Pecson vs. Coronel

A person without forced heirs may dispose of all property by will in favor of any qualified person, and the will is not invalid merely because the disposition is unnatural, unreasonable, or unjust; likewise, an attestation clause stating that the witnesses signed “in the presence of others” complies with the requirement that they sign in the presence of each other when the phrase is reasonably construed as “in the presence of the other witnesses.”

Dolores Coronel, a resident of Betis, Guagua, Pampanga, died leaving an estate and no forced heirs. Lorenzo Pecson was her nephew by affinity, being married to her niece Angela Coronel; the opponents were her blood relatives and their spouses or widows. The governing Civil Code provision allowed a person without forced heirs to dispose of all property by will in favor of any qualified person. Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, prescribed the extrinsic formalities and attestation clause for wills.

Dolores Coronel, a resident of Betis, Guagua, Pampanga, executed her last will and testament, Exhibit A, on July 1, 1918. In it she declared that she had no forced heirs and willed all her movable and immovable properties to her nephew Lorenzo Pecson, who was married to her niece Angela Coronel, in consideration of the good services he had rendered and was rendering to her. She named Lorenzo executor without bond and, should he be unable to serve, named her grandson Victor Pecson as substitute executor, also without bond. She stated that all her real and paraphernal property and credits were specified in an inventory. Because she did not know how to write, she requested Vicente J. Francisco to write her name at the foot of the will and on the left margin of each sheet before the witnesses. The attestation clause stated that the document was executed and declared by Dolores to be her last will in the witnesses’ presence; that, as she did not know how to write, she requested Vicente J. Francisco to sign her name under her express direction in their presence at the foot and on the left margin of each sheet; and that each witness signed in the presence of others and of the testatrix at the foot and on the margin of each of the two sheets, numbered “one” and “two.”

About six years before Exhibit A, Dolores had executed Exhibit B, which named Lorenzo Pecson as her sole heir and executor, with Victor Pecson as substitute, and which stated that, as she could not write, she requested Martin Pangilinan to write her name and affixed her mark between her name and surname before witnesses. About 1916 or 1917, Dolores showed Exhibit B to Attorney Francisco, her legal adviser. He advised that the will be remade because Exhibit B lacked the extrinsic formalities required by Act No. 2645, which had been enacted after its execution. She followed the advice, and Attorney Francisco drew Exhibit A in accordance with her instructions and brought it to her house for execution. Pablo Bartolome read Exhibit A to Dolores in her presence and that of the witnesses and asked whether the will was in accordance with her wishes. She answered that it was and requested Attorney Francisco to sign the will for her; he did so in the presence of the witnesses, who in turn signed before the testatrix and in the presence of each other.

The opponents, who were Dolores’s blood relatives and their spouses or widows, contested the probate. They alleged that the proof did not show that Exhibit A contained Dolores’s last will and that the attestation clause was not in accordance with section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645. They argued that it was improbable and exceptional for Dolores to exclude her blood relatives from her vast estate and leave it to one who was only a relative by affinity, with no sufficient motive, especially since she had maintained cordial relations with relatives who had helped manage and direct her lands. Attorney Francisco testified that Dolores had revealed to him her suspicion that some of her nephews had been accomplices in a robbery of which she had been a victim. The opponents admitted that Lorenzo had rendered services at least from 1914, although proof showed he had rendered such services long before that time, and that he was the administrator and manager of Dolores’s affairs in the last years of her life. They claimed that Exhibit B showed Dolores intended Lorenzo to be merely executor and distributor of the estate among her heirs, not sole beneficiary, pointing to the clause appointing an executor and a substitute. They also claimed that Dolores had promised Maria Coronel that she would leave her estate to her blood relatives, which Rosario Coronel tended to corroborate, and that Jose M. Reyes’s deposition phrase “in order that the latter might dispose of the estate in the most appropriate manner” meant distribute it among the heirs. They charged Attorney Francisco with improper means and Lorenzo Pecson with fraud or undue influence. Norberto Paras testified that he heard, when the will was being read to Dolores, a provision ordering the estate distributed among the heirs, but the preponderance of evidence showed he was not present at the reading; the appellants did not insist on the probative force of his testimony.

