Pelonia vs. People of the Philippines

A plea of self-defense shifts the burden to the accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence the confluence of unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed, and lack of sufficient provocation; failure to prove any requisite, especially unlawful aggression, defeats the defense, and the trial court’s factual findings affirmed by the Court of Appeals are generally binding in a Rule 45 petition.

Gregorio Pelonia was a member of the Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF) in Tawan-Tawan, Davao City, and had been issued a garrand rifle. Ignacio Nacilla harbored a long-standing grudge against Pelonia because Pelonia had reported him to the Marines for being abusive, which led to Nacilla being picked up, brought to camp, and manhandled.

On August 17, 1986, the eve of the fiesta of Barangay Tawan-Tawan, Davao City, Ignacio Nacilla, accompanied by Winefredo Bustamante, Monico Betarmos, and Boy Domondon, went to the barrio to attend the celebration and to see Nacilla’s brother, Lanoy. Along the way, they stopped at the residence of the Barangay Captain to ask permission to enter the barrio, as was the practice, and the Barangay Captain sent three members of the Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF) to accompany them into the barangay centro. From the Barangay Captain’s home, the group stopped at Blacito’s Store, where Nacilla bought bottles of beer. After a while, Boy Guhiling, one of the CHDF members, invited them to have supper at the house of Gregorio Pelonia, the accused. The group accepted and proceeded to Pelonia’s house. Upon their arrival, Pelonia invited them to the balcony. Nacilla, Betarmos, Bustamante, and Domondon sat at the balcony while Guhiling went downstairs. Pelonia, who was preparing fiesta meals, returned to the kitchen and finished chopping meat with his bolo, after which he left the bolo in the kitchen. He then prepared the table, laid out the food, and called the group into the sala.

According to the prosecution, Betarmos and Bustamante stood up to approach the table, but Nacilla remained seated and declared that his purpose in coming was not to eat but to kill. Nacilla had a long-standing grudge against Pelonia because Pelonia had reported him to the Marines for being abusive, which led to the Marines picking him up, bringing him to camp, and manhandling him. Betarmos said they were at Pelonia’s house to eat supper, and Nacilla agreed, but he then said that Pelonia was perhaps depending on his garrand rifle, his issued firearm as a CHDF member. Enraged by the insult spoken in his own home in front of his visitors and family, Pelonia rushed to his room to get his rifle. Betarmos and Bustamante heard the cocking of a gun. Betarmos told Nacilla that they should go down because something bad might happen, but Nacilla refused and said he would not fight back and would just let himself be killed. Betarmos and Bustamante ran toward the door. Pelonia returned to the sala, fired a warning shot toward the ceiling, and ordered Nacilla to go downstairs because he was being abusive. Nacilla declared, “I will not go down if nobody is killed.” Pelonia ran to the kitchen, jumped to the ground, and told Guhiling to come upstairs and get Nacilla. Guhiling and Flor Losica, Pelonia’s sister-in-law, proceeded upstairs just as Betarmos and Bustamante were rushing out. The commotion caused Pelonia’s wife and children to cry. Hearing their cries, Pelonia went back upstairs through a hole in his room. He saw his wife kneeling in front of Nacilla, imploring him not to hurt her husband, but Nacilla was adamant. Pelonia shot Nacilla with his rifle.

Pelonia interposed self-defense. He testified that around 8:00 o’clock in the evening of August 17, 1986, he received the visitors after Guhiling introduced them, and he invited them to come up. The group seated themselves in the balcony while Pelonia went back to the kitchen to finish chopping meat; he placed the meat in a basin, put the bolo on top, and placed the whole thing on the native sink. He prepared the table and called the group to partake of the food. Betarmos, Guhiling, and Bustamante came inside the sala, but Nacilla also came forward and said that his purpose in coming was not to eat but to kill because he had a long-standing grudge against Pelonia and it was time to avenge himself. Pelonia asked what he had done, but Nacilla took hold of Pelonia’s shoulder and pushed him to a chair. Pelonia’s wife cried for help, and Cipriano Losica came up but was collared by Nacilla. Pelonia ran to his room, got his gun, returned to the sala, and fired a warning shot upward, telling Nacilla to go down because he was abusive. Pelonia then ran to the kitchen and jumped to the ground. He told Guhiling to get Nacilla, and Guhiling, together with Flor Losica, went upstairs. Pelonia heard the shouts and crying of his wife and children, so he went back upstairs through the fox hole, an underground passage in his room. Emerging in his room, he proceeded to the sala and saw Nacilla holding the bolo he had used to chop meat. He again warned Nacilla to go down, but Nacilla instead attacked him with the bolo. Pelonia evaded the blows, and when he saw that Nacilla was about to thrust the bolo toward him, he shot Nacilla.

