Paredes vs. Abad

Section 9, Article XVII of the Transitory Provisions of the New Constitution, by making the term of elective provincial, city, and municipal officials indefinite, did not render election protests moot or foreclose a challenge to the right of proclaimed officials to hold office; the Courts of First Instance retained jurisdiction over protests arising from the November 8, 1971 elections under Section 8, Article XVII. A judge is disqualified to continue hearing a case where a strained personal relationship with a party and related circumstances create reasonable doubt as to his impartiality, in strict observance of due process.

Petitioners Cresencio Paredes, Venancio Uyan, Belino C. Sunga, and Vicente O. Valley were candidates who filed election protests against private respondents Gualberto Lumauig, John Langbayan, Felino Cunanan, and Victor A. Amasa, who had been proclaimed elected in the November 8, 1971 elections to the offices of Governor and Vice-Governor of Ifugao, Mayor of Masantol, Pampanga, and Governor of Eastern Samar. The legal backdrop is the New Constitution ratified on January 17, 1973, particularly Section 9, Article XVII (continuation of existing officials and indefinite terms), Section 8, Article XVII (continuation of courts and pending cases), and Section 2, paragraph 2, Article XII-C (COMELEC as sole judge of certain election contests). In G.R. Nos. L-36927-28, the additional context is the prior opposition by Paredes and Uyan to Judge Abad's confirmation before the Commission on Appointments, the criminal charges they filed against him before the COMELEC, and his recommendation by private respondent Gualberto Lumauig and the latter's brother, Congressman Romulo Lumauig.

The election protests arose from the November 8, 1971 elections. Petitioners Cresencio Paredes and Venancio Uyan filed protests for Governor and Vice-Governor of Ifugao against Gualberto Lumauig and John Langbayan; Belino C. Sunga filed for Mayor of Masantol, Pampanga against Felino Cunanan; and Vicente O. Valley filed for Governor of Eastern Samar against Victor A. Amasa. The private respondents had been proclaimed elected and had assumed their respective positions for a four-year term. Under the Election Code of 1971, election protests were to be filed within fifteen days after proclamation, so under ordinary circumstances they should have been filed in or before January 1972. When the Constitutional Convention approved the New Constitution on November 29, 1972, the protests were already pending in different Courts of First Instance, and trial had been under way in many if not all of them.

The New Constitution was ratified on January 17, 1973. Section 9, Article XVII of its Transitory Provisions provided that all officials and employees in the existing Government shall continue in office until otherwise provided by law or decreed by the incumbent President, but officials whose appointments are vested in the Prime Minister shall vacate upon appointment and qualification of successors. The respondent Judges thereafter dismissed the election protests on the ground that under Section 9 the protests had become moot and academic: the private respondents were now holding their respective positions under a new term, indefinite in duration, because the original four-year term to which they had been elected expired upon ratification on January 17, 1973. The dismissal orders were dated April 17, 1973 in G.R. Nos. L-36927-28, August 24, 1973 in G.R. No. L-37715, and December 14, 1973 in G.R. No. L-38331.

In G.R. Nos. L-36927-28, an additional issue concerned Judge Francisco Men Abad of the Court of First Instance of Ifugao. Petitioners Paredes and Uyan sought his disqualification. They alleged that they had opposed the confirmation of his nomination to his present position before the Commission on Appointments; that they had filed criminal charges against him before the COMELEC for violation of the Election Code of 1971, which were still pending; and that he had been recommended to his present position by his co-respondent Gualberto Lumauig, the protestee in Election Case No. 5, and by Lumauig's brother, Congressman Romulo Lumauig.

In his memorandum before the Supreme Court, Judge Abad stated that the charges against him boiled down to alleged electioneering during the local elections. He said the Department of Justice had reminded him and similar officials through directives to remain in their places of assignment to attend to election matters within their jurisdictions; that petitioners' evidence consisted mainly of affidavits of alleged witnesses; that these were submitted to the COMELEC and the Commission on Appointments and passed close scrutiny; that Hungduan, Ifugao, where he was then accredited as Municipal Judge, was never included as one of the protested municipalities; and that the Commission on Appointments decided the case favorably and exonerated him. He added that petitioners opposed his confirmation, but the Commission found the allegations false and confirmed his appointment, giving him a "clean bill of health." He characterized the motive of the protestants as personal and devoid of merit.