On the attestation clause, the appellants argued that it did not state that the will was signed by the witnesses in the presence of the testatrix and of each other, as required by section 618, because the phrase used was “in the presence of others.” They contended that “others” meant other persons, not the other witnesses. The appellee contended that the phrase should be construed as “of the others,” the article “the” having been inadvertently omitted. The appellants also argued that the evidence was insufficient to show that the attesting witnesses Damian Crisostomo and Sotero Dumaual were present at the execution of the will. The trial judge observed the demeanor of the witnesses for both parties and believed those for the petitioner; he found it neither probable nor likely that Attorney Francisco, a man versed in the law and conscientious about compliance with the extrinsic formalities of a will, would have consented to the omission of seeing that the testatrix and the attesting witnesses were all present when their signatures were affixed. The Court of First Instance probated the will.

• Sole Beneficiary: Petitioner maintained that he was instituted in Exhibit A as sole beneficiary of all of Dolores Coronel’s estate, and that the earlier designation in Exhibit B supported the testatrix’s intention to make him sole heir.
• Attestation Clause Interpretation: Petitioner contended that the phrase “in the presence of others” in the attestation clause should be construed as “in the presence of the others,” the article “the” having been inadvertently omitted, and that the clause therefore complied with section 618.

• True Will / Unnatural Disposition: Opponents-appellants argued that Exhibit A did not contain Dolores Coronel’s true will because it was improbable and exceptional for her to exclude her blood relatives from her vast estate and leave it to a relative by affinity, with no sufficient motive, especially given her cordial relations with relatives who had helped manage her lands.
• Undue Influence and Fraud: Appellants argued that if the will was not in fact her will, it was due to extraneous illegal influence; they charged Attorney Francisco with improper means and Lorenzo Pecson with fraud or undue influence to make him appear as sole beneficiary.
• Executor Clause: Appellants contended that the clause appointing Lorenzo Pecson executor and Victor Pecson substitute executor was repugnant to his institution as sole beneficiary and showed that he was merely an executor entrusted to distribute the estate among the relatives.
• Promise to Blood Relatives: Appellants argued that the testatrix intended to leave her estate to her blood relatives, based on a promise to Maria Coronel corroborated by Rosario Coronel, and that Jose M. Reyes’s phrase “dispose of the estate in the most appropriate manner” meant distribute it among the heirs.
• Attestation Clause: Appellants argued that the attestation clause did not state that the witnesses signed in the presence of the testatrix and of each other as required by section 618; the phrase “in the presence of others” meant other persons, not the other witnesses.
• Presence of Attesting Witnesses: Appellants argued that the evidence was insufficient to show that Damian Crisostomo and Sotero Dumaual were present at the execution of the will.

• True Will / Unnatural Disposition: Whether Exhibit A contained the true last will of Dolores Coronel despite the exclusion of her blood relatives and the alleged promise to leave her estate to them.
• Fraud or Undue Influence: Whether fraud or undue influence intervened in the preparation and execution of Exhibit A.
• Executor Clause: Whether the appointment of Lorenzo Pecson as executor, with Victor Pecson as substitute, negated his institution as sole beneficiary.
• Attestation Clause: Whether the attestation clause complied with section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, despite using the phrase “in the presence of others” rather than stating that the witnesses signed in the presence of each other.
• Presence of Attesting Witnesses: Whether the evidence established that Damian Crisostomo and Sotero Dumaual were present at the execution and signing of the will.
• Burden of Proof: Whether the petitioner was required to prove the reasons for the testatrix’s exclusion of her relatives from the estate.

