Pentecostes, Jr. vs. People

Intent to kill is the principal and essential element of attempted or frustrated murder and must be proved in a clear and evident manner to exclude every possible doubt; when such intent is lacking but wounds are inflicted, the crime is physical injuries only.

Petitioner Engr. Carlito Pentecostes, Jr. was an Irrigation Superintendent employed by the National Irrigation Administration (NIA), assigned at the Baua River Irrigation System in Sta. Cruz, Gonzaga, Cagayan. Private complainant Rudy Baclig was a resident of Brgy. Batangan, Gonzaga, Cagayan, while petitioner resided two-and-a-half kilometers away at Brgy. Flourishing, in the same municipality. Rudy had known petitioner since he attained the age of reason, both being residents of Gonzaga and petitioner being a known NIA official in the area.

On September 2, 1998, Rudy Baclig was drinking with his brother-in-law, consuming about half a bottle of gin. He thereafter left, accompanied by his four-year-old son, to walk to the house of a certain Siababa to buy coffee and sugar. Along the way, a gray automobile coming from the opposite direction passed by them. After a while, Rudy noticed the vehicle moving backward toward them. When the car was about two arms' length—approximately three meters—away, it stopped, and the driver called Rudy by his nickname "Parrod." Rudy moved closer, but after taking only one step, the driver, whom Rudy identified as petitioner, opened the car door and, while still seated, drew a gun and fired once, hitting Rudy just below the left armpit. Rudy immediately ran to the rear of the car, while petitioner sped away. Rudy and his son proceeded to the seashore, and Rudy later returned to the place where he was shot and shouted for help.

The people who came to assist Rudy initially brought him to the Municipal Hall of Gonzaga, Cagayan, where a policeman interrogated him and asked him to identify his assailant. Rudy identified petitioner as the shooter. He was then taken to the Don Alfonso Ponce Memorial Hospital at Gonzaga, Cagayan, where he was attended by Dr. Mila M. Marantan. The Medico-Legal Certificate indicated that Rudy suffered a gunshot wound with powder burns at the entry point, evidencing close-range firing, and that the wound would require ten days of medical attendance. Rudy was discharged the following day.

On June 1, 1999, an Information was filed by the Provincial Prosecutor of Aparri, Cagayan, charging petitioner with frustrated murder, alleged to have been committed with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and treachery, and aggravated by the use of an unlicensed firearm. Duly arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty.

Petitioner denied any involvement, claiming he was in Quezon City at the time of the incident, following up funding for one of NIA's projects in Gonzaga, Cagayan. He testified that he reported to the NIA Central Office on September 1, 1998 and stayed in Manila until the afternoon of September 4, 1998. To support this, he presented a Certificate of Appearance issued by Engr. Orlando C. Hondrade, then NIA Deputy Administrator, who testified through a deposition that he specifically remembered petitioner personally appearing before him on September 1 and 4 for ten to fifteen minutes each time. Petitioner also submitted his daily time record and a travel authority issued by his superior to show he was not at their office in Cagayan from the afternoon of August 31, 1998.

The RTC found petitioner guilty of attempted murder, crediting Rudy's positive identification—supported by adequate lighting from the car and a nearby store at a distance of only three meters—and rejecting the alibi, noting that petitioner's appearance before Engr. Hondrade on September 1 did not preclude his return to Gonzaga by the evening of September 2. The CA affirmed but modified the conviction to less serious physical injuries, holding that intent to kill was not established: petitioner fired only once, did not pursue Rudy or run him over, and the wound required only ten days of medical attendance. The CA, however, appreciated treachery as an aggravating circumstance and imposed six months of arresto mayor.

• Identification of Assailant: Petitioner argued that Rudy failed to positively identify him as the assailant, since Rudy allegedly identified him only through his voice, not his physical appearance, despite it being the first time Rudy heard petitioner's voice. Petitioner contended that Rudy's vision was impaired because he had consumed half a bottle of gin and the place was not properly lit, and that Rudy could not even identify the type of gun used.
• Ownership of Vehicle: Petitioner argued that the prosecution failed to establish that the car used by the perpetrator was owned by him, and that prosecution witnesses stated the car was often used by petitioner's father.
• Alibi: Petitioner maintained that it was impossible for him to have shot the victim on the night of September 2, 1998, because he was not in the Province of Cagayan from September 1 to September 4, 1998, as evidenced by his Certificate of Appearance, daily time record, and travel authority.
• Unfounded Motive: Petitioner contended that the CA erred in relying on an unfounded and baseless alleged motive—petitioner being a crusader against illegal drugs in their town—as a basis for concluding he was the assailant.

