People of the Phil. v. Santiago

When an habitual criminal has committed several crimes without being first convicted of any of them before committing the others, he cannot be sentenced for each of said crimes to the gradually increasing additional penalty; for purposes of the law, said crimes must be considered as one, applying the additional penalty to one of them and ignoring the rest.

The defendant, Gervasio Santiago, had been convicted nine times of estafa prior to the offenses at bar, having served his last sentence in April 1927. Act No. 3397, the habitual delinquency law then in force, prescribed graduated additional penalties for repeat offenders found guilty of enumerated crimes—including estafa—a third time or oftener within ten years of release or last conviction. The law's additional penalties ranged from a minimum corresponding to the third offense up to twenty-one to thirty years for the sixth or subsequent offense. The defendant had already been tried, convicted, and sentenced in a separate case (G.R. No. 32455, criminal case No. 38870) for estafa committed on March 13, 1929, receiving an additional penalty of twenty-one years for habitual delinquency. The instant appeal concerned a second estafa committed on August 27, 1929—before any conviction had been entered for the March 13, 1929 offense.

On the morning of August 27, 1929, Gervasio Santiago engaged Francisco Fulgencio's carretela at the stipulated price of P1.50 for a round trip from the corner of Isaac Peral and Nebraska Streets in Ermita to the Quinta Market. Santiago first went to the Meralco office and then to the San Miguel Brewery on Aviles Street. Upon reaching the brewery, Santiago entered one of its buildings, emerged after a while, and asked the driver whether he had any money. Fulgencio answered that he only had 70 centavos. Santiago asked for the loan of it and went into the brewery office.

Seeing that Santiago was trying to get away, Fulgencio pursued him in his carretela. Santiago disappeared somewhere near San Rafael Street, but Fulgencio soon spotted him with the help of someone who had seen him hide. Upon being discovered, Santiago at once returned the 70 centavos he had borrowed. The driver turned Santiago over to policeman Cirilo Abala, recounting what had happened. The policeman searched Santiago's pockets and found not a single centavo, so Santiago was unable to pay Fulgencio the P1.50 for the hire of his carretela. While the policeman went over to a police telephone, Santiago tried to run away, but the policeman gave chase and captured him.

Santiago admitted that he had already been convicted of estafa and that his last conviction was in April 1927. The evidence established that he had been previously convicted six times of the same crime, namely estafa. He had also been tried and convicted in a separate case (criminal case No. 38870) for estafa committed on March 13, 1929, and was sentenced to an additional penalty of twenty-one years' imprisonment for habitual delinquency under Act No. 3397. The instant estafa was committed on August 27, 1929, while the previous case was still pending judgment—before any conviction had been entered for the March 13, 1929 offense. The trial court found Santiago guilty beyond reasonable doubt of estafa and violation of section 1213 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila, imposing the principal penalty for estafa plus an additional penalty of nine years for habitual delinquency, calculated so that the total additional penalties across both cases would not exceed the statutory maximum of thirty years.

• Credibility of Defense Testimony: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in not giving due weight to his testimony that upon dismissing the carretela, he paid the driver 40 centavos as hire, which amount was accepted through the intervention of a policeman.
• Reasonable Doubt: Appellant maintained that the trial court erred in not granting him the benefit of reasonable doubt and in not acquitting him of the crime of estafa and the violation of section 1213 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the trial court erred in not giving due weight to the defendant's testimony regarding payment of 40 centavos and in denying him the benefit of reasonable doubt.
• Imposition of Additional Penalty for Habitual Delinquency: Whether the additional penalty for habitual delinquency under Act No. 3397 may be imposed for a crime committed before the defendant had been convicted of a prior offense of the same class, where the additional penalty was already imposed for that prior offense.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: No. The defendant's guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt; the only questions for decision were the principal and additional penalties to be imposed.
• Imposition of Additional Penalty for Habitual Delinquency: No. The additional penalty of nine years was eliminated because the two estafas were committed successively within a short space of time without the defendant having been convicted of the first before committing the second, and the proper additional penalty having already been applied to the first crime.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: The evidence showed beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant engaged Fulgencio's carretela, borrowed 70 centavos from the driver, attempted to flee, was apprehended, and was unable to pay the P1.50 hire. The defendant admitted prior estafa convictions. The trial court's factual findings were sustained, and the assigned errors regarding the defendant's testimony and reasonable doubt were rejected. The only questions requiring resolution concerned the proper principal and additional penalties.

• Imposition of Additional Penalty for Habitual Delinquency: Act No. 3397 provides that a person found guilty of enumerated crimes—including estafa—a third time or oftener within ten years of release or last conviction shall be deemed an habitual criminal, with graduated additional penalties. The law requires that the second crime be committed after the first conviction, and the third after the second conviction, establishing a sequential pattern of conviction-then-recidivism. Because the additional penalties are graduated, their application must also be gradual, in view of the reformatory nature of the law: the fourth additional penalty applies only when the fourth crime was committed after the third conviction, and so on. The rationale is that until the habitual criminal has served the additional penalty and has committed or abstained from committing another crime, it cannot be known whether the additional penalty has reformed him. An habitual criminal who, after having been convicted or having served his term, commits several of the enumerated crimes—whether simultaneously or successively—without having first been convicted of any of them before committing the others, cannot be sentenced to the additional penalty for each of said new crimes, because that would be contrary to the reformatory purpose of the law and the graduation of additional penalties, and because he would thus be made to serve gradually increased penalties for crimes committed before having been convicted of previously committed crimes of the same class. The degree of the offender's mental and moral perversity is the same whether the crimes were committed simultaneously or successively, so there is no logical or scientific basis for imposing a gradually increasing penalty for each. The Texas Criminal Court of Appeals' reasoning in Kinney vs. State was cited in support: a reformatory statute authorizing increased punishment for prior convictions does not warrant cumulation of simultaneously occurring cases but contemplates enhanced punishment for a party who, after one conviction, does not reform but persists in committing other offenses. Since the two estafas were committed one after the other within a short space of time, without the defendant having been convicted of the first before committing the second, and the proper additional penalty having been applied to the first crime, no additional penalty could be imposed for the offense before the court.

