Pascual vs. People

Where the quantum of proof required to establish conspiracy is lacking, the doubt as to whether the accused acted as principal or as accomplice is resolved in favor of the milder form of criminal liability, that of a mere accomplice; and the civil liability of an accomplice must be commensurate with the degree of his participation, such that he bears a lesser share than the principal in the civil indemnity, damages, and compensation for loss of earning capacity.

Shortly before 2:00 a.m. on October 29, 1996, Richard Apostol was walking along Mejorada Street near Sande Street in Tondo, Manila on his way to the house of his friend Alan Palad when he met Ernanie Rabang, who asked him whether he had seen Palad. Apostol told Rabang to accompany him instead, and at the corner of Sande and Mejorada Streets they met another friend, Rodel Robles. After an exchange of pleasantries, Apostol left Rabang and Robles to fetch Palad, and the four thereafter conversed among themselves on Sande Street. While they were talking, Apostol noticed four men coming from Perla Street; three of them crossed Sande Street while the fourth remained on the opposite side, and one of the three — later identified as Bartolome Glicerio, Jr. — walked to the opposite side to urinate. The other three were identified as Erwin Pascual, Wilbert Sarmiento, and Joel Ceasico, Jr.

According to the prosecution, after the group of Pascual approached the group of Apostol, Glicerio suddenly asked "ano iyon?", to which Rabang responded "anong ano rin iyon?"; Pascual replied "tang-ina mo, ang yabang mo ha!" and suddenly hit Rabang. Apostol backed off as the altercation ensued, and Pascual chased him; sensing that Pascual carried a bladed weapon, Apostol picked up a piece of wood from a nearby backyard, prompting Pascual to withdraw and return to the spot where Rabang and Glicerio stood. Sarmiento, in turn, ran after Palad, who sought refuge in his house and called for his brother; from his window, Palad saw petitioners, Ceasico, and Glicerio surround Rabang, and when Rabang was cornered, petitioners aided Glicerio in stabbing him. Rabang desperately parried the blows but failed, and Apostol, who was near the scene, threw a piece of wood to distract the group, allowing Rabang to move away and utter "may tama ako." Rabang was rushed to the hospital by relatives and neighbors but was pronounced dead on arrival. The group was thereafter seen kicking an old man on a bicycle along Sande Street, prompting a nearby security guard to fire a warning shot, after which they walked casually toward Pavia Street to Divisoria.

On the same day, Joel Deang, a barangay tanod of Divisoria, alighted from a jeepney along Pavia Street and saw petitioners' group mauling an old man at a nearby bakery. He shouted at them, and the group proceeded to the corner across the street, where they turned their ire on Christopher Lising, a fifteen-year-old son of Norma Lising, who was selling puto-bumbong in the area. The group surrounded Christopher and threatened to stab him, but Norma protected her son. Deang intervened, introduced himself as a barangay tanod, and told the group to stop making trouble; instead of heeding him, Pascual swiftly punched Deang's back, causing him to run to the barangay hall for help. Unable to find assistance, Deang picked up a bamboo stick and returned to Norma's stall; when he confronted the group again, they surrounded him and threatened to stab him with their knives, and as he ran toward Moriones Street they chased and eventually caught up with him. Deang tripped on a drainage pipe and fell, and while he lay on the ground the group hit him simultaneously: Pascual stabbed him with a knife, Sarmiento grabbed his bamboo stick and struck him several times on the head, Ceasico hit his face with a broken bottle, and Glicerio attacked him with an ice pick. Deang lost consciousness and was taken to a hospital, where he survived; Dr. Policarpio Santos, Jr., the attending physician, noted that were it not for the timely medical intervention, Deang would have died from his injuries. Records showed that Deang sustained five incised wounds on his face, a fatal stab wound on his chest wall which severed a rib vessel, and a stab wound at the side of his right arm.

