Pelobello vs. Palatino

An absolute pardon granted after election but before the date fixed for assuming office removes the disqualification incident to criminal conviction under the Election Code, restoring the elected official's eligibility to hold the contested position. The pardoning power of the Chief Executive, subject only to constitutional limitations, cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action, and an absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction.

The petitioner-appellant, Florencio Pelobello, instituted quo warranto proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas against the respondent-appellee, Gregorio Palatino, the mayor-elect of the municipality of Torrijos, Province of Marinduque. The proceedings were had pursuant to the provisions of section 167, in relation with section 94(a), of the Election Code (Commonwealth Act No. 357). The respondent-appellee had been convicted by final judgment in 1912 of atentado contra la autoridad y sus agentes and sentenced to imprisonment for two years, four months and one day of prision correccional, which conviction disqualified him from voting and being voted upon for the contested municipal office.

Florencio Pelobello instituted quo warranto proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas against Gregorio Palatino, the mayor-elect of the municipality of Torrijos, Province of Marinduque, pursuant to section 167, in relation with section 94(a), of the Election Code (Commonwealth Act No. 357). Pelobello alleged that Palatino, having been convicted by final judgment in 1912 of atentado contra la autoridad y sus agentes and sentenced to imprisonment for two years, four months and one day of prision correccional, was disqualified from voting and being voted upon for the contested municipal office, such disqualification not having been removed by plenary pardon.

The fact of conviction was admitted, as was the election and consequent proclamation of Palatino for the office of municipal mayor. It was also admitted that Palatino was granted by the Governor-General a conditional pardon in 1915. It was proven (Exhibit 1, admitted by the lower court) that on December 25, 1940, His Excellency, the President of the Philippines, granted Palatino absolute pardon and restored him to the enjoyment of full civil and political rights.

The record further showed that Palatino committed the offense more than 25 years ago; that he had merited conditional pardon from the Governor-General in 1915; that thereafter he had exercised the right of suffrage, was elected councilor of Torrijos, Marinduque, for the period 1918 to 1921; was elected municipal president of that municipality three times in succession (1922-1931); and finally elected mayor of the municipality in the election for local officials in December 1940. The absolute pardon was granted on December 25, 1940, after the election but before the date fixed by law for assuming office (section 4, Election Code).

• Disqualification Not Removed: Petitioner argued that respondent-appellee, having been convicted by final judgment of atentado contra la autoridad y sus agentes, was disqualified from voting and being voted upon for the contested municipal office, and that such disqualification had not been removed by plenary pardon at the time of the election.
• Timing of the Pardon: Petitioner contended that the absolute pardon, having been granted after the election, could not retroactively cure the respondent's disqualification to be a candidate at the time of the election.

• Effect of Absolute Pardon: Respondent argued that the absolute pardon granted by the President on December 25, 1940, restored him to the enjoyment of full civil and political rights and removed all disqualifications resulting from his prior conviction.
• Timing Before Assuming Office: Respondent maintained that since the pardon was granted before the date fixed by law for assuming office, it effectively removed the disqualification and enabled him to assume the position in deference to the popular will.

• Effect of Absolute Pardon on Disqualification: Whether the absolute pardon granted after the election but before the date fixed for assuming office had the effect of removing the disqualification incident to criminal conviction under paragraph (a) of section 94 of the Election Code.

• Effect of Absolute Pardon on Disqualification: Yes. The absolute pardon had the effect of removing the disqualification incident to criminal conviction under paragraph (a) of section 94 of the Election Code. The pardon, having been granted after the election but before the date fixed for assuming office, restored the respondent to the enjoyment of full civil and political rights and removed all disabilities resulting from the conviction.

• Effect of Absolute Pardon on Disqualification: The Court adopted the broad view expressed in Cristobal vs. Labrador (G.R. No. 47941, promulgated December 7, 1940) that, subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action; that an absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction; and that when granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction. The Court acknowledged that there was force in the argument that the effect of absolute pardon should not be extended to cases of this kind, but held that the better view in light of the constitutional grant in this jurisdiction is not to unnecessarily restrict or impair the power of the Chief Executive who, after inquiry into the environmental facts, should be at liberty to atone the rigidity of the law to the extent of relieving completely the party or parties concerned from the accessory and resultant disabilities of criminal conviction. The Court noted that Palatino committed the offense more than 25 years ago, had merited conditional pardon from the Governor-General in 1915, had thereafter exercised the right of suffrage, was elected councilor of Torrijos, Marinduque, for the period 1918 to 1921, was elected municipal president of that municipality three times in succession (1922-1931), and finally elected mayor of the municipality in the election for local officials in December 1940. Under these circumstances, it was evident that the purpose in granting him absolute pardon was to enable him to assume the position in deference to the popular will, and the pardon was extended before the date fixed in section 4 of the Election Code for assuming office. The Court saw no reason for defeating this wholesome purpose by a restrictive judicial interpretation of the constitutional grant to the Chief Executive, and gave efficacy to executive action, disregarding what at bottom was a technical objection.

