Pates vs. COMELEC

A petition for certiorari from a COMELEC en banc ruling under Rule 64 must be filed within 30 days from notice, with the period used for a motion for reconsideration deductible; the fresh period rule under Rule 65 does not apply. The period may be relaxed only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances or compelling reasons.

On February 1, 2008, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution that Nilo T. Pates sought to challenge. Pates’s counsel received a copy of that Resolution on February 4, 2008. On February 8, 2008, Pates filed a motion for reconsideration, four days after receipt.

On September 18, 2008, the COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution denying Pates’s motion for reconsideration. Pates received a copy of the en banc Resolution on September 22, 2008. Pates then filed a petition for certiorari with the SC on October 22, 2008.

On November 11, 2008, the SC dismissed the petition for late filing under Section 3, Rule 64. Pates filed an urgent motion for reconsideration with a reiteration for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, asking the SC to reverse the dismissal. Respondent Emelita B. Almirante filed a comment; the Office of the Solicitor General asked to be excused from filing a separate comment, which the SC granted.

• Fresh Period Rule: Petitioner argued that his petition was seasonably filed under the fresh period rule, under which the original period is counted from notice of the ruling on the motion for reconsideration without deducting the period used to prepare and file the motion.
• History and Uniformity: Petitioner argued that the fresh period rule was historically the prevailing rule; that the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Circular No. 39-98 changed it to the remainder rule; that A.M. No. 00-02-03-SC restored the fresh period rule; and that Narzoles vs. National Labor Relations Commission explained the change as responding to the confusion generated by Circular No. 39-98.
• Prior Applications: Petitioner argued that the fresh period rule was applied in Neypes vs. Court of Appeals, Spouses de los Santos vs. Vda. de Mangubat, Active Realty and Development Corporation vs. Fernandez, and Romero vs. Court of Appeals, and that these cases held that the order denying the motion for reconsideration is the final order and receipt of that denial is the correct reckoning point for appellate review.

• Correct Rule: Respondent Almirante countered that the SC correctly concluded the petition was filed out of time.
• Rule 64 Not Rule 65: Respondent Almirante argued that petitioner’s reliance on Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 00-02-03-SC, was misplaced because Rule 64, not Rule 65, is the vehicle for review of judgments and final orders or resolutions of the COMELEC.
• Different Periods: Respondent Almirante pointed out that Rule 64 and Rule 65 are different: Rule 65 provides a 60-day period for filing petitions for certiorari, while Rule 64 provides for 30 days.

• Applicability of the Fresh Period Rule to Rule 64: Whether the fresh period rule applicable to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 applies to petitions for certiorari of COMELEC rulings under Rule 64, making petitioner’s October 22, 2008 petition timely.
• Liberal Construction of Section 3, Rule 64: Whether the SC should suspend or liberally construe Section 3, Rule 64 to excuse petitioner’s late filing.
• Uniform Period for Election Cases: Whether considerations of uniformity and convenience justify modifying the period under Section 3, Rule 64 for election cases.

• Applicability of the Fresh Period Rule to Rule 64: No. Section 3, Rule 64 provides a special 30-day period from notice, with the period used for the motion for reconsideration deductible; Rule 64 cannot be equated to Rule 65. The petition filed on October 22, 2008 was two days late.
• Liberal Construction of Section 3, Rule 64: No. Petitioner presented no exceptional circumstance or compelling reason to warrant non-application of Section 3, Rule 64, and liberal construction cannot rescue a litigant whose counsel resorted to the wrong remedy.
• Uniform Period for Election Cases: No. Convenience and uniformity are not sufficiently compelling to modify the Rule 64 period; the constitutional importance of prompt determination of election results outweighs them.