• True Will / Unnatural Disposition: Yes. Exhibit A was the true last will; a person without forced heirs may dispose of all property by will, and an unnatural or unjust disposition does not invalidate the will absent statutory restriction, fraud, or undue influence.
• Fraud or Undue Influence: No. Fraud and undue influence were not proven; neither Attorney Francisco nor Lorenzo Pecson was shown to have contrived or executed any condemnable plan.
• Executor Clause: No. The appointment of an executor and substitute did not negate Lorenzo Pecson’s institution as sole beneficiary; an executor has duties beyond distributing the estate.
• Attestation Clause: Yes. The phrase “in the presence of others” was reasonably construed as “in the presence of the other witnesses,” the article “the” having been inadvertently omitted; grammatical or clerical errors do not invalidate the will when the intention is manifest.
• Presence of Attesting Witnesses: Yes. The evidence and the trial court’s findings established that Damian Crisostomo and Sotero Dumaual were present at the execution and signing of the will.
• Burden of Proof: No. Petitioner was not required to show the reasons for the exclusion; his duty was to prove the will voluntary and authentic, while the opponents bore the burden of proving their allegation that the estate was willed to another.

• True Will / Unnatural Disposition: The Civil Code’s first paragraph of the quoted article allowed any person without forced heirs to dispose by will of all property or any part of it in favor of any qualified person. That liberty had been in force since 1889, and it was not tenable to say its exercise was exceptional merely because family ties in the Philippines are strong. The exclusion of blood relatives was not strange; Lorenzo had rendered services admitted at least from 1914, with proof of earlier services, and was administrator and manager of Dolores’s affairs in her last years. Six years before Exhibit A, Dolores had named Lorenzo sole heir in Exhibit B. The alleged promise to Maria Coronel was not sufficiently proven; even if made, Dolores could retract it, as wills are revocable. The phrase “dispose of the estate in the most appropriate manner” did not mean “distribute among the heirs”; “to dispose” is not the same as “to distribute,” and the witness Reyes translated from Pampango to Spanish, a language he did not master. Norberto Paras’s testimony was outweighed, and appellants did not insist on it. The opponents’ affidavit of Pablo Bartolome, that he had informed the testatrix that the contents entrusted Pecson with distribution, was not proven because they failed to present him at the new trial despite his presence, raising the presumption under section 334, subsection 5, Code of Civil Procedure that his testimony would have been adverse. The Court also noted that petitioner’s failure to present Bartolome could not be considered against appellee because it was not raised in the assignments of error under Article 20, Rules of the Supreme Court. The decision cited 40 Cyc., 1079, for the rule that an unnatural or unjust will may be considered on testamentary capacity, but capacity was not disputed. Thus, there was no sufficient proof that Dolores intended to give her estate to her blood relatives or that Exhibit A was not her true will.

• Fraud or Undue Influence: Fraud or evil is not presumed. Attorney Francisco advised a new will so that it would comply with Act No. 2645; he prepared it substantially in accordance with Exhibit B; and he selected witnesses other than relatives to avoid obstacles to probate. His presumption that Dolores would ask him to sign was not fraudulent; he asked through Pablo Bartolome whom she wanted to sign the document. No interest in favoring Lorenzo was proven; Lorenzo was allegedly already his client, but Francisco denied it and it was not proven. His post-death negotiations with the opponents were conciliatory and at the instance of Agustin Coronel, not evidence of fraudulent intent. As to Lorenzo, the record lacked sufficient proof that he tried through fraud or undue influence to frustrate the testatrix’s alleged intention; no conspiracy between him and Francisco was shown. Therefore, no fraud or undue influence was established.

• Executor Clause: The appointment of an executor and substitute did not imply that Lorenzo was merely a distributor. An executor’s duties are not limited to distributing the estate, which in estate succession is done with court intervention; an executor also has powers for the preservation, defense, and liquidation of the estate until it reaches those entitled to it. The testatrix also ordered burial according to her social standing and could designate someone to ensure compliance; fulfillment of the will is an executor’s function. Thus, the clause did not negate the institution of Lorenzo as sole beneficiary.

