Pasvil/Pascual Liner, Inc., Workers Union-NAFLU vs. NLRC

When the Secretary of Labor and Employment assumes jurisdiction over or certifies a labor dispute to the NLRC under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, the NLRC may resolve all questions and controversies arising from that dispute, including the legality of an ongoing strike, notwithstanding the Labor Arbiter’s original and exclusive jurisdiction under Article 217. A strike is protected only when waged on account of a labor dispute; absent legitimate ground, it is illegal, and union officers who knowingly participate lose employment status under Article 264(a).

PASVIL/Pascual Liner, Inc. is a transportation company employing more or less 900 workers and servicing thousands of commuters in Metro Manila. Its employees are organized under the PASVIL/Pascual Liner, Inc. Workers Union—NAFLU, whose officers and members are petitioners. The dispute implicates the Labor Code provisions on jurisdiction over strikes and lockouts, particularly Article 217, Article 263(g), and Article 264.

PASVIL/Pascual Liner, Inc. is a transportation company employing more or less 900 workers and servicing thousands of commuters in Metro Manila, mostly students, professionals, government and private employees, and traders and merchants. Its workers are organized under the PASVIL/Pascual Liner, Inc. Workers Union—NAFLU. The individual petitioners are union officers: Donato Bugtong, President; Pedro Fernando, Vice President; Rodante Ambas, Secretary; Rodolfo Pascual, Treasurer; Felizardo Gaspar, Auditor; Conrado Clemente, Spokesman; and Ponciano Gabriel Sr., Roberto Espejon, Marcelo Mojar Jr., Arnulfo German, Jose Ogao, Arnel Fortaleza, Merlito Dela Cruz, Rommel Buenavente, Manuel Trinidad, Joselito Mendiola, Pedro Ociones, Guillermo Naranjo, and Fredenill Lazo, Board Members. On 3 August 1994, the Union filed a notice of strike with the NCMB-NCR against PASVIL for unfair labor practices consisting in union busting, discrimination, and discouraging union membership.

On 24 January 1995, the NCMB-NCR notified Union President Donato Bugtong that the conciliation meetings had established that the real issues were the dismissal of the Union President, which was pending before Labor Arbiter Melquiades Del Rosario of the NLRC-NCR, and the certification election case, which was pending before the Office of the Secretary. Those issues were not proper subjects of a Notice of Strike but were appropriate for preventive mediation. A series of conciliation conferences conducted by the NCMB-NCR failed to settle the dispute. Consequently, on 18 February 1995, the Union staged a strike; further efforts to effect settlement achieved nothing, and the strike continued.

On 21 February 1995, upon PASVIL’s petition, then Secretary of Labor and Employment Ma. Nieves R. Confesor assumed jurisdiction over the dispute pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code and certified it to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. Secretary Confesor justified her direct intervention on the ground that PASVIL was engaged in the transportation business, employed more or less 900 workers, and serviced thousands of commuters in Metro Manila; a prolonged work stoppage would cause unnecessary inconvenience and adverse effects to the riding public and to the livelihood of its employees and their families and dependents. She also cited the need to avert unnecessary work stoppages at a time when the administration was focused on sustaining economic gains and social reforms. She directed all striking workers to return to work within twenty-four hours from receipt and PASVIL to accept them back under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike, and directed the parties to cease and desist from acts that would prejudice the other party or exacerbate the situation. The directive was published in Daily Balita and Bulgar. Notwithstanding receipt of the order, Secretary Confesor found that the Union continued to picket and barricade PASVIL’s premises, preventing workers who wanted to report back to work from entering. On 24 February 1995, she reiterated her directive and deputized the Station Commander of the Novaliches Police Station to assist in the orderly and peaceful enforcement of her order, including the removal of all forms of obstruction and barricades to ensure free ingress to or egress from PASVIL’s premises.

