Paredes, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan

The Court will not interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of investigatory and prosecutory discretion absent a clear showing of grave abuse thereof, and political motivation behind a criminal complaint does not justify prohibiting prosecution where the evidence supports a finding of probable cause.

Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. was the provincial governor of Agusan del Sur, and Mansueto J. Honrada was the clerk of court of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur. Teofilo Gelacio, the vice mayor of San Francisco, was a political adversary of Paredes, Jr. The dispute centers on records from Criminal Case No. 1393, a perjury charge filed against Paredes, Jr. in 1984 before the MCTC, which was dismissed on March 24, 1986 upon motion of the prosecution. The falsification charges arose from certifications allegedly executed by Honrada, at the behest of Paredes, Jr. and his counsel Atty. Generoso Sansaet, stating that an arraignment had been held in Criminal Case No. 1393 on July 9, 1985, when the presiding judge certified that the case had never reached the arraignment stage. These certifications were used to support a motion for reconsideration in Criminal Case No. 13800, a separate anti-graft case pending against Paredes, Jr. before the Sandiganbayan, on the ground of double jeopardy.

In 1984, Teofilo Gelacio filed a perjury complaint against Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. before the MCTC of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1393, alleging that Paredes, Jr. had made false statements in a 1975 affidavit supporting his application for a free patent. The case was dismissed on March 24, 1986 upon motion of the prosecution, after the presiding judge, Ciriaco C. Ariño, suspended action pending a review petitioned by Paredes, Jr. before the Ministry of Justice. Judge Ariño later certified that Criminal Case No. 1393 had "never reached the arraignment stage."

On October 28, 1986, Gelacio filed another complaint against Paredes, Jr., this time for violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), alleging that Paredes, Jr., as Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, had unduly influenced the Public Land Inspector to approve his free patent application. This case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 13800 before the Sandiganbayan. Paredes, Jr. moved to quash the information; the motion was denied, and he filed a motion for reconsideration. In support of that motion for reconsideration, Paredes, Jr. submitted certifications from MCTC clerk of court Mansueto J. Honrada stating that an arraignment had been held in Criminal Case No. 1393 on July 9, 1985 — specifically, a Notice of Arraignment dated July 1, 1985 and a Transcript of Stenographic Notes dated July 9, 1985, both certified as true copies, along with a certification dated March 24, 1986. These documents were used to argue that the anti-graft case should be dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy. The Sandiganbayan dismissed Criminal Case No. 13800 on August 1, 1991, although on the ground of prescription; the Office of the Ombudsman's petition for review was dismissed by the Supreme Court on July 3, 1992 in G.R. No. 101724.

On January 23, 1990, Gelacio filed a complaint for falsification of public documents against Honrada, Paredes, Jr., and Atty. Generoso Sansaet (Paredes, Jr.'s counsel in Criminal Case No. 1393), alleging that they had conspired to certify as true copies of court records showing an arraignment that never took place. A preliminary investigation was conducted by Public Prosecutor Albert Axalan, who had been deputized to assist the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao. Paredes, Jr. denied the charges, claiming they were politically motivated, while Honrada maintained that an arraignment had indeed been held. Sansaet corroborated Honrada, stating in an affidavit that he was present during the arraignment and calling Judge Ariño's certification the product "of a faltering mind."

Before Prosecutor Axalan's resolution could be acted upon, Sansaet retracted his earlier statement. In an Affidavit of Explanations and Rectifications dated July 29, 1991, Sansaet claimed that no arraignment had actually been held in Criminal Case No. 1393 and that Honrada had made false certifications used to support the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 13800. Paredes, Jr. attributed this retraction to political estrangement with Sansaet, who had lost to Paredes, Jr. in the May 11, 1992 congressional elections and had subsequently allied himself with Democrito Plaza and Gelacio. Honrada, for his part, continued to insist that the certifications were truthful.

The reopening of the investigation was assigned to Graft Investigation Officer II Gay Maggie Balajadia-Violan, who recommended on February 24, 1992 that Paredes, Jr., Honrada, and Sansaet be charged with falsification of public documents. Her recommendation was indorsed by Deputy Ombudsman Cesar Nitorreda to Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez, who referred it to Special Prosecution Officer III Erdulfo Querubin for review. Querubin concurred but suggested filing three separate informations, since three documents were involved. Ombudsman Vasquez approved on June 26, 1992, and three informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 17791, 17792, and 17793.