Petitioners raised self-defense and denied the allegations. Pascual narrated that on October 29, 1996 he invited his friends to a wake in Caloocan and Sarmiento, Ceasico, and Glicerio joined him; they took a jeepney but did not reach Caloocan because Glicerio asked them instead to go to his girlfriend's house in Delpan. Before reaching Delpan they alighted on Moriones Street to take another ride to Divisoria, and while inside the second jeepney Glicerio asked the driver to stop along Juan Luna Street or Sande Street because he wanted to urinate. While Glicerio was urinating, a man approached him; petitioners and Ceasico went near Glicerio and heard him arguing with the man. Pascual pleaded with the man to pardon them because they were just passing through, but the man suddenly punched him, and another man holding a piece of wood hit Glicerio. When the man was about to hit him as well, Pascual ran toward Moriones Street and, noticing that no one was following him, returned to his friends. Thereafter Deang arrived, introduced himself as the barangay chairman, and told them to go home; Sarmiento told him that he had a high school classmate living in the vicinity, and after no one came out when they knocked on the door, they decided to go home. While passing along Moriones Street, they saw two men, one of whom shouted "ayun yung mga tarantado!"; Pascual recognized one of them as the man who had introduced himself as the barangay chairman of the area. Suddenly the barangay chairman attacked them while the other men threw bottles, and his friends wrestled with the barangay chairman while he merely stood and watched; after the incident they all went home. Sarmiento corroborated Pascual's statements and likewise denied the allegations.

The trial court found that prior to the fatal stabbing of Rabang, Alan and Richard saw Pascual hitting Rabang after cursing him, and that when Glicerio stabbed Rabang, Pascual was seen together with Sarmiento, Ceasico, and Glicerio cornering Rabang and preventing his escape. It further found that petitioners failed to present corroborating evidence, other than their self-serving statements, that Deang was the unlawful aggressor, while the prosecution proved through several witnesses that it was petitioners' group that first attacked an old man, then an innocent puto-bumbong vendor and her son, and finally Deang, who was merely performing his duties as a barangay tanod. These factual findings were affirmed by the Court of Appeals and adopted by the Supreme Court.

• Insufficiency of Evidence as to Pascual's Participation: Petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding them guilty of the crimes charged despite the prosecution's failure to prove Pascual's participation in Homicide and Frustrated Homicide.
• Self-Defense in Favor of Sarmiento: Petitioners maintained that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding them guilty of the crimes charged despite the justifying circumstance of self-defense in favor of Sarmiento.
• Voluntary Surrender as Mitigating Circumstance: Pascual pleaded voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance, which the RTC and the CA disregarded.

• Proof of Participation in Homicide and Frustrated Homicide: Whether the Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding the petitioners guilty of the crimes charged despite the prosecution's failure to prove petitioner Pascual's participation in Homicide and Frustrated Homicide.
• Self-Defense: Whether the Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding the petitioners guilty of the crimes charged despite the justifying circumstance of self-defense in favor of petitioner Sarmiento.

• Proof of Participation in Homicide and Frustrated Homicide: No. The conviction was affirmed, conspiracy not having been established beyond reasonable doubt, so that Pascual was liable only as an accomplice in Homicide under Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code; both petitioners remained liable for Frustrated Homicide.
• Self-Defense: No. The justifying circumstance of self-defense was not established, unlawful aggression on the part of Deang not having been proven by clear and convincing evidence, and self-defense is unavailing where there is nothing to repel.
• Penalty: Affirmed. As an accomplice, Pascual is entitled to a penalty one degree lower than that for the principal, and the Indeterminate Sentence Law was correctly applied in both cases.
• Civil Liability: Modified. The civil liability of an accomplice must be commensurate with the degree of his participation, so Pascual was held liable for only one-third of the civil indemnity, moral damages, actual damages, and loss of earning capacity chargeable to the principal.

