Patricio vs. Dario III

A minor descendant of the decedent who resides in the family home is not a beneficiary thereof under Article 154 of the Family Code unless he is dependent for legal support upon the head of the family who constituted the family home. Where the minor's father, who is of legal age, is capable of supporting him, the obligation of legal support falls primarily on the father, and the minor cannot be considered a beneficiary of the grandparents' family home. Thus, the family home may be partitioned after the 10-year period provided in Article 159 of the Family Code has lapsed, there being no minor beneficiary residing therein.

The case involves the estate of Marcelino V. Dario, who died intestate on July 5, 1987, survived by his wife, petitioner Perla G. Patricio, and their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private respondent Marcelino G. Dario III. The subject property, a parcel of land with a residential house and a pre-school building in Cubao, Quezon City, was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-30731 (175992). The dispute concerns the application of Articles 152, 153, 154, and 159 of the Family Code on the family home, and Articles 494, 495, and 498 of the Civil Code on co-ownership, in determining whether the property could be partitioned despite the alleged presence of a minor beneficiary.

Marcelino V. Dario died intestate on July 5, 1987, survived by his wife, petitioner Perla G. Patricio, and their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private respondent Marcelino G. Dario III. Among the properties he left was a parcel of land with a residential house and a pre-school building situated at 91 Oxford corner Ermin Garcia Streets in Cubao, Quezon City, covered by TCT No. RT-30731 (175992) of the Quezon City Registry of Deeds, with an area of 755 square meters.

On August 10, 1987, petitioner, Marcelino Marc, and private respondent extrajudicially settled the estate of Marcelino V. Dario. TCT No. RT-30731 (175992) was cancelled, and TCT No. R-213963 was issued in the names of petitioner, private respondent, and Marcelino Marc. Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private respondent of their intention to partition the subject property and terminate the co-ownership. Private respondent refused, prompting petitioner and Marcelino Marc to institute an action for partition before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-01-44038 and raffled to Branch 78.

The trial court ordered the partition of the subject property on October 3, 2002, in the following manner: Perla G. Patricio, 4/6; Marcelino Marc G. Dario, 1/6; and Marcelino G. Dario III, 1/6. The trial court also ordered the sale of the property by public auction, with all parties allowed to put up their bids, and in case of failure, the property was to be distributed accordingly. Private respondent's motion for reconsideration was denied on August 11, 2003, and he appealed to the Court of Appeals, which denied the appeal on October 19, 2005. However, upon private respondent's motion for reconsideration, the appellate court partially reconsidered its Decision on December 9, 2005, dismissing the complaint for partition. The Court of Appeals held that the family home should continue despite the death of one or both spouses as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and that the heirs could not partition the property unless the court found compelling reasons to rule otherwise. The appellate court also held that the minor son of private respondent, a grandson of the spouses, was a minor beneficiary of the family home.

Private respondent claimed that the subject property, being the family home duly constituted by the spouses, could not be partitioned while a minor beneficiary, his 12-year-old son Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, was still living therein. He argued that as long as the minor lives in the family home, it continues as such until the beneficiary becomes of age, even beyond the 10-year period from the decedent's death. Petitioner, on the other hand, alleged that the property remained a family home only up to July 5, 1997, the 10th year from the decedent's death, and that the brothers were already of age at the time of their father's death, so there was no more minor beneficiary.

• Application of the Civil Code on Co-Ownership: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals patently erred in applying Article 159 in relation to Article 154 of the Family Code on the family home, instead of Article 494 in relation to Articles 495 and 498 of the New Civil Code on co-ownership.
• Expiration of the 10-Year Period: Petitioner alleged that the subject property remained a family home of the surviving heirs only up to July 5, 1997, the 10th year from the date of death of the decedent, and that since the brothers were already of age at the time of their father's death, there was no more minor beneficiary to speak of.

• Continuation of the Family Home: Private respondent claimed that the subject property, being the family home duly constituted by the spouses, cannot be partitioned while a minor beneficiary, his 12-year-old son who is the grandson of the decedent, is still living therein.
• Minor Beneficiary's Rights: Private respondent argued that as long as the minor is living in the family home, the same continues as such until the beneficiary becomes of age, and that even after the expiration of 10 years from the decedent's death, the property continues to be considered the family home because his minor son, who is a beneficiary, still resides in the premises.