The NLRC scheduled conciliation conferences on 28 March and 19 April 1995, but only representatives of PASVIL appeared. On 12 May 1995, the NLRC ordered the parties to submit their position papers, and both complied. On 21 August 1995, PASVIL moved for early resolution on the ground that the strike was still ongoing and causing vast revenue losses. A hearing was set for 29 August 1995 to determine whether a formal hearing on the merits was necessary or whether PASVIL’s motion should be granted, but both parties failed to appear, so a second hearing was set for 11 October 1995. On that date, the parties were asked if they wished to submit the case for resolution; the Union, through Board Member Ponciano Gabriel Sr., requested and was granted until 23 October 1995 to notify the NLRC of its intention. On the deadline, the Union moved for a formal trial on the merits. A hearing on the motion was set for 6 November 1995, but only PASVIL’s counsel attended and was given until 15 November 1995 to comment. In its comment, PASVIL alleged that all questions raised by the Union had been traversed by the documents already submitted in evidence. Another hearing was scheduled for 7 December 1995, and again only PASVIL appeared. The NLRC believed that the Union’s motion for a formal trial was a mere dilatory move and that the evidence on hand would sufficiently allow it to reach a conclusion; it denied the motion and proceeded to resolve the legality of the Union’s purposes for staging the strike—namely, that twenty-four airconditioned buses were surreptitiously removed from the company premises to deprive Union officers and members of their jobs, and that Bugtong was arbitrarily dismissed from employment due to Union activities. PASVIL countered that the buses were sold to E & J Transport and Mayami Transit, with the proceeds applied to the payment of interest on its principal obligations, and that Bugtong was dismissed due to gross and habitual neglect of duty or willful disobedience.

The NLRC found that although PASVIL did not prove that the sale of the buses actually materialized, the evidence showed that even without those buses there was a sufficient number of buses remaining for the employees to continue working, and that PASVIL had exhorted its drivers and dispatchers to accept their respective assignments and operate the buses. Petitioners did not explain why they failed to man the remaining buses. The NLRC also found that petitioners did not specify the wage benefits they were entitled to that were not granted by PASVIL, nor did they clarify the particular working conditions they could not tolerate. As to Bugtong’s dismissal, a complaint had been filed before Labor Arbiter Melquiades Sol D. Del Rosario, who on 25 May 1995 held that the totality of infractions committed by Bugtong justified his dismissal. The NLRC further found that the strikers did not comply with Secretary Confesor’s directive to return to work. The NCMB-NCR had conducted an ocular inspection of PASVIL’s facilities on 7 September 1994 and determined that there were thirty-seven buses “ready for trip” but that these remained unmanned. PASVIL’s letter of 2 August 1994 exhorted its drivers and dispatchers individually to accept their assignments and operate the buses. Bugtong himself wrote the Social Security System on 3 August 1995 certifying that employees of PASVIL/Pascual Liner, Inc. were on strike effective 18 February 1995 up to the present.

• Jurisdiction over the Legality of the Strike: Petitioners argued that Article 217 of the Labor Code explicitly vests Labor Arbiters with original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving the legality of strikes and lock-outs, so the NLRC was not clothed with authority to decide the legality of the strike; they added that the dispute involved no complaint for illegal strike but for unfair labor practice, and that under Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Labor and Employment the Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction when he ruled on the legality of the strike.
• Denial of Formal Trial: Petitioners maintained that, under Rule V, Sec. 5, par. (b), of the NLRC’s New Rules of Procedure, the NLRC should have issued a separate ruling on their motion for formal trial, instead of merely incorporating its ruling in the assailed decision, so that they could have supplied or completed deficiencies in their evidence; they claimed there were factual issues that could not be resolved by documentary evidence, namely the blockade of free ingress to and egress from the company premises and non-compliance with the return-to-work order.
• Unfair Labor Practice: Petitioners asserted that PASVIL committed unfair labor practice when it surreptitiously pulled out twenty-four buses from its garage, then manned by active Union members, thereby substantially affecting their jobs; in the alternative, citing People’s Industrial and Commercial Employees and Workers Organization (FFW) vs. People’s Industrial and Commercial Corporation, they argued that a strike may be considered legal where the union believed in good faith that the company committed unfair labor practices and the circumstances warranted such belief, although the allegations are subsequently found to be untrue.
• Compliance with Return-to-Work Order: Petitioners claimed that they wanted to comply with Secretary Confesor’s return-to-work order but that the bus company refused to reinstate them; their affidavit averred that some workers wanted to return and obey the order but management refused to accept them and did not allow them inside the garage.

