Pasamba vs. National Labor Relations Commission

A probationary employee may be dismissed before the expiration of the probationary period for failing to qualify as a regular employee under reasonable standards made known by the employer at the time of engagement, and the regular-employee requirement that serious misconduct relate to the employee’s duties under Article 282 does not apply. The employer may terminate probationary employment under Article 281 if the employee fails to meet those standards, including a Code of Discipline against slanderous utterances.

SLMC is a medical center whose business depends on the reputation of its medical practitioners; petitioner was its probationary staff nurse, and Dr. Lopez was Assistant Chairman of its Department of Pediatrics. Article 281 of the Labor Code governs probationary employment and permits termination for just cause or failure to qualify under reasonable standards made known by the employer at the time of engagement. Article 282, by contrast, lists grounds for dismissing regular employees.

Petitioner Jennifer Fabello Pasamba was employed as a staff nurse by SLMC on 3 July 2001 on probationary status for a maximum of six months. On 15 October 2001, Dr. Pacita J. M. Lopez, Assistant Chairman of the Department of Pediatrics, filed a complaint with Lydia Cabigao, Vice President for Nursing, against petitioner for uttering slanderous remarks against her. Dr. Lopez attached a letter dated 10 October 2001 written by Hazel S. Cabales, mother of a patient, relaying an incident in which petitioner allegedly made remarks against Dr. Lopez: “Bakit si Dra. Lopez pa ang napili mong ‘pedia’ eh ang tanda-tanda na n’un? x x x Alam mo ba, kahit wala namang diperensya yung baby, ipinapa-isolate nya? Minsan nga, meron bagong baby siyang pasyente na ipinasok dito, sabi ko, bah, himala! Walang ikinabit sa kanya. Tapos, kinabukasan . . . kinabitan din pala!”

On 16 October 2001, SLMC issued a Memorandum requiring petitioner to reply in writing to Dr. Lopez’s complaint. In a Letter dated 18 October 2001, petitioner, through counsel, denied making the statement attributed to her by Cabales and claimed that Cabales had merely concocted the story after petitioner barred Cabales from staying in the Intermediate Maternity Care Unit (IMCU), since visitors were not allowed to do so. SLMC conducted a hearing on 19 October 2001, where petitioner was given an opportunity to be heard and confront Cabales, who was present; during the hearing, petitioner stated that she had nothing more to add to her letter dated 18 October 2001. Another Memorandum was sent to petitioner by SLMC on 25 October 2001, directing her to explain why disciplinary action should not be taken against her for violating Rule IV, Article 2 of the SLMC Code of Discipline, which covered (a) libelous utterances or publications tending to cause dishonor, discredit, or contempt to the hospital, its employees, customers, and officers; or (b) slanderous utterances causing embarrassment to the hospital, its employees, customers, and officers. In a Letter dated 29 October 2001, petitioner adopted the explanation in her 18 October 2001 letter and demanded a reinvestigation. On 7 November 2001, SLMC notified petitioner by letter that she was found guilty of uttering slanderous and derogatory remarks against Dr. Lopez and terminated her employment.

On 21 December 2001, petitioner filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter. In her Position Paper, she attached statements dated 21 November 2001 by Veronica A. Ramos and Mary Jean Parcon. Ramos recounted an incident in which she advised the husband of Hazel Cabales not to stay in the vicinity of the IMCU outside visiting hours. Parcon averred that in a conversation she overheard on 7 September 2001 between Cabales and petitioner, Dr. Lopez was never mentioned. Petitioner also attached a statement by Evengeline Aguilan Cambri commending her professional attitude and alleging that she never heard petitioner disparage Dr. Lopez, as well as statements by Nayma Magallanes and Charito Cruz, former patients whose newborn children were placed under petitioner’s care, saying they were highly satisfied with her services.

SLMC presented the Employment Contract as evidence of petitioner’s probationary status. It alleged that petitioner was informed of the standards by which probationary employees are evaluated and the rules all employees must comply with during a seminar held for that purpose, and it presented an Attendance Sheet, the evaluation form petitioner filled out, and a Certification dated 3 January 2002 showing that she attended the seminar and received a copy of the SLMC Code of Discipline.

