Paterno vs. Paterno

In a void marriage governed by Article 147 of the Family Code, properties acquired during the parties' cohabitation are presumed co-owned in equal shares, but the equal sharing extends only to the portion paid before the parties' de facto separation; amortizations made after separation are excluded from the co-ownership. Additionally, a trial court gravely abuses its discretion in ordering an increase in support based on the needs of children who have already attained majority, as the parent claiming support on their behalf ceases to have legal authority to do so.

Simon R. Paterno and Dina Marie Lomongo Paterno were married on December 27, 1987, and lived together for approximately a decade before Simon left the family abode in June 1998. On June 9, 2000, Simon filed a petition before the RTC seeking declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of respondent's psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The marriage was declared void by RTC Branch 144 of Makati in a Decision dated March 11, 2005, which found both parties psychologically incapacitated to fulfill their marital obligations. That decision attained finality, but the ancillary proceedings for liquidation, partition, distribution of common properties, and delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes remained pending. The parties' property relations fell under Article 147 of the Family Code, as they suffered no legal impediment to marry each other and lived exclusively together under a marriage later declared void ab initio.

Simon R. Paterno and Dina Marie Lomongo Paterno were married on December 27, 1987. After living together for about a decade, Simon left the family abode in June 1998. On June 9, 2000, he filed a petition before the RTC seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Dina on the ground of her psychological incapacity. RTC Branch 144 of Makati granted the petition in a Decision dated March 11, 2005, adjudging both parties psychologically incapacitated to fulfill their marital obligations. The decision attained finality, but the ancillary proceedings for liquidation, partition, distribution of common properties, and delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes remained pending before Branch 144.

On September 26, 2006, Dina filed a motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum seeking to present Simon as a hostile witness to testify and produce documents relative to the salaries he received and properties he acquired from the time the parties separated in fact until the declaration of nullity became final. Branch 144 granted the motion, prompting Simon to move for its quashal. In an Order dated November 22, 2006, Branch 144 recalled the subpoena, holding that under Article 147 of the Family Code, salaries and wages earned by either party after de facto separation belong solely to the earning spouse. Dina elevated the matter to the CA via certiorari, but the CA dismissed the petition on August 28, 2007, and denied reconsideration on October 22, 2007. Dina then filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No. 180226.

Meanwhile, the liquidation proceedings were re-raffled to Branch 136. On May 6, 2009, Dina filed an Omnibus Motion seeking the appraisal, partition, and delivery of her share in properties she alleged were admitted by both parties to be co-owned, as well as an accounting of fruits accruing from those properties and, in the alternative, the appointment of an independent administrator or receiver. The nine properties she identified were: the house and lot in Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa City; a condominium unit in Rockwell, Makati City; club membership at the Riviera Golf and Country Club; shares of stock in Little Gym; shares of stock in Mamita Realty; a Dodge Caravan; paintings by various known artists; pieces of accent furniture; and a collection of books. Simon opposed the motion, vehemently disputing the characterization of these properties as admittedly co-owned. He contended that while the Ayala Alabang and Rockwell properties were purchased during the union, the mortgage payments were made after the parties' de facto separation solely from his exclusive funds, and that the trial court should defer its proceedings pending the Supreme Court's resolution of G.R. No. 180226.

In an Order dated November 29, 2011, Branch 136 granted Dina's motion for partial distribution of her share in the conjugal partnership despite the pendency of G.R. No. 180226, reasoning that the properties before it were those the parties admitted were commonly owned, while the issue before the Supreme Court involved properties acquired after de facto separation. The RTC applied the Family Code and ruled that upon the declaration of nullity, the conjugal partnership was automatically dissolved and the property relation converted into ordinary co-ownership, entitling Dina to demand partition of her share. Finding no evidence that the listed properties were Simon's exclusive property, the RTC presumed them to be conjugal and advanced Dina's share upon the posting of a ₱50,000 bond. The RTC also increased monthly support to ₱250,000, citing the health condition of one daughter and the standard of living the children had been accustomed to. Simon's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated February 27, 2012. Simon elevated the matter to the CA, which affirmed the RTC orders in a Decision dated October 31, 2013, holding that the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion and that the issues raised by Simon regarding the conversion of the property regime and the increase in support were errors of judgment, not errors of jurisdiction, and thus not proper for certiorari.