• Dismissal Orders: Petitioners challenged the dismissal orders on certiorari, which had dismissed their election protests on the ground that Section 9, Article XVII of the New Constitution made the protests moot and academic.
• Disqualification of Judge Abad: Petitioners adduced the following reasons for disqualification: they opposed the confirmation of Judge Abad's nomination before the Commission on Appointments; they filed criminal charges against him before the COMELEC for violation of the Election Code of 1971, which were still pending; and he was recommended to his present position by private respondent Gualberto Lumauig and the latter's brother, Congressman Romulo Lumauig.

• Mootness: Respondent Judges dismissed the election protests on the ground that under Section 9, Article XVII, the private respondents were now holding their respective positions under a new indefinite term, the original four-year term having expired upon ratification of the New Constitution on January 17, 1973.
• COMELEC Jurisdiction: It was argued that the Courts of First Instance lost jurisdiction over the protests for Governor in G.R. No. L-36927 and G.R. No. L-38331, and for Vice-Governor in G.R. No. L-36928, because under the New Constitution the COMELEC is the sole judge of election contests of members of the National Assembly and elective provincial and city officials.
• Judge Abad's Defense: Judge Abad maintained that the charges against him boiled down to alleged electioneering; that the Department of Justice had reminded him and similar officials to remain in their places of assignment; that petitioners' evidence consisted mainly of affidavits; that these were submitted to the COMELEC and the Commission on Appointments and passed close scrutiny; that Hungduan, Ifugao, where he was accredited as Municipal Judge, was never included as a protested municipality; that the Commission on Appointments exonerated him and confirmed his appointment; and that petitioners' motive was personal and devoid of merit.

• Mootness and Right to Office: Whether the election protests filed by petitioners became moot and academic under Section 9, Article XVII of the Transitory Provisions of the New Constitution because the private respondents were allegedly holding their respective offices under a new indefinite term after the original four-year term expired upon ratification on January 17, 1973.
• Jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance: Whether the Courts of First Instance retained jurisdiction over the election protests for Governor and Vice-Governor despite the New Constitution making the COMELEC the sole judge of election contests of members of the National Assembly and elective provincial and city officials.
• Disqualification of Judge Abad: Whether Judge Francisco Men Abad should be disqualified from continuing to hear the election protests filed by Cresencio Paredes and Venancio Uyan against Gualberto Lumauig and John Langbayan.

• Mootness and Right to Office: No. Section 9 made the term indefinite but did not foreclose an election protest challenging the right to hold office; the private respondents' right arose principally from their having been proclaimed elected, and if they were not duly elected they should not enjoy the indefinite term.
• Jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance: Yes. Section 8, Article XVII continued the courts and provided that pending cases be heard under the laws then in force; Section 2, paragraph 2, Article XII-C did not refer to protests arising from the November 8, 1971 elections.
• Disqualification of Judge Abad: Yes. Judge Abad was declared disqualified to continue hearing the Ifugao protests for strict observance of due process because a strained personal relationship existed between him and petitioners.