The Labor Arbiter found that petitioner uttered the slanderous remarks against Dr. Lopez. It considered the statements made on petitioner’s behalf—that the affiants never heard her utter the slanderous words—inconclusive to prove she never actually uttered them. It found that Cabales had no motive to fabricate the statements she attributed to petitioner, whom Cabales positively identified and confronted during the company hearing.

• Relation to Job: Petitioner argued that uttering slanderous remarks is not related to her work as a staff nurse and therefore cannot be a valid ground for dismissal; she cited Philippine Aeolus Automotive United Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission for the rule that serious misconduct or improper behavior warranting dismissal of a regular employee must relate to the performance of the employee’s duties.
• Penalty under Company Rules: Petitioner argued that the SLMC Code of Discipline prescribes only a 30-day suspension for slanderous utterances, so dismissal was invalid; she cited Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. vs. Court of Appeals.

• Binding Factual Findings: Whether the SC should overturn the unanimous factual findings of the Labor Arbiter, NLRC, and CA that petitioner uttered the slanderous remarks against Dr. Lopez.
• Relation to Job: Whether uttering slanderous remarks is related to petitioner’s job as a staff nurse such that it can be a ground for dismissal.
• Probationary Dismissal and Penalty: Whether petitioner’s dismissal is valid despite the SLMC Code of Discipline allegedly prescribing only a 30-day suspension for slanderous utterances, considering her probationary status.
• Due Process: Whether petitioner was afforded the notice and hearing required for a valid dismissal.

• Binding Factual Findings: No. The factual findings of administrative agencies are binding and final if supported by substantial evidence, especially where the Labor Arbiter, NLRC, and CA are in full agreement; the SC is not a trier of facts.
• Relation to Job: Yes. The remarks were related to SLMC’s legitimate standards for probationary employment; as a probationary employee, petitioner could be terminated for failing to qualify under reasonable standards made known to her, and the regular-employee rule under Article 282 did not apply.
• Probationary Dismissal and Penalty: Yes. Under Article 281, SLMC could terminate petitioner before the six-month probationary period for failing to meet the Code of Discipline; the employer cannot be compelled to retain a probationary employee who violated serious company rules, and the regular-employee case cited was inapplicable.
• Due Process: Yes. SLMC issued memoranda requiring her reply, held a hearing on 19 October 2001 which she attended, and notified her of termination by letter dated 7 November 2001 with the reasons.

