Paredes-Garcia vs. Court of Appeals

The inherent contempt power must be exercised sparingly and on the preservative, not vindictive, principle; where the cited conduct constitutes indirect contempt under Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, the court must comply with due process by filing a written charge and giving the alleged contemner an opportunity to be heard before imposing a penalty. A ten-minute tardiness, absent any showing that another case was ready for trial, is de minimis and cannot justify a P100 contempt fine.

Maria Lourdes Paredes-Garcia was an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal, deputized at the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City and assigned to Branch 58 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, presided over by respondent Judge Escolastico M. Cruz, Jr. The dispute implicated the court’s inherent power to punish contempt and the procedural distinction between direct and indirect contempt under the Rules of Court. The case also involved the professional duty of lawyers to appear punctually at court hearings under the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics.

Maria Lourdes Paredes-Garcia, an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal, was deputized at the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City and assigned to Branch 58 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, presided over by respondent Judge Escolastico M. Cruz, Jr. At 8:30 a.m. on 11 April 1995, the respondent Judge commenced the session of his court. When Criminal Cases Nos. 93-7434 to 39 (People of the Philippines vs. Ofelia Baja) was called, petitioner, the prosecutor assigned to the case, was not yet around. She arrived ten minutes later, just when the second case in the calendar was on its first call. The respondent Judge forthwith ordered petitioner to explain within seventy-two hours her failure to come to court on time.

Before the finalization of the open court order, petitioner filed her Explanation. She alleged that she actually reported to her office at 8:00 a.m., as shown by a copy of a page of the Prosecutor’s logbook, and that she went to the respondent Judge’s court. She returned to her office to attend to some matters prior to the hearing, then proceeded back to the respondent Judge’s court for the hearings, but was late for ten minutes. At the time, the second case was just on its first call. She asserted further that she had never been late in any of the hearings of the court nor previously fined or ordered to explain for tardiness in any hearing, which she described as the respondent Judge’s usual practice for lawyers and litigants who come late.

Thereafter, the respondent Judge issued an order citing petitioner in contempt of court and directing her to pay within seventy-two hours from receipt a penalty of P100.00. The order stated that the time had come to advise petitioner that the xerox copy of the logbook had no evidentiary value insofar as coming to court on time was concerned; that under the law on physics, no creature can occupy two different spaces at the same time; and that coming to her office on time was different from coming to court on time. It characterized her allegation that she had never been late as a “downright lie,” said the only reason the court never ordered her to explain her tardiness was PAKIKISAMA, and referred to her verbal clash with the branch clerk of court on 11 April 1995 as the “last straw that broke the camel’s back.” The order also cited her several attempts to enter the Judge’s chambers, her improper conduct in asking court staff to carry her travelling bags or paraphernalia, buy food, deposit her pay checks, or run errands for her, her defiance of Memorandum No. 1-95 dated 28 March 1995, and her failure to remain in court while criminal proceedings were going on, which allegedly resulted in the dismissal of a case due to technicality (re: People vs. Cawili). Petitioner was cited in contempt and ordered to pay the P100.00 fine to the branch clerk.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the respondent Judge denied. The denial order quoted paragraph 9 of the motion alleging that the incident was the first and that she did not deserve cruel and harsh treatment, and stated that this was false, repeating that the truth was stated in the contempt order. Petitioner then instituted with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 37081. In that case, the respondent Judge defended the correctness of his orders and attached, among other things, Office Memorandum 1-95 of 28 March 1995 outlining his policy on those who wish to see him in chambers; his own affidavit narrating his policies on sessions, tardiness, imposition of fines, instances when petitioner personally apologized for tardiness, and the reason why he cited her for contempt; copies of eight orders imposing fines on government and private prosecuting lawyers and litigants who arrived late; and separate affidavits of personnel of his sala, a prosecution witness, and a private complainant attesting to instances of petitioner’s tardiness. The Court of Appeals limited the issues to whether petitioner was tardy and whether she committed falsehood in her explanation. It dismissed the petition, holding that petitioner admitted her tardiness and was not honest about her punctual attendance; it gave credence to the affidavits and concluded that although a late appearance of about ten minutes did not per se amount to stubborn or perverse disobedience, tardiness coupled with statements less than truthful should be castigated. It also stated that the respondent Judge should not be faulted for being strict about time attendance during trials, since he had consistently penalized private and government lawyers, litigants, witnesses, and court personnel who were remiss in coming to court on time.