Petitioners moved to quash the informations, but the Sandiganbayan denied the motion on August 25, 1992, as well as the motion for reconsideration. Petitioners then moved for reinvestigation, raising the same grounds: that the resolution was prepared by Violan, who allegedly had no part in the investigation; that Violan relied solely on Sansaet's retraction and Judge Ariño's certification while disregarding evidence in petitioners' favor; and that Querubin could not be expected to act fairly because he had been the prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 13800. The Sandiganbayan directed the prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation, but Special Prosecution Officer Carlos D. Montemayor recommended denial in a resolution dated December 9, 1992, finding no newly-discovered evidence or denial of due process. This was approved by Special Prosecutor Aniano Desierto and Ombudsman Vasquez, and the Sandiganbayan set the cases for trial.

• Due Process in Preliminary Investigation: Petitioners contended that their constitutional right to due process was violated at various stages of the preliminary investigation, specifically because the resolution recommending the filing of charges was not prepared by the prosecutor who initially conducted the investigation (Prosecutor Axalan) but by GIO II Violan, who allegedly had no part in the investigation.
• Bias and Partiality of Investigators: Petitioners argued that Violan was biased because she gave credence to Judge Ariño's certification despite his later affidavit expressing reluctance to have it used as evidence, and because she considered Sansaet's retraction, which petitioners claimed was inadmissible as a violation of attorney-client privilege under Rule 130, Section 24(b) of the Rules of Court. Petitioners further contended that Prosecutor Querubin was biased because he had handled the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 13800 against Paredes, Jr. and had sought review of its dismissal before the Supreme Court.
• Forum-Shopping: Petitioners maintained that Gelacio engaged in forum-shopping by filing multiple cases arising from the same incident — Paredes, Jr.'s free patent application — and that the present falsification charges were merely the latest in a series of harassment suits.
• Political Harassment and Lack of Probable Cause: Petitioners alleged that the charges were politically motivated, trumped up by political enemies including Congressman Democrito Plaza and Gelacio, and that there was no prima facie evidence to support the falsification charges. They cited affidavits alleging that Congressman Plaza had threatened Judge Ariño to secure the certification, and argued that Honrada's certifications were public instruments whose contents were conclusive under Rule 132, Section 23 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.

• Due Process in Preliminary Investigation: Whether the preparation of the resolution recommending the filing of charges by a graft investigation officer who did not conduct the initial preliminary investigation, but who was assigned after a key witness retracted his earlier affidavit, constituted a violation of petitioners' right to due process.
• Bias and Partiality of Investigators: Whether the investigating officers' reliance on Judge Ariño's certification and Sansaet's retraction, and Querubin's prior involvement in a related case, demonstrated bias and partiality that vitiated the preliminary investigation.
• Forum-Shopping: Whether the filing of the falsification charges constituted forum-shopping, given that multiple cases had been filed by the same complainant against the same defendant arising from the same underlying incident.
• Political Harassment and Probable Cause: Whether political motivation behind the complaint and alleged lack of probable cause justified enjoining the criminal prosecution.

• Due Process in Preliminary Investigation: No. The assignment of the resolution to a different investigating officer after a material development — Sansaet's retraction — did not violate due process, as the new investigator based her recommendation on the evidence on record.
• Bias and Partiality of Investigators: No. The investigators' consideration of Judge Ariño's certification and Sansaet's retraction did not demonstrate bias; Judge Ariño never retracted his certification, and Violan herself acknowledged the retraction's potential inadmissibility. Querubin's prior handling of a related case did not establish bias, as a public prosecutor's duty is to seek justice, not personal vindictiveness.
• Forum-Shopping: No. The several cases filed involved different transactions, facts, circumstances, and causes of action, even though they arose from the same underlying incident; a single act may give rise to distinct criminal and administrative liabilities.
• Political Harassment and Probable Cause: No. Political motivation behind a complaint does not justify prohibiting prosecution where probable cause exists, and the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause was supported by the evidence and did not constitute grave abuse of discretion.

• Due Process in Preliminary Investigation: The initial investigation was conducted by Prosecutor Axalan, but before his resolution could be acted upon, Sansaet retracted his earlier affidavit — a material development requiring the reopening of the investigation, reevaluation of evidence, and preparation of a new resolution. Violan was designated to conduct the investigation and prepare the report. The Court analogized this to a situation where one judge hears a case but, unable to finish, another judge renders the decision based on the evidence on record — an arrangement that has never been thought to raise due process concerns. What matters is that the decision-maker bases the decision on the record, not that the same person conducted the investigation from start to finish. The decision to charge was moreover the product of multiple layers of review: Violan's recommendation, Nitorreda's indorsement, Querubin's concurrence, and Vasquez's approval.