• Attestation Clause: Section 618 required the attestation to state the number of sheets or pages, that the testator signed the will and every page or caused another to write his name under express direction in the presence of three witnesses, and that the witnesses witnessed and signed the will and all pages in the presence of the testator and of each other. The clause stated that “each of us signed these presents in the presence of others and of the testatrix.” The phrase “of others” could mean “of other persons” or “of the others.” The latter was more reasonable; otherwise the words would be useless. The omission of “the” was a grammatical or clerical error, not vital when the intention is manifest. The Court cited In re will of Abangan, 40 Phil. 476, that the object of solemnities is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, avoid substitution, and guarantee truth and authenticity, but the law should not restrain the right to make a will or demand unnecessary requisites. The decision also cited 40 Cyc., 1404, for the rule that clerical mistakes may be corrected and technical grammar disregarded when necessary to effectuate the testator’s manifest intention. The case In the matter of the estate of Geronima Uy Coque, 43 Phil. 405, was distinguished because there the statement that the witnesses signed in the presence of each other was totally absent, while here the phrase was present. Thus, the attestation clause complied with section 618.

• Presence of Attesting Witnesses: The evidence led to the conclusion that Damian Crisostomo and Sotero Dumaual were present at the execution and signing of the will. The trial judge observed the demeanor of the witnesses and believed those for the petitioner; he found it neither probable nor likely that Attorney Francisco, versed in the law and conscientious about extrinsic formalities, would have consented to the omission of seeing that the testatrix and the witnesses were present when their signatures were affixed. The record furnished no sufficient ground to deviate from the trial judge’s reasoning and findings. Thus, the witnesses were present.

• Burden of Proof: The petitioner was not required to show the reasons the testatrix may have had for excluding her relatives. His duty was to prove that the will was voluntary and authentic. He who alleges that the estate was willed to another has the burden of proving that allegation. Since the opponents alleged that Dolores did not understand the true contents of the will, they had to prove it; their failure to present Pablo Bartolome raised the adverse presumption. Thus, no burden rested on petitioner to justify the exclusion.

• Testamentary Liberty and Unnatural Wills — A person without forced heirs may dispose of all property by will in favor of any qualified person. In the absence of statutory restriction, the testator has absolute dominion over property and may bestow it on whomsoever he pleases without regard to natural or legal claims. A will is not invalid merely because it is unnatural, unreasonable, or unjust; such unreasonableness may be considered on testamentary capacity, but capacity was not disputed here. Applied: Dolores Coronel’s exclusion of her blood relatives and institution of Lorenzo Pecson was upheld.
• Attestation Clause: “In the Presence of Others” as “Other Witnesses” — The requirement that witnesses sign in the presence of each other is satisfied when the attestation clause states they signed “in the presence of others” and the phrase is reasonably construed as “in the presence of the other witnesses,” with the article “the” inadvertently omitted. Grammatical or clerical errors are not usually vital when the intention is manifest. Applied: Exhibit A’s attestation clause complied with section 618.
• Object of Will Solemnities — The solemnities surrounding will execution aim to close the door against bad faith and fraud, avoid substitution of wills, and guarantee their truth and authenticity; laws on the subject should be interpreted to attain these ends but not to restrain or curtail the right to make a will or demand unnecessary requisites. Applied: The Court adopted a reasonable construction of the attestation clause rather than invalidating the will.
• Executor’s Appointment Does Not Negate Universal Institution — The appointment of an executor and substitute executor does not imply that the instituted beneficiary is merely a distributor of the estate. An executor has duties of preservation, defense, liquidation, and fulfillment of the will, and estate distribution occurs with court intervention. Applied: The executor clause did not negate Lorenzo Pecson’s institution as sole beneficiary.
• Burden of Proof in Probate — The proponent of a will must prove that it is voluntary and authentic; the party alleging that the estate was willed to another bears the burden of proving that allegation. The proponent need not prove the testator’s reasons for excluding relatives. Applied: The opponents, not Lorenzo Pecson, bore the burden of proving that Dolores intended her estate for her blood relatives.
• Adverse Presumption from Suppressed Evidence — Under section 334, subsection 5, Code of Civil Procedure, if a party suppresses evidence without explanation, the presumption is that the evidence would have been adverse if produced. Applied: The opponents’ failure to present Pablo Bartolome at the new trial, despite his presence, raised the presumption against them.
• Fraud and Undue Influence Not Presumed — Fraud or evil is not presumed; it must be proven. Applied: The charges against Attorney Francisco and Lorenzo Pecson failed for lack of proof.