• Bus Removal and Unfair Labor Practice: PASVIL countered that the twenty-four buses were sold to E & J Transport and Mayami Transit, and that the proceeds were applied to the payment of interest on its principal obligations.
• Bugtong’s Dismissal: PASVIL maintained that Bugtong was dismissed due to gross and habitual neglect of duty or willful disobedience.
• Formal Trial: PASVIL alleged that all questions raised by the Union had been traversed by the documents already submitted in evidence.
• Early Resolution: PASVIL moved for early resolution on the ground that the ongoing strike caused it vast revenue losses.

• Jurisdiction over the Legality of the Strike: Whether the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in ruling on the illegality of the strike, notwithstanding Article 217 of the Labor Code and the doctrine in Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Labor and Employment.
• Denial of Formal Trial: Whether the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to hold a formal trial and in not issuing a separate ruling on petitioners’ motion for formal trial.
• Unfair Labor Practice: Whether the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in holding that PASVIL was not guilty of unfair labor practice.
• Illegality of the Strike and Loss of Employment: Whether the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring the strike illegal and considering petitioners to have lost their employment status.

• Jurisdiction over the Legality of the Strike: No. Article 217’s grant to Labor Arbiters is subject to the exception in Article 263(g); when the Secretary assumes jurisdiction or certifies a dispute to the NLRC, the NLRC may resolve all questions arising therefrom, including the legality of the ongoing strike. Philippine Airlines is inapplicable because the certification here included the strike.
• Denial of Formal Trial: No. The NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying a formal trial; whether to conduct one depends on the adjudicator’s discretion and the sufficiency of position papers and supporting documents, and the ruling on the motion could be incorporated in the decision.
• Unfair Labor Practice: No. The evidence showed sufficient buses remained and PASVIL exhorted drivers and dispatchers to operate them; petitioners failed to explain why they did not man the remaining buses, and no good faith was shown.
• Illegality of the Strike and Loss of Employment: No. The strike lacked legitimate reason and petitioners defied the return-to-work order; under Article 264(a), union officers who knowingly participate in an illegal strike lose employment status.

