Pasion de Garcia vs. Locsin

A search warrant is valid only if the judge himself determines the existence of probable cause after examining under oath or affirmation the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and the warrant particularly describes the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right that may be waived, but to constitute waiver, it must appear that the right exists, that the person involved had knowledge of the right, and that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right; failure to resist or object to the execution of a warrant is but a submission to the authority of the law and does not constitute implied waiver.

The petitioner, Leona Pasion Viuda de Garcia, was a businesswoman in Victoria, Tarlac, whose house and store were searched by an agent of the Anti-Usury Board, a government body tasked with enforcing the Anti-Usury Law. Paragraph 3, Section 1 of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution provides that the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The Code of Criminal Procedure (G.O. No. 58), particularly sections 102-104, complements these constitutional requirements with reference to the duration of the validity of the search warrant and the obligation of the officer seizing property to deliver the same to the corresponding court.

On November 10, 1934, Mariano G. Almeda, an agent of the Anti-Usury Board, obtained from the justice of the peace of Tarlac, Tarlac, a search warrant (Exhibit B) commanding any officer of the law to search the person, house, or store of the petitioner at Victoria, Tarlac, for "certain books, lists, chits, receipts, documents and other papers relating to her activities as usurer." The search warrant was issued upon an affidavit given by Almeda stating "that he has and there (is) just and probable cause to believe and he does believe that Leona Pasion de Garcia keeps and conceals in her house and store at Victoria, Tarlac, certain books, lists, chits, receipts, documents, and other papers relating to her activities as usurer, all of which is contrary to the statute in such cases made and provided."

On the same date, Almeda, accompanied by a captain of the Philippine Constabulary, went to the office of the petitioner in Victoria, Tarlac, and after showing the search warrant to the petitioner's bookkeeper, Alfredo Salas, and without the presence of the petitioner who was ill and confined at the time, proceeded with the execution thereof. Two packages of records and a locked filing cabinet containing several papers and documents were seized by Almeda, and a receipt therefor was issued by him to Salas. The papers and documents seized were kept for a considerable length of time by the Anti-Usury Board and thereafter were turned over by it to the respondent fiscal, who subsequently filed, in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, six separate criminal cases against the petitioner for violation of the Anti-Usury Law.

On several occasions after the seizure, the petitioner, through counsel, demanded from the respondent Anti-Usury Board the return of the documents seized. On July 7, 1936, counsel for the petitioner wrote a letter to the Anti-Usury Board demanding again the return of the documents withheld. On January 7, 1937, and by motion on June 4, 1937, the legality of the search warrant was challenged by counsel for the petitioner in the six criminal cases, and the devolution of the documents was demanded. By resolution of October 5, 1937, the respondent Judge of First Instance denied the petitioner's motion of June 4 for the reason that though the search warrant was illegal, there was a waiver on the part of the petitioner. The respondent judge declared that considering the accused, by herself or through her representative, did not present any protest against the search at the time it was made or after a reasonable time, the court declared that the accused, by her silence and conduct, had implicitly waived her right not to be subjected to an unreasonable search, and any defect in the issuance of the search warrant and its execution had been implicitly cured. A motion for reconsideration was presented but was denied by order of January 3, 1938.

• Illegality of the Search Warrant: Petitioner sought the annulment of the search warrant and two orders of the respondent judge, and the restoration of certain documents alleged to have been illegally seized by an agent of the Anti-Usury Board, on the ground that the search warrant was issued without probable cause determined by the judge himself.
• No Waiver of Constitutional Right: Petitioner maintained that she did not waive her constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures, as she was ill and absent during the search, and she had repeatedly demanded the return of the seized documents through counsel.

• Waiver by Acquiescence: The Solicitor-General admitted that the search warrant was illegally issued but maintained that the petitioner had waived her constitutional right by her acquiescence after the search and seizure.
• Unreasonable Delay: The Solicitor-General also argued that the application for the return of the documents illegally seized was made after an unreasonable length of time after the date of seizure.

• Validity of the Search Warrant: Whether the search warrant was validly issued when the existence of probable cause was determined not by the judge himself but by the applicant.
• Waiver of Constitutional Immunity: Whether the petitioner waived her constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures by her failure to object at the time of the search and by the delay in demanding the return of the seized documents.

• Validity of the Search Warrant: No. The search warrant was illegally issued by the justice of the peace of Tarlac, Tarlac, because the existence of probable cause was determined not by the judge himself but by the applicant, and the judge did not examine the applicant and his witnesses, if any, under oath or affirmation.
• Waiver of Constitutional Immunity: No. The petitioner did not waive her constitutional right, as she was sick and not present when the warrant was served, and her failure to resist or object to the execution of the warrant does not constitute an implied waiver; the delay in making demand for the return of the documents seized was not such as to result in waiver by implication.