• Form of the CA Decision: Petitioner contended that the CA Decision did not comply with the constitutional requirement that decisions must clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which they are based, as the appellate court brushed aside his last three arguments by simply declaring them improper for certiorari as errors of judgment rather than errors of jurisdiction, thereby violating his right to due process.
• Judicial Courtesy: Petitioner argued that the CA seriously erred in ruling that the trial court need not observe judicial courtesy and could proceed to rule on the motion for partial distribution despite the pendency of G.R. No. 180226 before the Supreme Court, since the presumption of equal shares under Article 147 applies only to properties acquired during cohabitation and the issue of whether post-separation amortizations form part of the co-ownership was precisely the subject of the pending petition.
• Premature Partition: Petitioner maintained that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in granting the motion for partial distribution without first complying with the two-tiered procedure required for a valid partition—namely, determining whether the parties are indeed co-owners and how the properties will be divided—both of which were the very issues pending before the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 180226.
• Nature of the Property Regime: Petitioner argued that it was reversible error for the CA to uphold the trial court's pronouncement that the parties' property relation was originally governed by conjugal partnership of gains and then converted to ordinary co-ownership upon the declaration of nullity, since a marriage declared void ab initio produces no legal effect and the property regime is governed by special co-ownership from the beginning without need of conversion.
• Misapprehension of Facts: Petitioner asserted that the trial court grossly misunderstood his allegations regarding the ownership of the Ayala Alabang and Rockwell properties, as he never claimed them as his exclusive property but merely stated that the portions of mortgage payments made from his exclusive funds after separation should not form part of the co-owned properties.
• Increase in Support: Petitioner contended that the increase in monthly support from ₱175,000 to ₱250,000 lacked basis, as the obligation of mutual support between the spouses ceased upon the final decree of nullity, two of the three children had already attained majority and were no longer living with respondent, respondent had ceased to be their legal guardian, and respondent herself was gainfully employed and jointly obliged to provide support.
• Denial of Due Process: Petitioner claimed that the trial court denied him due process by issuing its February 27, 2012 Order denying his motion for reconsideration without waiting for his Reply to respondent's Comment and Opposition, despite having granted respondent several extensions for various pleadings.

• Propriety of Certiorari: Respondent countered that the CA correctly ruled that petitioner's last three arguments were not proper for a petition for certiorari since the alleged errors were merely errors of judgment and not errors of jurisdiction, considering that the properties covered by the assailed orders pertained only to those admitted to be common properties in petitioner's own Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.
• No Need to Defer Proceedings: Respondent argued that there was no reason for the trial court to defer its proceedings pending the Supreme Court's resolution of G.R. No. 180226, because the properties before the trial court were only those recognized as common properties acquired during the marriage, while the petition before the Supreme Court involved properties acquired after de facto separation; no temporary restraining order had been issued to forestall the trial court proceedings.
• Equal Shares Under Article 147: Respondent maintained that the second paragraph of Article 147 created a presumption that properties acquired while the parties lived together were obtained through their joint efforts and owned in equal shares, and that co-ownership did not end when one spouse stopped living with the other but only upon the finality of the declaration of nullity; respondent's efforts in the care and maintenance of the household were sufficient contribution to the acquisition of the Ayala Alabang and Rockwell properties, and petitioner's use of common funds for amortizations would not make those properties exclusively his.
• No Denial of Due Process: Respondent averred that petitioner could not claim denial of due process simply because his motion for reconsideration was resolved without waiting for his Reply, as the motion itself should already contain all arguments and objections, and petitioner was afforded an actual hearing on his motion.

• Scope of Co-ownership: Whether the term "acquired" under Article 147 of the Family Code encompasses the entire property purchased during cohabitation even if amortizations continued after the parties' de facto separation, and if so, how the property should be partitioned between them.
• Judicial Courtesy: Whether the trial court was required to defer its proceedings on the motion for partial distribution pending the Supreme Court's resolution of G.R. No. 180226.
• Increase in Support: Whether the trial court gravely abused its discretion in increasing the monthly support from ₱175,000 to ₱250,000 based on the needs of all three children when two had already attained the age of majority.
• Due Process: Whether the trial court denied petitioner due process by resolving his motion for reconsideration without waiting for his Reply to respondent's Comment and Opposition.