• Positive Identification: Whether the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner was the one who shot the victim.
• Alibi: Whether petitioner's defense of alibi would prosper.
• Proper Offense: Whether petitioner is guilty of attempted murder or only of less serious physical injuries.
• Treachery: Whether treachery attended the commission of the crime.

• Positive Identification: Yes. Rudy positively and categorically identified petitioner as his shooter through the lights of the car and a nearby store at a distance of only three meters, and immediately reported petitioner's identity to a police investigator and the attending physician.
• Alibi: No. Alibi is inherently weak and cannot prevail over positive identification; petitioner failed to account for his whereabouts on September 2–3, making it physically possible for him to have traveled to Cagayan and committed the crime.
• Proper Offense: Less serious physical injuries, not attempted murder. Intent to kill was not established because petitioner fired only a single shot, did not hit a vital organ, and did not follow up with further acts to ensure death; the wound required only ten days of medical attendance under Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Treachery: No. There was no evidence of deliberate and conscious adoption of means of execution ensuring the crime without risk to petitioner; he chanced upon Rudy while driving, and suddenness alone does not establish treachery.

• Positive Identification: Both the RTC and CA found that Rudy identified petitioner as the shooter, and the Supreme Court found no error in their appreciation. Rudy had known petitioner since childhood, both being residents of Gonzaga. Rudy identified petitioner through the car's lights and a nearby store's lights at a distance of approximately three meters. The powder burns on Rudy's wound corroborated his account of close-range firing. Although Rudy had consumed half a bottle of gin, he was categorical in his identification, and the attending physician confirmed he could answer all questions. Rudy immediately named petitioner to a police investigator and to Dr. Marantan. The Court adhered to the rule that the lone testimony of a credible eyewitness suffices for conviction, and that the trial court's findings on credibility are accorded great respect—especially when affirmed by the appellate court. Petitioner's contention that identification rested solely on voice was rejected; the CA clarified that Rudy saw petitioner when he opened the car door. The ownership of the car was declared immaterial in light of the positive identification.

• Alibi: The Court applied the settled rule that alibi is inherently weak and cannot prevail over positive identification. For alibi to prosper, the accused must show not only that he was elsewhere but that he was so far away as to make physical presence at the crime scene impossible. Petitioner's Certificate of Appearance accounted for his presence in Quezon City only on September 1 and 4; his whereabouts for September 2 and 3 were unaccounted for. It was not impossible for him to have returned to Cagayan, committed the crime on the evening of September 2, and traveled back to Quezon City. Petitioner's denial and alibi could not overcome Rudy's positive, straightforward, and consistent testimony.

• Proper Offense: Intent to kill is the essential element of attempted or frustrated murder and must be proved clearly to exclude every doubt. Petitioner shot Rudy only once and did not strike any vital part. He did not fire additional shots, pursue Rudy, or run him over with the car—acts he could have undertaken had he intended to kill. The wound required only ten days of medical attendance, and Rudy was discharged the following day. Under Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code, physical injuries requiring medical attendance for ten days or more constitute less serious physical injuries. The inference of intent to kill should not be drawn absent circumstances proving it beyond reasonable doubt.

• Treachery: Treachery requires (1) employment of means of execution giving the victim no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation, and (2) deliberate and conscious adoption of such means. While petitioner's assault was deliberate and sudden, he did not logically plan it; he chanced upon Rudy while driving. There was no evidence that petitioner employed means to ensure the crime's commission without risk to himself. Suddenness alone does not suffice. Accordingly, treachery did not attend the crime. With neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, the penalty was taken from the medium period of arresto mayor—two months and one day to four months—and the Indeterminate Sentence Law was held inapplicable because the maximum term of imprisonment is less than one year. The Court also found no factual basis for an award of moral damages.

