and 3, Revised Penal Code — Defines rape and prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Paragraph 3 defines statutory rape as carnally knowing a woman under twelve years of age. Applied to convict the accused on both counts, as the victim was under twelve, and the carnal knowledge was proven.

• Section 39, Rule 130, Revised Rules on Evidence — Defines the scope of “pedigree,” including birth, age, and family relationships, for purposes of the hearsay exception. Used to justify the subject matter of the grandfather’s testimony.

• Section 40, Rule 130, Revised Rules on Evidence — Provides that family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree, existing previous to the controversy, is admissible if the testifying witness is a member of the family by consanguinity or affinity. Applied to admit the grandfather’s declaration about the victim’s date of birth and age.

Fernan, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin, and Davide, Jr., JJ., concurred.