Petitioner then came to the Supreme Court through a petition for review on certiorari. She contended that the Court of Appeals decision was based on a mere possibility, thereby depriving her of her constitutional right to be presumed innocent; that she would never have the nerve or temerity to violate the court’s rules, indulge in falsehood, or commit any act that would taint her record and jeopardize her ambition to join the judiciary; that no order issued by the respondent Judge existed; and that her immediate submission of an explanation indicated her respect for the court. She attacked the value of the affidavits submitted by the respondent Judge as having been executed through his influence and moral ascendancy over the affiants. She also alleged that the contempt order was a retaliatory act because she had spurned the respondent Judge’s amorous advances; she described herself as a young woman who was “well-endowed and physically attractive” and claimed that the respondent Judge had extended unusual courtesies to her, including visits to her office, invitations for lunch, access to his chambers, and provision of an electric fan and a cellular phone. She asserted that she earned his ire when she failed to call him during a trip to Cagayan de Oro City and when she asked him to personally appear before her to take his oath for a jurat, after which he had the affidavit retrieved and referred to another prosecutor. She claimed that Memorandum No. 1-95 was aimed at severing her free access to him and that the respondent Judge acted with unusual haste; if she were guilty of anything, it would only be indirect contempt. In his Comment, the respondent Judge questioned the viability of the petition for failure to raise questions of law and to show that it fell within the exceptions to the conclusiveness of the Court of Appeals’ findings of fact. He underscored that petitioner admitted her tardiness, that the affidavits he submitted could not be taken lightly, and that he had consistently fined public and private lawyers and litigants who arrived late. He denied the alleged amorous advances, claimed that the electric fan was lent by the officer-in-charge and the cellular phone was borrowed by petitioner, and stated that petitioner suffered from a delusion of beauty. He also cited his awards and unsullied record and bemoaned petitioner’s competence, citing an acquittal caused by her neglect and an instance where she allegedly attempted to mislead the court by offering exhibits different from those presented and marked. The Office of the Solicitor General prayed for dismissal, arguing that the petition raised pure questions of fact and that the challenged decision was supported by the evidence despite the Court of Appeals’ use of the word “possibility”; it also averred that petitioner’s contentions regarding the respondent Judge’s alleged oppressive and vindictive attitude could not be entertained for having been raised for the first time on appeal. In her Reply, petitioner focused on the Court of Appeals’ alleged error in upholding the nature of the contempt as direct contempt, in sustaining the contempt order despite its issuance without due process, and in failing to consider the ulterior motive of the respondent Judge; she attached a copy of her performance rating sheet and the affidavit of Ma. Enrina Talag-Pascual.

• Tardiness Not Contumacious: Petitioner argued that being unintentionally late for ten minutes due to the performance of other official functions was not a callous disregard of the orders of the court nor a contumacious act against the dignity of the court and the solemnity of its proceedings.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner maintained that the contempt order and the subsequent order denying her motion for reconsideration were harsh and cruel and were issued with grave abuse of discretion.
• Improper Warrant of Arrest: Petitioner argued that the issuance of a warrant of arrest was a misapplication and clear misapprehension of Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
• Due Process and Nature of Contempt: Petitioner contended that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the contempt as direct contempt and in sustaining the legality of the contempt order although it was issued without due process; if she was guilty of anything, it would only be indirect contempt.
• Presumption of Innocence: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals decision was based on a mere possibility, thereby depriving her of her constitutional right to be presumed innocent.
• Ulterior Motive and Retaliation: Petitioner alleged that the contempt order was a retaliatory act because she had spurned the respondent Judge’s amorous advances, and that the respondent Judge acted with unusual haste.
• Influenced Affidavits: Petitioner attacked the value of the affidavits submitted by the respondent Judge as having been executed through his influence and moral ascendancy over the affiants.
• No Violated Order: Petitioner asserted that no order issued by the respondent Judge existed and that her immediate submission of an explanation indicated her unfailing respect for the court.

