Paynaga vs. Wolfe

A prisoner convicted by Spanish authorities of desertion from the Spanish army is not entitled to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation of July 4, 1902, because desertion is not a political offense covered by the proclamation, and Article XII of the Treaty of Peace requires the government to execute the final criminal judgment rendered before the treaty. Act No. 654, providing for appeals in habeas corpus proceedings, is not an ex post facto law because habeas corpus is a civil proceeding.

Evaristo Paynaga was in the custody of George N. Wolfe, Warden of Bilibid Prison, in Manila. The dispute implicated the transfer of sovereignty over the Philippine Archipelago from Spain to the United States, the Treaty of Peace between the United States and Spain, and the Amnesty Proclamation issued by the President of the United States on July 4, 1902, which pardoned political offenses committed during the insurrections. Act No. 654 supplied the procedure for appeals in habeas corpus proceedings.

Evaristo Paynaga was a prisoner in Bilibid Prison, Manila, under the custody of George N. Wolfe, its warden. On January 5, 1898, while the Philippine Archipelago was under Spanish sovereignty, Paynaga was convicted and sentenced by Spanish authorities, through an ordinary court-martial, to two years' imprisonment for desertion from the Spanish army. The sentence was two years' prision correccional militar and was to commence on January 5, 1898.

On October 18, 1898, Paynaga escaped. He remained at large until January 20, 1903, when he was rearrested. By then, sovereignty over the archipelago had passed from Spain to the United States, and the President of the United States had issued an Amnesty Proclamation on July 4, 1902, granting full and complete pardon and amnesty for treason, sedition, and all offenses political in character committed in the course of the insurrections described in the proclamation.

Paynaga applied to Judge B.S. Ambler of the Court of First Instance for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that Wolfe unlawfully detained and imprisoned him. He claimed that he came within the provisions of the Amnesty Proclamation and prayed for discharge under it. The answer to the petition and the commitment showed that he had been sentenced by ordinary court-martial to two years' prision correccional militar and that he should commence serving his sentence on January 5, 1898. The record contained no claim that Paynaga had participated in either of the insurrections, and the offense for which he was convicted was desertion, a violation of the laws pertaining to the military establishment of Spain. He had been convicted during Spanish sovereignty and was simply serving out his sentence for that offense.

• Amnesty Proclamation: Petitioner claimed that he came within the provisions of the Amnesty Proclamation issued by the President of the United States on July 4, 1902, and prayed for his discharge under the same.
• Ex Post Facto / Appeal in Habeas Corpus: Petitioner's counsel contended that Act No. 654, providing for appeals in habeas corpus proceedings, is in the nature of an ex post facto law, and that having been enacted subsequent to petitioner's right to petition for habeas corpus, the appeal should not be entertained.

• Ex Post Facto Application of Act No. 654: Whether Act No. 654, providing for appeals in habeas corpus proceedings, could be applied to petitioner's case without violating the prohibition against ex post facto laws.
• Amnesty Proclamation: Whether petitioner Evaristo Paynaga, convicted of desertion from the Spanish army, was entitled to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation issued by the President of the United States on July 4, 1902.
• Effect of Treaty of Peace: Whether Article XII of the Treaty of Peace between the United States and Spain required the government to execute the final judgment of the Spanish authorities sentencing petitioner to two years' imprisonment for desertion.

• Ex Post Facto Application of Act No. 654: No. Act No. 654 is not an ex post facto law as applied to petitioner; habeas corpus is a civil proceeding brought to enforce a civil right, entirely distinct from the criminal proceedings under which the prisoner was tried and convicted.
• Amnesty Proclamation: No. Petitioner was not entitled to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation because he was convicted of desertion, a violation of the laws pertaining to the military establishment of Spain, and there was no claim that he participated in either insurrection or that his offense was political in character.
• Effect of Treaty of Peace: Yes. Article XII of the Treaty of Peace required the government to execute the final judgment rendered by the Spanish authorities before the treaty, so petitioner remained subject to his sentence.

• Ex Post Facto Application of Act No. 654: The Court relied on its prior decision in Frank Mekin vs. George N. Wolfe, rendered March 27, 1903, where it was held that habeas corpus is a civil proceeding brought to enforce a civil right, entirely distinct from the criminal proceedings under which the prisoner has been tried and convicted. Because the habeas corpus proceeding is civil, the doctrine of ex post facto law cannot be applied to it. Act No. 654, providing for appeals in habeas corpus proceedings, therefore did not operate as an ex post facto law against petitioner, and the appeal was properly entertained.