• Bias and Partiality of Investigators: Judge Ariño's subsequent affidavit did not repudiate his earlier certification that Criminal Case No. 1393 "never reached the arraignment stage"; he merely stated that he had not expected the certificate to be used as evidence and that its use was "against his conscience" because the cases were politically motivated. The fact that he did not anticipate its evidentiary use does not diminish the truth of the certification. As for Sansaet's retraction, nothing in Violan's resolution showed that she based her conclusion of probable guilt on it; she merely noted that the "confession of Atty. Sansaet has important bearing in this case," while acknowledging that the retraction might be inadmissible as a violation of attorney-client privilege. The admissibility of the retraction was a question for the Sandiganbayan, not a ground for ascribing bias to the investigator. A mere divergence of opinions between a judge and a party's counsel on applicable law is not sufficient to disqualify the judge for bias. As for Querubin, his prior handling of Criminal Case No. 13800 did not establish bias; as a public prosecutor, his obligation was to see that justice was done, not to win a case, and it could not be casually assumed that his engagement in that case caused him to forsake his duty. His only contribution to the process was suggesting the filing of three separate informations.

• Forum-Shopping: The test for forum-shopping is whether the several actions filed involve the same transactions, essential facts, and circumstances. Although the several cases arose from the same underlying incident — Paredes, Jr.'s free patent application — they involved different facts, circumstances, and causes of action. Criminal Case No. 1393 was for perjury based on false statements in the patent application. Criminal Case No. 13800 was for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act based on alleged undue influence on the Public Land Inspector. The present cases (Criminal Case Nos. 17791, 17792, and 17793) were for falsification of court records pertaining to Criminal Case No. 1393. A.P. Case No. P-90-396 was an administrative case against Honrada. A single act may offend against two or more distinct provisions of law, and the same act may give rise to both criminal and administrative liability; these may be prosecuted simultaneously or successively so long as double jeopardy is not violated. The dismissal of the administrative case against Honrada did not bar criminal prosecution, as an absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to administrative prosecution, and vice versa.

• Political Harassment and Probable Cause: Political motivation behind the filing of charges cannot justify prohibiting a criminal prosecution if there is otherwise evidence to support them. A preliminary investigation was held during which petitioners were heard, and their evidence was considered in detail in Violan's resolution, which was reviewed by Querubin and approved by the Ombudsman. The Court is loath to interfere with the Ombudsman's discretion unless clearly abused, as the Ombudsman's investigatory and prosecutory powers are constitutionally granted, and judicial review of every exercise of prosecutorial discretion would grievously hamper court functions. While exceptions exist — such as where injunction protects constitutional rights, where there is a prejudicial question, where double jeopardy is apparent, where the prosecution is persecution rather than prosecution, or where there is clearly no prima facie case — none of these was present. The affidavits of Atty. Nueva and Judge Ariño went to the weight of evidence, which is for the trial court's appreciation. A preliminary investigation is not a trial; its function is merely to determine probable cause, which requires only a reasonable ground to believe the offense was committed, not evidence sufficient for conviction. To establish political harassment justifying the extraordinary writs, petitioners had to show that the public prosecutor, not merely the private complainant, acted in bad faith or lent himself to a scheme of harassment. Petitioners did not allege, much less show, that their political enemies had influence over the national prosecution service.

• Non-Interference with Ombudsman's Discretion — The Court will not interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of investigatory and prosecutory discretion unless such discretion is clearly shown to have been abused, based on respect for the Ombudsman's constitutionally granted powers and on practicality, as otherwise the courts would be swamped with petitions assailing the dismissal or filing of cases. Exceptions exist where: (a) injunction is necessary to protect constitutional rights of the accused; (b) necessary for orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; (c) there is a prejudicial question sub judice; (d) acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (e) prosecution is under an invalid law; (f) double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (g) the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (h) it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; (i) charges are manifestly false and motivated by lust for vengeance; (j) there is clearly no prima facie case and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied; and (k) a preliminary injunction has been issued to prevent unlawful arrest.

• Forum-Shopping Test — There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another. The mere filing of several cases based on the same incident does not necessarily constitute forum-shopping; the test is whether the several actions involve the same transactions, essential facts, and circumstances. A single act may offend against two or more distinct provisions of law, or give rise to both criminal and administrative liability, and these may be prosecuted simultaneously or successively so long as double jeopardy is not violated.