• Applicability of the Fresh Period Rule to Rule 64: Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution provides that, unless otherwise provided, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the SC on certiorari within 30 days from receipt of a copy. For this reason, Rule 64 is a separate rule specifically applicable to decisions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. Rule 64 expressly refers to Rule 65, subject to the exception clause “except as hereinafter provided.” The most patent procedural difference is Section 3, Rule 64, which provides a special 30-day period from notice of the decision or ruling, instead of the 60 days under Rule 65, and makes the intervening period used for a motion for reconsideration deductible from the original 30 days, instead of the fresh period of 60 days under Rule 65. Petitioner did not challenge the conclusion that his petition was filed outside Section 3, Rule 64; he merely insisted that the Rule 65 fresh period rule should apply to Rule 64. Rule 64 cannot simply be equated to Rule 65 even if it refers to the latter. Under the chronology, petitioner used four days for his motion for reconsideration, leaving 26 days; the last day fell on Saturday, October 18, 2008, and effectively moved to Monday, October 20, 2008. The petition filed on October 22, 2008 was two days late. The SC had previously ordered a similar dismissal in Domingo vs. Commission on Elections, and in Fortich vs. Corona stressed that procedural rules must be followed. Thus the November 11, 2008 dismissal for late filing was correct.
• Liberal Construction of Section 3, Rule 64: Exceptional circumstances or compelling reasons may have justified suspension of the Rules in the past, but those instances were exceptions rather than the rule and were allowed only upon a meritorious plea for liberal construction based on attendant exceptional circumstances. A party asking for suspension of the Rules comes with the heavy burden of proving that he deserves exceptional treatment; every plea for liberal construction must at least be accompanied by an explanation of why the party failed to comply and by a justification for the requested liberal construction, as stated in Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals. Petitioner presented no exceptional circumstance or compelling reason and failed to explain why his filing was late; he relied only on history, uniformity, and convenience. His omissions were fatal. In Lapid vs. Laurea, the SC reminded members of the bar that their first duty is to comply with the rules of procedure, rather than seek exceptions as loopholes, and that utter disregard of the rules cannot be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction. The Rules of Court are with us for the prompt and orderly administration of justice; litigants cannot, after resorting to a wrong remedy, simply cry for liberal construction, as held in Aguila vs. Baldovizo. Liberality has limits and must be exercised only in the most appropriate cases.
• Uniform Period for Election Cases: Petitioner’s plea for uniformity and convenience amounted to a request for simultaneous amendment of Section 3, Rule 64 and application of the proposed new rule to his case. Amendment of the provision is an exercise of the SC’s power to promulgate rules on practice and procedure under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution. Rulemaking is different from adjudication: it is an act of legislation requiring formulation of policies and consultation with constituencies, not determination of the legal rights and obligations of litigants before the SC. The SC acknowledged that uniform standards may avoid confusion and that the Constitution requires motions for reconsideration of division decisions to be decided by the Commission en banc, making the en banc ruling effectively a new ruling rendered separately and independently from the division. But these considerations are counterbalanced by the importance the Constitution and the SC accord to elections and the prompt determination of their results. Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution expressly requires the COMELEC’s rules of procedure to expedite the disposition of election cases, and the SC’s proceedings are the constitutional extension of cases that start with the COMELEC. Convenience and uniformity are not sufficiently compelling to modify the Rule 64 period; the period was retained for a constitutionally based reason, and the present petition’s plea for a temporary restraining order itself recognized the need for haste in election cases.

• Rule 64 as a special rule for COMELEC and COA — Rule 64 governs certiorari from decisions of the COMELEC and COA. It provides a 30-day period from notice, with the period used for a motion for reconsideration deductible; Rule 65’s 60-day fresh period rule does not apply. The SC applied this to dismiss Pates’s petition as two days late.
• Fresh period rule under Rule 65 — Under Rule 65, the original period is counted from notice of the ruling on the motion for reconsideration without deducting the period used to prepare and file the motion. The SC held it inapplicable to Rule 64.
• Liberal construction of procedural rules — Liberal construction is allowed only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances; a party must explain the failure to comply and justify the requested relaxation. The SC refused to apply it because Pates offered no exceptional circumstance or compelling reason.
• Rulemaking vs. adjudication — Amendment of the Rules of Court is an exercise of the SC’s rulemaking power under Section 5(5), Article VIII, requiring policy formulation and consultation, not adjudication. The SC held it could not amend Rule 64 through Pates’s case.
• Prompt determination of election cases — The Constitution requires COMELEC rules to expedite election cases, and this constitutional policy justifies retaining the 30-day period under Rule 64 despite arguments for uniformity and convenience.