• Proof of Participation in Homicide and Frustrated Homicide: Findings of the trial court which are factual in nature and which involve the credibility of witnesses are accorded respect, if not finality, by the appellate court when no glaring errors, gross misapprehension of facts, and speculative, arbitrary, and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings, the trial judge being in a better position to ascertain conflicting testimonies after having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and mode of testifying. No compelling reason existed to depart from the factual findings of the RTC and the CA. On the killing of Rabang, the CA correctly affirmed that Pascual was liable only as an accomplice. Although no prior agreement among the accused was shown, the chain of events disclosed a commonality of purpose: Pascual chased Apostol but, failing to catch him, returned to where Rabang and Glicerio were left; Ceasico and Sarmiento ran after Robles and Palad but likewise returned when they failed to catch them; Palad testified that from his house he could see Rabang surrounded by Glicerio, Ceasico, Pascual, and Sarmiento; and Apostol testified that he saw Glicerio stab Rabang. Pascual was fully aware of Glicerio's intent to kill and assented to and cooperated in the accomplishment of the crime. Complicity requires not only a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice, but also that the latter, with knowledge of the criminal intent, cooperate with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way. In cases of doubt as to whether persons acted as principals or accomplices, the doubt must be resolved in their favor and they should be held guilty as accomplices. Pascual was not an innocent spectator but was at the locus criminis to aid or abet the commission of the crime; these facts, however, did not make him a conspirator, for at most he was only an accomplice, the line separating a conspirator by concerted action from an accomplice by previous or simultaneous acts being slight. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed, but they assent to the plan and cooperate in its accomplishment. Under Article 8 of the RPC, conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it, and to prove it the prosecution must establish that two or more persons came to an agreement, that the agreement concerned the commission of a crime, and that the execution of the felony was decided upon; except in the case of the mastermind, it must also be shown that the accused performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. While direct proof of a previous agreement need not be established in most instances because conspiracy may be deduced from acts pointing to a joint purpose, concerted action, and community of interest, the existence of conspiracy cannot be presumed and its elements must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Article 18 of the RPC defines accomplices as those who, not being included in Article 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts, and the requisites of complicity are: (a) community of design, that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, the accused concurs in the latter's purpose; (b) cooperation in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts; and (c) a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice. Pascual could not be held a principal by direct participation because doubts existed whether there was a prior agreement or community of intention among the group in killing Rabang, and in case of doubt as to the accused's participation the doubt is resolved in his favor, the rationale being that where the quantum of proof required to establish conspiracy is lacking, the doubt as to whether the accused acted as principal or accomplice is resolved in favor of the milder form of criminal liability. The incident began after Glicerio had a verbal altercation with Rabang and his companions; Ceasico and petitioners crossed the street to find out why, and when Rabang cursed Glicerio, Pascual punched him and chased Apostol, after which a brawl ensued. From this unexpected scuffle, it cannot be concluded that the group had a previous agreement or community of intention to kill Rabang; the incident resulted from a sudden burst of emotions. Pascual, knowing the criminal design of Glicerio, cooperated by supplying material or moral aid for the efficacious execution of the crime, but the crime might still have been consummated even without his participation, his role being of a minor character and not indispensable in its consummation.
• Self-Defense: For self-defense to be appreciated, the accused must prove by clear and convincing evidence (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, (b) the reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself or herself. Unlawful aggression is the primordial element, a condition sine qua non; if no unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is established, self-defense is unavailing because there would be nothing to repel. The CA and the RTC correctly found that petitioners failed to discharge the burden of proving unlawful aggression on the part of Deang, their bare claim being unsupported by corroborating evidence other than their self-serving statements. On the contrary, the prosecution proved through the testimonies of several witnesses that it was petitioners' group that was the unlawful aggressor when they first attacked an old man, then an innocent puto-bumbong vendor and her son, and finally Deang, who was merely performing his job as a barangay tanod with the duty to maintain peace and order in the area and to apprehend petitioners for attacking innocent persons. Petitioners did not act in self-defense; their intent to kill Deang was evident from the extent of his injuries, Dr. Santos having noted that were it not for the timely medical attention, Deang would have died. Their claim of self-defense, which remained unsubstantiated, was nothing more than a clear last-ditch effort to exonerate themselves.
• Penalty: In Criminal Case No. 98-163621, the penalty for Homicide under Article 249 of the RPC is reclusion temporal; because Pascual is only an accomplice, the penalty to be imposed is one degree lower than that imposed for the principal, that is, prision mayor, and there being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Pascual was sentenced to four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. In Criminal Case No. 98-163622, although the penalty for homicide under Article 249 is reclusion temporal, the crime committed is merely Frustrated Homicide, so the penalty next lower in degree than reclusion temporal, which is prision mayor, must be imposed; applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the minimum penalty should be anywhere within the range of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to anywhere between the medium period of prision mayor ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years, as maximum. Thus, the RTC correctly imposed the penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. The RTC and the CA correctly disregarded Pascual's plea for voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance. For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the following requisites must be present: (1) the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself or herself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and (3) the surrender was voluntary. The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself or herself up and submit to the authorities either because of acknowledgment of guilt or the wish to save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for the search and capture; where the clear reason for the supposed surrender is the inevitability of arrest and the need to ensure the accused's safety, the surrender is not spontaneous. Here, a warrant of arrest had been issued on April 1, 1998 against all four accused, but they remained at large, prompting the trial judge to archive the cases subject to revival upon their arrest; it was only on August 30, 2000 that Pascual filed a motion for voluntary surrender, so the surrender cannot be regarded as voluntary or spontaneous.
• Civil Liability: The courts' discretion in awarding civil liability in criminal cases should not be untrammeled and must be guided by the principle behind differing liabilities for persons with varying roles in the commission of the crime. The entire amount of the civil indemnity, together with the moral and actual damages, should be apportioned among the persons who cooperated in the commission of the crime according to the degree of their liability, respective responsibilities, and actual participation in the criminal act; the person with greater participation should have a greater share in the civil liability than those who played a minor role, each principal should shoulder a greater share than every accomplice, and each accomplice should be liable for a greater amount as against every accessory. The number of principals versus accomplices and accessories must also be considered, since a mechanical two-thirds/one-third division may result in the accomplice's share exceeding that of each principal when the principals are numerous. The penalty and civil liability imposed upon the accused must be commensurate to the degree of his or her participation, and an accomplice should pay lesser civil liability than the principal, the principal being liable for two-thirds of the civil indemnity and moral damages while the accomplice pays one-third thereof. In Criminal Case No. 98-163621, the CA ordered Pascual to pay the heirs of Rabang ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00 as actual damages, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱2,004,000.00 representing loss of earning capacity; pursuant to Tampus and Saldua, in relation to Jugueta, Pascual, as accomplice, is liable to pay one-third of each civil liability, or ₱16,667.67 as civil indemnity, ₱16,667.67 as moral damages, and ₱33,333.33 as actual damages, this apportionment being based on the interpretation that there is only one principal liable in the case, similar to Saldua, and being more favorable to Pascual given that Glicerio and Ceasico remain at large. As to loss of earning capacity, Article 2206 of the Civil Code entitles the heirs of the victim to indemnification for loss of earning capacity; the parties stipulated that Rabang was earning ₱10,000.00 a month at the time of his death, and applying the formula in People vs. Wahiman — net earning capacity equals life expectancy multiplied by the difference between gross annual income and living expenses, or two-thirds of [80 minus the age at time of death] multiplied by [gross annual income less 50% thereof] — with Rabang 30 years old, the compensation is computed as 2/3 [80 - 30] x [₱120,000 - ₱60,000] = 33.4 x ₱60,000 = ₱2,004,000.00. Since Pascual's civil liability is reduced to conform to Tampus and Saldua, in relation to Jugueta, the amount of loss of earning capacity must likewise be reduced, and Pascual is liable to pay only one-third of ₱2,004,000.00, or ₱668,000.00. In Criminal Case No. 98-163622, the CA aptly ordered both petitioners to pay Deang ₱30,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱30,000.00 as moral damages in line with Jugueta, and was correct in reducing the temperate damages from ₱400,000.00 to ₱25,000.00; while Deang undoubtedly suffered pecuniary loss, he failed to offer statements of accounts to prove actual damages, so temperate damages of ₱25,000.00 is sufficient in conformity with prevailing jurisprudence. All monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the finality of the Decision until full payment.

