Pangonorom vs. People

Negligence is a question of fact, and the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts are binding on the Supreme Court absent palpable error or misapprehension of facts; an employer's subsidiary civil liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code arises only after the employee's conviction becomes final and the employee's insolvency is established.

Olimpio Pangonorom was a professional bus driver employed by Metro Manila Transit Corporation (MMTC) since 1984. The case concerns the criminal liability of a public utility driver for reckless imprudence and the subsidiary civil liability of his employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Articles 100 and 102 of the same Code, which imposes subsidiary liability on employers, among others, for felonies committed by their employees in the discharge of their duties.

On the evening of 10 July 1989, at around 9:00 P.M., Carlos R. Berba was driving an Isuzu Gemini car bearing Plate No. NAR-865 L Pil. '89 along EDSA, coming from the direction of Makati and headed toward the intersection of EDSA and Quezon Boulevard. The car belonged to his mother, Mary Berba, who was seated in front beside him, while his aunt, Amelia Berba, sat at the back. Upon nearing 680 Appliances along EDSA, Quezon City, their car was bumped from behind by an MMTC passenger bus bearing Plate No. NVJ-999 TB Pil. '89, driven by Olimpio Pangonorom.

According to the prosecution, the impact pushed the Gemini forward into the car ahead of it, after which it came to rest near the island; the bus continued a further 20 meters from the point of impact, and the Gemini was rendered a total wreck, with damages estimated at ₱42,600.00. Carlos testified that he had noticed the bus following closely behind them from Nepa Q-Mart up to the point of collision; his car was running along the second lane of EDSA from the island, while the MMTC bus ran very fast, kept switching lanes, and eventually occupied the second lane and struck his car. Carlos sustained cuts on his shoulder and back from broken glass and was treated at East Avenue Medical Center, incurring ₱1,000.00 in medication; Mary sustained contusion, hematoma, and abrasion, while Amelia sustained an abrasion on her right elbow, both also treated at the same hospital. It was a rainy day, the road was slippery, and although the rain had stopped, it was still drizzling.

Two passengers of the MMTC bus, Edward Campos and Enrico Bantique Estupigan, testified for the prosecution that the bus was running at 70 to 80 kilometers per hour when it swerved to the right to avoid hitting a van stranded at the left side of the island, but in the process hit and bumped the Gemini in front of it; the rear portion of the Gemini was smashed and its front damaged when it hit the Lancer car running ahead. The bus driver fled from the scene.

Olimpio, testifying for the defense, stated that he had been a driver since 1976, had worked as a truck driver in Mindanao and with Silangan Transit up to 1981, and had been employed by Metro Manila Transit from 1981 onward, holding a professional driver's license. On 10 July 1989, he drove an MMTC bus from Monumento to Baclaran and back, and at about 7:00 to 8:00 P.M., while traveling along EDSA toward Monumento, his bus was involved in an accident in front of 680 Appliances. According to him, it was drizzling; his bus was running at 70 kilometers per hour along the third lane of EDSA, while an Isuzu Gemini ahead of him was on his left side along the second lane about 30 meters away. When the car was about 20 meters away and before reaching a stalled vehicle, it swerved to the right without a signal light; he blew his horn and stepped on his brakes, but because the street was downhill, raining, and slippery, his brakes failed to control the bus, which hit and bumped the Gemini. He reported to their garage after the accident, left his vehicle, and returned to the scene with a wrecker; the passengers of the Isuzu car were brought to the hospital.

The defense also presented Milagros Garbo, MMTC's training officer, who testified on the company's procedure for hiring applicant drivers and the requirements they must submit, including passing an interview, seminars, written examination, actual driving test, psycho-physical test, road test, line familiarization test, defensive driving seminar, driver's familiarization seminar, and traffic rules and environment seminar, as well as submitting an NBI Clearance, Residence Certificate, Professional Driver's License, and Official Receipts of payment of required fees. Nenita Amado, a transport supervisor of MMTC, testified on the company's internal controls for supervising its drivers, including ten comptrollers, thirty-six dispatchers, seven field supervisors, sixty inspectors, and four service wreckers, as well as a centralized radio system monitoring drivers during travel; she instructed drivers to avoid accidents, obey traffic rules and regulations, and be courteous to passengers.

The trial court found that Olimpio drove the bus in a negligent manner, and the Court of Appeals upheld this finding, crediting the testimonies of the bus passengers Edward and Enrico and holding that the MMTC bus was the one switching lanes.

• Findings of Fact: Petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in sustaining the trial court's findings of fact instead of considering certain facts and circumstances that properly cast an element of reasonable doubt.
• Negligence of Carlos Berba: Petitioners maintained that Carlos was the one negligent because he switched to the lane where Olimpio was driving without first blinking his signal light and with his car only 20 meters away from the bus, and that they should not be held responsible for Carlos' negligence.
• Due Diligence in Selection and Supervision: Petitioners asserted that the testimonies of Milagros Garbo and Nenita Amado, as well as Exhibits 1 to 15, proved that MMTC exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its drivers.
• Non-Subsidiary Liability and Estoppel: Petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that MMTC was not subsidiarily liable for Olimpio's civil liability, and contested the appellate court's ruling that MMTC was estopped for failing to appeal seasonably.

