Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines vs. Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion

A search warrant must be struck down where the judge fails to personally examine the applicant for the search warrant and the latter's witnesses, or where the witnesses testify on matters not of their own personal knowledge. The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant must be followed strictly to preserve and uphold the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The warrant must also particularly describe the place to be searched, and such particularization may be done only by the judge in the warrant itself, not left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search.

Petitioners are Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP) and several of its officers and employees. Respondent Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion was the Presiding Judge of Branch 104, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, who issued the contested search warrant. Respondent State Prosecutor Leo B. Dacera III was conducting the preliminary investigation in IS No. 95-167 for illegal possession of firearms against petitioners. Respondent Special Operations Unit of the PNP Traffic Management Command applied for and enforced the search warrant. The constitutional framework is Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which requires probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and requires the warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Sections 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, as amended in 1988, detail the same requisites.

On January 25, 1995, Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied for a search warrant before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, alleging that the management of Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP), located at PICOP compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur, represented by its Senior Vice President Ricardo G. Santiago, was in possession or control of high-powered firearms, ammunition, and explosives, specifically seventy M16 Armalite rifles cal. 5.56, ten M16 US rifles, two AK-47 rifles, two UZI submachineguns, two M203 Grenade Launchers cal. 40mm, ten cal. 45 pistols, ten cal. 38 revolvers, two ammunition reloading machines, assorted ammunition, and ten handgrenades, in violation of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives). Attached to the application were the joint Deposition of SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod and SPO2 Cecilio T. Morito, as well as a summary of the information and the supplementary statements of Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno.

After propounding several questions to Bacolod, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued the contested search warrant, which authorized an immediate search between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. of "the aforementioned premises" and the seizure of the described articles. On February 4, 1995, the police enforced the search warrant at the PICOP compound and seized a large quantity of firearms, magazines, and live ammunition from various locations within the compound, including the ammo dam, the management intel/invest unit, and the new armory post.

Believing that the warrant was invalid and the search unreasonable, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash, a Supplemental Pleading to the Motion to Quash, and a Motion to Suppress Evidence before the trial court. On March 23, 1995, the RTC denied petitioners' motions, and on August 3, 1995, the trial court denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioners then filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court on pure questions of law.

The records showed that during the hearing for the issuance of the search warrant, Chief Inspector Pascua's participation consisted only of introducing Witness Bacolod to the court. Pascua was asked nothing else and said nothing more, and he failed even to affirm his application. Bacolod testified that he was dispatched by his Commander to investigate an alleged assassination plot of Congressman Amante, that he found that some of the suspects were employees of PICOP, that he conducted surveillance inside the compound by pretending to have official business with the company, and that he saw several high-powered firearms kept inside the ammo dam and the security headquarters. When asked whether it was possible that the firearms used by the security guards were illegally obtained, Bacolod stated, "I believe they have no license to possess high-powered firearms. As far as the verification at FEU, Camp Crame, [is concerned,] they have no license." He also stated that the security agency and its guards were not licensed, and that some of the firearms were owned by PICOP, but he made no statement that PICOP itself had no license to possess those firearms. No "no license" certification from the Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) of the PNP was attached to the application or presented during the hearing.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion in Refusing to Quash: Petitioners submitted that Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of discretion or exceeded his jurisdiction in refusing to quash Search Warrant No. 799 (95), because probable cause had not been sufficiently established and the warrant partook of the nature of a general warrant.
• Unlawful Service or Implementation: Petitioners submitted that Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of discretion or exceeded his jurisdiction in refusing to quash the search warrant on the ground that it was unlawfully served or implemented.
• Continuation of Preliminary Investigation: Petitioners submitted that State Prosecutor Dacera was acting with grave abuse of discretion in continuing with the proceedings in IS No. 95-167 on the basis of illegally seized evidence, and that he could not have any tenable basis for continuing with the proceedings.

• Factual Questions Not Proper for Certiorari: Respondents argued that the Petition should be dismissed for raising questions of fact, which are not proper in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, maintaining that the Petition merely assailed the factual basis for the issuance of the warrant and the regularity of its implementation.
• Compliance with Constitutional Requirement: The police argued in their Opposition that they complied with the constitutional requirement of particularity because they submitted sketches of the premises to be searched when they applied for the warrant, and that not one of the PICOP Compound housing units was searched because they were not among those identified during the hearing.
• Searching Questions Propounded: The Opposition to the Motion to Quash argued that it was erroneous for PICOP to allege that the court did not propound searching questions upon applicant P/Chief Inspector Napoleon Pascua and the witnesses he produced.

• Factual Questions: Whether the Petition should be dismissed for raising questions of fact not proper in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
• Personal Examination of Witnesses: Whether the search warrant is invalid because the trial court failed to examine personally the complainant and the other deponents.
• Personal Knowledge of Witness: Whether the search warrant is invalid because SPO3 Cicero Bacolod, who appeared during the hearing, had no personal knowledge that petitioners were not licensed to possess the subject firearms.
• Particularity of the Place to Be Searched: Whether the search warrant is invalid because the place to be searched was not described with particularity.
• Admissibility of Seized Evidence: Whether the firearms and explosives seized pursuant to the invalid search warrant are admissible in evidence and may serve as basis for the preliminary investigation in IS No. 95-167.