• Binding Factual Findings: The SC held that factual findings of administrative agencies are generally binding and even final as long as supported by substantial evidence; this is especially true where the Labor Arbiter, NLRC, and CA agree. The SC is not a trier of facts; absent a showing that the administrative body acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, the findings shall not be disturbed. The evidence supported the finding: Cabales, a disinterested person, attested that petitioner made defamatory statements; Cabales appeared at the 19 October 2001 hearing so petitioner could confront her, but petitioner failed to question her; Cabales had no motive to fabricate. Petitioner’s self-serving allegation of grudge was unconvincing; it was unlikely Cabales reported the incident simply because petitioner prohibited her from lingering within restricted premises, and although petitioner sought to prove other nurses had prohibited Cabales and her husband from doing the same, there was no showing Cabales vengefully filed complaints against those other nurses. The positive statements of Cabales could not be defeated by the suspiciously evasive and indirect allegations of petitioner’s witnesses that defamatory statements were not made within their hearing; even if true, those statements would not discount that the remarks were truly made, although unheard by the witnesses. Statements by former patients commending petitioner’s performance did not put into question the incident related by Cabales. Petitioner failed to present evidence sufficient to overturn the unanimous findings.
• Relation to Job: The SC rejected petitioner’s reliance on Philippine Aeolus Automotive United Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission. Petitioner was not dismissed for serious misconduct under Article 282; she was a probationary employee under Article 281. A probationary employee is one who, for a given period, is observed and evaluated to determine qualification for a permanent position; a probationary appointment affords the employer an opportunity to observe the skill, competence, and attitude of the probationer. Article 281 allows termination for just cause or failure to qualify as a regular employee under reasonable standards made known at engagement. The law does not preclude the employer from terminating probationary employment if the employer finds the employee not qualified for regular employment. As long as termination is for reasons under Article 281 before the expiration of the six-month probationary period, the employer is within its rights to sever the employer-employee relationship; a contrary interpretation would contravene the clear meaning of “probationary.” The law protecting laborer rights authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer. The provision that the probationary period shall not exceed six months means the probationary employee may be dismissed for cause at any time before the expiration of six months after hiring; if after working for less than six months the employee is found unfit, the employee can be dismissed; if the employee continues beyond six months, the employee is considered regular. SLMC notified petitioner of the standards: the Employment Contract provided strict compliance with the Code of Conduct, stated that SLMC would determine suitability including work habits, personal characteristics, and fitness prior to regularization, and allowed termination at management’s discretion if petitioner failed to qualify based on SLMC work standards; it also required strict compliance with the Code of Discipline and policies and stated that a copy would be issued at the start of probationary employment. Petitioner was informed that uttering slanderous remarks was an infraction; she attended the orientation seminar “Induction to St. Luke’s Family,” as evidenced by the Internal Customer Satisfaction Index Evaluations Form and Attendance Sheet, and the Certification issued by Luvie de los Reyes and Geraldine Dimalibot affirmed that the seminar covered the Code of Discipline. Rule IV, Article 2 of the Code prohibited libelous and slanderous utterances. Petitioner’s allegation that the remarks were unrelated to her tasks deserved scant consideration: SLMC’s business survival depended on the reputation of its medical practitioners, and imputing unethical behavior and lack of professionalism to a medical professional who was also a hospital official was inimical to SLMC’s interests and showed tremendous disloyalty. Petitioner’s bad faith was evident when she addressed the disparaging remarks to a former patient whose child was then a patient in SLMC and entrusted to the care of the medical professional in question. An employer cannot be compelled to retain an employee guilty of acts inimical to its interests and has the right to dismiss employees guilty of dishonesty and disloyalty as a measure of self-protection; dismissal for such a serious infraction was reasonable.
• Probationary Dismissal and Penalty: The SC rejected petitioner’s claim that the Code penalized slanderous utterances with only a 30-day suspension, not dismissal, as contrary to basic knowledge and common sense. Petitioner violated the Code of Discipline, which contained the standards she knew she must comply with before she could be accorded regular status. An employer cannot be compelled to continue employing a probationary employee who, as early as three months after hiring, had shown herself inclined to violate the more serious company rules. Petitioner could not put herself on the same plane as regular employees, who had proven their suitability and loyalty and therefore enjoyed a more secure tenure. In Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. vs. Court of Appeals, the SC held that the employer cannot dismiss a regular employee for an offense to which the company’s Service Manual assigned a vague penalty, and the employer there also failed to comply with procedural due process; that case involved a regular employee who worked with the company for no less than eight years and was not applicable to petitioner’s probationary dismissal.
• Due Process: The SC found that the records clearly showed petitioner was afforded sufficient notice and hearing. SLMC issued the Memorandum dated 16 October 2001 requiring petitioner to reply to the complaint filed against her. Thereafter, a company hearing, which petitioner attended, was held on 19 October 2001. Lastly, SLMC notified petitioner, through a letter dated 7 November 2001, that her employment was terminated and explained the reasons therefor.

• Probationary employment under Article 281 — Probationary employment shall not exceed six months from the date the employee started working unless covered by an apprenticeship agreement stipulating a longer period; the services of a probationary employee may be terminated for a just cause or when the employee fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer at the time of engagement; an employee allowed to work after the probationary period is considered a regular employee. Applied: petitioner was probationary for a maximum of six months, and SLMC terminated her before expiration for violating the Code of Discipline, a standard made known to her.
• Reasonable standards made known — The employer must inform the probationary employee of the standards for regularization at the time of engagement. Applied: the Employment Contract required strict compliance with the SLMC Code of Discipline, and petitioner attended an orientation seminar where the Code was discussed and received a copy.
• Binding factual findings of administrative agencies — Findings of administrative agencies are generally binding and final if supported by substantial evidence, especially when the Labor Arbiter, NLRC, and CA agree; the SC is not a trier of facts. Applied: the SC upheld the unanimous finding that petitioner uttered the slanderous remarks.
• Probationary employee distinguished from regular employee — A probationary employee is observed and evaluated to determine qualification for a permanent position; the regular-employee requirement under Article 282 that serious misconduct relate to duties does not apply to probationary dismissal under Article 281. Applied: petitioner’s citation to Philippine Aeolus Automotive United Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission was rejected because she was probationary, not regular.
• Employer’s right to protect business reputation — An employer cannot be compelled to retain an employee guilty of acts inimical to its interests and has the right to dismiss employees guilty of dishonesty and disloyalty as a measure of self-protection. Applied: petitioner’s slanderous remarks against Dr. Lopez, addressed to a patient’s mother, were inimical to SLMC’s reputation and showed disloyalty.
• Due process in dismissal — Dismissal requires notice and hearing. Applied: SLMC issued memoranda, held a hearing petitioner attended, and sent a termination letter with reasons.