• Positive Identification vs. Denial — The positive declaration of a witness is given more weight than the denial of the accused. The lone testimony of a sole eyewitness is sufficient to convict if found credible, credibility being weighed by quality rather than numbers. Findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are accorded great respect, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, consistent with the principle that credible testimony alone can sustain a conviction.
• Alibi — Alibi is an inherently weak defense that cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by the victim. To prosper, it must be shown not only that the accused was elsewhere when the offense was committed, but that he was so far away that it was physically impossible for him to have been present at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.
• Intent to Kill — Intent to kill is the principal and essential element of attempted or frustrated murder and must be proved in a clear and evident manner to exclude every possible doubt as to the homicidal intent of the aggressor. When intent to kill is lacking but wounds are inflicted, the crime is not attempted murder but physical injuries only. Factors relevant to determining intent include the number and location of wounds, whether vital organs were hit, and whether the assailant took further acts to ensure the victim's death.
• Treachery — Treachery requires two elements: (1) the employment of means of execution as would give the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation, and (2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of such means. Suddenness of attack, standing alone, is insufficient; there must be evidence of a deliberate plan to employ means ensuring the crime's commission without risk to the perpetrator.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law (Inapplicability) — The Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply when the maximum term of imprisonment is less than one year, in which case a straight penalty is imposed.

• "The principal and essential element of attempted or frustrated murder is the intent on the part of the assailant to take the life of the person attacked. Such intent must be proved in a clear and evident manner to exclude every possible doubt as to the homicidal intent of the aggressor." — This passage states the ratio decidendi for downgrading the conviction from attempted murder to less serious physical injuries.

• "When such intent is lacking but wounds are inflicted upon the victim, the crime is not attempted murder but physical injuries only." — This defines the doctrinal boundary between attempted murder and physical injuries, explaining why the single non-fatal shot supported only a conviction for less serious physical injuries.

• "In treachery, the perpetrator intentionally and purposely employs ways and means to commit the crime. There was no evidence, however, to show that petitioner employed such means of execution that would ensure the commission of the crime without harm to his person." — This explains why treachery was rejected despite the suddenness of the attack, clarifying that chancing upon the victim while driving negates deliberate and conscious adoption of means.

• People vs. Coscos, 424 Phil. 886 (2002) — Followed for the rule that the lone declaration of a sole eyewitness is sufficient to convict if credible, and that credibility is not determined by numbers.
• People vs. Ramos, G.R. No. 172470, April 8, 2008 — Followed for the rule that findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are accorded great respect unless it overlooked substantial facts.
• People vs. Gallego, 453 Phil. 825 (2003) — Followed for the rule that deference to the trial court's factual findings is especially warranted when affirmed by the appellate court.
• People vs. Malones, 469 Phil. 301 (2004) — Followed for the rule that alibi is inherently weak and cannot prevail over positive identification, and for the two-pronged requirement that alibi must demonstrate physical impossibility of presence at the crime scene.
• People vs. Pagador, 409 Phil. 338 (2001) — Followed for the rule that intent to kill must be proved clearly and evidently to exclude every doubt.
• People vs. Catbagan, G.R. Nos. 149430-32, February 23, 2004 — Followed for the two elements of treachery.
• People vs. Glino, G.R. No. 173793, December 4, 2007 — Followed for the rule that the Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply when the maximum term of imprisonment is less than one year.

• Article 265, Revised Penal Code — Defines less serious physical injuries as physical injuries not described as serious physical injuries but which incapacitate the offended party for labor for ten days or more, or require medical attendance for the same period. Applied because Rudy's wound required ten days of medical attendance, satisfying the statutory threshold.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Does not apply to those whose maximum term of imprisonment is less than one year. Applied to justify imposing a straight penalty of three months of arresto mayor rather than an indeterminate sentence.
• Article 2219(1), Civil Code — Provides that moral damages may be recovered in criminal offenses resulting in physical injuries. The Court found no factual basis in the records for the award of moral damages.

Renato C. Corona (Chairperson), Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, Jose Catral Mendoza.