• Factual Questions: No. The Petition raises only questions of law, which may be resolved in the present case, because petitioners do not question the truth of the facts as found by the judge but rather assail the way in which those findings were arrived at, a procedure they contend was violative of the Constitution and the Rules of Court.
• Personal Examination of Witnesses: Yes. The search warrant is invalid because the trial court failed to examine personally the complainant and the other deponents; the applicant's participation consisted only of introducing Witness Bacolod, and the judge relied mainly on the affidavits, which is insufficient.
• Personal Knowledge of Witness: Yes. The search warrant is invalid because Bacolod's testimony pertained not to facts personally known to him; he testified merely that he believed the security guards had no license, which does not meet the requirement that a witness must testify on his personal knowledge, not belief.
• Particularity of the Place to Be Searched: Yes. The search warrant is invalid because it failed to describe the place with particularity, simply authorizing a search of "the aforementioned premises" without specifying such premises, giving police officers unbridled and illegal authority to search all structures found inside the PICOP compound.
• Admissibility of Seized Evidence: No. Because the search warrant was procured in violation of the Constitution and the Rules of Court, all the firearms, explosives, and other materials seized were inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding, and the complaint and the proceedings before State Prosecutor Dacera had no more leg to stand on.

• Factual Questions: The Court held that there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or the falsity of alleged facts. In the present case, petitioners did not question the truth of the facts as found by the judge; rather, they assailed the way in which those findings were arrived at, a procedure which they contended was violative of the Constitution and the Rules of Court. The Petition therefore raised only questions of law, which could be resolved in the present case.

• Personal Examination of Witnesses: The Court noted that the trial judge insisted in his Order dated March 23, 1995, that he had propounded searching questions to the applicant and the witnesses, and the Opposition to the Motion to Quash supported this claim. The records, however, proclaimed otherwise. Except for Pascua and Bacolod, none of the witnesses and policemen appeared before the trial court. The applicant's participation in the hearing consisted only of introducing Witness Bacolod. Chief Inspector Pascua was asked nothing else, and he said nothing more; he failed even to affirm his application. The trial judge failed to propound questions, let alone probing questions, to the applicant and to his witnesses other than Bacolod, and obviously relied mainly on their affidavits. The Court cited the rule that mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are not sufficient; the examining judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and attach them to the record. The examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro-forma, and the examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application.

• Personal Knowledge of Witness: Bacolod appeared during the hearing and was extensively examined by the judge, but his testimony showed that he did not have personal knowledge that the petitioners, in violation of PD 1866, were not licensed to possess firearms, ammunition, or explosives. When questioned by the judge, Bacolod stated merely that he believed that the PICOP security guards had no license to possess the subject firearms. This did not meet the requirement that a witness must testify on his personal knowledge, not belief. Moreover, Bacolod failed to affirm that none of the firearms seen inside the PICOP compound was licensed; he merely declared that the security agency and its guards were not licensed, and he made no statement that PICOP itself had no license to possess those firearms. Worse, the applicant and his witnesses failed to attach a copy of the "no license" certification from the Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) of the PNP or to present it during the hearing, even though such certification could have been easily obtained since the FEO was located in Camp Crame where Bacolod's unit was also based. The Court cited People vs. Judge Estrada for the rule that the facts and circumstances that would show probable cause must be the best evidence that could be obtained under the circumstances, especially where the issue is the existence of the negative ingredient of the offense charged, such as the absence of a license required by law.

• Particularity of the Place to Be Searched: The Court held that the assailed search warrant failed to describe the place with particularity. It simply authorized a search of "the aforementioned premises" but did not specify such premises. The warrant identified only one place: the "Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP Compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig[,] Surigao del Sur." The PICOP compound, however, was made up of "200 offices/building, 15 plants, 84 staff houses, 1 airstrip, 3 piers/wharves, 23 warehouses, 6 POL depots/quick service outlets and some 800 miscellaneous structures, all of which are spread out over some one hundred fifty-five hectares." The warrant thus gave the police officers unbridled and illegal authority to search all the structures found inside the PICOP compound. The police's argument that they submitted sketches of the premises to be searched was not convincing because the sketches were not made integral parts of the search warrant issued by Judge Asuncion, and the fact that the raiding police team knew which buildings housed firearms did not justify the lack of particulars. The Court cited People vs. Court of Appeals for the rule that the place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the officers' own personal knowledge of the premises or the evidence they adduced in support of their application. The particularization of the description of the place to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search.

• Admissibility of Seized Evidence: Because the search warrant was procured in violation of the Constitution and the Rules of Court, all the firearms, explosives, and other materials seized were inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding, pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. The Court cited Stonehill vs. Diokno for the rule that the exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence was the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures, and that such evidence constitutes the "fruits of the poisonous tree." Since the complaint for illegal possession of firearms was based on the firearms and other materials seized pursuant to the invalid search warrant, and these illegally obtained pieces of evidence were inadmissible, the complaint and the proceedings before State Prosecutor Dacera had no more leg to stand on.