• Minor as Beneficiary of the Family Home: Whether Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, the minor son of private respondent and grandson of the decedent, can be considered a beneficiary under Article 154 of the Family Code.
• Propriety of Partition: Whether partition of the family home is proper where one of the co-owners refuses to accede to such partition on the ground that a minor beneficiary still resides in the said home.

• Minor as Beneficiary of the Family Home: No. Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot be considered a beneficiary under Article 154 of the Family Code because, although he is a descendant of the decedent and lives in the family home, he is not dependent for legal support upon his grandmother, petitioner, but upon his father, private respondent, who is the head of his immediate family and capable of supporting him.
• Propriety of Partition: Yes. Since there is no minor beneficiary residing in the family home, there is no legal impediment to partition the subject property. The heirs cannot be compelled to remain in a co-ownership indefinitely, and each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common property.

• Minor as Beneficiary of the Family Home: The Court applied the three requisites for a person to be a beneficiary of the family home under Article 154 of the Family Code: (1) they must be among the relationships enumerated in Article 154; (2) they live in the family home; and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family. As to the first requisite, the term "descendants" contemplates all descendants of the persons who constituted the family home without distinction, and thus includes grandchildren. Applying the principle ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos (where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish), the minor grandson satisfies the first requisite. As to the second requisite, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV has been living in the family home since 1994, within 10 years from the death of the decedent, thus satisfying the second requisite. However, as to the third requisite, the minor cannot demand support from his paternal grandmother if he has parents who are capable of supporting him. The liability for legal support falls primarily on the parents, especially the father, and only in their default is the obligation imposed on the grandparents. The Court agreed with Professor Pineda's view that grandchildren cannot demand support directly from their grandparents if they have parents who are capable of supporting them, following the order of support under Article 199 of the Family Code. There was no showing that private respondent is without means to support his son, nor any evidence that petitioner was willing to voluntarily provide for her grandson's legal support. Thus, the minor is dependent on legal support from his father, not from his grandmother, and cannot be considered a beneficiary under Article 154.
• Propriety of Partition: The Court held that with the finding that there is no minor beneficiary, there is no legal impediment to partition the subject property. The law does not encourage co-ownerships among individuals, as these often result in inequitable situations. Citing Santos vs. Santos, the Court ruled that no co-owner ought to be compelled to stay in a co-ownership indefinitely, and may insist on partition of the common property at any time. An action to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches. Since the parties were unable to agree on a partition, the court a quo should have ordered a partition by commissioners pursuant to Section 3, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. The partition should be made in accordance with Article 996 of the Civil Code, which provides that if the widow and legitimate children survive, the widow has the same share as that of each of the children. Since only one-half of the conjugal property owned by the decedent is to be allocated to the legal and compulsory heirs, the widow has the same share as each of her two surviving children: Perla Generosa Dario, 4/6; Marcelino Marc G. Dario II, 1/6; and Marcelino G. Dario III, 1/6.

• Beneficiaries of the Family Home (Article 154, Family Code) — The beneficiaries of a family home are: (1) the husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for legal support. Three requisites must concur: (1) they must be among the relationships enumerated in Article 154; (2) they live in the family home; and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the minor grandson, although a descendant living in the family home, failed the third requisite because he was dependent on his father for legal support, not on his grandmother.
• Continuation of the Family Home (Article 159, Family Code) — The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of 10 years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. The rule applies regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home. The Court interpreted this to mean that if there are beneficiaries who survive and are living in the family home, it will continue for 10 years, unless at the expiration of 10 years there is still a minor beneficiary, in which case the family home continues until that beneficiary becomes of age. The intention of the law is to safeguard and protect the interests of the minor beneficiary until he reaches legal age and would now be capable of supporting himself.
• Order of Liability for Support (Article 199, Family Code) — Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided: (1) the spouse; (2) the descendants in the nearest degree; (3) the ascendants in the nearest degree; (4) the brothers and sisters. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the obligation to support falls first upon the parents, especially the father, and only in their default is the obligation imposed on the grandparents. Thus, a grandchild cannot demand support directly from grandparents if the parents are capable of supporting him.
• Right to Demand Partition (Article 494, Civil Code) — No co-owner ought to be compelled to stay in a co-ownership indefinitely, and may insist on partition of the common property at any time. An action to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that since there was no minor beneficiary, the heirs could not be compelled to remain in a co-ownership, and partition was proper.

