Pasagui vs. Villablanca

An action is not one for forcible entry within the exclusive jurisdiction of the municipal court unless the complaint alleges both the plaintiff's prior physical possession and deprivation thereof by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth.

Appellants Calixto Pasagui and Fausta Mosar alleged that on November 15, 1962, for P2,800.00, they bought from appellees Eustaquia Bocar and Catalina Bocar a 2.6814-hectare parcel of agricultural land in Hamindangon, Pastrana, Leyte. The corresponding document of sale was executed, notarized on the same date, and recorded in the Registry of Deeds of Tacloban, Leyte on November 16, 1962.

During the first week of February, 1963, defendants Ester T. Villablanca and her husband Zosimo Villablanca allegedly took possession of the property, harvesting coconuts from its plantation, thus depriving plaintiffs of its possession. According to the complaint, the Villablancas acted illegally and without any right whatsoever, and despite demands to surrender the property and its possession, they failed or refused to return it, causing P800.00 in damages. Eustaquia and Catalina Bocar were joined as defendants by virtue of the warranty clause in the deed of sale, with plaintiffs praying alternatively that the vendors pay P2,800.00 plus incidental expenses under Article 1555 of the Civil Code in case of eviction or loss of ownership.

The record indicated that appellants had not acquired physical possession of the land since its purchase, the decision later referring to the purchase date as November 12, 1962, and that their purpose in filing Civil Case No. 3285 was precisely to get possession of the property. The trial court found from the allegations that the case was for forcible entry and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

• Nature of Action: Petitioner argued that the action is not one for forcible entry inasmuch as the complaint contains no allegation that the deprivation of possession was effected through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.

• Jurisdiction: Respondent countered that the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the action being one of forcible entry.

• Jurisdiction — Forcible Entry: Whether the action pleaded in the complaint is one of forcible entry within the exclusive jurisdiction of the municipal court.
• Test for Jurisdiction: Whether jurisdiction in a forcible entry case is determined by the nature of the action pleaded as appears from the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought.

• Jurisdiction — Forcible Entry: No. The action was not for forcible entry because the complaint alleged neither prior physical possession nor dispossession by the means specified in Section 1, Rule 70.
• Test for Jurisdiction: Yes. Jurisdiction is determined by the nature of the action pleaded as appears from the allegations in the complaint, with the averments and character of relief sought consulted.

• Jurisdiction — Forcible Entry: For an action to be considered forcible entry, prior physical possession must be alleged together with deprivation by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court; otherwise Courts of First Instance retain jurisdiction. The complaint merely averred that the Villablancas illegally and without any right took possession and harvested coconuts, depriving plaintiffs of possession, without claiming appellants were ever in actual physical possession before that entry. The bare claim of deprivation as legal owners was insufficient, and no inference of force from unlawful entry and exclusion could arise absent prior actual possession. The prayer for alternative relief against the vendors for return of the price in case of eviction or loss of ownership further showed the suit was not the summary action of forcible entry.
• Test for Jurisdiction: What determines municipal court jurisdiction in a forcible entry case is the nature of the action pleaded as appears in the allegations of the complaint, ascertained from its averments and the character of the relief sought. Although execution of a deed of absolute sale in a public instrument is equivalent to delivery under Article 1498 of the Civil Code, that presumptive delivery holds only absent impediment to passing of the property and was negated by appellants' actual failure to obtain material possession. Since appellants sought precisely to get possession, constructive delivery did not convert the claim into forcible entry.

• Jurisdiction determined by allegations of complaint — Jurisdiction, particularly whether an action is for forcible entry within municipal court jurisdiction, is determined by the nature of the action pleaded as appears from the allegations in the complaint; the averments of the complaint and the character of the relief sought are consulted.
• Requisites of forcible entry — An action is for forcible entry only where the plaintiff alleges prior physical possession and deprivation thereof by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court; dispossession by any other means falls within the jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance, without need to await expiration of twelve months.
• Constructive delivery by public instrument — Execution of a deed of absolute sale in a public instrument is equivalent to delivery under Article 1498 of the Civil Code, but such presumptive delivery holds only when no impediment prevents passing of the property from vendor to vendee and is negated where the vendees actually failed to obtain material possession.

• "It is well-settled that what determines the jurisdiction of the municipal court in a forcible entry case is the nature of the action pleaded as appears from the allegations in the complaint." — States the controlling jurisdictional test, directing examination of the complaint's averments and relief sought.
• "In order that an action may be considered as one for forcible entry, it is not only necessary that the plaintiff should allege his prior physical possession of the property but also that he was deprived of his possession by any of the means provided in section 1, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court, namely: force, intimidation, threats, strategy and stealth." — Formulates the dual requisites whose absence removed the case from municipal court jurisdiction.
• "This presumptive delivery only holds true when there is no impediment that may prevent the passing of the property from the hands of the vendor into those of the vendee." — Limits constructive delivery by public instrument where material possession was never obtained.

• Cananay vs. Sarmiento, 79 Phil. 36 — Cited for the rule that the averments of the complaint and character of relief sought determine whether the action is forcible entry within municipal court jurisdiction.
• Valderama Lumber Manufacturer's Co., Inc. vs. L. S. Sarmiento, 5 SCRA 287, 291 — Cited to support that both prior physical possession and deprivation by the Rule 70 means must be alleged, otherwise Courts of First Instance have jurisdiction.
• Gumiran vs. Gumiran, 21 Phil. 174, 178-179 — Cited extensively for the insufficiency of a bare allegation of deprivation as owner, the requirement of specially alleging jurisdictional facts in courts of special jurisdiction, and that Section 80 (now Rule 70) does not cover all dispossessions.
• Montenegro vs. Roxas de Gomez, 58 Phil. 723; Masallo vs. Cesar, 39 Phil. 134; Addison vs. Felix and Tioco, 38 Phil. 404 — Cited for the limitation that presumptive delivery by public instrument is negated where material possession did not pass.

• Section 1, Rule 70, Revised Rules of Court — Provides the exclusive means of dispossession for forcible entry — force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth; applied to find the complaint deficient for omitting both prior possession and any such means.
• Article 1498, Civil Code of the Philippines — Provides that execution of a public instrument is equivalent to delivery; applied but held to be only presumptive and negated by appellants' failure to obtain material possession.
• Article 1555, Civil Code of the Philippines — Invoked in the complaint's alternative prayer against vendors for return of price plus incidental expenses in case of eviction or loss of ownership; cited as showing the action was not merely summary forcible entry.

Barredo, Actg. Chairman, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr. and Martin, JJ., concur. Fernando, Chairman, J., is on leave.