• Negligence and Findings of Fact: Whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in sustaining the trial court's findings of fact instead of considering certain facts and circumstances that properly cast an element of reasonable doubt.
• Estoppel and Subsidiary Liability: Whether estoppel applies to MMTC.

• Negligence and Findings of Fact: No. Negligence is a question of fact, and the Court of Appeals' affirmance of the trial court's factual findings is binding absent palpable error; Olimpio, a professional public utility driver, was negligent in driving too fast on a slippery, downhill road.
• Estoppel and Subsidiary Liability: The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that MMTC was estopped, since MMTC appealed the civil aspect of the case on 8 March 1993; nonetheless, due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is not a defense under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, and MMTC's subsidiary liability cannot be enforced absent proof of Olimpio's insolvency and a final judgment of conviction.

• Negligence and Findings of Fact: The issue of whether a person is negligent is a question of fact. Findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, when they affirm the findings of fact of the trial court, are binding on the Supreme Court unless the findings of the trial and appellate courts are palpably unsupported by the evidence on record or unless the judgment itself is based on a misapprehension of facts. No such reversible error was committed. Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code defines reckless imprudence as voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution, taking into consideration the person's employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time, and place. Olimpio, a professional driver employed by MMTC since 1984, should have as his primary concern the safety not only of himself and his passengers but also of his fellow motorists. Because it had just rained, was still drizzling, and the road was slippery, he should have been more cautious and prudent. He admitted driving at 70 kilometers per hour, and having testified that he was familiar with the road, he ought to have known the downhill slope coming from Nepa-Q Mart and should have slowed down, since a downhill drive would naturally cause his vehicle to accelerate; instead, he admitted he was "running very fast." That the bus traveled a further 20 meters after he stepped on the brake, and that the car was thrown 10 to 15 meters away after it was hit, only proved that the bus was running very fast. His claim that Carlos suddenly transferred to his lane could hardly carry the day, because at a distance of 20 meters he still had the opportunity to avoid the collision by slowing down or stepping on the brake, yet he continued running very fast. Edward's declarations that "the bus was running very fast" and that Olimpio did not see the stranded van because he earlier overtook another bus were clear and categorical, and no ill or improper motive on Edward's part was shown; he was not related to the complainants, and the defense did not even try to rebut his testimony. When there is nothing to indicate that a witness was actuated by improper motives, his positive and categorical declarations on the witness stand under solemn oath deserve full faith and credit.
• Estoppel and Subsidiary Liability: The Court of Appeals' statement that MMTC failed to appeal seasonably the issue of its alleged non-subsidiary liability was incorrect, since the Notice of Appeal filed with the trial court on 8 March 1993 expressly interposed an appeal as to the civil aspect of the case on the ground of MMTC's subsidiary liability as employer of the accused under the Revised Penal Code. However, due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is not a defense in the present case. The governing law is Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Articles 100 and 102, which provides that the subsidiary liability established in the preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties. Pursuant to Article 103, an employer may be subsidiarily liable for the employee's civil liability in a criminal action when there is adequate evidence establishing (1) that he is indeed the employer of the convicted employee; (2) that he is engaged in some kind of industry; (3) that the employee committed the offense in the discharge of his duties; and (4) that the execution against the employee has not been satisfied due to insolvency. Articles 102 and 103 are deemed written into judgments in cases to which they are applicable, so the trial court need not expressly pronounce the employer's subsidiary liability in the dispositive portion, and such liability arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal action. Here, an employer-employee relationship exists between petitioners, MMTC is engaged in the transportation industry, and Olimpio was adjudged guilty of a wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties. However, there is no proof of Olimpio's insolvency, and the judgment of conviction against him has not attained finality, so no writ of execution can issue against him to satisfy his civil liability. Only after proof of the accused-employee's insolvency may the subsidiary liability of his employer be enforced. Even if it appears prima facie that execution against the employee cannot be satisfied, execution against the employer will not issue as a matter of course; the procedure for the enforcement of judgment must be followed. Once the judgment of conviction becomes final and executory, and after the writ of execution issued against the employee is returned unsatisfied because of his insolvency, only then can a subsidiary writ of execution be issued against MMTC after a hearing set for that precise purpose. It was still too early to hold MMTC subsidiarily liable with its accused-employee.