• Jurisdiction over the Legality of the Strike: Article 217 of the Labor Code provides that, except as otherwise provided under the Code, Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases arising from any violation of Article 264, including questions on the legality of strikes and lock-outs. The opening phrase recognizes an exception. Article 263(g) allows the Secretary of Labor and Employment, when in his opinion there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, to assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify it to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. In International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. vs. Secretary of Labor and Employment, the authority to assume jurisdiction was held to include all questions and controversies arising from the labor dispute, including cases over which the Labor Arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction; when the Secretary certifies the dispute to the NLRC, the NLRC is concomitantly empowered to resolve all questions and controversies arising therefrom, including cases otherwise belonging originally and exclusively to the Labor Arbiter. Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Labor and Employment limited the Secretary’s jurisdiction to issues involved in the dispute or submitted to him for resolution; there, the Secretary exceeded his jurisdiction when he restrained the employer from taking disciplinary action against employees who staged an illegal strike. The present case is different because Secretary Confesor’s certification to the NLRC involved the strike itself. The certification recited the Union’s notice of strike, the failed conciliation conferences, the Union’s strike on 18 February 1995, and the continuing strike with no settlement in sight. What was certified was the entire labor dispute, including the ongoing strike, so the NLRC had to rule on the matter. St. Scholastica’s College vs. Torres reiterated that before the Secretary may take cognizance of an issue merely incidental to the labor dispute, the issue must be involved in the labor dispute itself or submitted to him for resolution; if it was not, assumption of jurisdiction is grave abuse of discretion, but otherwise International Pharmaceuticals applies. Since the strike was included in the certification, no grave abuse of discretion attended the NLRC’s ruling on its legality.
• Denial of Formal Trial: Rule V, Sec. 5, par. (b), of the NLRC’s New Rules of Procedure provides that if the Labor Arbiter finds no necessity of further hearing after the parties have submitted their position papers and supporting documents, he shall issue an order to that effect and inform the parties, stating the reasons therefor. The purpose of the rule requiring an order submitting the case for decision is to provide a period from which to reckon the time frame within which to decide the case. The NLRC did not commit a serious violation of its own rules when it incorporated its ruling on petitioners’ motion for formal trial in its decision; determining the reckoning period was no longer necessary because the NLRC had already prepared a decision. It acted on the motion in its decision and stated reasons for denial: the Union’s counsel had not appeared at any of the previous hearings called by the NLRC, which numbered at least five, making the request appear to be a dilatory tactic, and the documents and supporting proofs on record were sufficient to allow a conclusion. Rule V, Sec. 3, requires that verified position papers be accompanied by all supporting documents, including affidavits of witnesses which take the place of their testimony, and parties are thereafter not allowed to allege facts or present evidence not referred to in the complaint, position papers, affidavits, and other documents. Petitioners’ theory that a separate ruling on their motion would have allowed them to rectify deficiencies in their evidence is fallacious; the opportune time to submit evidence was when they submitted their position papers. In PMI Colleges vs. NLRC, the absence of a formal hearing or trial before the Labor Arbiter was held not to be grave abuse of discretion; whether to conduct one depends on the sole discretion of the Labor Arbiter, taking into account the position papers and supporting documents submitted, and if the Labor Arbiter is confident that he can rely on the documents before him, he cannot be faulted for not conducting a formal trial unless the documents are really insufficient. Here, the NLRC found sufficient evidence, and PASVIL’s evidence adequately proved that it was not guilty of unfair labor practice; consequently, there was no legitimate reason for petitioners to hold a strike and thereafter defy the return-to-work order.
• Unfair Labor Practice: Petitioners maintained that PASVIL committed unfair labor practice by surreptitiously pulling out twenty-four buses from its garage, then manned by active Union members, thereby substantially affecting their jobs. They invoked People’s Industrial and Commercial Employees and Workers Organization (FFW) vs. People’s Industrial and Commercial Corporation for the proposition that a strike may be considered legal where the union believed in good faith that the company committed unfair labor practices and the circumstances warranted such belief, although the allegations are later found untrue. Factual findings of the NLRC are entitled to respect and finality in the absence of proof that they were arrived at arbitrarily or capriciously. Although PASVIL failed to prove that the sale of the buses pushed through, the NLRC found evidence that a sufficient number of units remained for the employees to continue working. PASVIL’s letter of 2 August 1994 exhorted its drivers and dispatchers individually to accept their respective assignments and operate the buses, and the NCMB-NCR’s ocular inspection on 7 September 1994 determined that thirty-seven buses were ready for trip but remained unmanned. Petitioners did not explain why they failed to operate the remaining buses. Good faith remains a valid defense against the claim of illegality of a strike, but petitioners could not find refuge in the cited case because, on the basis of PASVIL’s letters and the ocular inspection, there was not even a semblance of good faith on their part. The NLRC was correct in dismissing the charge of unfair labor practice against PASVIL and in declaring the strike illegal.
• Illegality of the Strike and Loss of Employment: Article 264, par. (a), of the Labor Code provides the sanction of loss of employment status for any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike. The NLRC found that petitioners led the illegal strike against PASVIL, and petitioners did not dispute this. The NLRC’s declaration that petitioners lost their employment status was thus sustained. Petitioners blamed PASVIL’s alleged refusal to accept them back for their failure to comply with Secretary Confesor’s directive to return to work, citing an affidavit averment that some workers wanted to return and obey the return-to-work order but management refused to accept them and did not allow them inside the garage. The averment was unclear as to which orders of Secretary Confesor petitioners allegedly displayed willingness to obey; other averments referred to the first order. It was hard to believe that such was the situation, because if petitioners wanted to resume their jobs but PASVIL refused, PASVIL would not have had recourse to Secretary Confesor. That second recourse led Secretary Confesor to find that, notwithstanding receipt of the 21 February 1995 order, the Union continued to picket and barricade the company premises, preventing workers who wanted to report back to work from entering. Secretary Confesor reiterated her previous return-to-work order. Pitted against this finding, petitioners’ averments could not be sustained; absent cogent reasons, the factual findings of the Secretary of Labor and Employment would not be altered, modified, or reversed because by reason of her official position she is considered to have acquired expertise in matters within her jurisdiction. A stronger proof that petitioners and other Union members defied the return-to-work order was Bugtong’s own letter to the Social Security System dated 3 August 1995 certifying that employees of PASVIL/Pascual Liner, Inc. were on strike effective 18 February 1995 up to the present. This certification bound petitioners and relegated to insignificance their pretension to the contrary. Under Article 264, par. (a), St. Scholastica’s College held that from the moment a worker defies a return-to-work order he is deemed to have abandoned his job; it is already in itself knowingly participating in an illegal act. The law could not interpose its hand to protect the employees from the consequences of their misbehavior.

