Panganiban vs. Oamil

A vendee of a co-owner's undivided interest in commonly owned property acquires only the rights of the vendor-co-owner, and the effect of the transfer is limited to the specific portion awarded to the vendor upon partition; a court trying an ordinary civil action for specific performance cannot override a final and executory partition decree by awarding a different portion of the property.

Partenio Rombaua and his deceased first wife Juliana acquired during their marriage a 409-square-meter commercial parcel of land in Olongapo City. Upon Juliana's death in 1976, the property became subject to co-ownership: one-half belonged to Partenio as his conjugal share, and the remaining half was owned pro indiviso by Partenio and his five children (the petitioners) as surviving heirs, each holding a one-sixth share. The property was physically divided into two portions of 204.5 square meters each — one facing 21st Street and the other facing Canda Street. A judicial partition case (Special Civil Action No. 340-0-86) was filed by the petitioners against Partenio to annul an extrajudicial partition and settle the respective shares. Separately, on May 17, 1990, Partenio executed an "Agreement to Sell" with respondent Julita Oamil, purporting to sell his conjugal share in the same property.

Partenio Rombaua and his deceased first wife Juliana acquired during their marriage a 409-square-meter commercial parcel of land located at No. 11 21st Street, East Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City. Juliana died in 1976. The property thus became subject to co-ownership: one-half belonged to Partenio as his conjugal share, and the remaining half was owned pro indiviso by Partenio and his five children — Julita Rombaua Panganiban, Paquito Rombaua, Ruperto Rombaua, Teresita Rombaua Telaje, and Leonor Rombaua Opiana (the petitioners) — as surviving heirs of Juliana, each holding a one-sixth share in that half. The property was physically divided into two portions of 204.5 square meters each: one facing 21st Street and the other facing Canda Street.

On May 17, 1990, Partenio executed an "Agreement to Sell" with respondent Julita S. Oamil, purporting to sell his conjugal share in the property. Respondent was aware at the time of the execution that the property was conjugal property owned in common by Partenio and the heirs of his deceased wife. Separately, the petitioners had filed a judicial partition case against Partenio (Special Civil Action No. 340-0-86) before the RTC of Olongapo City, Branch 75, seeking to annul an extrajudicial partition and settlement. On July 31, 1990, the partition court rendered a decision declaring Partenio and Juliana conjugal owners of the entire property and ordering its partition, specifically awarding Partenio the Canda St. portion as his conjugal share. This decision was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals on March 31, 1995, and became final and executory with entry of judgment on May 29, 1995.

On April 26, 1993, respondent Oamil filed a complaint for specific performance with damages against Partenio before the RTC of Olongapo City, Branch 73, docketed as Civil Case No. 140-0-93, praying that Partenio be ordered to execute a final deed of sale over his conjugal share. Partenio was declared in default for failure to file an answer, and respondent presented her evidence ex parte. On December 26, 1993, the trial court rendered judgment ordering Partenio to execute a deed of absolute sale over the ½ front portion of the property in favor of respondent, without specifying whether this referred to the 21st St. portion or the Canda St. portion. The decision became final and executory on February 4, 1994, and a writ of execution was issued, resulting in the transfer of the tax declaration covering the 21st St. portion to respondent's name.

In June 1994, the petitioners filed a verified petition for relief from the trial court's decision, arguing that their interests as co-owners were being litigated in the pending partition case and that they were unjustly deprived of the opportunity to defend their interests because they were not impleaded despite being indispensable parties. The trial court denied the petition for relief on January 13, 1995, holding that petitioners were not indispensable parties since the proceedings involved only Partenio's conjugal share. The parties agreed to defer the proceedings pending the resolution of the appeal in the partition case. Meanwhile, in 1995, one Sotero Gan filed a motion for leave to file a complaint in intervention, claiming to have purchased Partenio's conjugal share and to have a deed of waiver and quitclaim executed by Partenio in his favor. The trial court denied Gan's motion as filed out of time, the decision having become final in February 1994.

On October 23, 1997, the trial court denied both Gan's motion for reconsideration and the petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the January 13, 1995 order. Critically, in the same order, the trial court substantially modified its December 26, 1993 decision by awarding specifically the 21st St. portion to Partenio as his conjugal share — directly contradicting the final and executory partition decree in Special Civil Action No. 340-0-86, which had awarded the Canda St. portion to Partenio. Petitioners and Gan interposed separate appeals to the Court of Appeals. On March 2, 2001, the appellate court affirmed in toto the trial court's October 23, 1997 order, sustaining the award of the 21st St. portion to respondent on the ground that petitioners had acknowledged Partenio's "acts of ownership" over that portion, signifying consent. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied on July 10, 2001.