• Negligence as a question of fact — Whether a person is negligent is a question of fact. Findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, when they affirm the findings of fact of the trial court, are binding on the Supreme Court unless the findings of the trial and appellate courts are palpably unsupported by the evidence on record or unless the judgment itself is based on a misapprehension of facts. The Court applied this rule in declining to disturb the concurrent findings that Olimpio drove negligently.
• Reckless imprudence under Article 365, Revised Penal Code — Reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration (1) his employment or occupation; (2) his degree of intelligence; (3) his physical condition; and (4) other circumstances regarding persons, time, and place. The Court applied these factors to Olimpio as a professional public utility driver who drove too fast on a slippery, downhill road.
• Subsidiary civil liability of employers under Article 103, Revised Penal Code — An employer may be subsidiarily liable for the employee's civil liability in a criminal action when there is adequate evidence establishing (1) that he is indeed the employer of the convicted employee; (2) that he is engaged in some kind of industry; (3) that the employee committed the offense in the discharge of his duties; and (4) that the execution against the employee has not been satisfied due to insolvency. The Court enumerated these requisites and found the first three present but the fourth unproven.
• Due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is not a defense under Article 103 — The Court held that due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is not a defense in a case governed by Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Articles 100 and 102, notwithstanding the defense evidence on MMTC's hiring and supervision procedures.
• Subsidiary liability arises only after final conviction and proof of insolvency — The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability (Articles 102 and 103) are deemed written into judgments in cases to which they are applicable, so the trial court need not expressly pronounce the employer's subsidiary liability in the dispositive portion. The subsidiary liability of the employer arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal action, and may be enforced only after the judgment of conviction becomes final and executory and the writ of execution issued against the employee is returned unsatisfied because of his insolvency, after a hearing set for that precise purpose.

• "The issue of whether a person is negligent is a question of fact." — States the standard of review that governed the Court's refusal to disturb the concurrent factual findings of the trial and appellate courts on Olimpio's negligence.
• "As a public utility driver, Olimpio should have as his primary concern the safety not only of himself or of his passengers, but, also the safety of his fellow motorists." — Articulates the heightened duty of care owed by a professional public utility driver, which the Court used to measure Olimpio's conduct under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
• "Pursuant to Article 103, an employer may be subsidiarily liable for the employee's civil liability in a criminal action when there is adequate evidence establishing (1) that he is indeed the employer of the convicted employee; (2) that he is engaged in some kind of industry; (3) that the employee committed the offense in the discharge of his duties; and (4) that the execution against the employee has not been satisfied due to insolvency." — Canonical formulation of the four requisites for an employer's subsidiary civil liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.
• "Only after proof of the accused-employee's insolvency may the subsidiary liability of his employer be enforced." — States the ratio decidendi on the timing of the employer's subsidiary liability, which the Court held was not yet enforceable in this case.

• Thermochem Incorporated vs. Naval, G.R. No. 131541, 20 October 2000, 344 SCRA 76 — Cited for the rule that the issue of whether a person is negligent is a question of fact.
• China Airlines, Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129988, 14 July 2003, 406 SCRA 113 — Cited, along with Romago Electric, Austria, and Halili, for the rule that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals affirming those of the trial court are binding on the Supreme Court absent palpable error or misapprehension of facts.
• People vs. Balili, G.R. No. 125908, 5 September 2002, 388 SCRA 376 — Cited, along with People vs. Gonzales and People vs. Quening, for the rule that a witness's positive and categorical declarations under solemn oath deserve full faith and credit absent any indication of improper motive.
• Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. People, G.R. No. 147703, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA 456 — Cited for the rule that the provisions on subsidiary liability are deemed written into judgments and that the trial court need not expressly pronounce the employer's subsidiary liability, and for the rule that only after proof of the accused-employee's insolvency may the employer's subsidiary liability be enforced.
• Baza Marketing Corporation vs. Bolinao Security and Investigation Service, Inc., 202 Phil. 478 (1982) — Cited, along with Joaquin vs. Aniceto, for the requisites of an employer's subsidiary liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Alvarez vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-59621, 23 February 1988, 158 SCRA 57 — Cited for the rule that the subsidiary liability of the employer arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal action, and for the rule that the trial court need not expressly pronounce such liability.
• Carpio vs. Doroja, G.R. No. 84516, 5 December 1989, 180 SCRA 1 — Cited, along with Alvarez and Pajarito vs. Señeris, for the rule that the employer's subsidiary liability arises only after conviction of the employee.
• Ozoa vs. Vda. De Madula, No. L-62955, 22 December 1987, 156 SCRA 779 — Cited for the rule that even if it appears prima facie that execution against the employee cannot be satisfied, execution against the employer will not issue as a matter of course, and that the procedure for enforcement of judgment must be followed.
• People vs. Jubail, G.R. No. 143718, 19 May 2004, 428 SCRA 478 — Cited, along with People vs. Saludes and People vs. Melendres, Jr., for the rule that in criminal cases an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned, or reverse the trial court's decision on grounds other than those raised as errors.

• Article 365, Revised Penal Code — Defines reckless imprudence as voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution, taking into consideration the offender's employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time, and place; applied to Olimpio as a professional public utility driver.
• Article 103, Revised Penal Code — Provides that the subsidiary liability established in the preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties; the Court applied it to hold that MMTC's subsidiary liability was not yet enforceable absent proof of Olimpio's insolvency.
• Article 100, Revised Penal Code — Provides that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable; cited in relation to Article 103.
• Article 102, Revised Penal Code — Establishes the subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and proprietors of establishments; cited in relation to Article 103.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — The procedural basis for the petition for review filed with the Supreme Court.

Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.