• Probable Cause in Preliminary Investigation — Probable cause is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well-founded — a state of facts that would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to entertain an honest or strong suspicion that a thing is so. It does not import absolute certainty and does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction; it is enough that the act or omission complained of is believed to constitute the offense charged.

• Political Harassment as Ground for Injunction — To warrant a finding of political harassment justifying the extraordinary writs of certiorari and prohibition, it must be shown that the complainant possesses the power and influence to control the prosecution of cases and that the public prosecutor, not just the private complainant, is acting in bad faith or has lent himself to a scheme of harassment.

• "The mere filing of several cases based on the same incident does not necessarily constitute forum-shopping. The test is whether the several actions filed involve the same transactions, essential facts, and circumstances." — This passage articulates the controlling test for forum-shopping, distinguishing it from the filing of multiple cases arising from a common underlying incident but involving different causes of action.

• "Indeed, this Court is loath to interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman unless such discretion is clearly shown to have been abused." — This statement captures the governing principle of judicial non-interference with the Ombudsman's constitutionally vested investigatory and prosecutory powers, a doctrine frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence.

• "What is important is that the judge who decides does so on the basis of the evidence in record. It does not matter that he did not conduct the hearing of that case from the beginning." — This passage, offered by analogy, defines the due process standard for preliminary investigations conducted by successive investigating officers: the decision must be based on the record, regardless of who conducted the initial proceedings.

• "A preliminary investigation is not a trial. The function of the government prosecutor during the preliminary investigation is merely to determine the existence of probable cause." — This formulation distinguishes the limited purpose of preliminary investigation from a full trial and is commonly cited to explain why evidentiary questions are reserved for the trial court.

• Crisostomo vs. Securities and Exchange Commission, 179 SCRA 146 (1989) — Cited for the definition of forum-shopping: the seeking of a favorable opinion in another forum as a result of an adverse opinion in one, other than by appeal or certiorari.
• GSIS vs. Sandiganbayan, 191 SCRA 655 (1990) — Cited for the proposition that the test for forum-shopping is whether the several actions involve the same transactions, essential facts, and circumstances.
• Young vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 228 SCRA 718 (1993) — Cited as the controlling authority for the rule that the Court will not interfere with the Ombudsman's discretion absent grave abuse, based on respect for constitutional powers and practicality.
• Brocka vs. Enrile, 192 SCRA 183 (1990) — Cited for the enumerated exceptions to the general rule of non-interference with criminal prosecution, including protection of constitutional rights, prejudicial questions, double jeopardy, persecution rather than prosecution, and absence of prima facie case.
• Pilapil vs. Sandiganbayan, 221 SCRA 349 (1993) — Cited for the definition of probable cause as a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is well-founded, and for the principle that a preliminary investigation does not require inquiry into sufficiency of evidence for conviction.
• Maceda vs. Vasquez, 221 SCRA 464 (1993) — Cited by petitioners for the proposition that only the Supreme Court has the power to oversee court personnel's compliance with laws; the Court distinguished this as governing administrative liability, not criminal liability for the same act.
• Tan vs. Comelec, 237 SCRA 353 (1994) — Cited for the principle that dismissal of an administrative case does not necessarily bar criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts.
• Gandionco vs. Peñaranda, 155 SCRA 725 (1987) — Cited for the proposition that a divergence of opinions between a judge and a party's counsel on applicable law is not sufficient ground for disqualification on the basis of bias and partiality.
• Suarez vs. Platon, 69 Phil. 556 (1940) — Cited for the principle that a public prosecutor is the representative of sovereignty whose interest in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case but that justice shall be done.

• Section 3(a), Republic Act 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) — Cited as the basis for Criminal Case No. 13800, charging Paredes, Jr. with unduly persuading, inducing, or influencing the Public Land Inspector to approve his free patent application. Distinguished from the falsification charges in the present cases as involving a different offense arising from the same underlying incident.
• Rule 130, Section 24(b), Rules of Court — Invoked by petitioners to argue that Sansaet's retraction was inadmissible as a violation of attorney-client privilege. The Court held that Violan did not rely on the retraction for her finding of probable cause and that its admissibility was a question for the Sandiganbayan.
• Rule 132, Section 23, Revised Rules on Evidence — Invoked by petitioners to argue that Honrada's certifications, as public instruments, were conclusive evidence of the fact of arraignment. The Court found this argument unpersuasive, as the truth of the certifications was precisely the issue in the falsification charges.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Panganiban, JJ., concurred.