PDIC vs. Casimiro

Probable cause for filing criminal information requires only facts sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof; it does not require absolute certainty of guilt or sufficient evidence to secure a conviction, and may be established through hearsay evidence provided there is substantial basis for crediting such hearsay.

Fidel C. Cu owned 85.99% of Bicol Development Bank, Inc. (BDBI), with Carmelita B. Zate serving as Chairman/President. Mary Lou S. Apelo was a former Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) employee who had served as Bank Officer-In-Charge examining BDBI's books in 2000-2002. After the BSP Monetary Board ordered BDBI's closure on December 22, 2008, the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) assumed statutory receivership. During the receivership, Arsenia T. Gomez, a former BDBI Cashier, Service Officer, and Treasurer, submitted an affidavit to PDIC alleging that Apelo provided Cu with advance warnings of surprise BSP examinations in exchange for monetary deposits totaling ₱140,000.00 made to her bank account between 2006 and 2007.

• The Alleged Bribery Scheme: Arsenia T. Gomez, former BDBI Cashier, Service Officer, and Treasurer, executed an affidavit alleging that Cu instructed her to deposit ₱30,000.00 to Apelo's Philippine National Bank account on November 16, 2006, characterizing it as "Professional Fee natin sa kanya yan." Subsequent deposits of ₱60,000.00 (April 20, 2007) and ₱50,000.00 (October 3, 2007) were allegedly made on orders of Cu and Zate. Gomez claimed these payments were in exchange for Apelo providing Cu "advance warnings" of impending BSP surprise examinations, allowing Cu to temporarily infuse cash into the vault and instruct employees to cover book exceptions before examinations.
• Cover-up Mechanism: Gomez alleged that Cu and Zate directed her to initially record these disbursements as "Other Cash Items" in BDBI's books, then later regularize and remove them by incorporating them into other accounts until fully covered.
• Evidence Presented: Gomez attached deposit slips and official receipts evidencing the deposits to Apelo's account. She asserted no legitimate transactions existed between BDBI and Apelo to warrant such payments.
• Defenses: Cu denied ordering the deposits, arguing lack of evidence that Apelo knew of or withdrew the funds. Zate claimed Gomez's statements were unfounded. Apelo did not file a counter-affidavit despite notice.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: PDIC maintained that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the complaint, as the evidence presented was sufficient to establish probable cause.
• Standard for Probable Cause: Petitioner argued that probable cause requires only facts sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime was committed and that respondents are probably guilty, not absolute certainty or proof beyond reasonable doubt.
• Admissibility of Hearsay: PDIC contended that technical rules of evidence, including the hearsay rule, do not apply in preliminary investigations, and that Gomez's affidavit, as a high-ranking officer's testimony, provided substantial basis to credit the allegations.

• Lack of Proof of Receipt: The Ombudsman (through the Overall Deputy Ombudsman) found that absent proof that Apelo withdrew the deposited amounts, certainty of her receipt of monetary consideration could not be established, negating the bribery charge.
• Inadmissible Evidence: The Ombudsman ruled that Gomez's affidavit was inadmissible hearsay, particularly regarding statements that Apelo was the source of advance warnings, and therefore could not support a finding of probable cause.

• Standard for Probable Cause: Whether the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in finding no probable cause by requiring proof of actual withdrawal of deposited funds and by excluding hearsay evidence.
• Admissibility of Hearsay in Preliminary Investigation: Whether hearsay evidence is admissible to establish probable cause in preliminary investigations before the Ombudsman.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint. Probable cause requires only facts sufficient to support a prima facie case, not absolute certainty of guilt. The requirement that Apelo must have withdrawn the funds to establish receipt imposed an evidentiary standard appropriate for trial, not preliminary investigation.
• Elements of Crimes Established: The facts alleged satisfied the elements of Direct Bribery (Apelo as public officer receiving gifts in consideration of an act relating to her official function), Corruption of Public Officials (Cu and Zate making offers/promises to a public officer), and violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 (acting with manifest partiality or bad faith). The respondents' denials and Apelo's failure to file a counter-affidavit were insufficient to overcome the prima facie case.
• Hearsay Evidence: Hearsay evidence is admissible in preliminary investigations to establish probable cause provided there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. Gomez's position as former Cashier, Service Officer, and Treasurer of BDBI provided such substantial basis, as she would be privy to delicate transactions. The technical rules of evidence do not apply in preliminary investigations, which are merely inquisitorial proceedings to determine whether there is reasonable basis to believe a crime was committed.

• Probable Cause Defined: Probable cause is such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean "actual or positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction; it is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed by the suspects.
• Hearsay in Preliminary Investigation: The determination of probable cause can rest partially, or even entirely, on hearsay evidence, as long as there is a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause because preliminary investigation does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties, and the validity of defenses or accusations are better ventilated during trial proper.

• "Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean 'actual or positive cause' nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief."
• "Probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged."
• "The determination of probable cause can rest partially, or even entirely, on hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in a preliminary investigation because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties."

• Ciron v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 194339-41 (2015) — Cited for the principle that the Court refrains from interfering with the Ombudsman's determination of probable cause absent grave abuse of discretion, defined as capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.
• Fenequito v. Vergara, Jr., G.R. No. 172829 (2012) — Cited for the definition of probable cause and the parameters for finding its existence.
• Estrada v. Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 212140-41 (2015) — Cited for the doctrine that hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in preliminary investigations as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay, citing United States jurisprudence.

• Article 210, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes Direct Bribery, requiring that the accused is a public officer who receives gifts in consideration of committing a crime or act relating to official functions.
• Article 212, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes Corruption of Public Officials, requiring that the offender makes offers or promises to a public officer under circumstances that would make the latter liable for direct bribery.
• Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) — Prohibits public officers from causing undue injury or giving unwarranted benefits through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence.
• Section 10, Republic Act No. 3591 (PDIC Charter) — Cited for PDIC's powers as statutory receiver to investigate causes of bank closure.

Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Perez, JJ.