• Conspiracy — Definition and Requisites — Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. To prove conspiracy, the prosecution must establish: (1) that two or more persons came to an agreement; (2) that the agreement concerned the commission of a crime; and (3) that the execution of the felony was decided upon. Except in the case of the mastermind, it must also be shown that the accused performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. While direct proof of a previous agreement need not be established in most instances, since conspiracy may be deduced from the acts of the accused pointing to a joint purpose, concerted action, and community of interest, the existence of conspiracy cannot be presumed and its elements must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. In this case, the Court found that the killing of Rabang arose from a sudden burst of emotions following an unexpected scuffle, and no prior agreement or community of intention to kill was established.
• Complicity — Definition and Requisites — Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code defines accomplices as persons who, not being included in Article 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts. An accomplice is one who knows the criminal design of the principal and cooperates knowingly or intentionally by supplying material or moral aid for the efficacious execution of the crime. The requisites of complicity are: (a) community of design, that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, the accused concurs in the latter's purpose; (b) cooperation in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts; and (c) a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice. The Court applied these requisites in holding that Pascual, fully aware of Glicerio's criminal design, cooperated in the execution of acts which led to Rabang's death, but that his role was of a minor character and not indispensable in the consummation of the crime.
• Accomplice Distinguished from Conspirator — Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed, but they assent to the plan and cooperate in its accomplishment. The line that separates a conspirator by concerted action from an accomplice by previous or simultaneous acts is slight, and in cases of doubt as to whether persons acted as principals or accomplices, the doubt must be resolved in their favor and they should be held guilty as accomplices.
• Doubt as to Degree of Participation Resolved in Favor of Milder Liability — Where the quantum of proof required to establish conspiracy is lacking, the doubt created as to whether the accused acted as principal or accomplice is always resolved in favor of the milder form of criminal liability, that of a mere accomplice. The Court applied this rule in reducing Pascual's liability from that of a principal by direct participation to that of an accomplice.
• Self-Defense — Requisites and Primordial Element — For self-defense to be appreciated, the accused must prove by clear and convincing evidence: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) the reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself or herself. Unlawful aggression is the primordial element, a condition sine qua non; if no unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is established, self-defense is unavailing because there would be nothing to repel. The Court held that petitioners' self-serving statements failed to prove unlawful aggression on the part of Deang, while the prosecution established that petitioners' group was the unlawful aggressor.
• Voluntary Surrender — Requisites — For voluntary surrender to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the following requisites must be present: (1) the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself or herself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and (3) the surrender was voluntary. The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself or herself up and submit to the authorities either because of acknowledgment of guilt or the wish to save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for the search and capture. Where the clear reason for the supposed surrender is the inevitability of arrest and the need to ensure the accused's safety, the surrender is not spontaneous. The Court held that Pascual's surrender on August 30, 2000, more than two years after the warrant of arrest issued on April 1, 1998, was neither voluntary nor spontaneous.
• Apportionment of Civil Liability Among Principals, Accomplices, and Accessories — The courts' discretion in awarding civil liability in criminal cases is not untrammeled and must be guided by the principle behind differing liabilities for persons with varying roles in the commission of the crime. The entire amount of the civil indemnity, together with the moral and actual damages, should be apportioned among the persons who cooperated in the commission of the crime according to the degree of their liability, respective responsibilities, and actual participation in the criminal act. Each principal should shoulder a greater share in the total amount of indemnity and damages than every accomplice, and each accomplice should be liable for a greater amount as against every accessory. The number of principals versus accomplices and accessories must also be considered, because a mechanical division may result in the accomplice's share exceeding that of each principal when the principals are numerous. In this case, the Court applied the rule that the principal is liable for two-thirds of the civil indemnity and moral damages while the accomplice pays one-third thereof, and extended the same proportion to actual damages and loss of earning capacity.
• Loss of Earning Capacity — Formula — Article 2206 of the Civil Code entitles the heirs of the victim to indemnification for loss of earning capacity. Under the formula laid down in People vs. Wahiman, net earning capacity equals life expectancy multiplied by the difference between gross annual income and living expenses, or two-thirds of [80 minus the age at the time of death] multiplied by [gross annual income less 50% thereof]. The Court applied this formula to compute the compensation for Rabang's loss of earning capacity at ₱2,004,000.00, then reduced Pascual's liability to one-third thereof, or ₱668,000.00, consistent with his status as a mere accomplice.