• Doctrine on Graduated Application of Habitual Delinquency Penalties — When an habitual criminal has committed several crimes, whether simultaneously or successively, without being first convicted of any of them before committing the others, he cannot be sentenced for each of said crimes to the gradually increasing additional penalty. For purposes of the law, said crimes must be considered as one, applying the additional penalty to one of them and ignoring the rest. The rationale is that the graduated additional penalties under the habitual delinquency law are reformatory in nature; each successive penalty presupposes that the offender has been convicted of a prior offense and has nevertheless failed to reform. Crimes committed before any intervening conviction reflect the same degree of moral perversity and thus cannot logically attract progressively increased penalties. The Court applied this doctrine by eliminating the nine-year additional penalty imposed for the August 27, 1929 estafa, since the proper additional penalty had already been imposed for the March 13, 1929 estafa in a separate case, and no conviction had intervened between the two offenses.

• "When an habitual criminal has committed several crimes, without being first convicted of any of them before committing the others, he cannot be sentenced for each of said crimes to the gradually increasing additional penalty, and for the purposes of the law, said crimes must be considered as one, applying the additional penalty to one of them, and ignoring the rest." — This is the controlling ratio decidendi of the case, articulating the rule that graduated habitual delinquency penalties cannot be cumulated for crimes committed before any intervening conviction.

• "If in order that an additional penalty may be imposed upon an habitual criminal for a new crime, he must have been previously convicted or must have served the sentence for the preceding crime. An habitual criminal who, after having been convicted or after having served his term, commits several of the crimes mentioned in the law, whether all at once or one after another, without having first been convicted of any of them before committing the others, cannot be sentenced to the additional penalty of each of said new crimes, because that would be contrary to the reformatory purpose of the law, and the graduation of the additional penalties, and because he would thus be made to serve additional penalties gradually increased for crimes committed before having been convicted of crimes of the same class committed previously." — This passage explains the reformatory rationale underlying the doctrine and the logical impossibility of imposing graduated penalties for crimes committed before any prior conviction.

• "Pen. Code 1895, art. 1014, authorizing an increased punishment where defendant has previously been convicted of the same offense, when construed with other provisions of the Penal Code, and the Code of Criminal Procedure, is a reformatory statute, and does not warrant the cumulation of a number of cases occurring simultaneously, in order to add to the punishment of the case on trial, but contemplates an enhanced punishment for a party who, after one conviction, does not reform, but persists in committing other offenses of a like character." — This quotation from Kinney vs. State, adopted by the Court, provides the comparative jurisprudential foundation for the reformatory interpretation of habitual delinquency penalties.

• Kinney vs. State, 45 Tex. Cr. R. 500; 79 S.W. 570 — Followed. The Texas Criminal Court of Appeals held that a reformatory statute authorizing increased punishment for prior convictions does not warrant cumulation of simultaneously occurring cases but contemplates enhanced punishment for a party who, after one conviction, does not reform. The Court adopted this reasoning to support the graduated application of habitual delinquency penalties.

• Section 1, Act No. 3397 (Habitual Delinquency Law) — Defines an habitual criminal as any person who, within ten years of release or last conviction, is found guilty of enumerated crimes (robo, hurto, estafa, embezzlement, forgery, vagrancy, or prostitution) a third time or oftener. The Court construed this provision as requiring sequential convictions—each subsequent crime must follow a prior conviction—to justify the graduated additional penalties, holding that crimes committed before any intervening conviction must be treated as one for purposes of the additional penalty.
• Article 534, No. 1, Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 3244, in connection with Articles 535, No. 1 and 536 — Defines and penalizes estafa. The penalty for estafa in the amount of P1.50 was fixed at arresto mayor in the minimum and medium degrees; due to recidivism, the penalty was elevated one degree to arresto mayor in the maximum degree to presidio correccional in the minimum degree, imposed in the medium period as one year and one day of presidio correccional.
• Section 1213, Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila — Penalizes the violation for which the defendant was fined P5 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The conviction and fine were affirmed.

Street, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concurred.

• Villamor, J. — Concurred with the majority's modification of the principal penalty but dissented from the elimination of the additional penalty. He argued that the reasoning for eliminating the additional penalty—based on the successive commission of crimes without intervening conviction—should be addressed to the Legislature for amendment of the law rather than applied judicially. He maintained that as an habitual criminal who had committed estafa nine times, the reckoning should be based on the last sentence served in April 1927, and that the defendant must suffer the proper additional penalty for each of the two subsequent estafas, subject only to the statutory maximum of thirty years total.

• Avanceña, C.J. — Concurred in the dissenting opinion of Justice Villamor.