The trial court conducted an ocular inspection of the locus criminis without a representative from the prosecution. The trial court found the prosecution’s version credible and rejected Pelonia’s claim of self-defense as not established by clear and convincing evidence. It also found that the prosecution failed to prove the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s factual findings, giving no credence to Pelonia’s testimony and that of his witnesses. It found no proof that Nacilla attacked Pelonia with a bolo. It considered the conflicting estimates of time—Flor Losica’s 30 seconds and Helen Pelonia’s 5 minutes—and concluded that the deceased could not have taken the bolo from the kitchen in that interval. It noted that while Patm. Galerita testified that he saw a bolo on the floor near the victim’s right hand, other prosecution witnesses said Nacilla had no bolo or was not holding one. Dr. Napoleon dela Peña testified that the bullet’s trajectory, entering at the left maxilla and exiting at the lateral aspect of the right side of the neck, made it impossible for the assailant and the victim to have been on the same level when the shooting occurred, and impossible that the victim was merely bending downward; the deceased was situated lower than the accused when shot, supporting the prosecution’s contention that the deceased was seated when Pelonia propped himself on a chair and shot him. Dr. dela Peña also testified that the exit wound indicated the assailant was at a distance of 7 to 10 meters from the victim when the rifle was fired. The Court of Appeals found this physical evidence supported the prosecution’s contention that there was no bolo hacking against which Pelonia defended himself.

• Self-Defense: Petitioner argued that the lower court erred in not finding that he acted in self-defense when he shot the deceased, maintaining that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression, and lack of sufficient provocation on his part.
• Ocular Inspection and Due Process: Petitioner maintained that the Court of Appeals violated his right to due process when it disregarded the findings of the ocular inspection of the crime scene conducted on April 16, 1988; the absence of the prosecution was through its own fault, and the inspection would show a bullet hole near the victim that would contest the prosecution’s claim that the deceased was merely seated when shot.
• Misapprehension of Facts and Acquittal: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion and misapprehended the facts in disregarding self-defense and in not acquitting him.

• Self-Defense: Whether petitioner acted in self-defense when he shot Ignacio Nacilla, such that he should be acquitted.
• Ocular Inspection and Due Process: Whether the Court of Appeals violated petitioner’s right to due process in disregarding the April 16, 1988 ocular inspection of the crime scene.
• Review of Factual Findings: Whether the Court of Appeals misapprehended the facts and erred in not acquitting petitioner, and whether the factual findings are reviewable under Rule 45.
• Mitigating Circumstances and Penalty: Whether the mitigating circumstances appreciated by the Court of Appeals were correctly credited and whether the penalty imposed was proper.

• Self-Defense: No. Self-defense was not proven by clear and convincing evidence; unlawful aggression was absent, and petitioner failed to prove the confluence of all requisites.
• Ocular Inspection and Due Process: No. The Court of Appeals correctly sustained the RTC’s refusal to consider the ocular inspection because the prosecution was absent and the inspection was declared null and void; even if admitted, the commissioner’s findings are not conclusive.
• Review of Factual Findings: No. The issues are factual and beyond the scope of a Rule 45 petition; no exception to the binding effect of the trial court’s findings, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, was shown.
• Mitigating Circumstances and Penalty: Partly granted. Only two mitigating circumstances were credited—voluntary surrender and immediate vindication of a grave offense, with sufficient provocation merged into the latter; the penalty was modified accordingly.

• Self-Defense: Self-defense is inherently weak and easily fabricated. When the accused invokes it, he admits causing the victim’s injuries, and the burden shifts to him to prove by clear and convincing evidence the confluence of (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. The accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence, and even if the prosecution’s evidence is weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the accused has admitted the killing. The trial court found the prosecution witnesses credible and Pelonia’s testimony incredible. The Court of Appeals found no proof of a bolo attack; the medical evidence showed the deceased was lower than the accused and was shot from a distance of 7 to 10 meters, supporting the prosecution’s version that the deceased was seated. Unlawful aggression was therefore absent, and the other requisites need not be discussed. The conviction for homicide stands.
• Ocular Inspection and Due Process: The RTC’s Order dated August 5, 1988 declared the April 16, 1988 ocular inspection null and void because the prosecution was absent. The Court of Appeals sustained the RTC’s refusal to consider it. The private prosecutor’s absence was due to his involvement in an administrative case, but the prosecuting fiscal’s absence was not explained. In any event, even if the ocular inspection were admitted, the findings of the commissioner based on such inspection are not necessarily conclusive and are not binding upon the court. No due process violation attended the exclusion.
• Review of Factual Findings: A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 entertains only questions of law. The trial court’s findings of fact, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are generally binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court. The recognized exceptions include: (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based; (7) the finding of absence of facts is contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to the findings of the trial court; (9) the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the Court of Appeals are beyond the issues of the case; and (11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties. Pelonia failed to show any exception. The Court reviewed the records and found no reason to deviate from the factual findings.
• Mitigating Circumstances and Penalty: The Court of Appeals appreciated sufficient provocation, passion and obfuscation, and voluntary surrender. Only two out of the three mitigating circumstances can be credited. Voluntary surrender was properly appreciated: after the killing, Pelonia submitted himself to the authorities by going to the Airbone Unit, whose commander thereafter surrendered him to the Baguio Station. The mitigating circumstance of having acted in immediate vindication of a grave offense was likewise properly appreciated because Pelonia was humiliated in front of his guests and kin in his own house. The mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation cannot be considered apart from the circumstance of vindication of a grave offense; because both arose from one and the same incident, they should be considered as only one mitigating circumstance. Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, homicide is punishable by reclusion temporal. With two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance, Article 64(5) of the Revised Penal Code requires the imposition of prision mayor, the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, in the period the court may deem applicable. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty is taken from the medium period of prision mayor, while the minimum is taken from the penalty next lower in degree, prision correccional. The imposable penalty is therefore six years of prision correccional as minimum to eight years and one day of prision mayor as maximum.