• "Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed, but they assent to the plan and cooperate in its accomplishment." — This passage states the canonical distinction between an accomplice and a conspirator, and supplies the ratio for holding that Pascual, though present at the locus criminis and cooperating in the killing, did not thereby become a conspirator.
• "In case of doubt as to the accused's participation, the doubt should be resolved in his favor. The rationale for this is that where the quantum of proof required to establish conspiracy is lacking, the doubt created as to whether accused acted as principal or accomplice will always be resolved in favor of the milder form of criminal liability, that of a mere accomplice." — This is the controlling rule that reduced Pascual's liability from that of a principal by direct participation to that of an accomplice, and it is the doctrinal core of the decision.
• "In self-defense, unlawful aggression is the primordial element, a condition sine qua non. If no unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is established, self-defense is unavailing because there would be nothing to repel." — This passage states the settled requisites of self-defense and explains why petitioners' plea failed: no unlawful aggression on the part of Deang was proven by clear and convincing evidence.
• "The person with greater participation in the commission of the crime should have a greater share in the civil liability than those who played a minor role in the crime or those who had no participation in the crime but merely profited from its effects. Each principal should shoulder a greater share in the total amount of indemnity and damages than every accomplice, and each accomplice should also be liable for a greater amount as against every accessory." — Quoted from People vs. Tampus and adopted by the Court, this passage supplies the principle governing the reduction of Pascual's civil liability to one-third of the amounts chargeable to the principal.