• Amnesty Proclamation: The Amnesty Proclamation grants a full and complete pardon and amnesty to all persons in the Philippine Archipelago who participated in the insurrection against the authority and sovereignty of the Kingdom of Spain at divers times from August 1896 until the cession of the Archipelago by that Kingdom to the United States, and to those engaged in the insurrection against the authority and sovereignty of the United States, or who gave aid and comfort to persons participating in said insurrection, for the offenses of treason or sedition, and for all offenses political in their character committed in the course of such insurrection pursuant to orders issued by the civil, military, or insurrectionary authorities, or which grew out of internal political feuds or dissensions between Filipinos and Spaniards or the Spanish authorities, or which resulted from internal political feuds or dissensions among the Filipinos themselves during either of said insurrections. There was no claim that Paynaga participated in either insurrection, nor that the character of the offense for which he was convicted was of the nature embraced in the proclamation. He was convicted of desertion, a violation of the laws pertaining to the military establishment of Spain. He was therefore clearly not entitled to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation.

• Effect of Treaty of Peace: The case was not one of the Government trying and convicting a person charged with desertion from the Spanish army. Paynaga had been convicted during Spanish sovereignty of the offense of desertion and was simply serving out his sentence for that offense. Article XII of the Treaty of Peace between the United States and Spain provides that judgments rendered in criminal matters before the date of the treaty shall be deemed final and shall be executed in due form by competent authority in the territory within which such judgment should be carried out. Under this clause, it was incumbent upon the government to execute the judgment in this case. The Court of First Instance therefore erred in directing Paynaga's discharge.

• Habeas corpus as a civil proceeding — Habeas corpus is a civil proceeding brought to enforce a civil right, entirely distinct from the criminal proceedings under which the prisoner was tried and convicted. The doctrine of ex post facto law cannot be applied to it. The Court applied this principle to hold that Act No. 654, allowing appeals in habeas corpus proceedings, could apply to petitioner's case even if enacted after his right to petition arose.
• Amnesty covers political offenses only — An amnesty proclamation granting pardon for treason, sedition, and all offenses political in character committed in the course of insurrection does not cover desertion from the Spanish army, which is a violation of laws pertaining to the military establishment of Spain. The Court applied this to deny petitioner the benefits of the July 4, 1902 Amnesty Proclamation because there was no claim he participated in either insurrection or that his offense was political.
• Finality and execution of criminal judgments under treaty — Article XII of the Treaty of Peace between the United States and Spain provides that judgments rendered in criminal matters before the date of the treaty shall be deemed final and shall be executed in due form by competent authority in the territory within which such judgment should be carried out. The Court applied this to hold that the government was obliged to execute the Spanish judgment against petitioner, not to try him anew.

• "habeas corpus is a civil proceeding brought to enforce a civil right, and is entirely distinct from the criminal proceedings under which the prisoner has been tried and convicted, and that the doctrine off ex post facto law can not be applied to the case." — This passage states the ratio for rejecting the ex post facto challenge to Act No. 654 and treats habeas corpus as civil rather than criminal in nature.
• "The defendant clearly is not entitled to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation." — This is the Court's conclusion that desertion from the Spanish army was not among the political offenses covered by the July 4, 1902 Amnesty Proclamation.
• "It is not a case of this Government trying and convicting a person charged with desertion from the Spanish army. The defendant was convicted during the Spanish sovereignty of the offense of desertion, and is simply serving out his sentence for that offense." — This passage distinguishes execution of an existing Spanish judgment from a new prosecution by the American government.
• "Under this clause of the treaty, it is incumbent upon this government to execute the judgment in this case." — This states the treaty obligation that required the government to carry out the Spanish criminal judgment against petitioner.

• Frank Mekin vs. George N. Wolfe, March 27, 1903 — Controlling precedent relied upon by the Court for the rule that habeas corpus is a civil proceeding and that the ex post facto doctrine does not apply to Act No. 654. The text cites it as a prior decision of the same Court.

• Article XII, Treaty of Peace between the United States and Spain — Provides that judgments rendered in criminal matters before the date of the treaty shall be deemed final and shall be executed in due form by competent authority in the territory within which such judgment should be carried out. The Court applied it to require the government to execute the Spanish judgment against Paynaga.
• Act No. 654 — Provides for appeals in habeas corpus proceedings. The Court held it was not an ex post facto law because habeas corpus is a civil proceeding distinct from the criminal case.
• Amnesty Proclamation of July 4, 1902 — Grants full and complete pardon and amnesty for treason, sedition, and all offenses political in character committed in the course of the insurrections described. The Court applied it to deny Paynaga relief because desertion from the Spanish army was not a political offense covered by the proclamation.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Willard, Mapa, and Ladd, JJ., concur. McDonough, J., did not sit in this case.