• Procedural Viability: Respondent Judge questioned the viability of the petition for its failure to raise questions of law and to show that it fell within the exceptions to the rule on conclusiveness of the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals.
• Admitted Tardiness: Respondent Judge underscored that petitioner admitted her tardiness and that the affidavits he submitted could not be taken lightly, having been obtained from various affiants whose positive assertions could not be overcome by petitioner’s self-serving denial.
• Consistent Policy: Respondent Judge claimed that he had consistently fined public and private lawyers and litigants who arrived late in court.
• Denial of Amorous Advances: Respondent Judge denied the alleged amorous advances; he claimed that the electric fan was lent to petitioner by the officer-in-charge of the court, that the cellular phone was just borrowed from him by petitioner, and that petitioner was suffering from a delusion of beauty.
• Judicial Record and Petitioner Competence: Respondent Judge averred that his record as a trial court judge remained unsullied and cited several awards; he also bemoaned petitioner’s competence as a prosecutor, citing an instance where her neglect caused the acquittal of an accused in a B.P. Blg. 22 case and another where she allegedly attempted to mislead the court by offering exhibits different from those presented and marked.
• Office of the Solicitor General — Dismissal: The Office of the Solicitor General prayed for dismissal because the petition raised pure questions of fact and the challenged decision was supported by the evidence notwithstanding the Court of Appeals’ use of the word “possibility”; it also averred that petitioner’s contention that the Court of Appeals disregarded facts showing the respondent Judge’s oppressive and vindictive attitude could not be entertained for having been raised for the first time on appeal.

• Due Process in Contempt: Whether the respondent Judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in citing the petitioner for contempt and imposing a P100 fine without complying with the due process requirements for indirect contempt.
• Nature of Contempt and Tardiness: Whether the petitioner’s ten-minute tardiness could be summarily punished as direct contempt and whether the P100 fine was reasonable.
• Grounds for Contempt: Whether the grounds enumerated by the respondent Judge—falsehood in the explanation, verbal clash with the branch clerk, improper attempts to enter chambers, improper conduct toward court staff, defiance of Memorandum No. 1-95, and failure to remain in court—could be punished as contempt without a written charge and hearing.
• Scope of Certiorari: Whether the Court of Appeals, in resolving the special civil action for certiorari, erred in considering affidavits and documents not available to or considered by the respondent Judge when he issued the challenged orders.

• Due Process in Contempt: Yes. The petition was granted; the respondent Judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in holding petitioner guilty of contempt without due process. The cited grounds constituted indirect contempt under Section 3, Rule 71, requiring a written charge and opportunity to be heard.
• Nature of Contempt and Tardiness: No. The ten-minute tardiness was de minimis and did not warrant the P100 fine; even if summarily treated as direct contempt, the penalty was unreasonable. The contempt order was mainly based on other grounds, not merely tardiness.
• Grounds for Contempt: No. The grounds could constitute indirect contempt under Section 3, Rule 71(a) and (d); the judge could not immediately impose a penalty but had to comply with due process.
• Scope of Certiorari: Yes. The Court of Appeals should have limited itself to whether the judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; it should not have considered affidavits and documents not available to or considered by the judge when he issued the orders.