• Effect of Absolute Pardon — An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction. When granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the absolute pardon granted to Palatino after the election but before the date fixed for assuming office removed the disqualification incident to his prior criminal conviction, thereby restoring his eligibility to hold the contested municipal office.
• Pardoning Power Cannot Be Restricted by Legislative Action — Subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action. The Court applied this doctrine to reject the restrictive interpretation of the Election Code's disqualification provision, holding that the Chief Executive should be at liberty to relieve completely the party concerned from the accessory and resultant disabilities of criminal conviction.

• "We adopt the broad view expressed in Cristobal vs. Labrador, G. R. No. 47941, promulgated December 7, 1940, that subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action; that an absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction, and that when granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction." — This passage states the controlling doctrine on the effect of an absolute pardon and is the ratio decidendi of the case.
• "We are of the opinion that the better view in the light of the constitutional grant in this jurisdiction is not to unnecessarily restrict or impair the power of the Chief Executive who, after inquiry into the environmental facts, should be at liberty to atone the rigidity of the law to the extent of relieving completely the party or parties concerned from the accessory and resultant disabilities of criminal conviction." — This passage articulates the Court's rationale for giving broad effect to the pardoning power and rejecting restrictive judicial interpretation.
• "We see no reason for defeating this wholesome purpose by a restrictive judicial interpretation of the constitutional grant to the Chief Executive. We, therefore, give efficacy to executive action and disregard what at bottom is a technical objection." — This passage explains the Court's decision to affirm the lower court's judgment and give effect to the executive grant of pardon.

• Cristobal vs. Labrador, G.R. No. 47941, December 7, 1940 — Controlling precedent. The Court adopted the broad view expressed in this case that the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action, and that an absolute pardon removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction.

• Section 167, Commonwealth Act No. 357 (Election Code) — The provision pursuant to which the quo warranto proceedings were instituted. The Court applied this provision in the context of the disqualification challenge against the respondent-appellee.
• Section 94(a), Commonwealth Act No. 357 (Election Code) — The provision defining the disqualification incident to criminal conviction. The Court held that the absolute pardon removed this disqualification.
• Section 4, Commonwealth Act No. 357 (Election Code) — The provision fixing the date for assuming office. The Court noted that the absolute pardon was granted before this date, which was significant to the resolution of the case.
• Article VII, Section 11, paragraph 6, 1935 Constitution — The constitutional provision granting the President the power to grant pardons after conviction. The dissenting opinion cited this provision to argue that the pardon could not have retroactive effect, but the majority's reasoning was grounded in the broad view of the pardoning power.

Avanceña, C.J., Diaz and Moran, JJ., concurred in the decision.

• Justice Horrilleno — Dissented on the ground that the application of Cristobal vs. Labrador to the present case was erroneous. The dissenting justice argued that in Cristobal, the conditional pardon was obtained much before the elections, whereas in the present case, Palatino was not a qualified elector at the time of the December 10, 1940 elections, and the absolute pardon was granted on December 25, 1940, fifteen days after the elections and after he had been proclaimed the winning candidate. The dissent contended that the majority's principle retroactively made Palatino a qualified elector and eligible candidate, which would mean he was pardoned before he was even convicted of the offense of registering as a qualified elector when he was not. The dissent also argued that the principle could serve as an incentive to violate the Election Code, as an absolute pardon granted after the elections would validate an otherwise illegal and void election. The dissent further distinguished Ex parte Garland and Hildreth vs. Health, noting that in those cases the pardon was granted before the relevant elections, and cited Washington vs. State (75 Alabama 582) and State of Washington vs. Linda Burfield Hazzard (47 A.L.R. 540-541) to support the view that a pardon does not necessarily restore all rights and privileges forfeited by conviction.