Peñaranda vs. People

A malefactor who spontaneously desists from performing all acts of execution necessary to produce a felony is not liable for an attempted felony, even if he had already commenced execution, but remains criminally accountable for any offense actually consummated before the desistance. In distinguishing attempted murder from physical injuries, intent to kill must be proven beyond reasonable doubt and is inferred from the means used, the nature and number of wounds, and the conduct of the assailants before, during, and after the attack; where intent to kill is absent and the wounds are not fatal, the crime is only physical injuries, which is necessarily included in a charge of frustrated or attempted murder.

Gutierrez and petitioner were both tricycle drivers in Meycauayan, Bulacan. Before the incident, Gutierrez filed a complaint before the Sangguniang Barangay against petitioner for charging excessive fare. Animosity between the two persisted, with petitioner allegedly threatening Gutierrez. On the evening of June 5, 2005, Gutierrez was at the tricycle terminal when Ivan Villaranda summoned petitioner and three others. The group attacked Gutierrez with a samurai, steel pipes, and a stone, leaving him with hack wounds.

• The Prior Dispute: Petitioner and private complainant Reynaldo Gutierrez both drove tricycles at Libtong, Meycauayan, Bulacan. Before June 5, 2005, Gutierrez filed a barangay complaint against petitioner for over-pricing tricycle fare. Petitioner denied the charge and claimed that Gutierrez thereafter cursed him, threw a stone, and chased him with a panaksak, though a barangay official intervened. The defense maintained that petitioner was later told Gutierrez merely wanted money.

• The Attack on June 5, 2005: Around 7:30 to 8:00 p.m., Gutierrez was at the tricycle terminal. Ivan Villaranda summoned petitioner and three others — Rannie Cecilia, Raul Cecilia, and an unknown person. Petitioner threw a stone, hitting Gutierrez on the left arm. Gutierrez, who was holding a steel pipe because of a prior altercation with Ivan, prepared to defend himself. Raul intervened, telling him, “Hayaan mo na Boyet, ako na ang bahala.” Gutierrez lowered his weapon. A tricycle arrived, and Edwin Celedonia alighted and hacked Gutierrez’s upper right biceps with a samurai. Ivan, Rannie, and Raul then hit Gutierrez with steel pipes while petitioner struck him with a stone. All aggressors immediately ran away. As they fled, Rannie threw the steel pipe Gutierrez had held, hitting him in the stomach.

• Aftermath: Gutierrez walked alone to the barangay hall to ask for an ambulance. He was brought to Sta. Maria Hospital and later transferred to Reyes Memorial Hospital. The prosecution presented a Medico Legal Certificate, a Clinical Abstract, and photographs of injuries. The medical certificate indicated hack wounds requiring more than thirty days to heal. The prosecution did not present evidence that the wounds were fatal or would have caused death without medical intervention.

• Defense Version: Petitioner denied participating in the attack, claiming he was not “Raul Kalbo.” He argued that Gutierrez only wanted money and that he used his bail money rather than paying Gutierrez. Petitioner also asserted he was at home, about 1.5 kilometers from the terminal, though he admitted he could travel that distance quickly.

• Misapprehension of Facts: Petitioner argued that the lower courts misapprehended the factual record, warranting review of factual issues despite the Rule 45 limitation, and that the evidence did not support a finding of intent to kill or conspiracy.

• Lack of Intent to Kill: Petitioner maintained that the prosecution failed to prove intent to kill because the wounds were not shown to be fatal, and the assailants voluntarily stopped the assault and fled, indicating no homicidal design.

• Absence of Conspiracy: Petitioner asserted that no prior agreement or coordinated action was proved; his identification as one of the assailants was unreliable, and his mere presence at the terminal did not establish conspiracy.

• Alibi: Petitioner presented alibi, claiming he was at home at the time of the incident and that it was physically improbable for him to be at the scene, though he acknowledged the distance was traversable.

• Sufficiency of Evidence for Attempted Murder: The People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, contended that the prosecution established attempted murder beyond reasonable doubt; the use of deadly weapons, the coordinated nature of the attack, and the victim’s vulnerable position demonstrated intent to kill.

• Conspiracy Through a Ruse: Respondent argued that Raul’s intervention asking Gutierrez to lower his weapon was a decoy that allowed the simultaneous attack, proving a unity of purpose and conspiracy among all accused.

• Abuse of Superior Strength: Respondent maintained that the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength attended the commission of the crime, as five armed persons overwhelmed a lone, subsequently unarmed, victim.

• Intent to Kill and Nature of Wound: Whether the prosecution proved intent to kill and that the wound was fatal, such that the crime committed was attempted murder rather than physical injuries.