• “The factual findings of administrative agencies are generally held to be binding and even final as long as they are supported by substantial evidence in the record of the case.” — The SC used this rule to decline overturning the unanimous findings of the Labor Arbiter, NLRC, and CA that petitioner uttered the slanderous remarks.
• “The services of an employee hired on probationary basis may be terminated when he or she fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement.” — This is the Article 281 rule the SC applied to uphold petitioner’s dismissal as a probationary employee.
• “A probationary employee is one, who, for a given period of time, is being observed and evaluated to determine whether or not he is qualified for a permanent position.” — The SC used this definition to distinguish petitioner from a regular employee and reject her reliance on Article 282 cases.
• “An employer cannot be compelled to retain an employee who is guilty of acts inimical to the interests of the employer.” — The SC applied this to petitioner’s slanderous remarks against Dr. Lopez, which it found inimical to SLMC’s reputation and interests.

• Philippine Aeolus Automotive United Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 387 Phil. 250 (2000) — Distinguished; cited by petitioner for the rule that serious misconduct of a regular employee must relate to duties, but the SC held it inapplicable because petitioner was a probationary employee dismissed under Article 281, not a regular employee dismissed for serious misconduct under Article 282.
• Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-38482, 18 June 1976, 71 SCRA 470 — Distinguished; cited by petitioner on penalty, but the SC held it involved a regular employee who worked at least eight years, a vague penalty, and failure of procedural due process, unlike petitioner’s probationary dismissal with notice and hearing.
• Escorpizo vs. University of Baguio, 366 Phil. 166 (1999) — Followed; cited for the definition of a probationary employee as one observed and evaluated to determine qualification for a permanent position.
• International Catholic Migration Commission vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 72222, 30 January 1989, 169 SCRA 606 — Followed; cited with Escorpizo for the same definition of probationary employment.
• Prime Marine Services, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 358 Phil. 30 (1998) — Followed; cited for the rule that factual findings of administrative agencies are binding and final if supported by substantial evidence.
• Ilas vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. Nos. 90394-97, 7 February 1991, 193 SCRA 682 — Followed; cited for the rule that the SC is not a trier of facts and will not disturb administrative findings absent lack or excess of jurisdiction.
• Lopez vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 167385, 13 December 2005, 477 SCRA 596 — Followed; cited for the employer’s right to dismiss employees guilty of dishonesty and disloyalty as a measure of self-protection.
• MGG Marine Services, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 328 Phil. 1046 (1996) — Followed; cited with Lopez for the same employer right.

• Article 281, Labor Code — Probationary employment shall not exceed six months from the date the employee started working unless covered by an apprenticeship agreement stipulating a longer period; the services of a probationary employee may be terminated for a just cause or when the employee fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer at the time of engagement; an employee allowed to work after the probationary period is considered a regular employee. Applied: petitioner was probationary for a maximum of six months, and SLMC terminated her before expiration for failing to meet the Code of Discipline standards made known to her.
• Article 282, Labor Code — Lists grounds for dismissing regular employees, including serious misconduct. The SC mentioned it only to distinguish: petitioner was not dismissed for serious misconduct under Article 282 because she was a probationary employee under Article 281.
• Rule IV, Article 2, SLMC Code of Discipline — Prohibits libelous utterances or publications tending to cause dishonor, discredit, or contempt to the hospital, its employees, customers, and officers; and slanderous utterances causing embarrassment to the hospital, its employees, customers, and officers. Applied: petitioner was found guilty of uttering slanderous and derogatory remarks against Dr. Lopez, violating this rule.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — Governs a petition for review on certiorari. Applied: petitioner filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the CA Decision.