• Scope of Co-ownership: Yes, the term "acquired" encompasses the entire property purchased during cohabitation regardless of payment mode, but equal sharing pertains only to the portion paid before the parties' de facto separation. The disputable presumption of co-ownership arises upon purchase during cohabitation, but the partnership is considered terminated upon separation.
• Judicial Courtesy: Moot and academic. The Court noted that G.R. No. 180226 had already been resolved in a Resolution dated April 26, 2017, rendering the issue of whether the trial court should have awaited that ruling moot.
• Increase in Support: Yes, the trial court gravely abused its discretion. The obligation of mutual support between spouses ceased upon the finality of the decree of nullity, and respondent ceased to have authority to claim support on behalf of children who had attained majority.
• Due Process: No grave abuse of discretion was found on this ground. The Court did not separately address this issue in its ruling, as the petition was granted on the substantive grounds of property partition and support.

• Scope of Co-ownership: The Court applied the law-of-the-case doctrine, citing its prior Resolution in G.R. No. 180226 dated April 26, 2017, which had already established that Article 147 of the Family Code applies only to properties acquired by the parties during the period of their cohabitation. Because the present petition is an offshoot of the same case involving the same facts and arguments, that pronouncement is binding. The Court then construed the term "acquired" in Article 147 under the principle that when the law does not distinguish, neither should the court. The provision made no distinction or qualification as to the manner of acquisition, so "acquired" must be taken in its ordinary acceptation: for as long as the property was purchased during cohabitation—whether on installment, financing, or other mode of payment—the disputable presumption of equal co-ownership arises. However, because the co-ownership is considered terminated upon the parties' separation or desistance to continue their relations, respondent's equal share pertains only to the paid portion before separation. Amortizations made after separation are excluded, since there is no longer a family or household to care for or maintain. If respondent proves that post-separation payments were made from common funds, she would have an equal share in those portions as well. The presumption is merely disputable and may be rebutted by proof that the property, though acquired during cohabitation, was not obtained through joint efforts.

• Judicial Courtesy: The Court declared this issue moot and academic because G.R. No. 180226 had already been resolved by the Third Division in a Resolution dated April 26, 2017. The Court then treated the pronouncement in that Resolution as the law of the case, applying it to resolve the substantive issues in the present petition. The doctrine of law of the case, as explained in Spouses Sy vs. Young, provides that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case so long as the facts on which the decision was predicated continue to be the facts before the court.

• Increase in Support: Under Article 198 of the Family Code, the obligation of mutual support between spouses ceases when a judgment declaring a marriage void becomes final and executory. Since the marriage was declared void on March 11, 2005, petitioner was obliged to support only their three children thereafter. At the time the RTC issued its November 29, 2011 Order, two of the three daughters had already attained the age of majority, and respondent ceased to have authority to claim support on their behalf pursuant to Articles 234 and 236 of the Family Code. By the time the petition was filed in 2014, the youngest daughter had likewise reached majority. The RTC gravely abused its discretion in increasing support based on the needs of all three children. The Court noted, however, that petitioner is not precluded from seeking reduction of support, as judgment for support does not become final and may be modified according to changed circumstances, citing Lim-Lua vs. Lua.

• Due Process: The Court did not separately rule on this issue, as the petition was granted on the substantive grounds. The CA had rejected petitioner's claim, finding that no ground had been shown to justify why the required Reply could not be filed on time, and the Court did not disturb this finding.

• Law of the Case — The opinion delivered on a former appeal constitutes the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same case, and cannot be departed from in subsequent proceedings in the same case, so long as the facts on which the decision was predicated continue to be the facts before the court. The Court applied this doctrine by treating its April 26, 2017 Resolution in G.R. No. 180226—which held that Article 147 applies only to properties acquired during cohabitation—as binding on the present petition, which is an offshoot of the same case.

• Article 147 Co-ownership in Void Marriages — When a man and a woman suffering no legal impediment to marry each other live exclusively together as husband and wife under a void marriage, their wages and salaries are owned in equal shares and property acquired through their work or industry is governed by the rules on co-ownership. Properties acquired while they lived together are presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts and owned in equal shares. A party who did not participate in acquisition is deemed to have contributed jointly if their efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and household. The co-ownership terminates upon the parties' separation or desistance to continue their relations. The presumption of equal shares is disputable and may be rebutted by proof that the property was not obtained through joint efforts.