• Attempted Felony — Spontaneous Desistance: Whether the elements of an attempted felony were present, particularly whether the non-performance of all acts of execution resulted from spontaneous desistance of the malefactors.

• Conspiracy: Whether petitioner acted in conspiracy with his co-accused.

• Treachery: Whether treachery attended the commission of the offense.

• Abuse of Superior Strength: Whether abuse of superior strength was properly appreciated.

• Intent to Kill and Nature of Wound: No intent to kill was proved. The prosecution failed to show that Gutierrez’s wounds were fatal or would have caused death without medical help. The factors for determining intent to kill — the means employed, the nature and location of the wounds, and the conduct of the malefactors — negated any homicidal intent. Despite possessing deadly weapons, petitioner and his companions fled after ganging up on the victim, leaving him alive and able to seek help on his own. The attackers could have easily killed the defenseless victim but chose not to. Consequently, the crime committed is serious physical injuries under Article 263(4) of the Revised Penal Code, which is necessarily included in the charge of frustrated or attempted murder.

• Attempted Felony — Spontaneous Desistance: The elements of an attempted felony were not met. The third requisite — that the offender’s act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance — was absent. After inflicting wounds, all assailants voluntarily ran away, with no external force compelling them to stop. Under Article 6, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code and the doctrine in U.S. v. Eduave, an attempted crime requires that the offender’s purpose be thwarted by a foreign force or agency. Where the malefactors voluntarily desist, they are not liable for the attempted felony. Fear or remorse suffices; the motive need not be noble. The spontaneous desistance exempted petitioner from attempted murder, though not from the serious physical injuries already inflicted.

• Conspiracy: Conspiracy was established. Ivan summoned petitioner and the others; petitioner threw the first stone; Raul disarmed Gutierrez through a ruse; Edwin hacked the victim; and all subsequently struck Gutierrez with various weapons before fleeing together. These acts demonstrated a unity of purpose and concerted effort to inflict injuries. No direct proof of a prior agreement was necessary; conspiracy could be inferred from the coordinated actions.

• Treachery: Treachery did not attend the crime. Gutierrez had a steel pipe and was aware of the hostility from Ivan and his group, having come prepared for a possible confrontation. The victim thus had an opportunity to defend himself, negating the essence of a sudden, unexpected attack. Raul’s ruse did not transform the assault into a treacherous one; prior warning and the existence of an opportunity to defend negate treachery.

• Abuse of Superior Strength: This aggravating circumstance was present. Five assailants, armed with a samurai, steel pipes, and a stone, attacked a single victim who had been persuaded to lower his weapon. The force used was manifestly excessive and out of proportion to Gutierrez’s means of defense, even though he was not completely defenseless. The inequality of forces was knowingly exploited to facilitate the crime.

• Distinction between Attempted/ Frustrated Murder and Physical Injuries — When the accused intended to kill, as shown by use of a deadly weapon, and the victim sustained fatal wounds but survived due to timely medical aid, the crime is frustrated murder or frustrated homicide. If the wounds are not fatal, the crime is only attempted murder or attempted homicide (if intent to kill is present). If there is no intent to kill and the wounds are not fatal, the crime is physical injuries (serious, less serious, or slight). Intent to kill is the principal element and must be proved clearly; it is inferred from: (1) the means used; (2) the nature, location, and number of wounds; (3) the conduct of the malefactors before, during, and immediately after the assault; and (4) the circumstances and motives. Here, the absence of fatal wounds and the attackers’ flight without killing established the lack of intent, downgrading the crime to serious physical injuries.

• Spontaneous Desistance in Attempted Felony — An attempted felony requires that the offender, after beginning execution by overt acts, is prevented by an external cause — not by his own will — from performing all acts of execution. If the offender voluntarily desists, whether from fear, remorse, or any other motive, the character of an attempt is lost. The law encourages retreat and abandonment by exempting the offender from liability for the intended felony; however, criminal liability subsists for any offense actually consummated before the desistance. Applied here, the assailants’ voluntary flight precluded conviction for attempted murder, but they remained liable for the serious physical injuries inflicted.

• Conspiracy Inferred from Coordinated Conduct — Conspiracy exists when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. It may be proved by circumstantial evidence of a common design and concerted action. Each conspirator is liable for the acts of the others in furtherance of the common objective. The Court inferred conspiracy from Ivan’s summoning of the group, the initial stone thrown by petitioner, Raul’s disarmament ruse, the successive attack by all, and their simultaneous flight.