• Due Process in Contempt: The contempt power is inherent in all courts and is an implied constitutional power, indispensable to self-preservation, the execution of judicial powers, the maintenance of authority, and the due administration of justice. It is not limitless. It must be used sparingly, with caution, restraint, judiciousness, deliberation, and due regard to the provisions of law and the constitutional rights of the individual; it should be exercised on the preservative and not vindictive principle; and being drastic and extraordinary, it should not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of justice. The open court order of 11 April 1995 merely required petitioner to explain her failure to come to court on time; it was not a show-cause order or citation for contempt. The challenged order was issued mainly because the respondent Judge perceived the Explanation as a “downright lie” and because of other grounds: petitioner’s verbal clash with the branch clerk, her previous improper attempts to enter the Judge’s chambers, her improper conduct in asking court staff to carry her bags, buy food, deposit her pay checks, or run errands, her defiance of Memorandum No. 1-95, and her failure to remain in court while criminal proceedings were going on, resulting in the dismissal of a case due to technicality. These could constitute indirect contempt under Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, probably under paragraphs (a) and (d). For indirect contempt, the judge cannot immediately impose a penalty; he must comply with due process by filing a charge in writing and giving the accused an opportunity to be heard by himself or counsel. The charge may be made by the judge himself. If the answer is satisfactory, the contempt proceedings end; otherwise, the court shall proceed to investigate the charges and consider the answer or testimony. Contempt proceedings are commonly treated as criminal in nature, so the mode of procedure and rules of evidence are assimilated to criminal prosecutions; reasonable doubt in fact or law as to the alleged contemner’s guilt is resolved in favor of the alleged contemner, and the penalty may be imposed only after the alleged contemner has been heard. Because the respondent Judge found petitioner guilty and imposed the fine without granting her an opportunity to answer the imputed falsehood and improprieties and without an opportunity to be heard, he disregarded the requirements of due process in contempt proceedings and acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
• Nature of Contempt and Tardiness: Even assuming arguendo that the respondent Judge’s order was meant to resolve the issue of petitioner’s tardiness on the morning of 11 April 1995 and could be summarily dealt with as direct contempt, the penalty of P100.00 was unreasonable. Petitioner admitted that she was late by ten minutes and that she arrived when the second case in the calendar was on its first call. The reference to a first call, which was not denied by the respondent Judge, presupposes a practice where at the commencement of sessions at 8:30 a.m. cases are called to determine which are ready and to call the second time those which were not ready on the first call; two cases ready on the first call could not be tried at the same time. The delay of ten minutes was therefore of de minimis importance, especially considering that there was no showing at all that another case was ready for trial at 8:30 a.m. As to the alleged “lie,” no evidence supported it except the respondent Judge’s appeal to petitioner’s conscience, which itself admitted that there was no evidence to prove petitioner’s prior tardiness or any order calling her attention to it or admonishing her. If it was the respondent Judge’s practice or policy to impose a fine on lawyers and litigants, and he was able to attach copies of eight orders imposing such fines, then he should have done so against petitioner if she had been tardy in the past; yet he could not produce any order intended for petitioner, showing unfair or discriminatory implementation of his policy. If petitioner had in fact been habitually tardy, no pakikisama could warrant the respondent Judge’s tolerance, unless the petitioner’s version that she had been the object of the respondent Judge’s special attention or grant of privileges in the past were believed.
• Grounds for Contempt: The grounds or reasons enumerated by the respondent Judge could constitute grounds for indirect contempt under Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, probably under paragraphs (a) and (d) thereof. He could not, therefore, immediately impose a penalty, but had to faithfully comply with the due process requirements prescribed in Section 3: the filing of a charge in writing and giving the accused an opportunity to be heard by himself or by counsel. The charge may be made by the judge himself. Considering that the respondent Judge seemed to have personal knowledge of the alleged grounds, it was even his duty, if he were honestly convinced of their viability, to institute the proceedings. If the answer to the charge is satisfactory, the contempt proceedings end; otherwise, they proceed in accordance with the Rules. On the day set for hearing, the court shall proceed to investigate the charges and consider such answer or testimony as the respondent may make or offer. Since contempt proceedings are commonly treated as criminal in nature, the mode of procedure and rules of evidence are assimilated to criminal prosecutions; reasonable doubt in fact or in law as to the alleged contemner’s guilt is resolved in favor of the alleged contemner, and the penalty, if warranted, can only be imposed after the alleged contemner shall have been heard. In finding petitioner guilty and imposing the fine without granting her an opportunity to answer the imputed falsehood and improprieties and without an opportunity to be heard, the respondent Judge disregarded the requirements of due process.
• Scope of Certiorari: The special civil action filed by petitioner was for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which is an available remedy in appropriate cases of judgments in contempt proceedings. The only issue the Court of Appeals had to resolve was whether the respondent Judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the challenged orders. It should not have taken into account, in resolving the merits, the affidavits and other documents submitted by the respondent Judge to prove the alleged falsehood in petitioner’s Explanation and the correctness of his orders. These pieces of evidence were obtained when the case was already before the Court of Appeals and were not available to or considered by the respondent Judge when he issued the orders. The Court also emphasized that these pronouncements should not be understood as absolving petitioner from any liability for her tardiness or from her solemn duty as an officer of the court. As a lawyer, she is bound by her oath to conduct herself with all good fidelity to the courts and to her client. Punctuality is not only a practice mandated by the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics; it is a virtue that must be faithfully maintained as part of her contribution to a speedy, efficient, and effective administration of justice. If petitioner committed a breach of her duty to the court, she could accordingly be dealt with, but in accordance with established procedure; the right to do so was reserved to the respondent Judge. Finally, both petitioner and the respondent Judge resorted to personal attacks against each other, failed to limit themselves to the issues, and exchanged tirades on their competence and physical being, contrary to the decorum expected of officers of the court. Because petitioner’s continued detail at the branch presided by the respondent Judge could affect the administration of justice due to their soured relationship, she had to be reassigned elsewhere.

• Inherent contempt power — The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts, indispensable to their right of self-preservation, the execution of their powers, the maintenance of their authority, and the due administration of justice; it is an implied constitutional power. It is not limitless: it must be used sparingly, with caution, restraint, judiciousness, deliberation, and due regard to the provisions of law and the constitutional rights of the individual; it should be exercised on the preservative and not vindictive principle; and being drastic and extraordinary, it should not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of justice. In this case, the respondent Judge’s use of contempt to punish conduct amounting to indirect contempt without due process exceeded the proper exercise of that power.
• Direct vs. indirect contempt and due process — Conduct constituting indirect contempt under Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court—such as misbehavior of an officer of the court in the performance of his official duty or in his official transaction, or any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice—cannot be summarily punished. The court must file a written charge and give the alleged contemner an opportunity to be heard by himself or counsel. The charge may be made by the judge himself. If the answer is satisfactory, the proceedings end; otherwise, a hearing follows. Contempt proceedings are criminal in nature; reasonable doubt is resolved in favor of the alleged contemner, and penalty may be imposed only after hearing. The respondent Judge violated these requirements.
• Preservative, not vindictive, exercise of contempt power — The contempt power must be exercised on the preservative and not vindictive principle. It may tempt a judge to make its exercise nothing more than a camouflage for wounded pride, prejudice, revenge, misplaced passion, or selfish motives. The Court found that the respondent Judge failed to observe this rule of conduct.
• De minimis tardiness — A ten-minute tardiness, where the second case was still on first call and there was no showing that another case was ready for trial at 8:30 a.m., is of de minimis importance and does not warrant a P100 contempt fine. Even if summarily treated as direct contempt, the penalty was unreasonable.
• Scope of certiorari in contempt proceedings — A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an available remedy in contempt proceedings. The reviewing court’s only issue is whether the judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. It should not consider affidavits or documents not available to or considered by the judge when he issued the challenged orders.
• Punctuality as a professional duty — Lawyers are bound by their oath to conduct themselves with fidelity to the courts and to their clients. Punctuality is mandated by Rule 11.02, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Canon 21 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, and is a virtue for ensuring a speedy, efficient, and effective administration of justice. A breach may be dealt with, but only according to established procedure. The Court reserved this right to the respondent Judge.

• "The power, however, is not limitless. It must be used sparingly with caution, restraint, judiciousness, deliberation, and due regard to the provisions of the law and the constitutional rights of the individual. It should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, it should not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of justice." — This passage states the controlling principle on the inherent contempt power, emphasizing restraint and the preservative purpose of contempt.
• "Indeed, the contempt power could easily tempt a judge to make its exercise nothing more than a camouflage for a wounded pride, a burning prejudice, revenge, a misplaced passion, or selfish motives." — This warning is the Court’s canonical formulation of the danger of vindictive contempt and supports its finding that the respondent Judge failed to observe the proper rule of conduct.
• "The grounds or reasons enumerated by the respondent Judge could constitute grounds for indirect contempt under Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, probably under paragraphs (a) and (d) thereof. He cannot, therefore, immediately impose a penalty, but must faithfully comply with the due process requirements prescribed in the said Section 3, namely, the filing of a charge in writing and giving the accused an opportunity to be heard by himself or by counsel." — This is the ratio decidendi on due process: the cited conduct was indirect contempt, so summary punishment was improper.
• "The delay then of ten minutes was of de minimis importance, especially considering the fact that there is no showing at all that another case was ready for trial at 8:30 a.m." — This passage establishes the Court’s holding that the tardiness alone did not justify the contempt fine.