• Validity of the Search Warrant: The Court reiterated the constitutional requirements for a valid search warrant: (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized. In the instant case, the existence of probable cause was determined not by the judge himself but by the applicant. All that the judge did was to accept as true the affidavit made by agent Almeda. It does not appear that he examined the applicant and his witnesses, if any. Even accepting the description of the properties to be seized to be sufficient, the properties seized were not delivered to the court which issued the warrant, as required by law (secs. 95 and 104, G.O. No. 58); instead, they were turned over to the respondent provincial fiscal and used by him in building up cases against the petitioner. Considering that at the time the warrant was issued there was no case pending against the petitioner, the averment that the warrant was issued primarily for exploration purposes is not without basis. The lower court was therefore correct in reaching the conclusion that the search warrant was illegally issued.

• Waiver of Constitutional Immunity: The Court acknowledged that the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived, either expressly or impliedly. However, to constitute a waiver of a constitutional right, it must appear: first, that the right exists; secondly, that the persons involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. The petitioner did not object to the legality of the search when it was made because she was sick and was not present when the warrant was served upon Alfredo Salas. The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being a personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so in her behalf. The failure on the part of the petitioner and her bookkeeper to resist or object to the execution of the warrant does not constitute an implied waiver of constitutional right; it is but a submission to the authority of the law. As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officer's authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. While waiver may be the result of a failure to object within a reasonable time to a search and seizure illegally made, the petitioner, on several occasions and prior to the filing of criminal actions against her, had demanded verbally, through counsel, the return by the Anti-Usury Board of the properties seized. The demand was refused simply because the board had not finished its investigation. On July 7, 1936, counsel for the petitioner wrote a letter to the Anti-Usury Board demanding again the return of the documents withheld, and similar demands were made on January 7, 1937 and June 4, 1937. In light of these circumstances, the Court found that the petitioner did not waive her constitutional right, and the delay in making demand for the return of the documents seized was not such as to result in waiver by implication.

• Requisites for a Valid Search Warrant — For a search warrant to be valid: (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized. In this case, the warrant was declared void because the judge merely accepted the applicant's affidavit without personally determining probable cause or examining the applicant and his witnesses.

• Elements of Waiver of Constitutional Right — To constitute a waiver of a constitutional right, it must appear: first, that the right exists; secondly, that the persons involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. The Court applied this test and found that the petitioner, who was ill and absent during the search, did not have the actual intention to relinquish her right, especially given her repeated demands for the return of the seized documents.

• Submission to Authority Not Waiver — A peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. The failure to resist or object to the execution of a warrant does not constitute an implied waiver of constitutional right, as the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen.

• "Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is declared a popular right and for a search warrant to be valid, (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized." — This passage states the canonical formulation of the requisites for a valid search warrant under the Constitution and is the controlling rule applied to declare the warrant void in this case.

• "It is well-settled that to constitute a waiver of a constitutional right, it must appear, first, that the right exists; secondly, that the persons involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and, lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right." — This passage defines the elements of waiver of a constitutional right and is the test applied by the Court to determine that the petitioner did not waive her immunity.

• "In any event, the failure on the part of the petitioner and her bookkeeper to resist or object to the execution of the warrant does not constitute an implied waiver of constitutional right. It is, as Judge Cooley observes, but a submission to the authority of the law." — This passage establishes the principle that peaceful submission to a search is not consent or waiver, but merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law.

• Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas and Anti-Usury Board (1937), 35 Off. Gaz., 1183 — Cited as one of the cases since the approval of the Constitution emphasizing the necessity of adherence to the constitutional requirements on searches and seizures.
• People vs. Sy Juco (1937), G.R. No. 41957 — Cited as one of the cases emphasizing the necessity of adherence to the constitutional requirements on searches and seizures.
• Rodriguez vs. Villamiel (1937), G.R. No. 44328 — Cited as one of the cases emphasizing the necessity of adherence to the constitutional requirements on searches and seizures, and for the proposition that the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived.
• Molo vs. Yatco (1936), 35 Off. Gaz., 1935 — Cited as one of the cases emphasizing the necessity of adherence to the constitutional requirements on searches and seizures.
• People vs. Kagui Malasugui, 34 Off. Gaz., pp. 2163, 2164 — Cited for the proposition that the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived.

• Paragraph 3, Section 1, Bill of Rights, Constitution — Provides that the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The Court applied this provision to declare the search warrant void for failure to comply with its requirements.
• Sections 95 and 104, Code of Criminal Procedure (G.O. No. 58) — These provisions complement the constitutional requirements with reference to the duration of the validity of the search warrant and the obligation of the officer seizing property to deliver the same to the corresponding court. The Court noted that the properties seized were not delivered to the court which issued the warrant, as required by law, but were instead turned over to the respondent provincial fiscal.

Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Diaz, and Concepcion, JJ., concurred.