• Strike as a protected right only when based on a labor dispute — A strike is recognized and protected by labor laws only when waged on account of a labor dispute; absent such a dispute, employees who engage in work stoppage commit an illegal strike and face the consequences. The Court applied this principle in upholding the NLRC’s declaration that the Union’s strike was illegal.
• Assumption or certification jurisdiction under Article 263(g) — When the Secretary of Labor and Employment assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute in an industry indispensable to the national interest, or certifies it to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, the authority extends to all questions and controversies arising from the dispute, including cases otherwise within the Labor Arbiter’s original and exclusive jurisdiction under Article 217. The Court applied this to hold that the NLRC could rule on the legality of the ongoing strike because the Secretary’s certification included the entire labor dispute and the strike.
• Limited jurisdiction over merely incidental issues — Before the Secretary may take cognizance of an issue merely incidental to the labor dispute, the issue must be involved in the labor dispute itself or submitted to him for resolution; otherwise, assumption of jurisdiction is grave abuse of discretion. The Court distinguished Philippine Airlines because the certification in this case expressly included the strike.
• Discretion to dispense with formal trial — The Labor Arbiter or NLRC may decide a case on the basis of position papers and supporting documents if these are sufficient; the absence of a formal hearing is not grave abuse of discretion, and whether to conduct one depends on the adjudicator’s discretion. The Court applied this in upholding the denial of petitioners’ motion for formal trial.
• Good faith as a defense in illegal strike cases — Good faith belief that the employer committed unfair labor practices may be a valid defense against the claim of illegality of a strike, but the circumstances must warrant such belief. The Court found no semblance of good faith because sufficient buses remained and the ocular inspection showed thirty-seven buses ready for trip but unmanned.
• Loss of employment for union officers who knowingly participate in an illegal strike — Under Article 264, par. (a), of the Labor Code, any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike loses employment status. The Court applied this to petitioners, whom the NLRC found to have led the illegal strike.
• Defiance of a return-to-work order — From the moment a worker defies a return-to-work order, he is deemed to have abandoned his job; such defiance is itself knowingly participating in an illegal act. The Court applied this to petitioners, who continued picketing and barricading and whose own certification to the SSS confirmed the strike was ongoing.

• “Simply put, a strike is recognized and protected by our labor laws only when waged on account of a labor dispute. In the absence thereof, the employees who engage themselves in work stoppage commit an illegal strike and should face the consequences thereof.” — This passage states the foundational principle on the legality of strikes and frames the Court’s analysis of the Union’s work stoppage.
• “In the same manner, when the Secretary of Labor and Employment certifies the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration the latter is concomitantly empowered to resolve all questions and controversies arising therefrom including cases otherwise belonging originally and exclusively to the Labor Arbiter.” — This is the ratio decidendi on jurisdiction, explaining why the NLRC could rule on the legality of the strike despite Article 217.
• “Good faith is still a valid defense against the claim of illegality of a strike. However, petitioners cannot find refuge in People’s Industrial & Commercial Employees and Workers Organization (FFW) because, on the basis of PASVIL’s letters to its individual employees and the ocular inspection by the NCMB-NCR, we do not find even a semblance of good faith on the part of petitioners.” — This passage defines the good faith defense and explains why it failed on the facts.
• “Under the same Art. 264, par. (a), St. Scholastica’s College expressed in no uncertain terms that from the moment a worker defies a return-to-work order he is deemed to have abandoned his job. It is already in itself knowingly participating in an illegal act.” — This passage states the consequence of defying a return-to-work order and supports the loss of employment status.