• Abuse of Superior Strength vs. Treachery — Abuse of superior strength is present when there is a notorious inequality of forces that the aggressor purposely uses to facilitate the crime. It does not require that the victim be completely defenseless, only that the force employed is excessive relative to the means of defense. Treachery, in contrast, requires that the attack be sudden and unexpected, affording the victim no opportunity to defend or retaliate. Where the victim is forewarned and arms himself, treachery is negated, but abuse of superior strength may still be appreciated if the aggressors exploit their numerical and weapon superiority.

• "If the malefactors do not perform all the acts of execution by reason of their spontaneous desistance, they are not guilty of an attempted felony. The law does not punish them for their attempt to commit a felony. The rationale of the law is explained as follows: 'First, the character of an attempt is lost when its execution is voluntarily abandoned. x x x Secondly, the policy of the law requires that the offender, so long as he is capable of arresting an evil plan, should be encouraged to do so, by saving him harmless in case of such retreat before it is possible for any evil consequences to ensue.'" — This passage, quoting People v. Lizada, sets out the core justification for exempting spontaneous desistance from attempted felony liability and was central to downgrading the charge.

• "The crime cannot be attempted murder. This is clear from the fact that the defendant performed all of the acts which should have resulted in the consummated crime and voluntarily desisted from further acts. A crime cannot be held to be attempted unless the offender, after beginning the commission of the crime by overt acts, is prevented, against his will, by some outside cause from performing all of the acts which should produce the crime." — Quoted from U.S. v. Eduave, this excerpt defines the controlling test for attempted felony that the Court applied to the facts.

• "When nothing in the evidence shows that the wound would be fatal without medical intervention, the character of the wound enters the realm of doubt; under this situation, the doubt created by the lack of evidence should be resolved in favor of the petitioner." — The rule of lenity applied to the failure of proof on the fatal nature of the wound, leading to the conclusion that the crime was not frustrated or attempted murder.

• U.S. v. Eduave, 36 Phil. 209 (1917) — Established the controlling definition of an attempted felony: the non-performance of all acts of execution must be due to some cause or accident other than the offender’s spontaneous desistance. The Court relied on this foundational ruling to hold that the voluntary flight of the attackers negated attempted murder.

• Palaganas v. People, G.R. No. 165483, September 12, 2006, 501 SCRA 533 — Provided the framework distinguishing frustrated/attempted murder from physical injuries based on the fatal character of the wound and intent to kill. The Court expressly followed this case in analyzing the crime committed.

• People v. Lizada, G.R. Nos. 143468-71, January 24, 2003, 396 SCRA 62 — Reiterated the doctrine that spontaneous desistance exempts the offender from attempted felony liability, and explained the policy rationale. The Court quoted Lizada extensively on the encouragement of retreat.

• People v. Pelagio, No. L-16177, May 24, 1967, 20 SCRA 153 — Recognized that desistance may be spurred by fear or remorse and that the motive is immaterial; only the fact of voluntary discontinuance matters. Applied to affirm that the assailants’ flight, unprompted by outside force, was spontaneous desistance.

• People v. Escarlos, G.R. No. 148912, September 10, 2003, 410 SCRA 463 — Cited for the rule that treachery is negated when the victim is aware of the hostility and has an opportunity to defend himself. Used to strike down the finding of treachery.

• People v. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016, 788 SCRA 331 — Applied as the jurisprudential basis for the award of exemplary damages.

• Article 6, paragraph 3, Revised Penal Code — Defines an attempted felony: the offender commences execution by overt acts and does not perform all acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. The absence of the third element — non-desistance — precluded conviction for attempted murder.

• Article 8, Revised Penal Code — Conspiracy exists when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. The Court inferred conspiracy from the coordinated and successive acts of petitioner and his companions.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Enumerates the qualifying circumstances for murder, including abuse of superior strength and treachery. The Court found abuse of superior strength present but ruled out treachery.

• Article 263, paragraph 4, Revised Penal Code — Penalizes serious physical injuries causing illness or incapacity for labor for more than thirty days with prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods if committed with any of the circumstances mentioned in Article 248. This provision supplied the penalty after downgrading the offense.

• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied in fixing the minimum and maximum terms of the indeterminate penalty: the minimum was taken from arresto mayor medium to maximum, and the maximum from the maximum period of prision correccional minimum and medium.

• Article 2219, Civil Code — Allows recovery of moral damages for a criminal offense resulting in physical injuries, applied to justify the award of moral damages of P25,000.00.

• Rule 120, Section 4, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Allows conviction for an offense necessarily included in the offense charged when there is a variance between allegation and proof. The Court invoked this rule to convict petitioner of serious physical injuries instead of the charged frustrated/attempted murder.

Gesmundo, C.J. (Chairperson), Lazaro-Javier, M. Lopez, and J. Lopez, JJ., concurred. No separate concurring opinions were registered.