• Right to Intervene as Co-owners: Petitioners maintained that as co-owners of the subject property by virtue of succession to the rights of their deceased mother, they are indispensable parties in Civil Case No. 140-0-93 and possess an interest that must be protected.
• Binding Effect of Partition Decree: Petitioners argued that the final and executory decision in Special Civil Action No. 340-0-86, which awarded the Canda St. portion to Partenio as his conjugal share, should be respected and that the trial court could not award a different portion in the specific performance case.
• Lack of Jurisdiction to Partition: Petitioners contended that the trial court in Civil Case No. 140-0-93, being a court trying an ordinary civil suit, had no jurisdiction to act as a partition court or to effect a partial division of the property without the participation of all co-owners.

• Grounds for Relief Not Available: Respondent argued that the grounds stated by petitioners for relief from judgment are not included in the enumeration under Section 2, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.
• Petitioners Not Indispensable Parties: Respondent contended that petitioners are not indispensable parties because the subject matter of the proceedings involves only Partenio's conjugal share in the property.
• Acts of Ownership as Consent: Respondent argued that petitioners had always acknowledged Partenio's acts of ownership over the 21st St. portion, thereby signifying their consent and barring them from questioning the award of that portion.

• Co-ownership and Intervention: Whether petitioners, as co-owners of the subject property, can intervene in the proceedings in Civil Case No. 140-0-93 in order to protect their rights.
• Conclusiveness of Partition Decree: Whether the final and executory decision in Special Civil Action No. 340-0-86, awarding the Canda St. portion to Partenio, is conclusive and binding on the specific performance case and precludes the trial court from awarding the 21st St. portion instead.
• Jurisdiction to Partition: Whether the trial court in an ordinary civil action for specific performance had jurisdiction to effectively partition the co-owned property by awarding a specific portion to respondent.

• Co-ownership and Intervention: Yes. Petitioners are entitled to relief because their rights as co-owners were transgressed when the trial court disregarded the final partition decree and awarded a specific portion of the property contrary to what had been adjudicated.
• Conclusiveness of Partition Decree: Yes. The final and executory partition decree awarding the Canda St. portion to Partenio became the law of the case and is binding on the parties and their successors-in-interest, including respondent, who did not intervene or oppose the partition despite knowledge of its pendency.
• Jurisdiction to Partition: No. The trial court in an ordinary civil action for specific performance had no jurisdiction to act as a partition court; it could only determine the rights and obligations of the parties with respect to Partenio's undivided share and could not subject the property to a partial division without the participation of all co-owners.

• Co-ownership and Intervention: Under a co-ownership, no individual can claim title to any definite portion of the community property until partition. Before partition, a co-owner has absolute ownership of his undivided interest and is free to alienate, assign, or mortgage it, but the effect of any such transfer is limited to the portion which may be awarded to him upon partition. Petitioners, as co-owners by succession, had an interest in the property that was directly affected when the trial court awarded the 21st St. portion — which included their undivided shares — to respondent. The trial court's refusal to abide by the partition decree unnecessarily transgressed petitioners' rights, entitling them to relief.

• Conclusiveness of Partition Decree: The decision in Special Civil Action No. 340-0-86 determined what Partenio, and ultimately respondent as his successor-in-interest, was entitled to. As Partenio's successor-in-interest, respondent could not acquire any superior right than what Partenio could transfer after partition. A vendee of co-owned property merely steps into the shoes of the vendor-co-owner. Respondent knew as early as May 17, 1990 that the property was conjugal property owned in common, and she was apprised of the pendency of the partition case during the specific performance proceedings. Yet she did not intervene, take part, or enter any formal opposition in the partition proceedings, despite the rights granted her under Article 497 of the Civil Code. She unconditionally agreed to the suspension of the specific performance case pending the resolution of the partition appeal. When the partition decision became final without respondent having questioned it, the division of property decreed therein could no longer be impugned by her. The principle of conclusiveness of judgments bars relitigation of the same issue between the parties and their privies, requiring only identity of issues, not identity of cause of action.

• Jurisdiction to Partition: The trial court in Civil Case No. 140-0-93 was not a partition court but one litigating an ordinary civil case. It could only award to respondent whatever specific portion Partenio was found entitled to in the event of partition, in accordance with Article 493 of the Civil Code and the procedure outlined in the Rules of Court. It could not, in an ordinary proceeding for specific performance, subject the property to a partial division or partition without the knowledge and participation of the other co-owners, and while a special civil action for partition was simultaneously pending. All evidence of alleged acts of ownership by one co-owner should have been presented in the partition case, not in the specific performance case. The trial court's suspension of proceedings to await the partition outcome indicated its intent to abide by the partition decree, yet it ultimately disregarded that decree entirely.