• International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. vs. Secretary of Labor and Employment, G.R. Nos. 92981-83, 9 January 1992, 205 SCRA 59 — Controlling precedent; held that the Secretary’s authority under Article 263(g) includes all questions and controversies arising from the labor dispute, including cases over which the Labor Arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction. The Court applied it to empower the NLRC to rule on the strike’s legality.
• Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 88210, 23 January 1991, 193 SCRA 223 — Distinguished; held that the Secretary’s jurisdiction in assumption and/or certification cases is limited to the issues involved in the dispute or submitted to him for resolution. The Court found it inapplicable because the certification here included the strike.
• St. Scholastica’s College vs. Torres, G.R. No. 100158, 29 June 1992, 210 SCRA 565 — Followed; reiterated that an issue merely incidental to the labor dispute must be involved in the dispute itself or submitted for resolution, otherwise assumption of jurisdiction is grave abuse of discretion; also cited for the rule that defiance of a return-to-work order is knowingly participating in an illegal act.
• PMI Colleges vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 121466, 15 August 1997, 277 SCRA 462 — Followed; held that the absence of a formal hearing before the Labor Arbiter is not grave abuse of discretion, and whether to conduct one depends on the sufficiency of the position papers and supporting documents.
• People’s Industrial and Commercial Employees and Workers Organization (FFW) vs. People’s Industrial and Commercial Corporation, No. L-37687, 15 March 1982, 112 SCRA 441 — Cited by petitioners for the good faith defense; not applied because the Court found no semblance of good faith on the part of petitioners.
• Guinnux Interiors, Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 115569, 27 May 1997, 272 SCRA 689 — Cited for the rule that factual findings of the NLRC are entitled to respect and finality absent proof that they were arrived at arbitrarily or capriciously.
• Capitol Wireless, Inc. vs. Confesor, G.R. No. 117174, 13 November 1996, 264 SCRA 68 — Cited for the rule that factual findings of the Secretary of Labor and Employment are entitled to respect because of her official position and expertise in matters within her jurisdiction.
• Tiu vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 123276, 18 August 1997, 277 SCRA 680 — Cited in connection with the consequence of defying a return-to-work order under Article 264, par. (a).

• Article 217, Labor Code — Labor Arbiters have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving the legality of strikes and lock-outs, except as otherwise provided under the Code. The Court held that the exception applies when the Secretary assumes jurisdiction or certifies the dispute to the NLRC under Article 263(g).
• Article 263(g), Labor Code — When the Secretary of Labor and Employment is of the opinion that a labor dispute causes or is likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, he may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify it to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. The Court applied this provision to uphold the Secretary’s certification and the NLRC’s authority to resolve the legality of the ongoing strike.
• Article 264(a), Labor Code — Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike loses employment status. The Court applied this sanction to petitioners, whom the NLRC found to have led the illegal strike.
• Rule V, Sec. 5(b), NLRC New Rules of Procedure — If the Labor Arbiter finds no necessity of further hearing after the parties have submitted their position papers and supporting documents, he shall issue an order to that effect and inform the parties, stating the reasons therefor. The Court held that the purpose of the order is to provide a reckoning period for deciding the case, and that incorporating the ruling in the decision was not a serious violation.
• Rule V, Sec. 3, NLRC New Rules of Procedure — Verified position papers must be accompanied by all supporting documents, including affidavits of witnesses which take the place of their testimony; parties are thereafter not allowed to allege facts or present evidence not referred to in the complaint, position papers, affidavits, and other documents. The Court applied this to reject petitioners’ claim that they should have been allowed to augment their evidence after denial of a formal trial.

Puno, Mendoza, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concurred.