• Saldua vs. People, G.R. No. 210920, December 10, 2018, 889 SCRA 1 — Controlling precedent relied upon by the Court; it held that an accomplice should pay lesser civil liability than the principal, with the principal liable for two-thirds of the civil indemnity and moral damages and the accomplice for one-third thereof, and that the penalty and civil liability imposed must be commensurate to the degree of participation in the crime.
• People vs. Tampus, et al., 607 Phil. 296 (2009) — Followed and quoted at length; it held that the courts' discretion in awarding civil liability in criminal cases is not untrammeled and must be guided by the differing liabilities of persons with varying roles in the crime, and that the number of principals and accomplices must be considered in determining civil liability.
• People vs. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806 (2016) — Followed as to the amounts of damages for consummated homicide (₱50,000.00 civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 moral damages without exemplary damages, and ₱50,000.00 temperate damages when no documentary evidence of burial or funeral expenses is presented) and as to the awards of civil indemnity, moral damages, and temperate damages for Frustrated Homicide.
• People vs. Wahiman, 760 Phil. 368 (2015) — Followed for the formula computing loss of earning capacity, applied by the Court in arriving at ₱2,004,000.00 before reduction to one-third.
• People vs. Elijorde, 365 Phil. 640, 650 (1999) — Cited for the requisites of complicity, particularly the requirement of a relation between the acts of the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice.
• People vs. Fronda, 294 Phil. 80, 90 (1993) — Cited for the definition of an accomplice as one who knows the criminal design of the principal and cooperates knowingly or intentionally by supplying material or moral aid for the efficacious execution of the crime.
• People vs. De Vera, et al., 371 Phil. 563, 583-584 (1999) — Cited for the three requisites of conspiracy and for the rule that, except in the case of the mastermind, the accused must have performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.
• Tadena vs. People, G.R. No. 228610, March 20, 2019 — Cited for the requisites of voluntary surrender and the rule that surrender is not spontaneous where the reason is the inevitability of arrest and the need to ensure the accused's safety.
• Estrella vs. People, G.R. No. 212942, June 17, 2020 — Cited for the rule that findings of the trial court which are factual in nature and involve the credibility of witnesses are accorded respect, if not finality, by the appellate court, and that the Court will not reexamine or reevaluate evidence already analyzed and ruled upon by the trial court.
• People vs. Villanueva, 822 Phil. 821, 833 (2017) — Cited for the elements of self-defense and the primordial character of unlawful aggression.

• Article 8, Revised Penal Code — Defines conspiracy and proposal to commit felony, providing that a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The Court applied this provision in holding that the prosecution failed to establish the three requisites of conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt, so that Pascual could not be held a principal by direct participation.
• Article 17, Revised Penal Code — Enumerates who are considered principals: those who take a direct part in the execution of the act; those who directly force or induce others to commit it; and those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have been accomplished. The Court used this provision to distinguish principals from accomplices and to hold that Pascual's acts did not make him a principal by direct participation.
• Article 18, Revised Penal Code — Defines accomplices as persons who, not being included in Article 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts. This was the basis for convicting Pascual as an accomplice in the crime of Homicide.
• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Fixes the penalty for Homicide at reclusion temporal. The Court applied it in computing the penalty for Pascual as an accomplice (one degree lower, prision mayor) and, for Frustrated Homicide, the penalty next lower in degree (prision mayor), in both cases with the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
• Article 11, Revised Penal Code — Provides for the justifying circumstance of self-defense, which requires unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed, and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself or herself. The Court cited it in rejecting petitioners' self-defense claim for failure to prove unlawful aggression on the part of Deang.
• Article 2206, Civil Code of the Philippines — Provides that the amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances, and that the defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, the indemnity to be paid to the heirs and in every case assessed and awarded by the court. The Court applied it in awarding compensation for Rabang's loss of earning capacity, reduced to one-third as against Pascual.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied in fixing the minimum and maximum terms of the penalties imposed on Pascual as an accomplice in Homicide and on both petitioners for Frustrated Homicide, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances.

Leonen (Chairperson), Hernando, and Rosario, JJ., concur. Delos Santos, J., on official leave.