Pecson vs. Coronel

An order allowing a will to probate may be set aside after expiration of the probate period under Section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure where the failure to oppose was due to excusable negligence induced by the proponent's fraud. Courts of First Instance, as courts of both law and equity with general jurisdiction, may grant such equitable relief and reopen probate to hear the opposition.

Dolores Coronel was an 82-year-old resident of Betis, Guagua, Pampanga, whose surviving heirs claimed through her deceased brothers. Lorenzo Pecson was not related to her by blood, being married to one of her nieces, but had been entrusted during her last years with all her business and money. Section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure afforded equitable relief from judgments obtained through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable negligence.

Dolores Coronel died in Betis, Guagua, Pampanga on January 7, 1920 at the age of 82 years. During her last years she had entrusted all her business and money to Lorenzo Pecson, who was married to one of her nieces but otherwise unrelated. A document dated July 1, 1918, bearing her thumb mark, purported to appoint Pecson as her only legatee to the exclusion of her surviving brothers and the descendants of her deceased brothers.

According to Eriberto Coronel and the other movants, descendants of Coronel's deceased brothers, Pecson abused that confidence by having the document drafted under his direction with the help of his lawyer Vicente J. Francisco and securing the deceased's thumb mark without her knowing its contents. They alleged it was never her desire to name Pecson sole legatee, but to divide her estate in equal parts among surviving brothers and descendants of deceased brothers by representation. Before execution, she had on numerous occasions ordered Pecson to so divide the estate upon her death, and Pecson falsely promised to do so while intending to retain the whole estate, valued at approximately P1,000,000, a large part allegedly omitted from his inventory. The document remained in Pecson's possession from execution and, notwithstanding Sections 626, 627 and 628 of the Code of Civil Procedure, was filed for probate only on February 27, 1920, fifty days after death.

A few days after presentation for probate, Pecson called a meeting of the heirs in the deceased's house, stating he would partition the property but could not yet ascertain shares because of undetermined expenses, and promised to notify them within five months of their respective portions. Trusting that promise and his prior promises to the deceased, the movants presented no opposition, believing Pecson would fulfill his assurance of equal division. Thereafter, by order of April 7, 1920, the document was allowed to probate without opposition and letters of administration issued to Pecson without bond. On or about the beginning of August 1920, Pecson definitely refused to give the movants any share. On September 13, 1920 they moved to set aside the decree, alleging fraud, duress, and excusable negligence. Both sides filed affidavits, and the trial court denied the motion on December 16, 1920.

• Sufficiency and Finality: Petitioner argued that the facts stated in the motion were not sufficient to justify reopening of the proceedings and that the probate of the will was final and conclusive, praying that the motion be denied.

• Fraud in Execution: Respondents countered that consent to the July 1, 1918 document was obtained through fraud and illegal means, Pecson having abused confidence, caused its drafting, and secured the deceased's thumb mark without her knowledge of contents through his lawyer's assistance.
• False Promise of Partition: Respondents argued that Pecson falsely promised the deceased and later the heirs that he would divide the estate equally among surviving brothers and descendants of deceased brothers, intending all along to retain it for himself.
• Prevention of Opposition: Respondents maintained that the post-filing meeting and promise to notify shares within five months were made for the sole purpose of preventing opposition to probate, causing their failure to oppose through inadvertence or excusable negligence.
• Delayed Filing and Concealment: Respondents alleged that Pecson kept the document from execution until fifty days after death in violation of Sections 626, 627 and 628 of the Code of Civil Procedure and omitted a large part of the approximately P1,000,000 estate from inventory.

• Power to Set Aside Probate: Whether the order allowing the will to probate can be reversed after the period fixed for its probate has expired.
• Applicability of Section 113: Whether sufficient facts have been shown so as to bring this case within the purview of Section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

• Power to Set Aside Probate: Yes. Courts of First Instance, having general jurisdiction as courts of both law and equity, have power to grant equitable relief under Section 113 even against a probate decree.
• Applicability of Section 113: Yes. The opponents' failure to oppose, induced by reliance on Pecson's assurances that their rights were protected, constituted excusable negligence warranting reopening.

• Power to Set Aside Probate: The remedy sought is one in equity, cognizable by Courts of First Instance by virtue of their general jurisdiction as courts of both law and equity. Accordingly, jurisdiction over cases falling under Section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure exists, and its provisions are applicable to probate proceedings as recognized in Annuran vs. Aquino and Ortiz, if the alleged facts warrant application.
• Applicability of Section 113: Sufficiently established was that appellants, in view of the understanding with Pecson, believed the rights now claimed were protected and therefore did not oppose probate. Although negligent, their negligence under the circumstances was excusable. Denial of reopening was thus an improper exercise and abuse of discretion, requiring reversal, setting aside of the probate decree, and remand for opposition pleadings and evidence.

• Equity jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance — Courts of First Instance, having general jurisdiction, are courts both of law and of equity. Applied here to sustain their power to entertain a Section 113 motion to set aside a probate decree after the probate period.
• Relief under Section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure in probate — Section 113 relief for mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable negligence applies to probate decrees, following Annuran vs. Aquino and Ortiz. Applied to allow reopening where heirs failed to oppose due to reliance on the proponent's assurances.
• Excusable negligence and abuse of discretion — Negligence in failing to oppose probate may be excused where induced by the proponent's fraudulent promises that rights were protected. Denial of relief under such circumstances constitutes abuse of discretionary power, warranting reversal and remand for hearing on opposition.

• "The Courts of First Instance of these Islands having, as they have, general jurisdiction, are courts both of law and of equity." — States the jurisdictional basis for entertaining equitable relief from a final probate order.
• "And as courts of equity, they have jurisdiction over cases falling under section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure." — Defines the source of authority to set aside judgments upon excusable negligence.
• "We find that the opponents have been negligent, but under the circumstances of these case, we consider their negligence excusable and hold that the court, whose order is the subject of this appeal, did not properly exercise its discretion in this matter and, therefore, committed an abuse of its discretionary powers." — Articulates the ratio for reversing denial of reopening and ordering new hearing.

• Annuran vs. Aquino and Ortiz, 38 Phil., 29 — Cited as authority that the provisions of Section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable to the instant probate case if the alleged facts warrant it.

• Section 113, Code of Civil Procedure — Provides equitable relief from judgments on grounds including excusable negligence; held applicable to set aside an unopposed probate decree and to reopen proceedings for opposition.
• Sections 626, 627 and 628, Code of Civil Procedure — Invoked by movants to allege Pecson's breach of duty to file the will promptly, having kept it from execution until fifty days after death; cited as part of the fraud allegations supporting relief.

Araullo, C.J., Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur.