Pardo vs. Republic of the Philippines

Reciprocity and qualification in naturalization may be established by a foreign consul's certification of the applicant's national law, aided where appropriate by judicial notice, without literal compliance with the authentication requirements for foreign laws, if the court is satisfied of the proof's authenticity. Applied to a Spanish applicant, articles 17 et seq. of the Spanish Civil Code, which make no distinction as to nationality, were judicially noticeable to show Filipinos are eligible for Spanish citizenship, while long residence and daily intercourse corroborated a good working knowledge of Tagalog.

Vicente Rosal Pardo was a Spanish citizen who had lived in the Philippines since childhood, married a Filipino woman, and earned his livelihood in Manila. Philippine naturalization law conditioned admission on, among others, ability to speak and write a principal Filipino language and reciprocity — that the applicant's national law grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens of that country. Proof of foreign law was ordinarily governed by provisions on judicial notice and authentication of official acts.

Vicente Rosal Pardo was a Spanish citizen born in Spain in 1895 who had resided in the Philippines since 1905, where he married a Filipino woman. At the time of his petition he was employed in Manila with an annual salary of P4,800. According to the evidence, he had at one time owned or managed two stores successively on the Escolta, and lately had been a foreman and warehouseman at Soriano & Co.

To satisfy the language qualification, Pardo testified that he knows enough Tagalog to be understood in that language. Lino Gutierrez, described as a respectable citizen who had intimately known the applicant for 27 years through business relations, corroborated that testimony. The trial judge heard the applicant translate into Tagalog the Spanish sentence, "He venido residiendo en Filipinas por el periodo de 36 años," and appeared satisfied with the correctness of the translation, which was not transcribed. Pardo's arrival at age ten and 44 years of continuous residence except for a few months' visit to Spain, mingling and dealing by reason of his work with people who use Tagalog in daily intercourse, was offered to lend credence to his claimed working knowledge.

On reciprocity, Pardo introduced a certificate signed by the Consul General of Spain in the Philippines stating that in accordance with articles 17 and 225 of the Spanish Civil Code, among other Spanish legislation, Filipinos are eligible to Spanish citizenship in Spain. Article 17 was shown to provide that foreigners who have obtained a certificate of naturalization and those who have not obtained such certificate but have acquired domicile in any town of the Monarchy are Spaniards, with no discrimination as to nationality. Upon this record, the Court of First Instance of Manila adjudged Pardo entitled to become a Filipino citizen, finding the language and reciprocity requirements met.

• Language Qualification: Respondent argued that Pardo was unable to speak and write any of the principal Filipino languages, and therefore failed to satisfy the language requirement for naturalization.
• Reciprocity Proof: Respondent argued that the evidence was insufficient to show that the laws of Spain grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens of Spain, challenging the consular certificate as competent proof of Spanish law.
• Reconsideration — Misreading of Precedents and Authentication: Respondent maintained on reconsideration that the Chinese naturalization cases cited did not rule that mere consular authentication constitutes competent proof, but had become academic because of an admission that a copy duly authenticated under the Rules had been presented in another case, and that a local consul's certification does not conform to Section 41, Rule 123.

• Language Requirement: Whether Pardo's knowledge of Tagalog satisfied the requirement of ability to speak and write a principal Filipino language.
• Reciprocity — Substance of Spanish Law: Whether the laws of Spain grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens thereof, as shown by articles 17 and 225 of the Spanish Civil Code.
• Reciprocity — Proof and Judicial Notice: Whether reciprocity may be established by a Spanish Consul General's certificate and by judicial notice of the Spanish Civil Code without strict compliance with the authentication requirements for foreign laws.

• Language Requirement: Yes. A good working knowledge of Tagalog, credited through testimony, corroboration, courtroom demonstration, and 44 years of daily intercourse, satisfied the requirement.
• Reciprocity — Substance of Spanish Law: Yes. Articles 17 et seq., making no discrimination as to nationality, render Filipinos eligible to Spanish citizenship by naturalization or domicile.
• Reciprocity — Proof and Judicial Notice: Yes. Consular certification was allowable as competent proof in naturalization, aided by judicial notice of the Spanish Civil Code, since literal adherence to the Rules of Court on evidence is not obligatory in such proceedings if authenticity is satisfactory.

• Language Requirement: The governing test was satisfied by functional ability rather than claimed perfection. Pardo's own testimony of knowing enough Tagalog to be understood was corroborated by Lino Gutierrez, who had known him intimately for 27 years, and by the trial judge's personal observation of Pardo's Tagalog translation in open court. Credence was further lent by arrival at age ten, 44 years of continuous residence except for a brief visit to Spain, Escolta store experience, and work as foreman and warehouseman involving daily dealings with Tagalog speakers. An extravagant understatement in the brief was not taken in isolation as a sincere admission of inability, being characterized as extreme modesty rather than literal fact.
• Reciprocity — Substance of Spanish Law: Article 17 provides that foreigners who have obtained a certificate of naturalization and those without such certificate but who have acquired domicile in any town of the Monarchy are Spaniards. Because no discrimination was made therein, the provisions apply to persons of any nationality, including Filipinos. The Consul General's certificate invoking articles 17 and 225 among other Spanish legislation thus stated a non-discriminatory eligibility consistent with the Code's text.
• Reciprocity — Proof and Judicial Notice: As the Spanish Civil Code had been and remained the basic code in force in the Philippines, its articles 17 et seq. were matters known to Philippine judges by reason of judicial functions and judicially recognizable without introduction of proof under Section 5, Rule 123. Judicial cognizance was deemed to embrace all its provisions, including parts that ceased to operate locally after Spain relinquished sovereignty, just as cognizance of English common law was not precluded by expert opinion. Moreover, mere authentication of naturalization law by the Chinese Consulate General in Manila had been admitted as efficient evidence in prior cases, and the existence of Chinese reciprocity law so recognized was thereafter judicially noticed. Finally, Rule 132 (cited in text as Rule 1342 on applicability) expressly provides the Rules shall not apply to naturalization proceedings except by analogy or suppletorily when practicable and convenient; hence proof not meeting Section 41, Rule 123 may sustain a favorable action where, in light of all circumstances, the court is satisfied of its authenticity after fair consideration on satisfactory proof.

• Language qualification in naturalization — Functional, working knowledge of a principal Filipino language suffices; it may be established by the applicant's testimony, corroboration by long acquaintance, demonstration before the trial judge, and inference from decades of residence and daily intercourse with speakers. Modest or extravagant understatement in pleadings is not taken in isolation against such corroborated showing.
• Judicial notice of the Spanish Civil Code — Articles 17 et seq. of the Spanish Civil Code, as part of the basic code historically in force in the Philippines, are matters known to Philippine judges by reason of judicial functions and may be judicially recognized without introduction of proof under Section 5, Rule 123, including provisions on Spanish citizenship that ceased to apply locally after change of sovereignty. Applied to hold Filipinos eligible for Spanish citizenship where the Code draws no nationality distinction.
• Proof of foreign reciprocity law in naturalization — A translation or certificate of foreign naturalization law made and certified correct by the applicant's Consulate General in Manila may be admitted and considered efficient evidence of reciprocity, following Yap vs. Solicitor General, Leelin vs. Republic of the Philippines, Yee Bo Mann vs. Republic of the Philippines, and Jose Go alias Joseph Gotianuy vs. Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines. Once the fact of such foreign law is ascertained in previous cases, subsequent courts may take judicial notice thereof.
• Relaxed application of Rules of Court to naturalization — The Rules, including rules of evidence such as Section 41, Rule 123 on certification and authentication of foreign law, do not apply to naturalization proceedings except by analogy or suppletorily whenever practicable and convenient. Where no specific statutory procedure is indicated, merits are decided on fair consideration of the evidence on satisfactory proof, so non-conforming proof of foreign law may be allowed if authenticity is satisfactory in light of all circumstances.

• "As the Spanish Civil Code has been and still is "the basic code in force of the Philippines," articles 17 et seq. thereof may be regarded as matters known to judges of the Philippines by reason of their judicial functions and nay be judicially recognized by them without the introduction of proof. (Section 5, Rule 123.)" — States the basis for judicially noticing Spanish citizenship provisions to establish reciprocity without formal proof.
• "evidence of the law of a foreign country or reciprocity regarding the acquisition of citizenship, although not meeting the prescribed rule of practice by section 41 of Rule 123, may be allowed and used as basis for a favorable action if, in the light of all circumstances, the court is satisfied of the authenticity of the written proof offered." — Formulates the relaxed evidentiary standard for foreign-law proof peculiar to naturalization proceedings.
• "These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenience." — Quotes the applicability rule relied upon to excuse literal adherence to authentication requirements in naturalization.

• Yap vs. Solicitor General, L-1602 — Followed as authority that a copy of foreign citizenship law, Exhibit E showing Filipinos can acquire citizenship by naturalization, was admitted; later treated as having recognized the fact of reciprocity law for judicial notice in subsequent cases.
• Leelin vs. Republic of the Philippines, L-1761 — Followed for the proposition that a translation of foreign naturalization law made and certified correct by the Consulate General in Manila was admitted and considered efficient evidence of eligibility of Filipinos.
• Yee Bo Mann vs. Republic of the Philippines, L-1606 — Followed to hold objection to consular-certified translation of no moment where reciprocity had already been accepted as fact in previous naturalization cases; basis for disposing of Lock Ben Ping vs. Republic of the Philippines, L-1675 on the same pronouncement.
• Jose Go alias Joseph Gotianuy vs. Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines and Felipe Fernandez, L-1563 — Cited among the line of decisions accepting consular authentication as competent proof of foreign nationality law.
• Bryan vs. Eastern and Western Asso., 28 Phil., 310 — Applied by analogy that the court is not precluded by expert opinion from advising itself on foreign law, supporting judicial cognizance of Spanish citizenship law.
• In the matter of the application of Rafael Roa Yrostoza for naturalization, L-1394 — Distinguished as an unnecessary remand for further proof of reciprocity law, explained as oversight for failure to direct attention to the Civil Code articles apprised in the present case.

• Section 5, Rule 123, Rules of Court — Governs matters judicially noticeable as known to judges by reason of judicial functions without introduction of proof; applied to articles 17 et seq. of the Spanish Civil Code as the historic basic code in force.
• Section 41, Rule 123, Rules of Court — Prescribes certification and authentication requirements for proof of foreign law; held not literally obligatory where a local consul's certification, though non-conforming, satisfactorily established authenticity.
• Rule on Applicability of the Rules (cited as Rule 1342) — Provides the Rules shall not apply to naturalization, land registration, cadastral, election, insolvency, and other unprovided cases except by analogy or suppletorily when practicable and convenient; applied to allow relaxed evidentiary treatment in naturalization.
• Section 4(h), Revised Naturalization Law — Requires reciprocity, that the applicant's national law grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens thereof; applied as satisfied by Spanish law under the consular certificate and Code provisions.
• Articles 17 and 225, Spanish Civil Code — Provide that foreigners obtaining naturalization certificates and those acquiring domicile in any town of the Monarchy are Spaniards; applied without nationality discrimination to hold Filipinos eligible for Spanish citizenship.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes and Torres, JJ., concurred in the January 23, 1950 decision. Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concurred in the April 28, 1950 resolution denying reconsideration.