• Requisites for a Valid Search Warrant — The requisites are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such presence is determined personally by the judge; (3) the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce are personally examined by the judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized. In this case, the search warrant was invalid because the trial court failed to examine personally the complainant and the other deponents, the witness who appeared had no personal knowledge that petitioners were not licensed to possess the subject firearms, and the place to be searched was not described with particularity.

• Personal Examination by the Judge — Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are not sufficient; the examining judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and attach them to the record. The examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro-forma, and the examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application. In this case, the judge failed to propound questions to the applicant and to his witnesses other than Bacolod, and relied mainly on their affidavits.

• Testimony on Facts Personally Known to the Witness — A witness must testify on his personal knowledge, not belief. Where the offense charged includes a negative ingredient, such as the absence of a license required by law, the facts and circumstances that would show probable cause must be the best evidence that could be obtained under the circumstances, and if the best evidence could not be secured at the time of the application, the applicant must show a justifiable reason therefor during the examination by the judge. In this case, Bacolod testified merely that he believed the security guards had no license, and no "no license" certification from the FEO was presented.

• Particularity of the Place to Be Searched — The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the officers' own personal knowledge of the premises or the evidence they adduced in support of their application for the warrant. The particularization of the description of the place to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search. In this case, the warrant authorized a search of "the aforementioned premises" without specifying such premises, giving police officers unbridled authority to search all structures in the 155-hectare PICOP compound.

• Fruits of the Poisonous Tree — Evidence obtained through an invalid search warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding, as the exclusionary rule is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In this case, the firearms and other materials seized pursuant to the invalid warrant could not serve as basis for the criminal complaint for illegal possession of firearms.

• "To preserve and to uphold the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures, the requisites for the issuance of search warrant must be followed strictly. Where the judge fails to personally examine the applicant for a search warrant and the latter's witnesses, or where the witnesses testify on matters not of their own personal knowledge, the search warrant must be struck down." — This is the opening statement of the decision and articulates the core ratio decidendi: strict compliance with the requisites for issuance of a search warrant is essential to uphold the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures.

• "Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may procedure and attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false." — This passage states the rule that the judge must personally examine the applicant and witnesses in writing and under oath, and that mere reliance on affidavits is insufficient.

• "It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro-forma, if the claimed probable cause is to be established. The examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application." — This passage defines the standard of examination required of the judge in determining probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant.

• "The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the officers' own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized." — This passage states the rule on particularity of the place to be searched, holding that the description in the warrant itself controls and cannot be supplemented by the officers' knowledge or the evidence they submitted.

• People vs. Judge Estrada, G.R. No. 124461, September 25, 1998 — Cited as controlling authority for the rule that the facts and circumstances showing probable cause must be the best evidence obtainable under the circumstances, particularly where the issue is the existence of a negative ingredient of the offense charged, such as the absence of a license required by law.
• People vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126379, June 26, 1998 — Cited as controlling authority for the rule that the place to be searched cannot be changed, enlarged, or amplified by the police, and that the particularization of the description of the place to be searched may be done only by the judge in the warrant itself.
• Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 255 SCRA 438, March 29, 1996 — Cited for the enumeration of the requisites of a valid search warrant.
• Pendon vs. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 429, November 16, 1990 — Cited for the rule that the examination of the applicant and witnesses must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro-forma.
• Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383, June 19, 1967 — Cited for the rule that the exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures, and that such evidence constitutes the "fruits of the poisonous tree."
• Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 658, July 11, 1996 — Cited for the definition of a question of fact as distinguished from a question of law.
• Burgos Sr. vs. Chief of Staff, 218 Phil. 754 (1984) — Cited for the proposition that the police's knowledge of which buildings housed firearms did not justify the lack of particulars of the place to be searched.
• Uy Kheytin vs. Villareal, 42 Phil. 886, September 21, 1920 — Cited for the proposition that the constitutional right against unreasonable search limits the search to places described in the warrant.
• Villanueva vs. Querubin, 48 SCRA 345, December 27, 1972 — Cited for the proposition that the constitutional right embodies the belief that to value the privacy of home and person and to afford it constitutional protection is to value human dignity.

• Section 2, Article III, 1987 Constitution — The constitutional provision guaranteeing the right against unreasonable searches and seizures and requiring probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and requiring the warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The Court held that the search warrant was procured in violation of this provision, and that all seized items were inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
• Section 3, Rule 126, Rules of Court (as amended in 1988) — Provides that a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized. The Court applied this rule in finding the search warrant invalid.
• Section 4, Rule 126, Rules of Court (as amended in 1988) — Requires the judge to personally examine, in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them, and to attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted. The Court found that the judge failed to comply with this requirement.
• PD 1866 — The statute penalizing illegal possession of firearms, ammunition, and explosives, which was the offense alleged in the application for the search warrant and the basis of the criminal complaint in IS No. 95-167.

Romero, Vitug, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concurred. Purisima, J., did not participate in the deliberations.

N/A — No dissenting opinions are noted in the provided case text.