• Statutory Construction: Ubi Lex Non Distinguit — When the law does not distinguish, neither should the court. The Court applied this principle to construe the term "acquired" in Article 147, holding that since the provision made no distinction as to the manner of acquisition, the term must be taken in its ordinary acceptation to encompass any mode of purchase during cohabitation.

• Modifiability of Support Judgments — A judgment for support does not become final and may be reduced or increased proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to support, citing Lim-Lua vs. Lua.

• "For as long as the property had been purchased, whether on installment, financing or other mode of payment, during the period of cohabitation, the disputable presumption that they have been obtained by the parties' joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares, shall arise." — This passage articulates the Court's construction of "acquired" under Article 147, establishing that the presumption of co-ownership attaches upon purchase during cohabitation regardless of payment mode.

• "However, equal sharing of the entire properties is not possible in this scenario since the Ayala Alabang and Rockwell properties were still being amortized when the parties' separated. As such, respondent's equal share shall only pertain to the paid portion before their separation, for in this peculiar kind of co-ownership, and in keeping with the pronouncement in G.R. No. 180226, the partnership is considered terminated upon the parties' separation or desistance to continue said relations." — This passage defines the temporal limit of equal sharing under Article 147, limiting the co-owner's equal share to the portion paid before de facto separation.

• "In increasing the amount of support due from petitioner based on the needs of all three children, the RTC gravely abused its discretion." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the support issue, holding that the trial court's basis for increasing support was legally infirm because two children had already attained majority.

• Barrido vs. Nonato, 745 Phil. 608 (2014) — Cited to explain the nature of the co-ownership envisioned under Article 147 of the Family Code, including its three requisites: (1) the parties must be capacitated to marry each other; (2) they live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void. Followed as controlling authority on the elements and operation of Article 147.

• Spouses Sy vs. Young, 711 Phil. 444 (2013) — Cited for the doctrine of law of the case, which the Court applied to bind the present petition to the pronouncements in the prior Resolution of G.R. No. 180226. Followed.

• Valdes vs. RTC, Br. 102, Quezon City, 328 Phil. 1289 (1996) — Cited to support the proposition that Article 147 of the Family Code is a remake of Article 144 of the 1950 Civil Code, and thus its retroactive application does not impair vested rights. Followed.

• Cariño vs. Cariño — Discussed in the quoted portion of the G.R. No. 180226 Resolution to distinguish cases where no judicial declaration of nullity was secured; distinguished as inapplicable where a judicial declaration of nullity exists.

• Aznar — Discussed in the quoted portion of the G.R. No. 180226 Resolution, expounding on Article 144 of the Civil Code (the basis of Article 147), to the effect that the co-ownership of parties in a void marriage may be considered terminated upon their separation or desistance to continue said relations. Followed.

• Lim-Lua vs. Lua, 710 Phil. 211 (2013) — Cited for the doctrine that a judgment for support does not become final and may be reduced or increased according to changed circumstances. Followed.

• Ty-Delgado vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 79 Phil. 268 (2016) — Cited for the principle of statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, neither should the court. Followed.

• Article 147, Family Code — Governs the property relations of parties to a void marriage who are capacitated to marry each other and live exclusively together as husband and wife. The Court applied this provision to determine that properties acquired during cohabitation are presumed co-owned in equal shares, but that the co-ownership terminates upon de facto separation, limiting equal sharing to the portion paid before separation.

• Article 148, Family Code — Referenced as the alternative provision governing property relations of parties to a void marriage, but found inapplicable because the parties suffered no legal impediment to marry each other.

• Article 198, Family Code — Provides that the obligation of mutual support between spouses ceases when a judgment declaring a marriage void becomes final and executory. The Court applied this to hold that petitioner's obligation of mutual support to respondent ceased upon the finality of the March 11, 2005 decree of nullity.

• Articles 234 and 236, Family Code — Cited by petitioner for the proposition that respondent ceased to have personality or authority to claim support on behalf of children who had attained majority. The Court sustained this argument.

• Article 256, Family Code — Provides that the Family Code has retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. The Court applied this to justify the retroactive application of Article 147 to the parties' marriage, which was celebrated before the Family Code took effect.

• Article 144, Civil Code — The predecessor of Article 147 of the Family Code. The Court noted that Article 147 is a remake of Article 144, supporting the conclusion that no vested rights are impaired by retroactive application.

Peralta, C.J. (Chairperson), Caguioa, J., and Lazaro-Javier, J. concurred. Lopez, J. was on official leave.