• People vs. Estenzo, 64 SCRA 211, 214 [1975] — Quoted by the Court for the caution judges must observe in contempt cases, warning against prejudice, covert hostility, or previous incidents leading them to characterize conduct susceptible of innocent explanation as slights on the dignity of the court.
• In re Kelly, 35 Phil. 944, 950 [1916]; In re Lozano and Quevedo, 54 Phil. 801 [1930]; Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil. 271 [1933]; Commissioner of Immigration vs. Cloribel, 20 SCRA 1241 [1967] — Cited for the doctrine that the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and indispensable to self-preservation, execution of powers, maintenance of authority, and due administration of justice.
• In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 [1949] — Cited for the proposition that the contempt power is an implied constitutional power.
• Fontelera vs. Amores, 70 SCRA 37 [1976] — Cited in connection with the implied constitutional nature of the contempt power and the caution required in its exercise.
• Villavicencio vs. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778 [1919]; Oliveros vs. Villaluz, 57 SCRA 163 [1974]; People vs. Maceda, 188 SCRA 532 [1990]; De Guia vs. Guerrero, 234 SCRA 625 [1994] — Cited for the rule that the contempt power is not limitless and must be exercised sparingly, with restraint, and on the preservative rather than vindictive principle.
• People vs. Gagui, 2 SCRA 752 [1961] — Cited for the holding that failure of counsel to appear in court for trial despite due notice constitutes indirect contempt.
• People vs. Venturanza, 98 Phil. 211 [1956] — Cited for the rule that the charge for indirect contempt may be made by the judge himself.
• In re Antonio Quirino (Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons), 76 Phil. 630 [1946] — Cited for the duty of the judge, if honestly convinced of the viability of indirect contempt grounds, to institute the proceedings.
• Lee Yick Hon vs. Collector of Customs, 41 Phil. 548 [1921]; Benedicto vs. Cañada, 21 SCRA 1066 [1967]; Delgra vs. Gonzales, 31 SCRA 237 [1970] — Cited for the rule that contempt proceedings are criminal in nature and the mode of procedure and rules of evidence are assimilated to criminal prosecutions.
• People vs. Alarcon, 69 Phil. 265 [1939] — Cited for the rule that reasonable doubt in fact or law as to the alleged contemner’s guilt is resolved in favor of the alleged contemner.
• Yatco vs. Court of Appeals, 37 SCRA 174 [1971] — Cited for the rule that the penalty in contempt may be imposed only after the alleged contemner has been heard.
• Caluag vs. Pecson, 82 Phil. 8, 13 [1948] — Cited for the due process requirements in contempt proceedings.
• Delgra vs. Gonzales, 31 SCRA 237 [1970] — Cited for the availability of certiorari in contempt proceedings and the limited issue on review.

• Section 1, Rule 71, Rules of Court — Cited in the discussion distinguishing direct contempt from misbehavior committed outside the presence of the court, and in relation to the principle that failure of counsel to appear in court for trial despite due notice constitutes indirect contempt.
• Section 3, Rule 71, Rules of Court — Provides grounds for indirect contempt, including paragraphs (a) misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duty or in his official transaction, and (d) any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice. The Court held that the grounds cited by the respondent Judge could fall under these paragraphs and required a written charge and opportunity to be heard.
• Section 5, Rule 71, Rules of Court — Provides that on the day set for hearing, the court shall proceed to investigate the charges and consider such answer or testimony as the respondent may make or offer. The Court cited it to show the hearing required before penalty.
• Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court — Defines certiorari and limits the issue to whether the respondent judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The Court used it to fault the Court of Appeals for considering evidence not before the judge.
• Rule 11.02, Canon 11, Code of Professional Responsibility — “A lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings.” The Court cited it to remind petitioner of her professional duty despite granting relief.
• Canon 21, Canons of Professional Ethics — “It is the duty of the lawyer not only to his client, but also to the courts and to the public to be punctual in attendance....” The Court cited it for the same purpose.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — The petition for review on certiorari was filed under Rule 45 to set aside the Court of Appeals decision. The Court gave due course and granted it.

Justices Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban concurred. Chief Justice Narvasa took no part.