• Mootness and Right to Office: Section 9, Article XVII made indefinite the four-year term of elective provincial, city, and municipal officials, but at ratification on January 17, 1973 that term had not yet expired; it was to expire on December 31, 1975. The law under which they were elected also provided for a hold-over. As far as elective officials are concerned, Section 9 refers only to those duly elected; they continue in office until otherwise provided by law or decreed by the incumbent President. A distinction exists between the "term" of office and the "right" to hold office. The term is the period during which an elected officer or appointee is entitled to hold office, perform functions, and enjoy privileges and emoluments; the right to hold public office is the just and legal claim to hold and enjoy the powers and responsibilities of the office. Section 9 affected the term, not the right; although the right of an incumbent legally holding office is co-extensive with the term. The right of private respondents to continue indefinitely arose not only from Section 9 but principally from their having been proclaimed elected in the November 8, 1971 elections. If they were not duly elected and had no right to hold office, they should not be allowed to enjoy the indefinite term. It was erroneous to conclude that their term expired and that they were holding under a new term; they held under the term to which they were elected, now indefinite. Ingles vs. Mutuc was cited: an indefinite term is deemed expired only when the appointing power ends the incumbent's services; for elective officials, only when law or decree of the incumbent President ends the services. The Constitutional Convention did not intend to shield or protect those unduly elected; otherwise election victories characterized by fraud, threats, intimidation, vote buying, or other irregularities would receive a stamp of approval, contrary to the goals of the New Society. Section 7, Article XVII provided that existing laws not inconsistent with the Constitution remain operative until amended, modified, or repealed by the National Assembly; Section 220 of the Election Code of 1971, giving petitioners the right to file an election contest, had not been amended, modified, or repealed.
• Jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance: Section 8, Article XVII provided that all courts existing at ratification continue and exercise jurisdiction until otherwise provided by law, and all cases pending shall be heard, tried, and determined under the laws then in force. The Courts of First Instance presided over by respondent Judges should continue to hear, try, and decide the election protests. The argument that they lost jurisdiction because the COMELEC is the sole judge of election contests of members of the National Assembly and elective provincial and city officials was rejected. The New Constitution was ratified on January 17, 1973; Section 2, paragraph 2, Article XII-C could not have referred to election protests filed as a result of the November 8, 1971 elections. Under the 1971 Election Code, election protests were to be filed within fifteen days after proclamation, so under ordinary circumstances they should have been filed in or before January 1972. When the Constitutional Convention approved the New Constitution on November 29, 1972, the present election protests and similar others were already pending in different Courts of First Instance, and trial had been under way in many if not all. The Constitutional Convention must have referred to these protests when it decreed that all courts existing at ratification continue and exercise jurisdiction and that pending cases be heard, tried, and determined under the laws then in force.
• Disqualification of Judge Abad: Pimentel vs. Salanga held that disqualification is not presumed; a judge is not legally prohibited from sitting merely because counsel or a party complains against him, and the matter is one of conscience. The Court nevertheless suggested voluntary inhibition where fairness might be impugned. In the case at bar, the Court went further. A strained personal relationship must have arisen between petitioners and Judge Abad: petitioners opposed his confirmation before the Commission on Appointments, filed criminal charges against him before the COMELEC, and he was recommended by private respondent Gualberto Lumauig and the latter's brother, Congressman Romulo Lumauig. Not only petitioners but also their political supporters might not have full faith, trust, and confidence in his impartiality. Due process requires the cold neutrality of an impartial judge; next in importance to rendering a righteous judgment is doing it in a manner that begets no suspicion of fairness and integrity. Luque vs. Kayanan and Mateo vs. Villaluz were cited as cases where disqualification or inhibition was required because of animosity, hostility, or circumstances impairing judicial objectivity. Judge Abad was therefore declared disqualified to continue hearing the Ifugao protests.

• Term vs. Right to Hold Office — A "term" of office is the period during which an elected officer or appointee is entitled to hold office, perform its functions, and enjoy its privileges and emoluments; a "right" to hold public office is the just and legal claim to hold and enjoy the powers and responsibilities of the office. Section 9, Article XVII affected the term, not the right; hence an election protest challenging the right to hold office was not foreclosed.
• Indefinite Term Under Section 9, Article XVII — Section 9 made the terms of elective provincial, city, and municipal officials indefinite, but it did not shield unduly elected officials. Officials continue under the term to which they were elected until otherwise provided by law or decreed by the incumbent President. The provision did not render pending election protests moot.
• Continuation of Courts and Pending Cases Under Section 8, Article XVII — All courts existing at the time of ratification continue and exercise jurisdiction until otherwise provided by law, and all pending cases shall be heard, tried, and determined under the laws then in force. This preserved the jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance over the election protests.
• COMELEC as Sole Judge Under Section 2, Article XII-C — The provision making the COMELEC the sole judge of election contests of members of the National Assembly and elective provincial and city officials did not apply to election protests arising from the November 8, 1971 elections, because those protests were already pending when the New Constitution was approved.
• Existing Laws Remain Operative Under Section 7, Article XVII — Existing laws not inconsistent with the New Constitution remain operative until amended, modified, or repealed by the National Assembly. Section 220 of the Election Code of 1971, which gave petitioners the right to file an election contest, remained in force.
• Due Process and Judicial Disqualification — Due process requires the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. Disqualification is not presumed, but a judge may be disqualified where a strained personal relationship with a party and related circumstances create reasonable doubt as to his impartiality. Judge Abad was declared disqualified to continue hearing the Ifugao protests.
• Hold-over Doctrine — The law under which the elective officials were elected provided for a hold-over, which supported the conclusion that their four-year term had not expired upon ratification of the New Constitution.