• "Any person who was no forced heirs may dispose by will of all his property or any part of it in favor of any person qualified to acquire it." — This is the Civil Code provision quoted by the decision; it grounds the testatrix’s liberty to dispose of all property by will when she has no forced heirs.
• "In the absence of any statutory restriction every person possesses absolute dominion over his property, and may bestow it upon whomsoever he pleases without regard to natural or legal claim upon his bounty. If the testator possesses the requisite capacity to make a will, and the disposition of his property is not affected by fraud of undue influence, the will is not rendered invalid by the fact that it is unnatural, unreasonable, or unjust." — This passage states the core rule on unnatural wills and explains why Dolores Coronel’s exclusion of her blood relatives did not invalidate Exhibit A.
• "We believe it to be more reasonable to construe the disputed phrase 'of others' as meaning 'of the other witnesses,' and that a grammatical or clerical error was committed consisting in the omission of the article 'the'." — This is the ratio for the attestation-clause issue, construing “of others” as “of the other witnesses” and treating the omitted article as a clerical error.
• "The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will." — Quoted from In re will of Abangan, this passage states the purpose of will solemnities and the interpretive balance the Court applied to uphold Exhibit A.

• In re will of Abangan, 40 Phil. 476 — Quoted and relied upon for the principle that the solemnities of wills are intended to prevent bad faith, fraud, and substitution and to guarantee authenticity, but should not be interpreted to restrain the right to make a will or require unnecessary requisites.
• In the matter of the estate of Geronima Uy Coque, 43 Phil. 405 — Invoked by appellants but distinguished; there the attestation clause totally omitted the statement that the witnesses signed in the presence of each other, whereas Exhibit A contained the phrase “in the presence of others,” reasonably construed as “of the other witnesses.”

• Civil Code, first paragraph of the quoted article (article number not stated in the provided text) — Any person without forced heirs may dispose by will of all property or any part of it in favor of any qualified person. Applied to uphold Dolores Coronel’s testamentary liberty to exclude her blood relatives and institute Lorenzo Pecson.
• Section 618, Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645 — Required the attestation clause to state the number of sheets or pages, that the testator signed the will and every page or caused another to write his name under express direction in the presence of three witnesses, and that the witnesses witnessed and signed the will and all pages in the presence of the testator and of each other. Applied: The Court construed “in the presence of others” as “in the presence of the other witnesses” and found compliance.
• Section 334, subsection 5, Code of Civil Procedure — Provides that if a party suppresses evidence without explanation, the presumption is that the evidence would be adverse if produced. Applied to the opponents’ failure to present Pablo Bartolome at the new trial.
• Article 20, Rules of the Supreme Court — Points not raised in the assignments of error cannot be considered against the appellee. Applied to the petitioner’s failure to present Pablo Bartolome, which the Court declined to consider against the appellee because it was not assigned as error.
• Act No. 2645 — Amended section 618 and imposed new extrinsic formalities after Exhibit B was executed. Applied: Attorney Francisco advised Dolores to remake her will to comply with the new formalities.

Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, and Johns, JJ.