• "To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur: (1) they must be among the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home; and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family." — This passage articulates the canonical three-part test for determining who qualifies as a beneficiary of the family home under Article 154 of the Family Code, which is central to the Court's analysis.
• "Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV is dependent on legal support not from his grandmother, but from his father. Thus, despite residing in the family home and his being a descendant of Marcelino V. Dario, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot be considered as beneficiary contemplated under Article 154 because he did not fulfill the third requisite of being dependent on his grandmother for legal support." — This passage states the ratio decidendi of the case: the minor grandson failed the dependency requirement and therefore could not prevent partition of the family home.
• "The law does not encourage co-ownerships among individuals as oftentimes it results in inequitable situations such as in the instant case. Co-owners should be afforded every available opportunity to divide their co-owned property to prevent these situations from arising." — This passage expresses the policy rationale behind allowing partition of co-owned property, which the Court applied to the facts of the case.

• Manacop vs. Court of Appeals, 342 Phil. 735, 744 (1997) — Cited for the proposition that actual occupancy of the family home need not be by the owner specifically, but may be by the beneficiaries enumerated in Article 154 of the Family Code, and that the law definitely excludes maids and overseers from being beneficiaries.
• Santos vs. Santos, 396 Phil. 928 (2000) — Cited as controlling precedent for the rule that no co-owner ought to be compelled to stay in a co-ownership indefinitely, and may insist on partition of the common property at any time, and that an action to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches.
• Vda. de Daffon vs. Court of Appeals, 436 Phil. 233 (2002) — Cited for the rule that an action for partition is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties involved, and that if the court after trial should find the existence of co-ownership among the parties, the court may and should order the partition of the properties in the same action.

• Article 152, Family Code — Defines the family home as the dwelling house where husband and wife, or an unmarried head of a family, reside, including the land on which it is situated. The Court applied this provision to identify the subject property as the family home of the spouses.
• Article 153, Family Code — Provides that the family home is deemed constituted from the time it is occupied as a family residence, and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, it continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment. The Court applied this provision to determine the continuing status of the family home.
• Article 154, Family Code — Enumerates the beneficiaries of a family home: (1) the husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for legal support. The Court applied this provision to determine whether the minor grandson qualified as a beneficiary.
• Article 159, Family Code — Provides that the family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of 10 years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. The Court applied this provision to determine whether the 10-year period had lapsed and whether a minor beneficiary still resided in the home.
• Article 194, Family Code — Defines legal support as comprising everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. The Court cited this provision in discussing the nature of legal support.
• Article 199, Family Code — Provides the order of liability for support: (1) the spouse; (2) the descendants in the nearest degree; (3) the ascendants in the nearest degree; (4) the brothers and sisters. The Court applied this provision to hold that the obligation to support the minor falls primarily on his father, not his grandmother.
• Article 494, Civil Code — Provides that no co-owner shall be compelled to remain in the co-ownership, and each co-owner may demand partition of the common property at any time. The Court applied this provision to hold that the heirs could demand partition of the subject property.
• Article 996, Civil Code — Provides that if the widow or widower and legitimate children or descendants are left, the surviving spouse has in the succession the same share as that of each of the children. The Court applied this provision to determine the respective shares of the heirs: Perla Generosa Dario, 4/6; Marcelino Marc G. Dario II, 1/6; and Marcelino G. Dario III, 1/6.
• Rule 69, Sections 3 and 5, Rules of Court — Provides for partition by commissioners, who should be not more than three competent and disinterested persons, and for the sale of the real estate at public sale when it cannot be divided without great prejudice. The Court directed the trial court to conduct partition by commissioners pursuant to these provisions.

Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, J., Callejo, Sr., J., and Chico-Nazario, J., concurred in the decision.