• "There is a difference between the "term" of office and the "right" to hold an office. A "term" of office is the period during which an elected officer or appointee is entitled to hold office, perform its functions and enjoy its privileges and emoluments. A "right" to hold a public office is the just and legal claim to hold and enjoy the powers and responsibilities of the office." — This passage states the central distinction on which the ruling on mootness rests, separating the duration of office from the legal claim to hold it.
• "It is erroneous to conclude that under Section 9, Art. XVII of the New Constitution, the term of office of the private respondents expired, and that they are now holding their respective offices under a new term. We are of the opinion that they hold their respective offices still under the term to which they have been elected, although the same is now indefinite." — This is the ratio decidendi rejecting the respondent Judges' mootness theory.
• "The Constitutional Convention could not have intended, as in fact it did not intend, to shield or protect those who had been unduly elected." — This passage explains why the indefinite term did not bar election protests against the right to hold office.
• "But in the case at bar, we would like to go one step further and hold that for the strict observance of the rule of due process, the respondent Judge Abad is hereby declared disqualified to continue hearing the election protests filed by Cresencio Paredes and Venancio Uyan against the private respondents Gualberto Lumauig and John Langbayan." — This is the dispositive ruling on the disqualification of Judge Abad.

• Ingles vs. Mutuc, L-20390, November 29, 1968, 26 SCRA 171 — Cited for the rule that an indefinite term of a confidential employee is deemed expired only when the appointing power ends the incumbent's services; applied by analogy to the indefinite term of elective officials under Section 9.
• Pimentel vs. Salanga, L-27934, September 18, 1967, 21 SCRA 160 — Cited for the rule that disqualification is not presumed and a judge is not legally prohibited from sitting merely because a party complains against him; the Court suggested voluntary inhibition but went further to disqualify Judge Abad.
• Luque vs. Kayanan, L-26826, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 165 — Cited for due process and judicial impartiality; animosity and hostility between a party or counsel and the judge required inhibition.
• Mateo, et al. vs. Villaluz, L-34756, March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 18 — Cited for disqualification where the judge had subscribed an extrajudicial statement later repudiated, impairing objectivity and the due process requirement of an impartial tribunal.

• Section 9, Article XVII, New Constitution — All officials and employees in the existing Government continue in office until otherwise provided by law or decreed by the incumbent President; officials whose appointments are vested in the Prime Minister vacate upon appointment and qualification of successors. The Court held it made terms indefinite but did not moot election protests or affect the right to hold office.
• Section 8, Article XVII, New Constitution — All courts existing at ratification continue and exercise jurisdiction until otherwise provided by law, and all pending cases shall be heard, tried, and determined under the laws then in force. This was the basis for the Courts of First Instance retaining jurisdiction.
• Section 2, paragraph 2, Article XII-C, New Constitution — The COMELEC is the sole judge of contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of Members of the National Assembly and elective provincial and city officials. The Court held it did not apply to protests arising from the November 8, 1971 elections.
• Section 7, Article XVII, New Constitution — Existing laws not inconsistent with the New Constitution remain operative until amended, modified, or repealed by the National Assembly. Section 220 of the Election Code of 1971 remained operative.
• Section 220, Election Code of 1971 — An ordinary election contest for a provincial, city, municipal, or municipal district office shall be filed with the proper Court of First Instance within fifteen days after proclamation. This was the source of petitioners' right to file an election contest.
• Section 9, Election Code of 1971 — Officials elected shall assume office on the first day of January next following and shall hold office for four years and until their successors shall have been elected and qualified. This was cited to show that the law provided for a hold-over.
• Section 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court — Cited in the Pimentel excerpt as the basis for voluntary inhibition; the Court's disqualification of Judge Abad was grounded on strict observance of due process.

Makalintal, C.J., Zaldivar, Fernando, Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma, and Aquino, JJ., concurred. Castro and Teehankee, JJ., concurred in the result. Barredo, J., also concurred but took no part in G.R. No. L-37715.