• Conclusiveness of Judgments — A fact or question that was in issue in a former suit and was judicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to that action and persons in privity with them are concerned, and cannot again be litigated in any future action between such parties or their privies. Identity of cause of action is not required; merely identity of issues is sufficient. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the partition decree awarding the Canda St. portion to Partenio was conclusive on respondent as Partenio's successor-in-interest, precluding the trial court from awarding the 21st St. portion instead.

• Nature of Co-ownership Rights Before Partition — During the existence of a co-ownership, no individual can claim title to any definite portion of the community property until partition. A co-owner has absolute ownership of his undivided interest and may alienate, assign, or mortgage it, but the effect of such transfer is limited to the portion which may be awarded to him upon partition. The Court applied this principle to hold that Partenio could sell his undivided interest to respondent, but only to the extent of the portion ultimately adjudicated to him in the partition case — the Canda St. portion.

• Rights of Assignees in Partition (Article 497, Civil Code) — In the event of a division or partition of property owned in common, assignees of one or more of the co-owners may take part in the division and object to its being effected without their concurrence, but they cannot impugn any partition already executed absent fraud or formal opposition. The Court noted that respondent, as assignee of Partenio's share, failed to exercise these rights in the partition proceedings, and thus could no longer challenge the final partition decree.

• Jurisdictional Limitation of Ordinary Civil Courts — A trial court trying an ordinary civil action cannot resolve to perform acts pertaining to a special proceeding, such as partition, because the latter is subject to specific prescribed rules. The Court held that the trial court in the specific performance case had no jurisdiction to act as a partition court or to effect a partial division of co-owned property.

• "In a contract of sale of co-owned property, what the vendee obtains by virtue of such a sale are the same rights as the vendor had as co-owner, and the vendee merely steps into the shoes of the vendor as co-owner." — This passage articulates the fundamental principle limiting a buyer's rights in a sale of co-owned property: the vendee acquires no greater rights than the vendor-co-owner had, and the transfer's effect is limited to the portion the vendor receives upon partition.

• "The spring may not rise higher than its source." — This metaphor encapsulates the rule that respondent, as successor-in-interest to Partenio, could not acquire rights superior to those Partenio held; she was bound by the same limitations on his conjugal share as determined in the partition decree.

• "[A] fact or question which was in issue in a former suit and was there judicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to that action and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while the judgment remains unreversed by proper authority." — This is the canonical formulation of the conclusiveness of judgments doctrine as applied in this case, establishing that identity of issues — not identity of cause of action — is the controlling requirement.

• City of Mandaluyong vs. Aguilar, G.R. No. 137152, January 29, 2001 — Cited for the principle that during co-ownership, no co-owner can claim title to any definite portion until partition, and that a co-owner's alienation of his undivided interest is limited to the portion awarded to him upon partition.
• Del Campo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108228, February 1, 2001 — Cited for the rule that a vendee of co-owned property steps into the shoes of the vendor-co-owner and obtains the same rights the vendor had.
• Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 (1991) — Cited within the conclusiveness of judgments formulation for the proposition that identity of issues — not identity of cause of action — is essential for a former judgment to be conclusive in a subsequent action.
• Natcher vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 133000, October 2, 2001 — Cited for the principle that trial courts trying an ordinary action cannot perform acts pertaining to a special proceeding, as the latter is governed by specific prescribed rules.
• Looyuko vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 102696, 102716, 108257 & 120954, July 12, 2001 — Cited for the rule that intervention, being merely collateral or ancillary to the principal action, may no longer be allowed in a case already terminated by final judgment.

• Article 493, Civil Code — Provides that each co-owner has full ownership of his part and the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and may alienate, assign, or mortgage it, except when personal rights are involved; but the effect of the alienation or mortgage with respect to the co-owners is limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon termination of the co-ownership. Applied to establish that Partenio could sell his undivided interest but only to the extent of the portion awarded to him upon partition.
• Article 497, Civil Code — Provides that assignees of co-owners may take part in the division of the thing owned in common and object to its being effected without their concurrence, but cannot impugn any partition already executed absent fraud or formal opposition. Applied to show that respondent, as assignee of Partenio's share, had the right to participate in the partition proceedings but failed to do so, and thus could no longer challenge the final partition decree.
• Section 2, Rule 38, Rules of Court — Enumerates the grounds for relief from judgment. Referenced by respondent in arguing that petitioners' stated grounds for relief were not among those enumerated.

Justices Austria-Martinez, Corona, Nachura, and Reyes concurred. (Justice Corona sat in lieu of Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario, per Special Order No. 484 dated January 11, 2008.)