• “Rule 64, however, cannot simply be equated to Rule 65 even if it expressly refers to the latter rule.” — The SC rejects Pates’s attempt to import the Rule 65 fresh period rule into Rule 64.
• “The period is 30 days from notice of the decision or ruling (instead of the 60 days that Rule 65 provides), with the intervening period used for the filing of any motion for reconsideration deductible from the originally-granted 30 days (instead of the fresh period of 60 days that Rule 65 provides).” — The SC explains the special period under Section 3, Rule 64.
• “Every plea for a liberal construction of the Rules must at least be accompanied by an explanation of why the party-litigant failed to comply with the rules and by a justification for the requested liberal construction.” — The SC sets the burden for a party seeking relaxation of procedural rules.
• “The reason, as made clear above, is constitutionally-based and is no less than the importance our Constitution accords to the prompt determination of election results.” — The SC explains why the Rule 64 period was retained despite arguments for uniformity.

• Domingo vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 136587, August 30, 1999, 313 SCRA 311 — Precedent for dismissing a petition for certiorari from a COMELEC ruling for late filing.
• Fortich vs. Corona, G.R. No. 131457, November 17, 1998, 298 SCRA 679, 690-691 — Relied on for the rule that procedural rules must be treated with utmost respect and followed, with liberal construction only in proper cases and under justifiable causes.
• Lapid vs. Laurea, G.R. No. 139607, October 28, 2002, 391 SCRA 277 — Relied on for the reminder that members of the bar’s first duty is to comply with procedural rules, not seek exceptions, and that disregard of rules cannot be rationalized by liberal construction.
• Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146559, August 13, 2004, 436 SCRA 478, 483 — Cited for the heavy burden on a party asking for suspension of the Rules and the requirement of explanation and justification for liberal construction.
• Aguila vs. Baldovizo, G.R. No. 163186, February 28, 2007, 517 SCRA 91 — Cited for the rule that litigants cannot, after resorting to a wrong remedy, simply cry for liberal construction of the rules.

• Section 7, Article IX-A, 1987 Constitution — Provides that decisions, orders, or rulings of each Commission may be brought to the SC on certiorari within 30 days from receipt. Applied to support the 30-day period under Rule 64.
• Section 3, Rule 64, Rules of Court — Provides that the petition shall be filed within 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution; a motion for reconsideration interrupts the period; if denied, the aggrieved party may file within the remaining period, not less than five days. Applied to dismiss Pates’s petition as late.
• Section 2, Rule 64, Rules of Court — Refers to Rule 65 in certiorari proceedings, subject to the exception clause “except as hereinafter provided.” Applied to show that Rule 64 is a separate rule and that Section 3 supplies the special period.
• Section 4, Rule 65, Rules of Court (as amended by A.M. No. 00-02-03-SC) — Petitioner invoked the fresh period rule under this provision. The SC held it inapplicable because Rule 64, not Rule 65, governs review of COMELEC rulings.
• Section 5(5), Article VIII, 1987 Constitution — Grants the SC power to promulgate rules on practice and procedure. Applied to hold that amending Rule 64 is an exercise of rulemaking, not adjudication.
• Section 3, Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution — Requires COMELEC rules of procedure to expedite disposition of election cases and requires motions for reconsideration of division decisions to be decided by the Commission en banc. Applied to justify retaining the 30-day period under Rule 64.