• Self-Defense: Requisites and Burden of Proof — In criminal cases, self-defense is inherently weak and easily fabricated. When the accused invokes it, he admits causing the victim’s injuries; the burden shifts to him to prove by clear and convincing evidence the confluence of (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. The accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence. Applied: petitioner failed to prove unlawful aggression, as the trial court and the Court of Appeals found no bolo attack; the conviction for homicide was affirmed.
• Finality of Trial Court’s Factual Findings — Factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are generally binding and conclusive on the Supreme Court. They may be reviewed only under recognized exceptions, such as speculation, misapprehension of facts, conflicting findings, or overlooked undisputed facts. Applied: petitioner failed to show any exception; the Court declined to review factual issues under Rule 45.
• Ocular Inspection and Due Process — An ocular inspection conducted without the prosecution, after being declared null and void by the trial court, cannot be considered; even if admitted, the commissioner’s findings are not necessarily conclusive and are not binding on the court. Applied: the Court of Appeals correctly sustained the RTC’s refusal to consider the April 16, 1988 inspection.
• Mitigating Circumstances: Sufficient Provocation and Vindication of Grave Offense — The mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation cannot be considered apart from the circumstance of vindication of a grave offense when both arise from one and the same incident; they are treated as only one mitigating circumstance. Applied: petitioner’s humiliation in his own house in front of guests and kin supported immediate vindication of a grave offense, but sufficient provocation was merged with it.
• Penalty with Two Mitigating Circumstances — Under Article 64(5) of the Revised Penal Code, when two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are present, the court imposes the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, in the period it may deem applicable. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum is taken from the medium period of the lower penalty, and the minimum from the penalty next lower in degree. Applied: homicide under Article 249, punishable by reclusion temporal, was reduced to prision mayor, with sentence fixed at six years of prision correccional as minimum to eight years and one day of prision mayor as maximum.

• "Like alibi, self-defense is inherently a weak defense and can easily be fabricated. When the accused interposes self-defense, he hereby admits having caused the injuries of the victim. The burden of proof then shifts on him to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, the confluence of the essential requisites for such a defense, namely: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed and to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself." — States the requisites of self-defense and the burden of proof borne by the accused, the central reason the conviction was affirmed.
• "It is settled that only questions of law are entertained in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The trial court’s findings of fact, especially when affirmed by the CA, are generally binding and conclusive upon this Court." — States the procedural rule that barred review of petitioner’s factual claims and explains why the lower courts’ factual findings were not disturbed.
• "It is settled, however, that the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation cannot be considered apart from the circumstance of vindication of a grave offense. These two circumstances arose from one and the same incident so that they should be considered as only one mitigating circumstance." — Defines the treatment of two mitigating circumstances arising from the same incident and supports the penalty modification.
• "Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, homicide is punishable by reclusion temporal. However, considering that there are two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance attendant to the crime, the imposable penalty, following Article 64(5) of the Revised Penal Code, is prision mayor, the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, in the period that the court may deem applicable." — States the penalty rule applied in reducing the sentence for homicide.

• Rugas vs. People, 464 Phil. 493, 504-505 (2004) — Cited for the rule that self-defense is inherently weak and that the accused bears the burden of proving its requisites by clear and convincing evidence.
• People vs. De los Reyes, G.R. No. 140680, May 28, 2004, 430 SCRA 166, 173 — Cited for the rule that factual findings of the trial court, including calibration of witness testimony and assessment of probative weight, are given high respect, if not conclusive effect, absent cogent facts.
• Fuentes vs. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1163, 1168-1169 (1997) — Cited for the recognized exceptions to the rule that factual findings of the trial court are binding on the Supreme Court.
• People vs. Torpio, G.R. No. 138984, June 4, 2004, 431 SCRA 9, 17-18 — Cited for the rule that sufficient provocation cannot be considered apart from vindication of a grave offense when both arise from the same incident, and should be treated as one mitigating circumstance.

• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Defines and punishes homicide with reclusion temporal. Applied: petitioner was convicted of homicide, and this article supplied the prescribed penalty.
• Article 64(5), Revised Penal Code — When two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall impose the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, in the period it may deem applicable. Applied: two mitigating circumstances reduced the penalty to prision mayor.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — A petition for review on certiorari may raise only questions of law. Applied: petitioner’s factual issues were not reviewable absent any of the recognized exceptions.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Requires the maximum penalty to be taken from the medium period of the penalty prescribed, and the minimum from the penalty next lower in degree. Applied: the sentence was fixed at six years of prision correccional as minimum to eight years and one day of prision mayor as maximum.

Consuelo Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, Minita V. Chico-Nazario, Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura.